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MythicRatatoskr + Armorsteal + M365 Token Replay: OTX Pulse Analysis — Sandworm Collaboration, SEO Poisoning & AiTM Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 21, 2026
12 min read

Classification: TLP:WHITE | Analyst: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence | Pulse Source Date: 2026-11-21


1. Threat Summary

Three live OTX pulses published within the last 24 hours paint a picture of simultaneous pressure across the enterprise attack surface: nation-state intrusion, commodity infostealer distribution, and cloud identity compromise.

Campaign Alpha — MythicRatatoskr (UAC-0099 + Sandworm collaboration): On July 16th, 2025, UAC-0099 conducted spearphishing against a Ukrainian grain logistics company, deploying the MATCHWOK backdoor. The following day, operators introduced MythicRatatoskr, a previously undocumented Go-based backdoor that routes C2 over the Yggdrasil mesh network — a decentralized, end-to-end encrypted IPv6 overlay. This is a significant tradecraft evolution: by tunneling C2 through Yggdrasil, Sandworm-affiliated operators bypass conventional IPv4 egress monitoring, DNS-based detection, and most commercial threat intel blocklists. The agriculture/logistics targeting is consistent with Sandworm's historical focus on Ukrainian economic and supply-chain infrastructure. The toolset also includes MATCHBOIL and the destructive utility SDelete, signaling intent to anti-forensically wipe artifacts and potentially stage destructive follow-on operations.

Campaign Bravo — Armorsteal SEO Poisoning: Since September 2026, an unknown actor has operated an SEO poisoning and typosquatting campaign impersonating the Chocolatey package manager and Microsoft Activation Scripts (MAS). Victims searching for legitimate software installation commands are served malicious PowerShell scripts that drop Python-based infostealer components protected by Pyarmor (commercial-grade obfuscation). Armorsteal's three-component architecture includes clipboard hijacking — a direct threat to cryptocurrency transactions and any credential or token material passing through the clipboard.

Campaign Charlie — M365 Token Spray & Replay: Between July and September 2026, adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) relays captured Microsoft 365 sign-in sessions, with stolen tokens replayed from infrastructure controlled by German hosting provider 1337 Services GmbH. Over ten weeks: 79 organizations compromised, 497 successful sign-ins. This is business email compromise at industrial scale — no malware on the endpoint is required, which makes identity-layer detection the only viable control.

Collective assessment: Defenders face a three-front problem — encrypted mesh C2 that evades network controls, developer/tooling trust abuse that evades user suspicion, and session-token theft that evades MFA. Each campaign maps to a distinct defensive gap.


2. Threat Actor / Malware Profiles

MythicRatatoskr (UAC-0099 / Sandworm)

  • Distribution: Spearphishing emails targeting Ukrainian agriculture and grain logistics; initial foothold via MATCHWOK backdoor, then secondary staged deployment of MythicRatatoskr within ~24 hours.
  • Payload behavior: Go-compiled backdoor. Go binaries are large, statically linked, and frequently misidentified by signature engines; expect low static detection rates.
  • C2 communication: Yggdrasil mesh network — decentralized end-to-end encrypted IPv6 traffic between overlay nodes. The Yggdrasil address space lives in the 0200::/7 range. This renders domain-reputation and JA3/JA4-based TLS fingerprinting largely ineffective because the overlay handles encryption internally.
  • Persistence: Secondary-stage deployment via the MATCHWOK loader chain; expect service or scheduled task persistence typical of Sandworm-linked intrusions.
  • Anti-analysis: Encrypted mesh C2 defeats network sandboxing; SDelete is used for forensic artifact destruction — treat any SDelete execution in an enterprise environment as a high-fidelity hostile signal.
  • Associated tooling: MATCHWOK, MATCHBOIL, SDelete. C2/staging domains include egyptanimals.com, uztickets.com, and adomd.net.

Armorsteal

  • Distribution: SEO poisoning + typosquatting. Fake sites impersonate Chocolatey and MAS (Microsoft Activation Scripts); the typosquat massgravel.net (mimicking the legitimate massgrave.dev MAS project) is a confirmed lure domain.
  • Payload behavior: Malicious PowerShell scripts delivered as fake 'install commands' — the victim executes the initial stager themselves, defeating attachment-based email security. Drops a three-component Python infostealer with clipboard hijacking for crypto-wallet and credential theft.
  • C2 communication: Exfiltration over HTTPS from Python processes — look for python.exe/pythonw.exe making outbound connections, which is abnormal on end-user workstations.
  • Persistence: Standard infostealer tradecraft — expect Run key or scheduled task persistence alongside staged Python environments in user-writable directories (%APPDATA%, %LOCALAPPDATA%, %TEMP%).
  • Anti-analysis: Pyarmor obfuscation defeats static analysis and string-based YARA on the Python payload; the self-executed PowerShell stager defeats sandbox detonation chains.

