Recent OTX pulses indicate a convergence of legacy malware persistence and modern infrastructure abuse. A mature LokiBot infostealer campaign is actively distributing credential-harvesting payloads via malspam targeting over a hundred software applications. Simultaneously, a sophisticated campaign exploits the trust in CI/CD pipelines by hijacking GitHub Actions runners to perform distributed exploitation of cPanel and WHM servers using CVE-2026-41940. Furthermore, the compromise of a third-party vendor (Klue) highlights the ongoing risk of supply chain attacks via OAuth token theft, specifically targeting CRM data within Salesforce environments.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
LokiBot (S0447)
- Distribution Method: Malspam campaigns utilizing JScript email attachments (.js/.jse) to initiate a multi-stage infection chain.
- Payload Behavior: Highly evasive infostealer capable of extracting credentials, cookies, and wallet data from browsers, email clients, FTP, and crypto wallets.
- C2 Communication: Connects to hard-coded domains utilizing specific URI paths (e.g.,
/alien/fre.php) to exfiltrate stolen data and receive configuration updates. - Persistence: Uses registry run keys and scheduled tasks; often injects into legitimate processes like
explorer.exeorregsvr32.
GitHub Actions Abuse Campaign
- Adversary TTP: Compromises developer repositories to inject malicious workflow files.
- Infrastructure Abuse: Uses GitHub-hosted runners (CI/CD infrastructure) as the attack source, obfuscating the origin of the attack.
- Objective: Automated distributed scanning and exploitation of cPanel/WHM servers to deploy Linux payloads.
Supply Chain / OAuth Threat
- Vector: Third-party vendor compromise (Klue) leveraging stolen OAuth tokens.
- Target: SaaS environments (Salesforce, Gong).
- Impact: Unauthorized access to PII and customer CRM data.
IOC Analysis
The provided indicators span multiple infrastructure layers:
- Network Infrastructure (C2): The LokiBot campaign utilizes the
alphastand.*TLD cluster (trade,win,top). The GitHub campaign relies on a hardcoded IP43.228.157.68hosting payload APIs. - File Artifacts: SHA256 hashes are provided for the LokiBot dropper (
c099...) and the Linux payloads used in the GitHub campaign (22f7...). These should be immediately blocked in EDR solutions. - Vulnerability: CVE-2026-41940 is explicitly referenced for the cPanel exploitation. SOC teams should prioritize patching or applying WAF rules for this CVE.
- Operationalization: IOCs should be ingested into SIEM correlation engines for alerting on
DeviceNetworkEventsandDeviceFileEvents. The domains should be added to DNS sinkholes.
Detection Engineering
title: LokiBot JScript Dropper with Network Activity
id: 91a3e2c4-b7d1-4a5f-9e8d-2c3b4a5e6f7g
description: Detects potential LokiBot infection chain initiated by JScript files making network connections to known C2 infrastructure.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/25
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/61019235/
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1204.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: '.js'
selection_network:
InitiatingProcessCommandLine|contains: '.js'
filter_legit:
ParentImage|contains:
- '\Program Files'
- '\System32'
condition: selection_img and selection_cli and selection_network and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative scripts
level: high
---
title: GitHub Actions Runner Connecting to External Non-GitHub IP
id: 82b2f1a3-c6e0-4d5f-8f9e-1d2c3e4f5a6b
description: Detects GitHub Actions runners establishing outbound connections to known suspicious IP addresses or non-GitHub infrastructure, indicating potential abuse.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/25
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/61019236/
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: azure
detection:
selection:
InitiatingProcessUser|contains: 'runner'
selection_ip:
DestinationIp|startswith:
- '43.228.'
- '192.168.' # Example private, adjust based on known infrastructure
condition: selection and selection_ip
falsepositives:
- Legitimate CI/CD testing against external staging servers
level: critical
---
title: Suspicious Linux Payload Download via cPanel Exploit
id: 73c1e0b2-a5d9-3c4e-7e8d-0c1b2d3e4f5a
description: Identifies the download of payloads associated with the CVE-2026-41940 cPanel exploitation campaign from the observed C2 IP.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/25
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/61019236/
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: linux
detection:
selection:
DestinationIp: '43.228.157.68'
DestinationPort: 80
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- None
level: critical
kql
// Hunt for LokiBot C2 Domains and GitHub Abuse IP
let IoC_Domains = dynamic(['alphastand.trade', 'alphastand.win', 'alphastand.top', 'kbfvzoboss.bid', 'baccarat.com.au']);
let IoC_IPs = dynamic(['43.228.157.68']);
let IoC_Hashes = dynamic(['c099f965144bccd0b590f946659fc3c0747c54aef505b6caaca9078712f455fb', '22f721fd3a81d2e27cbf90a122bb977f630c50b79daa98350f0e57b04dfa81f1']);
// Network Connections
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl in (IoC_Domains) or RemoteIP in (IoC_IPs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| union (
DeviceProcessEvents
| where SHA256 in (IoC_Hashes) or ProcessCommandLine has ".js" and InitiatingProcessFileName in ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, FolderPath
)
| order by Timestamp desc
powershell
# IOC Hunter for LokiBot and GitHub Exploit Payloads
# Requires Administrative Privileges
$IoCHashes = @(
"c099f965144bccd0b590f946659fc3c0747c54aef505b6caaca9078712f455fb", # LokiBot
"22f721fd3a81d2e27cbf90a122bb977f630c50b79daa98350f0e57b04dfa81f1" # Linux Payload (if running on Windows Subsystem)
)
$IoCDomains = @(
"alphastand.trade",
"alphastand.win",
"alphastand.top",
"kbfvzoboss.bid"
)
function Get-FileHashRecursive {
param (
[string]$Path,
[string[]]$Hashes
)
Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($Hashes -contains $hash) {
Write-Host "[!] MALICIOUS FILE FOUND: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
function Check-HostsFile {
$hostsPath = "$env:SystemRoot\System32\drivers\etc\hosts"
if (Test-Path $hostsPath) {
$content = Get-Content $hostsPath
foreach ($domain in $IoCDomains) {
if ($content -match $domain) {
Write-Host "[!] SUSPICIOUS HOSTS ENTRY DETECTED for $domain in $hostsPath" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
}
}
Write-Host "[*] Starting IOC Hunt..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
# Check C:\ and common user profiles
Get-FileHashRecursive -Path "C:\" -Hashes $IoCHashes
Check-HostsFile
Write-Host "[*] Hunt Complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan
# Response Priorities
**Immediate (0-4h):**
* Block all listed domains (`alphastand.*`, `kbfvzoboss.bid`) and IP addresses (`43.228.157.68`) at the perimeter firewall and proxy.
* Scan all endpoints for the specific SHA256 file hashes provided in the IOCs.
* Isolate any systems showing signs of wscript.exe connecting to non-corporate infrastructure.
**24h:**
* Initiate credential reset procedures for accounts that may have been compromised by the LokiBot infostealer (prioritize admin and database access).
* Revoke and rotate OAuth tokens associated with third-party integrations (specifically Klue/Salesforce/Gong) and enforce "least privilege" access for connected apps.
* Audit all GitHub repositories for unauthorized workflow files or commits from unknown contributors.
**1 Week:**
* Patch cPanel/WHM servers against CVE-2026-41940.
* Implement strict controls on GitHub Actions usage (e.g., requiring approval for fork pull requests, pinning actions to specific SHAs).
* Conduct a review of email filtering rules to block JScript attachments and malspam patterns associated with LokiBot.
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub
Is your security operations ready?
Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.