Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-09-30 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

LAMASHTU Ransomware Gang: 10 New Leak-Site Listings — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

Executive Summary

On 2026-09-30, ransomware.live monitoring observed LAMASHTU publish 10 new listings on its dark web leak site. Every listing was independently observed by a second crawler, which corroborates that the criminal actor made the claim; it does not corroborate that any named organization was breached. The claimed set spans healthcare, manufacturing, energy and utilities, transportation, financial services, technology, one uncategorized listing and one listing with sector not found. Geographically, Germany dominates with five listings, followed by Italy, the United States, France and Australia, with one organization lacking country attribution.

Named organizations listed by LAMASHTU are: Dr Damiel Pugliese, Astidental di Sabbione, Vinco Energy, Becker Logistik, Wilhelm Kühne, FIDUCIAL, Virtual Ideas, PROJAHN, Altmannshofer Sicherheits-Videotechnik and GERLON. Security Arsenal is not stating that these organizations were attacked, hit, breached or are managing an active incident. Treat the listings as accusations that require validation, outreach where appropriate, and defensive hunting.

Defensive emphasis for the next 24-72 hours: patch the actively exploited edge and management-plane CVEs listed below, confirm no internet-exposed RDP or legacy VPN paths, disable Office macro execution paths, and hunt for pre-encryption staging such as 7-Zip or Rclone archive creation, abnormal cloud egress, PsExec or WMI lateral movement, new services, Volume Shadow Copy deletion and backup tampering.

Sourcing & Verification

• Corroboration posture: 10 of 10 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler; 0 appear on a single source only.
• Meaning of corroboration: MULTI-SOURCE means two independent crawlers saw the gang post the claim. Inclusion reflects the threat actor's claim and is NOT confirmation of a breach.
• Disputes and silence: a named organization may dispute a listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false. Disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction, contract and sector; not every incident is reportable, so neither silence nor denial settles the question.
• Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — LAMASHTU

• Aliases: none are confirmed in the dataset available to this briefing. Treat alias claims from secondary reposts as unverified until tied to cryptographic proof, infrastructure overlap or moderator statements.
• Operating model: not established. The broad cross-sector, multi-country burst is consistent with either an affiliate-driven RaaS model or a closed group purchasing access; defenders should plan for both.
• Ransom economics: no reliable demand range is established here. Planning assumption for enterprise risk modeling: double extortion with a demand scaled to perceived revenue, cyber-insurance posture, regulatory exposure and sensitivity of stolen data.
• Likely initial access themes: unconfirmed for LAMASHTU specifically, but the current ransomware playbook emphasizes edge-device exploitation, SSL VPN and firewall flaws, exposed RDP, valid-account abuse, phishing with macro or script execution, and occasional supply-chain or developer-tool compromise.
• Extortion approach: assume double extortion — steal first, encrypt later, threaten publication on a leak site, then pressure via countdown timers and partial data teasers.
• Dwell time: not established for this actor. Use a defensive assumption of days to weeks from initial access to detonation, with the highest-signal window occurring shortly before encryption when staging, credential dumping and backup discovery accelerate.
• Known toolset to hunt generically: valid accounts, VPN or RDP persistence, PowerShell, Windows Management Instrumentation, PsExec-like service execution, Cobalt Strike-style beacons, 7-Zip or Rar archiving, Rclone or similar cloud sync tools, vssadmin or WMI shadow-copy deletion, bcdedit recovery tampering and backup-console discovery.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sectors being targeted

From the 10 listings: manufacturing appears three times via Astidental di Sabbione, Wilhelm Kühne and Altmannshofer Sicherheits-Videotechnik; healthcare appears once via Dr Damiel Pugliese; energy and utilities once via Vinco Energy; transportation once via Becker Logistik; financial services once via FIDUCIAL; technology once via Virtual Ideas; other once via PROJAHN; and GERLON is listed with sector not found. This is not proof of compromise in any sector; it is the actor's claimed targeting spread.

Geographic concentration

Germany is the concentration point with five listings: Becker Logistik, Wilhelm Kühne, PROJAHN, Altmannshofer Sicherheits-Videotechnik and GERLON. Italy, the United States, France and Australia each have one listing. Dr Damiel Pugliese has country attribution not provided in the source data. The pattern suggests a DACH-weighted or European industrial-services emphasis with opportunistic reach into the US and Australia.

Victim profile

The listed organizations appear mostly regional or mid-market industrial, logistics, professional-services and technology entities rather than global mega-enterprises. Revenue should be treated as unknown unless independently verified; for planning, assume small-to-mid enterprise through mid-market ranges, roughly tens of millions to low hundreds of millions in annual revenue depending on sector. The mix of manufacturing, logistics, energy and healthcare claims is consistent with pressure operations that maximize operational downtime, safety sensitivity, regulatory exposure and data confidentiality.