M365 Token Spray & Replay (AiTM)

  • Distribution: Phishing lures directing victims to adversary-in-the-middle relay pages that proxy the genuine Microsoft 365 login flow, capturing the session token after MFA completes.
  • Payload behavior: No endpoint payload — the stolen session token is replayed directly from attacker infrastructure.
  • C2 / infrastructure: Token replay sourced from IP space of German hosting provider 1337 Services GmbH. 497 successful sign-ins across 79 organizations over ten weeks indicates low-and-slow replay pacing designed to stay under impossible-travel and velocity thresholds.
  • Detection implication: Endpoint tooling sees nothing. Detection must occur in Entra ID sign-in logs: token replay indicators, anomalous ASN/session correlations, and post-auth BEC behaviors (inbox rules, forwarding, OAuth consent).

3. IOC Analysis

The pulse indicator sets divide into three operational classes:

Network indicators (MythicRatatoskr): Domains egyptanimals.com, uztickets.com, adomd.net — push to DNS sinkhole, web proxy, and firewall blocklists immediately. Note that Yggdrasil-based C2 means domain blocking alone is insufficient; also alert on outbound IPv6 traffic to 0200::/7 and any Yggdrasil peering ports (default TCP/UDP listeners in the 9000-range vary by config, but overlay bootstrap connections are the choke point).

Typosquat domain (Armorsteal): massgravel.net — block at DNS and proxy, then hunt proxy and DNS logs for historical resolution to identify potentially infected hosts. Because delivery is victim-initiated (user pastes a malicious PowerShell command), DNS hits to this domain should be treated as a probable-compromise signal, not just a navigation event.

File hashes (MD5/SHA1/SHA256 across all pulses): 59 indicators for MythicRatatoskr/MATCHWOK, 26 for Armorsteal, 1 SHA256 for the token-replay campaign. Operationalize as follows: import the full sets into your EDR blocklist (not just alerting), sweep historical AV/EDR telemetry for retroactive matches, and pivot SHA1 hashes into VirusTotal/MalwareBazaar to retrieve full-family clustering. The mixed MD5/SHA1 sets suggest vendor-sourced enrichment — validate hashes against your EDR's native hash format before bulk import.

Tooling guidance: Use MISP or OpenCTI to ingest the pulses and correlate against internal telemetry; use yggdrasilctl or interface enumeration on endpoints to detect unauthorized Yggdrasil installs; use Entra ID sign-in log analytics for the token-replay indicators.


4. Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: MythicRatatoskr Yggdrasil Mesh C2 Activity
id: 7c1e2a44-9b3d-4f6a-a2c1-mythicrat001
status: experimental
description: Detects installation or execution artifacts of the Yggdrasil IPv6 mesh overlay used by MythicRatatoskr for encrypted C2 in the UAC-0099/Sandworm campaign against Ukrainian agriculture targets.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/21
references:
  - https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/mythicratatoskr-yggdrasil-enabled-backdoor-deployed-uac0099-sandworm-collaboration/
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\yggdrasil.exe'
    - Image|endswith: '\yggdrasilctl.exe'
  selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'yggdrasil'
      - '-useconffile'
      - '0200::/7'
  selection_net:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'tls://'
      - 'tcp://'
      - 'quic://'
  condition: selection_img or (selection_cmd and selection_net)
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate Yggdrasil mesh deployments (extremely rare in enterprise environments)
level: high
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1090
  - attack.t1572
---
title: Armorsteal Pyarmor Python Stealer Execution
id: 8d2f3b55-0c4e-5a7b-b3d2-armorsteal01
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious Python execution consistent with the Armorsteal infostealer delivered via SEO poisoning and typosquatted Chocolatey/MAS sites, including Pyarmor-protected payloads staged in user-writable directories.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/21
references:
  - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/seo-poisoning-campaign-delivers-new-armorsteal-malware
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_python:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\python.exe'
      - '\pythonw.exe'
  selection_path:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
      - '\AppData\Roaming\'
      - '\AppData\Local\Programs\'
      - '\Public\'
  selection_stager:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
  selection_clipboard:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'pyperclip'
      - 'clip'
      - 'win32clipboard'
  condition: selection_python and (selection_path or selection_stager or selection_clipboard)
falsepositives:
  - Developer workstations running legitimate Python tooling; baseline per-department
level: high
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.006
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1115
---
title: SDelete Secure Deletion Execution
id: 9e3a4c66-1d5f-6b8c-c4e3-sdelete00001
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of Sysinternals SDelete, used by the UAC-0099/Sandworm MythicRatatoskr campaign for anti-forensic artifact destruction on Ukrainian victim systems.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/21
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith: '\sdelete.exe'
  selection_orig:
    OriginalFileName: 'sdelete.exe'
  selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' -p '
      - ' -z'
      - ' -c'
  condition: selection_img or selection_orig or (selection_cmd and 1 of selection_*)
falsepositives:
  - Rare legitimate administrator secure-deletion; correlate with Sandworm-targeted sector exposure
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.defense_evasion
  - attack.t1070.004
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Security Arsenal — Unified hunt: MythicRatatoskr C2, Armorsteal delivery, M365 token replay
// MythicRatatoskr / UAC-0099: C2 domains + Yggdrasil IPv6 overlay traffic
let mythic_domains = dynamic(["egyptanimals.com", "uztickets.com", "adomd.net"]);
let net_hits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl in (mythic_domains)
   or (RemoteIPType == "Public" and RemoteIP startswith "02" and IPv6 == true)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort;
// Armorsteal: typosquat resolution + python spawned by powershell from user-writable paths
let proc_hits = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("python.exe", "pythonw.exe")
        and (FolderPath has_any ("\\AppData\\", "\\Temp\\", "\\Public\\")
             or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "powershell.exe"))
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("massgravel.net", "pyarmor", "pyperclip")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA1;
// M365 token replay: successful sign-ins from hosting-provider ASN with token replay indicators
let identity_hits = SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where ResultType == 0
| extend TokenIssuer = tostring(parse_json(AuthenticationDetails)[0].authenticationMethod)
| where NetworkLocationDetails has "1337 Services"
   or (TokenIssuerType has "Unknown" and IPAddress !in (dynamic([])))
   or (isnotempty(SessionId) and SessionId in (
       SigninLogs | where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
       | summarize count() by SessionId | where count_ > 1 | project SessionId))
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, Location, AppDisplayName, TokenIssuerType, SessionId;
net_hits
PowerShell
# Security Arsenal — MythicRatatoskr / Armorsteal Endpoint IOC Hunt
# Run elevated on suspected hosts. Outputs consolidated findings to C:\IR\hunt_results.txt
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$out = "C:\IR\hunt_results.txt"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path "C:\IR" -Force | Out-Null
"=== HUNT START $(Get-Date -Format o) ===" | Out-File $out

# 1. MythicRatatoskr: Yggdrasil mesh overlay artifacts (IPv6 0200::/7 interfaces, binaries, services)
"`n[1] Yggdrasil Overlay Artifacts" | Out-File $out -Append
Get-NetIPAddress -AddressFamily IPv6 | Where-Object { $_.IPAddress -match '^(02|03)' } |
  ForEach-Object { "SUSPICIOUS IPv6 (Yggdrasil range): $($_.IPAddress) on $($_.InterfaceAlias)" | Out-File $out -Append }
Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'yggdrasil' } |
  ForEach-Object { "YGGDRASIL PROCESS: $($_.Name) PID $($_.Id) Path $($_.Path)" | Out-File $out -Append }
Get-Service | Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'yggdrasil' } |
  ForEach-Object { "YGGDRASIL SERVICE: $($_.Name) [$($_.Status)]" | Out-File $out -Append }
Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Program Files","C:\ProgramData","$env:APPDATA","$env:LOCALAPPDATA" -Recurse -Filter "yggdrasil*" -Depth 4 |
  ForEach-Object { "YGGDRASIL BINARY: $($_.FullName)" | Out-File $out -Append }

# 2. MythicRatatoskr C2 domain evidence in DNS cache
"`n[2] C2 Domain Resolution Evidence" | Out-File $out -Append
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $_.Entry -match 'egyptanimals\.com|uztickets\.com|adomd\.net|massgravel\.net' } |
  ForEach-Object { "DNS HIT: $($_.Entry) -> $($_.Data)" | Out-File $out -Append }

