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Microsoft 365 Outage Phishing + Fake Crypto-Wallet ScreenConnect RAT: OTX Pulse Analysis — Enterprise Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 17, 2026
9 min read

Threat Summary

Two concurrent campaigns reported to AlienVault OTX on 2026-11-17 reveal a dual-pronged credential and access theft operation spanning both enterprise and consumer-finance targets. Neither campaign is attributed to a named actor, but the TTP overlap — social engineering urgency lures, living-off-the-land tooling, and credential harvesting — is consistent with initial access broker (IAB) tradecraft feeding downstream infostealer and ransomware ecosystems.

Campaign 1 — Microsoft 365 Outage Lure Phishing: Beginning 2026-11-13, a high-volume phishing operation impersonated Microsoft 365 Service Health notifications. Emails claimed user mailboxes were "held" during a service disruption and would be permanently deleted within 24 hours unless the recipient authenticated. The artificial 24-hour countdown is a classic urgency-pressure tactic designed to bypass user skepticism. Click-through leads to credential harvesting pages hosted on compromised or freshly registered infrastructure, including .sbs TLD domains (outagerestored.sbs, outagefixed.sbs) and abused legitimate domains (reallifeaccounting.com). Multi-sector targeting suggests indiscriminate volume-based harvesting — credentials are likely aggregated for resale on dark web marketplaces or used for follow-on business email compromise (BEC).

Campaign 2 — Fake Crypto-Wallet ScreenConnect Deployment: A targeted campaign against cryptocurrency hardware wallet users (Coldcard, Ledger, Pera Algorand Wallet, Revolut, Xaman) distributes malicious ZIP archives containing BAT scripts disguised as wallet firmware or software updates. Execution deploys ConnectWise ScreenConnect — a legitimate remote support tool — as a persistent remote access trojan (RAT). Once ScreenConnect is resident, operators gain full interactive access to the victim machine: direct wallet theft, seed phrase capture via keylogging or screen scraping, clipboard hijacking of wallet addresses, and harvesting of browser-stored exchange credentials. This aligns with MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1204 (User Execution), T1219 (Remote Access Software), and T1059.003 (Windows Command Shell).

Collective assessment: Both campaigns monetize identity and access. The M365 campaign harvests corporate credentials at scale; the crypto campaign establishes persistent hands-on-keyboard access to high-value financial targets. Enterprise defenders should treat both as components of the broader credential-theft supply chain that feeds infostealer logs, initial access listings, and account takeover (ATO) into dark web markets.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

M365 Outage Phishing Kit

  • Attribution: Unattributed; consistent with commodity phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operators given volume and multi-sector spread
  • Distribution: Bulk email spoofing Microsoft 365 service health alerts; sender infrastructure includes lookalike domains (moments-notice.com) and URL shortener/redirect chains (url.newbooker.com/ls/click)
  • Payload behavior: Credential harvesting pages (themelist0.html) hosted on compromised legitimate sites (reallifeaccounting.com, planetmaison.com) and throwaway .sbs domains; captures M365 username/password pairs, likely with MFA-bypass phishing kit characteristics (adversary-in-the-middle patterns common in current kits)
  • C2/exfil: Harvested credentials POST to attacker-controlled endpoints on the same lure domains
  • Persistence: None at endpoint level; persistence is achieved at the identity layer via stolen sessions/passwords
  • Anti-analysis: Redirect chains, compromised-site hosting to evade reputation filters, urgency lures to defeat user scrutiny

ScreenConnect RAT (Fake Wallet Installer)

  • Attribution: Unattributed; financially motivated, consistent with crypto-drain crews
  • Distribution: ZIP archives masquerading as wallet updates (Coldcard, Ledger, Pera Algorand, Revolut, Xaman); likely spread via phishing, SEO poisoning, and forum/malvertising links; lure domain exodus-wallet.pro impersonates Exodus wallet
  • Payload behavior: Malicious BAT script executes silent installation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect client (MITRE T1219 — Remote Access Software). Because ScreenConnect is signed, legitimate software, it bypasses most signature-based and many behavioral controls
  • C2 communication: ScreenConnect relays outbound HTTPS (443) to ScreenConnect cloud relay infrastructure or attacker-controlled self-hosted instances — no inbound listener required, defeating NAT/firewall assumptions
  • Persistence mechanism: ScreenConnect installs as a Windows service (typically ScreenConnect Client (…) service name), auto-starting on boot; survives reboots and standard user logoff
  • Anti-analysis: Abuse of legitimate signed binaries (defense evasion via T1219/T1218 patterns), batch script obfuscation, no traditional malware payload on disk — most AV engines will not flag the installer

IOC Analysis

The pulse indicators fall into four operational classes:

