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MarkiRAT Surveillance Operations + Pink Vishing Campaign + Global Smishing Network: OTX Pulse Analysis — Enterprise Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
July 4, 2026
7 min read

Threat Summary

The OTX pulse data reveals three distinct but concerning threat activities currently impacting organizations and individuals globally. First, an Iran-nexus threat cluster, TAG-182, is actively deploying MarkiRAT malware targeting Iranian citizens through fake Android applications distributed via Instagram, exploiting the recent internet restoration in Iran. Second, a new extortion group known as Pink (cluster CL-CRI-1147) is conducting sophisticated vishing campaigns using fake IT helpdesk impersonation to steal credentials, bypass MFA, and exfiltrate cloud data from enterprise platforms like SharePoint and OneDrive. Third, a massive global smishing operation impersonating over 267 brands across 72 countries is targeting telecommunications, finance, and government sectors, with a significant concentration in Latin America and Mexico particularly affected. These campaigns collectively demonstrate the evolution of social engineering tactics, from SMS phishing to voice-based attacks and mobile application distribution, with clear objectives of credential theft, surveillance, and financial extortion.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

TAG-182 (Iran-nexus threat cluster)

  • Distribution: Fake Android VPN services and media players distributed through Instagram
  • Payload behavior: MarkiRAT (S0652) provides remote access capabilities, likely including data collection, command execution, and surveillance features
  • Associated malware: MarkiRAT, FurBall, DCHSpy, BouldSpy
  • C2 communication: Network infrastructure includes domains like yemplayer.site and related domains designed to impersonate legitimate services
  • Targeting: Iranian citizens both domestically and abroad
  • Timing: Campaign intensified after Iran's partial internet restoration in May 2026

Pink (cluster CL-CRI-1147)

  • Distribution: Voice phishing (vishing) and fake IT helpdesk calls
  • Payload behavior: Credential theft, MFA bypass, cloud data exfiltration
  • Target industries: Not specified but targets enterprise cloud platforms (SharePoint, OneDrive)
  • Extortion: 72-hour ransom demands to prevent data leaks
  • Associated domains: deploypasskey.com, passkeyadd.com, passkeydeploy.com

Global Smishing Operation

  • Distribution: SMS-based phishing (smishing) impersonating 267 brands
  • Technique: Phishing-as-a-service, error page decoys (Error 524)
  • Scale: 4,389 phishing domain instances with concentration in Mexico (1,851 cases)
  • Target industries: Telecommunications (1,754 instances), financial services, consumer rewards
  • Geographical focus: 72 countries, with significant activity in Latin America

IOC Analysis

The indicators provided in these OTX pulses include IP addresses, file hashes, and domains. The IP 46.30.191.123 likely serves as a C2 server for TAG-182 operations. The SHA256 hash 400eb6a94810323a1fc5f8ab31c682fe765aaec2cc61b37c31d719c7e45c9a6c corresponds to the MarkiRAT malware sample. Domains like yemplayer.site, microsoft.comi-site.website, google.comisignin.online exhibit typosquatting patterns designed to impersonate legitimate services. The Pink campaign domains (deploypasskey.com, passkeyadd.com, passkeydeploy.com) are themed around passkey deployment, likely used in credential theft attacks.

SOC teams should operationalize these indicators by blocking the domains at the perimeter and DNS resolvers, blacklisting the IP address at firewalls, and scanning endpoints for the MarkiRAT file hash. SIEM solutions can correlate network traffic to these indicators, while EDR platforms can search for the file hash and suspicious processes. Network tools like Zeek or Suricata can be configured to alert on connections to these domains and IPs.

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

YAML
---
title: Suspicious Android Package Installation Related to TAG-182 Campaign
id: 8d7b9a3c-5e2f-4a1d-9b7e-6f8d4e5c9b1a
description: Detects installation of suspicious Android applications associated with TAG-182 MarkiRAT campaign, specifically fake VPN or media player apps
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/05
modified: 2026/07/05
references:
    - https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/nexus-tag182-disseminates-markirat
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.mobile
    - attack.t1190
logsource:
    product: android
    category: package_installation
detection:
    selection:
        EventType|contains: 'install'
    filter_common:
        PackageName|contains:
            - 'com.android'
            - 'com.google'
            - 'com.microsoft'
            - 'com.facebook'
    filter_legitimate_vpn:
        PackageName:
            - 'com.openvpn.android'
            - 'net.openvpn.openvpn'
            - 'org.torproject.android'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
    - Installation of legitimate VPN or media applications
level: high
---
title: Cloud Credential Theft and Data Exfiltration - Pink Campaign
id: 7a6c5b4d-3e2f-4a1d-9b7e-6f8d4e5c9b1a
description: Detects potential credential theft and data exfiltration activity associated with Pink extortion group targeting SharePoint and OneDrive
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/05
modified: 2026/07/05
references:
    - https://www.theregister.com/cyber-crime/2026/06/04/pink-is-the-latest-goon-squad-to-use-fake-helpdesk-calls-to-steal-creds/5251434
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1530
logsource:
    product: azure
    service: security
detection:
    selection_access:
        Category: 'SignInLogs'
        AuthenticationRequirement|contains: 'multiFactorAuthentication'
    selection_mfa_bypass:
        ConditionalAccessStatus: 'failure'
        ConditionalAccessPolicies: 'null'
    selection_exfil:
        Category: 'ThreatManagement'
        Operation|contains:
            - 'MailItemsAccessed'
            - 'FileCheckedOut'
            - 'FileDownloaded'
    condition: selection_access and selection_mfa_bypass or selection_exfil
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate access from new devices
    - Valid file access patterns
level: high
---
title: Connection to Typosquatting Domains - Global Smishing Operation
id: 9d8e7a6c-5e2f-4a1d-9b7e-6f8d4e5c9b1a
description: Detects network connections to domains exhibiting typosquatting patterns associated with global smishing operations and phishing campaigns
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/05
modified: 2026/07/05
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1102
logsource:
    category: network_connection
detection:
    selection_typosquatting:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'comi-site'
            - 'come-site'
            - 'isignin.online'
    selection_brands:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'microsoft'
            - 'google'
            - 'facebook'
            - 'apple'
            - 'amazon'
    condition: selection_typosquatting and selection_brands
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate connections to domains with similar names
level: medium