# 3. Armorsteal: staged Python environments + suspicious persistence in user-writable paths
"`n[3] Armorsteal Python Staging & Persistence" | Out-File $out -Append
Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Programs","$env:APPDATA","$env:TEMP" -Recurse -Include "python.exe","pythonw.exe","*.pyc" -Depth 4 |
  ForEach-Object { "STAGED PYTHON: $($_.FullName)" | Out-File $out -Append }
Get-ItemProperty "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run","HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" |
  ForEach-Object { $_.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Value -match 'python|AppData|Temp' } |
    ForEach-Object { "SUSPICIOUS RUN KEY: $($_.Name) = $($_.Value)" | Out-File $out -Append } }
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Actions.Execute -match 'python|powershell' -and $_.Actions.Arguments -match 'AppData|Temp|http' } |
  ForEach-Object { "SUSPICIOUS TASK: $($_.TaskName) -> $($_.Actions.Execute) $($_.Actions.Arguments)" | Out-File $out -Append }

# 4. Known-bad hash sweep (sample from OTX pulses — extend with full 86-indicator set)
"`n[4] Hash Sweep (OTX IOC sample)" | Out-File $out -Append
$badSha1 = @('01855153ca7a33ad5ff36451de5612dfba0dd2ca','028ca11f3f0d8396043af7bf756231fc2f50f829',
'09c816697c0c2aff9b4ff58681558ca30d04c9cd','131a371a1e4ee78ec3b2863607c99290ec3b58a6',
'4e3e6577866e4ce2ed73ca089700ae04230e768f','02794f7c99c69ea166979cff84ebc13fdea425ee','0f4a02a9c79423fcfc344455c8c99f926f7eee2e')
Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:USERPROFILE\Downloads","$env:TEMP","$env:APPDATA","$env:LOCALAPPDATA" -Recurse -File -Depth 4 |
  ForEach-Object { $h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA1).Hash.ToLower()
    if ($badSha1 -contains $h) { "MALICIOUS FILE: $($_.FullName) SHA1=$h" | Out-File $out -Append } }

# 5. Active outbound connections from python/powershell (live exfil check)
"`n[5] Active Suspicious Connections" | Out-File $out -Append
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object {
  ($_.OwningProcess | ForEach-Object { (Get-Process -Id $_).Name }) -match 'python|powershell' } |
  ForEach-Object { "OUTBOUND: PID $($_.OwningProcess) -> $($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)" | Out-File $out -Append }

"=== HUNT COMPLETE $(Get-Date -Format o) ===" | Out-File $out -Append
Write-Host "Hunt complete. Review $out and escalate any hits to IR immediately."

5. Response Priorities

Immediate (0–4 hours):

  • Block egyptanimals.com, uztickets.com, adomd.net, and massgravel.net at DNS, proxy, and EDR network layers.
  • Push all 86 file-hash indicators (59 MythicRatatoskr, 26 Armorsteal, 1 token-campaign SHA256) into EDR blocklists and sweep 30 days of historical telemetry for retroactive matches.
  • Alert on any Yggdrasil overlay artifacts: IPv6 addresses in 0200::/7, yggdrasil.exe/yggdrasilctl.exe processes, and unexpected IPv6 tunnel interfaces. Any SDelete execution is an automatic critical-severity escalation.
  • For the identity campaign: revoke sessions and force re-authentication for any Entra ID account with successful sign-ins from 1337 Services GmbH IP space; audit inbox rules, forwarding, and OAuth grants created in the July–September 2026 window.

Within 24 hours:

  • Armorsteal is a credential/token stealer with clipboard hijacking — treat every host with a massgravel.net resolution or Pyarmor-style Python staging as fully credential-compromised. Reset all credentials reachable from those hosts, revoke stored browser session tokens, rotate any cryptocurrency wallet keys or exchange credentials used on the device, and invalidate M365 refresh tokens.
  • Run the KQL identity query across the full 90-day lookback; any session ID appearing from multiple source IPs indicates replay — disable the account pending investigation.
  • Agriculture, grain logistics, and Ukraine-adjacent organizations: assume targeted spearphishing. Detonate any MATCHWOK-adjacent attachments received since mid-2025.

Within 1 week:

  • Egress hardening: Enforce IPv6 egress policy (deny-by-default to 0200::/7 and unapproved overlay networks). MythicRatatoskr exists precisely because most enterprises monitor IPv4 only.
  • Script execution control: Deploy PowerShell Constrained Language Mode and script-block logging enterprise-wide; alert on user-initiated iex/irm download cradles — the Armorsteal kill chain dies if users cannot pipe remote scripts to execution.
  • Identity architecture: Migrate priority users to phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) — AiTM relays cannot replay what is cryptographically bound to the origin. Enable token protection / Continuous Access Evaluation and alert on token replay signals in Entra ID Protection.
  • Detection deployment: Push the Sigma rules and KQL queries above into production; tune the Python execution rule against your developer baseline before enabling blocking.

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