TypeExamplesOperationalization
Phishing/lure domainsmoments-notice.com, outagefixed.sbs, outagerestored.sbs, exodus-wallet.pro, newbooker.com, planetmaison.comBlock at DNS sinkhole, secure web gateway, and email gateway. Note .sbs TLD — consider alerting on newly observed .sbs domains org-wide
Malicious URLs / redirect chainsreallifeaccounting.com/themelist0.html, url.newbooker.com/ls/clickURL-path-level detections in proxy logs; the themelist0.html filename is a high-fidelity kit artifact — hunt historically
File hashes (MD5 + SHA-1 derivations)1829cc10e7795e54b7cb3d551975aea5, 73e60d1b2667a37f27ccb22f3e767f4d, etc. (44 indicators in pulse)Import into EDR blocklists and threat intel platforms; note the pulse provides MD5s of both payloads and their SHA-1 counterparts — ingest both
Behavioral (no IOC required)ScreenConnect service creation, BAT-from-ZIP executionHighest-fidelity detections; infrastructure rotates but T1219 behavior is stable

Tooling guidance: Ingest OTX pulses via the OTX DirectConnect API or TAXII feed into your TIP (OpenCTI, MISP, ThreatConnect). Push domains/URLs to DNS firewall (e.g., RPZ) and SWG; push hashes to EDR (Defender, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne custom IOC lists). Decode pivot relationships with urlscan.io and VirusTotal for the redirect chains. Prioritize behavioral detections over hash matching — the BAT scripts are trivially repackaged.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: ScreenConnect Remote Access Tool Installation
description: Detects installation or execution of ConnectWise ScreenConnect client, abused in fake crypto-wallet campaigns as a RAT (T1219)
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/17
references:
    - https://bartblaze.blogspot.com/2026/11/crypto-hardware-wallet-users-under.html
level: high
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1219
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|contains: 'ScreenConnect'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'screenconnect'
            - 'connectwise'
    selection_service:
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceName|contains: 'ScreenConnect Client'
    condition: selection_img or selection_cmd or selection_service
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate IT/RMM deployments of ConnectWise ScreenConnect — whitelist known MSP instance GUIDs
---
title: BAT Script Executed From ZIP Archive or Temp Extraction Path
description: Detects batch script execution from user temp/downloads paths typical of malicious ZIP-delivered wallet lure droppers (T1059.003, T1204.002)
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/17
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1204.002
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.bat'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '\Temp\'
            - '\Downloads\'
            - 'AppData\Local\Temp'
            - '.zip'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user-run batch installers; tune with parent process and signer context
---
title: M365 Outage Phishing Lure Domain or Kit Artifact Access
description: Detects network access to known M365 outage-lure phishing domains and the themelist0.html credential-harvest kit artifact
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: proxy
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/17
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.002
detection:
    selection_domain:
        c-uri-domain|contains:
            - 'moments-notice.com'
            - 'outagefixed.sbs'
            - 'outagerestored.sbs'
            - 'newbooker.com'
            - 'planetmaison.com'
            - 'reallifeaccounting.com'
            - 'exodus-wallet.pro'
    selection_uri:
        c-uri|contains: 'themelist0.html'
    condition: selection_domain or selection_uri
falsepositives:
    - None expected for lure domains; reallifeaccounting.com is compromised legitimate infrastructure — block URL path, alert on domain
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Sentinel hunt: ScreenConnect RAT deployment + M365 lure infrastructure contact
let LureDomains = dynamic(["moments-notice.com","outagefixed.sbs","outagerestored.sbs","newbooker.com","planetmaison.com","reallifeaccounting.com","exodus-wallet.pro"]);
let NetHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (LureDomains) or RemoteUrl endswith ".sbs"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ActionType;
let ScreenConnectProc = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where FileName has_any ("ScreenConnect","ConnectWise")
    or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("screenconnect","connectwise")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256;
let BatFromZip = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has ".bat"
    and (ProcessCommandLine has "Temp" or ProcessCommandLine has "Downloads" or ProcessCommandLine has ".zip")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","winrar.exe","7z.exe","7zg.exe","msedge.exe","chrome.exe","outlook.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
NetHits
| union ScreenConnectProc, BatFromZip
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
PowerShell
# OTX Pulse 2026-11-17 hunt: ScreenConnect RAT artifacts + phishing lure evidence
$Results = [System.Collections.Generic.List[object]]::new()

# 1) ScreenConnect services (persistence via Windows service)
Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'ScreenConnect|ConnectWise' -or $_.DisplayName -match 'ScreenConnect|ConnectWise' } | ForEach-Object {
    $Results.Add([pscustomobject]@{Check='ScreenConnect Service'; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME; Detail="$($_.Name) | $($_.PathName) | State=$($_.State) | StartMode=$($_.StartMode)"})
}