Posting frequency and escalation pattern

All 10 listings carry the same publication date, 2026-09-30. That is a single-day burst, not enough to establish a sustained cadence, but it is operationally relevant because simultaneous multi-sector claims often follow either a batch of access broker purchases, an affiliate push, or a leak-site queue release. Escalation indicators to watch next: repeated listings for the same organizations, publication of sample archives, countdown timer changes, added proof files, and cross-posting to Telegram or criminal forums.

CVE connection — hypothesis only, not victim-specific

No evidence in this dataset ties any named organization to a specific CVE, and Security Arsenal is not asserting an initial-access vector for any listed organization. At sector level, the following CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities entries are confirmed ransomware-used exposure classes that defenders should treat as urgent where present: CVE-2026-59310 affecting Broadcom VMware vCenter; CVE-2026-63077 affecting JetBrains TeamCity; CVE-2026-20316 affecting Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center; CVE-2026-50751 affecting Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 authentication; and CVE-2026-50751-adjacent supply-chain risk represented by CVE-2026-48027 affecting Nx Console. The hypothesis to test is that internet-facing management planes, virtualization control planes, CI/CD systems and developer endpoints create efficient paths into healthcare, manufacturing, energy, logistics and financial environments.

Detection Engineering

Sigma rules:

---
title: LAMASHTU Playbook - Office Macro or Mail Client Spawning Script and Shell Tooling
id: 9c2d4b2a-7f0a-4c1f-9d2a-lamashtu00001
status: experimental
description: Detects common ransomware initial-access execution where Office or mail processes spawn script interpreters, encoded commands or LOLBins. Use with environment tuning.
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/09/30
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - winword.exe
      - excel.exe
      - powerpnt.exe
      - outlook.exe
      - msaccess.exe
  selection_child:
    Image|endswith:
      - powershell.exe
      - pwsh.exe
      - cmd.exe
      - wscript.exe
      - cscript.exe
      - mshta.exe
      - rundll32.exe
      - regsvr32.exe
      - msiexec.exe
  selection_suspicious:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - -enc
      - encodedcommand
      - downloadstring
      - frombase64string
      - hidden
      - bypass
      - iex
      - start-process
  filter_known_good:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - microsoft office
      - trustedinstaller
  condition: selection_parent and selection_child and 1 of selection_suspicious* and not filter_known_good
fields:
  - Computer
  - User
  - ParentImage
  - Image
  - CommandLine
  - ParentCommandLine
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative automation launched from Office templates
level: high
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1566
  - attack.t1059
  - attack.t1204
---
title: LAMASHTU Playbook - External RDP or Remote Interactive Logon From Non Private Space
id: 9c2d4b2a-7f0a-4c1f-9d2a-lamashtu00002
status: experimental
description: Detects successful remote interactive logons from public IP space, a common precursor to hands-on ransomware deployment after VPN or RDP exposure.
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/09/30
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
  definition: Windows Security Event 4624
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4624
    LogonType: 10
  filter_private:
    IpAddress|startswith:
      - '10.'
      - '172.16.'
      - '172.17.'
      - '172.18.'
      - '172.19.'
      - '172.20.'
      - '172.21.'
      - '172.22.'
      - '172.23.'
      - '172.24.'
      - '172.25.'
      - '172.26.'
      - '172.27.'
      - '172.28.'
      - '172.29.'
      - '172.30.'
      - '172.31.'
      - '192.168.'
      - '127.'
  filter_allowed:
    IpAddress|startswith:
      - '203.0.113.'
  condition: selection and not filter_private and not filter_allowed
fields:
  - Computer
  - TargetUserName
  - IpAddress
  - WorkstationName
  - AuthenticationPackageName
falsepositives:
  - Jump hosts with documented public ingress
  - Managed service provider access
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1133
  - attack.t1078
  - attack.t1021.001
---
title: LAMASHTU Playbook - Pre Encryption Staging Exfiltration and Shadow Copy Tampering
id: 9c2d4b2a-7f0a-4c1f-9d2a-lamashtu00003
status: experimental
description: Detects archive creation, cloud sync tooling, lateral movement helpers and recovery tampering frequently observed immediately before ransomware detonation.
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/09/30
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_archive:
    Image|endswith:
      - 7z.exe
      - 7zg.exe
      - rar.exe
      - winrar.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' a '
      - ' -p'
      - ' -r'
      - ' -v'
  selection_exfil:
    Image|endswith:
      - rclone.exe
      - megacmd.exe
      - azcopy.exe
      - aws.exe
      - gcloud.exe
      - rsync.exe
  selection_lateral:
    Image|endswith:
      - psexec.exe
      - psexesvc.exe
      - wmic.exe
      - winrm.cmd
      - powershell.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '\\'
      - ' invoke-command'
      - ' enter-pssession'
      - ' wmic '
      - ' process call create'
  selection_impact:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'vssadmin delete shadows'
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'shadowcopy delete'
      - 'bcdedit'
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
      - 'bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures'
      - 'wbadmin delete backup'
  condition: 1 of selection_archive* or 1 of selection_exfil* or selection_lateral or selection_impact
fields:
  - Computer
  - User
  - Image
  - CommandLine
  - ParentImage
  - ParentCommandLine
falsepositives:
  - Backup software, software distribution and administrators packaging release files
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1560
  - attack.t1567
  - attack.t1490
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1021