Microsoft Sentinel KQL

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for connections to TAG-182 MarkiRAT C2 domains
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl in~ ("yemplayer.site", "microsoft.comi-site.website", "google.comisignin.online", "comesignt.website", "min.come-site.website")
| summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by count_ desc

// Hunt for Pink campaign domains
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl in~ ("deploypasskey.com", "passkeyadd.com", "passkeydeploy.com")
| summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by count_ desc

// Hunt for suspicious Android APK installations
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "ApplicationInstall"
| where FileName endswith ".apk"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("googleplaystore", "amazon.appstore", "system")
| summarize count() by DeviceName, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by count_ desc

// Hunt for MarkiRAT file hash
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where SHA256 == "400eb6a94810323a1fc5f8ab31c682fe765aaec2cc61b37c31d719c7e45c9a6c"
| project DeviceName, FileName,FolderPath, SHA256, Timestamp

PowerShell IOC Hunt Script

PowerShell
# IOC Hunt Script for TAG-182 MarkiRAT and Pink Campaign
# Created: 2026-07-05
# Purpose: Scan endpoints for indicators of compromise from OTX pulses

# MarkiRAT file hash
$maliciousHash = "400eb6a94810323a1fc5f8ab31c682fe765aaec2cc61b37c31d719c7e45c9a6c"

# Malicious domains
$maliciousDomains = @(
    "yemplayer.site",
    "microsoft.comi-site.website",
    "google.comisignin.online",
    "comesignt.website",
    "min.come-site.website",
    "deploypasskey.com",
    "passkeyadd.com",
    "passkeydeploy.com"
)

# Malicious IP
$maliciousIP = "46.30.191.123"

# Function to check DNS cache for malicious domains
function Check-DNSCache {
    Write-Host "Checking DNS cache for malicious domains..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    
    $dnsCache = Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    $foundDomains = @()
    
    foreach ($domain in $maliciousDomains) {
        $matches = $dnsCache | Where-Object { $_.Entry -like "*$domain*" }
        if ($matches) {
            $foundDomains += $domain
            Write-Host "SUSPICIOUS DNS ENTRY FOUND: $domain" -ForegroundColor Red
            $matches | Format-Table Entry, Data, TimeToLive
        }
    }
    
    if ($foundDomains.Count -eq 0) {
        Write-Host "No malicious domains found in DNS cache." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
    
    return $foundDomains
}

# Function to check for connections to malicious domains
function Check-NetworkConnections {
    Write-Host "Checking active network connections..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    
    $connections = Get-NetTCPConnection -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    $foundConnections = @()
    
    # Check for connections to malicious IP
    $ipMatches = $connections | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -eq $maliciousIP }
    if ($ipMatches) {
        $foundConnections += $maliciousIP
        Write-Host "SUSPICIOUS CONNECTION FOUND: $maliciousIP" -ForegroundColor Red
        $ipMatches | Format-Table LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, State, OwningProcess
        
        # Get process details
        foreach ($conn in $ipMatches) {
            $process = Get-Process -Id $conn.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
            if ($process) {
                Write-Host "Owning Process: $($process.ProcessName) (PID: $($process.Id))" -ForegroundColor Red
                Write-Host "Process Path: $($process.Path)" -ForegroundColor Red
            }
        }
    }
    
    if ($foundConnections.Count -eq 0) {
        Write-Host "No connections to malicious indicators found." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
    
    return $foundConnections
}

# Function to check for suspicious scheduled tasks
function Check-ScheduledTasks {
    Write-Host "Checking for suspicious scheduled tasks..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    
    $tasks = Get-ScheduledTask -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    $suspiciousTasks = @()
    
    foreach ($task in $tasks) {
        $taskActions = $task.Actions
        
        foreach ($action in $taskActions) {
            if ($action.Execute -like "*powershell*" -or $action.Execute -like "*cmd.exe*") {
                if ($action.Arguments -like "*http*") {
                    $suspiciousTasks += $task
                    Write-Host "SUSPICIOUS TASK FOUND: $($task.TaskName)" -ForegroundColor Red
                    Write-Host "Action: $($action.Execute) $($action.Arguments)" -ForegroundColor Red
                }
            }
        }
    }
    
    if ($suspiciousTasks.Count -eq 0) {
        Write-Host "No suspicious scheduled tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
    
    return $suspiciousTasks
}

# Main execution
Write-Host "Starting IOC hunt script..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Timestamp: $(Get-Date)" -ForegroundColor Cyan

Check-DNSCache
Check-NetworkConnections
Check-ScheduledTasks

Write-Host "IOC hunt script completed." -ForegroundColor Cyan

Response Priorities

  • Immediate: Block all identified IOCs at perimeter and DNS level; isolate any systems showing connections to malicious domains; add MarkiRAT file hash to EDR detection rules
  • 24h: Initiate credential reset for all user accounts with suspicious activity; conduct hunt for MarkiRAT file hash across endpoints; review access logs for SharePoint and OneDrive
  • 1 week: Implement application allowlisting for mobile devices; enhance vishing awareness training; deploy phishing-resistant authentication methods; strengthen MFA verification procedures

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

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