# 2) ScreenConnect install directories
$Paths = @("$env:ProgramFiles\ScreenConnect*","${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\ScreenConnect*","$env:ProgramData\ScreenConnect*","$env:LOCALAPPDATA\ScreenConnect*")
foreach ($p in $Paths) { Get-ChildItem $p -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
    $Results.Add([pscustomobject]@{Check='ScreenConnect Path'; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME; Detail=$_.FullName}) } }

# 3) Outbound connections to ScreenConnect relays or lure infrastructure
$LureHosts = 'moments-notice.com|outagefixed|outagerestored|newbooker|planetmaison|reallifeaccounting|exodus-wallet|screenconnect'
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
    $conn = $_
    try { $dns = (Resolve-DnsName $conn.RemoteAddress -ErrorAction Stop).NameHost } catch { $dns = '' }
    if ($dns -match $LureHosts) {
        $proc = Get-Process -Id $conn.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        $Results.Add([pscustomobject]@{Check='Suspicious Connection'; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME; Detail="$($conn.RemoteAddress):$($conn.RemotePort) -> $dns | Process=$($proc.ProcessName)"})
    }
}

# 4) Known malicious BAT/ZIP hashes in Downloads and Temp
$BadMD5 = @('1829cc10e7795e54b7cb3d551975aea5','1d49be4bac3afef330dff80515aec590','30e40c8e80de484130213776f8f0e444','56930e936a70d3fd25436195945a942a','73e60d1b2667a37f27ccb22f3e767f4d','773dbb36091db84e9f0735b98ff7371b','83929df46fe5ea355dae169e8e765d29')
$ScanDirs = @("$env:USERPROFILE\Downloads", "$env:TEMP")
foreach ($dir in $ScanDirs) {
    Get-ChildItem $dir -Recurse -Include *.bat,*.zip -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
        $h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm MD5 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
        if ($BadMD5 -contains $h.ToLower()) {
            $Results.Add([pscustomobject]@{Check='Known Malicious File'; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME; Detail="$($_.FullName) MD5=$h"})
        }
    }
}

# 5) Run keys referencing ScreenConnect or recent BAT payloads
$RunKeys = @('HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run','HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run')
foreach ($rk in $RunKeys) {
    Get-ItemProperty $rk -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
        $_.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Value -match 'screenconnect|\.bat|temp' } | ForEach-Object {
            $Results.Add([pscustomobject]@{Check='Run Key Persistence'; Host=$env:COMPUTERNAME; Detail="$rk -> $($_.Name)=$($_.Value)"})
        }
    }
}

$Results | Format-Table -AutoSize
if ($Results.Count -eq 0) { Write-Output "[+] No indicators of OTX 2026-11-17 campaigns found on $env:COMPUTERNAME" }

Response Priorities

Immediate (0-4 hours):

  • Block all pulse domains at DNS sinkhole, SWG, and email gateway: moments-notice.com, outagefixed.sbs, outagerestored.sbs, newbooker.com, planetmaison.com, exodus-wallet.pro; block URL path themelist0.html org-wide
  • Push the 44 file-hash indicators to EDR blocklists; alert (not just log) on any execution
  • Hunt fleet-wide for unauthorized ScreenConnect/ConnectWise services and processes using the KQL and PowerShell above; any ScreenConnect instance not traceable to your approved RMM inventory is a confirmed incident
  • Search email logs for M365 outage-themed messages received since 2026-11-13

24 hours:

  • Treat any user who clicked the M365 lure as credential-compromised: force password reset, revoke all active sessions and refresh tokens, review MFA registration changes and inbox rules created after click time
  • Audit Entra ID / identity provider sign-in logs for anomalous authentication to harvested accounts (impossible travel, new device, token replay)
  • For any ScreenConnect-positive host: isolate from network, capture memory, assume full interactive compromise — enumerate accessed files, browsers, and any crypto wallet software present
  • Check for crypto transaction activity if wallet applications existed on compromised endpoints

1 week:

  • Implement an application control policy for RMM tooling: allowlist only approved remote access software via WDAC/AppLocker; alert on any other RMM binary (this class of ScreenConnect abuse is invisible to AV)
  • Deploy email bannering and DMARC enforcement reporting for Microsoft-impersonating sender domains; tune secure email gateway rules for service-notification spoofing patterns
  • Block or alert on newly registered .sbs and similar low-reputation TLDs at the proxy
  • Roll out targeted user awareness for both lures: Microsoft never threatens mailbox deletion via email links, and hardware wallet vendors never distribute updates via ZIP/BAT scripts

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