KQL hunt query for Microsoft Sentinel:

let lookback = 7d;
let suspicious_procs = dynamic(['powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','cmd.exe','wscript.exe','cscript.exe','mshta.exe','rundll32.exe','psexec.exe','psexesvc.exe','wmic.exe','rclone.exe','7z.exe','rar.exe','vssadmin.exe','bcdedit.exe','wbadmin.exe']);
let remote_logons =
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 10
  | extend IsPrivate = IpAddress startswith '10.' or IpAddress startswith '192.168.' or IpAddress startswith '172.16.' or IpAddress startswith '172.17.' or IpAddress startswith '172.18.' or IpAddress startswith '172.19.' or IpAddress startswith '172.20.' or IpAddress startswith '172.21.' or IpAddress startswith '172.22.' or IpAddress startswith '172.23.' or IpAddress startswith '172.24.' or IpAddress startswith '172.25.' or IpAddress startswith '172.26.' or IpAddress startswith '172.27.' or IpAddress startswith '172.28.' or IpAddress startswith '172.29.' or IpAddress startswith '172.30.' or IpAddress startswith '172.31.'
  | where IsPrivate == false
  | summarize RdpSuccesses=count(), FirstRdp=min(TimeGenerated), LastRdp=max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, TargetUserName, IpAddress;
let new_services =
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventID == 7045
  | summarize NewServices=count(), Services=make_set(ServiceName) by Computer, Account;
let proc =
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventID == 4688
  | extend Proc = tostring(split(ProcessName,'.') [0]) + '.exe'
  | where Proc in~ (suspicious_procs)
  | summarize SuspiciousProcessCount=count(), Commands=make_set(CommandLine) by Computer, AccountName;
remote_logons
| join kind=leftouter new_services on Computer
| join kind=leftouter proc on $left.Computer == $right.Computer
| extend Score = RdpSuccesses + NewServices*3 + SuspiciousProcessCount
| where Score >= 5
| project Computer, TargetUserName, IpAddress, RdpSuccesses, FirstRdp, LastRdp, NewServices, Services, SuspiciousProcessCount, Score, Commands
| order by Score desc;

PowerShell rapid-response collection script:

$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$out = Join-Path $env:TEMP ('ransom-precheck-' + (Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd-HHmmss') + '.csv')
$rdp = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections
$nla = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -Name UserAuthentication
$listener = Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen | Select-Object -First 1
$tasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, Author
$services = Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.Created -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } | Select-Object Name, DisplayName, PathName, StartName, State
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy | Select-Object ID, InstallDate, VolumeName, DeviceObject
$shadowStorage = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowStorage | Select-Object Volume, UsedSpace, AllocatedSpace, MaxSpace
$result = [pscustomobject]@{
  Hostname = $env:COMPUTERNAME
  RdpDisabledValue = $rdp.fDenyTSConnections
  RdpListenerPresent = [bool]$listener
  NlaValue = $nla.UserAuthentication
  RecentScheduledTasks = ($tasks | ConvertTo-Json -Compress)
  RecentServices = ($services | ConvertTo-Json -Compress)
  ShadowCopyCount = ($shadows | Measure-Object).Count
  ShadowStorage = ($shadowStorage | ConvertTo-Json -Compress)
  CollectedUtc = (Get-Date).ToUniversalTime()
}
$result | Export-Csv -Path $out -NoTypeInformation
Write-Output $out

Incident Response Priorities

T-minus detection checklist: before encryption fires

• Authentication edge: spikes in Windows Security 4625 followed by 4624, impossible travel, VPN logons outside change windows, new VPN accounts, disabled MFA, logons from hosting providers or TOR exits, and RDP LogonType 10 from public IP space.
• Identity control plane: new Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, local administrators, GPO changes, suspicious DCSync-style replication, Kerberos ticket anomalies, and unexpected ADFS or SSO signing changes.
• Execution and lateral movement: Office or Outlook spawning PowerShell, cmd, mshta, wscript or rundll32; PsExec service names; WMI process call create; WinRM sessions; remote service installs via Event 7045; admin share writes; and Cobalt Strike-style named pipes or beacon intervals if EDR exposes them.
• Staging and exfiltration: bursts of 7-Zip or Rar creation across file servers, archive passwords, split volumes, Rclone or MEGA-style tooling, unusual egress to object storage, large DNS or HTTPS sessions to rare destinations, and DLP alerts on finance, HR, legal, clinical, engineering or source-code repositories.
• Impact preparation: vssadmin delete shadows, WMI shadowcopy deletion, bcdedit recovery disabled, wbadmin backup deletion, backup job failures, backup-console password resets, EDR tamper attempts, and mass file rename canaries.

Critical assets this actor type historically prioritizes for extortion pressure

Because LAMASHTU-specific exfiltration preferences are not established, prioritize the assets that create maximum leverage across the claimed sectors: backups and backup consoles; Active Directory, NTDS and identity logs; finance, payroll, legal and contract repositories; HR and PII; PHI and clinical-adjacent systems for healthcare exposure; OT-adjacent historians and engineering drawings for manufacturing or energy exposure; routing, VPN and firewall configuration backups; source code, CI/CD secrets and customer data for technology exposure; and any data enabling regulatory notification pressure under GDPR, HIPAA, state breach laws or sector rules.

Containment actions ordered by urgency

1. Isolate identity first: disable suspected accounts, revoke tokens and sessions, reset exposed credentials, and protect tier-zero assets before touching powered-on endpoints.
2. Cut ingress: restrict VPN to emergency access groups, block public RDP, disable risky legacy IKEv1 paths where feasible, and emergency-patch or isolate vulnerable vCenter, TeamCity, Cisco FMC and Check Point gateways.
3. Preserve evidence: export VPN, firewall, EDR, Windows Security, Sysmon, DNS, proxy, DLP, backup and hypervisor logs before retention rolls over.
4. Stop egress: block rare cloud storage destinations, sinkhole suspected C2, rate-limit large uploads, and enable temporary egress default-deny for servers where operationally possible.
5. Segment blast radius: isolate affected VLANs or sites, pause high-risk service accounts, constrain WMI, WinRM, SMB admin shares and remote service creation.
6. Protect recovery: verify immutable backups, offline copies, backup admin MFA, restore tests and separation between production identity and backup identity.
7. Engage response: activate incident response, legal, privacy, communications, cyber insurance and law enforcement contacts; do not negotiate, pay or contact the actor from production infrastructure.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate — next 24 hours

• Patch or virtually mitigate CISA KEV items: CVE-2026-59310 for VMware vCenter, CVE-2026-63077 for JetBrains TeamCity, CVE-2026-20316 for Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center, CVE-2026-50751 for Check Point Security Gateway and CVE-2026-48027 for Nx Console supply-chain exposure. Prioritize internet-facing and management-plane systems.
• Enforce MFA on VPN, firewall admin, vCenter, backup consoles, remote support and cloud control planes; remove shared and local admin standing access.
• Confirm no direct internet RDP; require VPN plus device compliance, disable RDP where not needed, and alert on LogonType 10 from public IP space.
• Block Office macros from the internet, enable Attack Surface Reduction rules, and prevent Office processes from launching script interpreters.
• Deploy the Sigma and KQL logic above; create critical alerts for shadow-copy deletion, backup tampering, EDR tamper, new services and Rclone execution.
• Lock down egress for servers: deny unsanctioned cloud storage, archive upload tools and newly seen destinations; alert on large outbound transfers.
• Verify backups are immutable, offline or logically air-gapped, and test at least one critical restore path.

Short-term — next two weeks

• Re-architect remote access around phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, device posture and just-in-time admin; remove legacy VPN profiles and unmanaged service accounts.
• Implement tiered administration and PAM for domain, virtualization, backup, firewall and CI/CD control planes; separate backup identity from production identity.
• Segment by business function and sensitivity: isolate OT and healthcare-adjacent systems, restrict server-to-server SMB, WMI, WinRM and RDP, and add canary files and decoy credentials.
• Improve CI/CD and developer controls after the Nx Console supply-chain signal: pin dependencies, verify package provenance, isolate build runners, rotate developer secrets and monitor TeamCity or build-plane changes.
• Add data-centric controls: DLP policies for finance, HR, legal, clinical and engineering repositories; egress anomaly baselines; and encryption-at-rest key separation to reduce extortion leverage.
• Run a ransomware tabletop using a single-day multi-victim leak-site burst scenario, including legal review of disclosure duties, customer communication, restoration order and regulator notification thresholds.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub