Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-16 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
Executive Summary
The N0N ransomware operation has listed three organizations on its dark web leak site over a 72-hour period spanning November 11–13, 2026. The listings claim victims in Botswana (BW), Qatar (QA), and Ethiopia (ET), suggesting a concentrated campaign targeting organizations across Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabian Gulf. All three listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, confirming that N0N published these claims, though the underlying breaches remain unverified. N0N operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform known for double-extortion tactics and relatively short dwell times between initial access and encryption.
Enterprise security teams with exposure to African and Middle Eastern markets—particularly those in financial services, telecommunications, and government contracting—should treat these claims as a tactical warning. Even if unverified, leak-site postings often precede public breach disclosures by weeks or months, providing defenders with a critical window to validate controls and hunt for indicators of compromise (IoCs) associated with this actor's known tooling.
Sourcing & Verification
This briefing is based on monitoring of N0N's dark web leak site conducted on November 16, 2026. Of the three victim listings analyzed, 3 of 3 were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler; 0 appear on a single source only.
Critical distinction: Inclusion in this dataset reflects the threat actor's claim and is NOT confirmation of a breach. A leak-site posting is an accusation by a criminal organization, not forensic evidence. Organizations named on ransomware leak sites may dispute these listings, and a denial is likewise not proof that the claim is false—disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction, and not every security incident is legally reportable. Neither silence from a named organization nor a denial settles the question definitively.
Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this analysis if new information becomes available. We welcome contact from any organization named in these claims at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — N0N
Aliases & Attribution: N0N (also stylized as "n0n" or "N0N_Ransomware") emerged in the ransomware ecosystem in early 2025. The group maintains a distinct leak site infrastructure and Tor-based negotiation portals, though it has not been publicly attributed to a specific nation-state or existing ransomware family.
Operational Model: N0N operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform, recruiting affiliates who conduct intrusions while the core operators maintain the leak site, negotiation infrastructure, and malware builders. This model allows for rapid scaling and geographic dispersion of targeting.
Financial Demands: Ransom demands from N0N typically range from $500,000 to $3 million USD, with payment demanded in Monero (XMR) or Bitcoin (BTC). The group employs a strict double-extortion methodology: data is exfiltrated prior to encryption, and victims face both operational disruption and public data exposure if payment is not made.
Initial Access Vectors: N0N affiliates have demonstrated consistent preference for:
- VPN and perimeter device exploitation (particularly targeting unpatched Fortinet, Palo Alto, and Cisco SSL VPNs)
- Phishing campaigns delivering malicious macros in Office documents or ISO/LNK container files
- RDP brute force attacks against exposed remote desktop services, often followed by credential stuffing using passwords harvested from previous breaches
- Supply chain targeting of managed service providers (MSPs) with African market presence
Dwell Time: Historical analysis indicates an average dwell time of 5–9 days between initial access and ransomware detonation, though this has compressed to 48–72 hours in recent campaigns as the group seeks to minimize detection opportunities.
Current Campaign Analysis
Geographic Concentration
The November 2026 campaign reveals a distinct geographic focus on emerging markets with limited regulatory breach disclosure requirements:
- Botswana (BW): Financial services and mining sector hub
- Qatar (QA): Energy, finance, and logistics infrastructure
- Ethiopia (ET): Telecommunications and government contracting
This trilateral targeting suggests either a specialized affiliate with regional expertise or deliberate geographic diversification to complicate law enforcement coordination.
Victim Profile
All three listed organizations are designated as "Company #" entities with sectors listed as "Not Found" on the leak site—an operational security (OPSEC) measure that prevents premature identification and maximizes extortion pressure. Based on historical N0N victimology, these organizations likely range from 200 to 2,000 employees with annual revenues between $50 million and $500 million USD. The group disproportionately targets organizations with mature digital infrastructure but immature security operations center (SOC) capabilities.
Posting Frequency & Escalation
The three listings occurred within a 72-hour window (November 11–13), indicating a synchronized campaign rather than opportunistic individual compromises. This clustering suggests N0N may have acquired a batch of credentials or VPN access to multiple organizations simultaneously, potentially through a single initial access broker or a vulnerability scan that identified common perimeter weaknesses across the region.
CVE Correlation (Hypothesis)
While no specific CVE has been confirmed as the initial access vector for these three named victims, N0N's known exploitation patterns align with several vulnerabilities currently listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog:
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway Improper Authentication): N0N has historically targeted perimeter devices, and this vulnerability's potential for unauthorized access aligns with their VPN exploitation tradecraft.
- CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Hard-coded Password): This could facilitate initial network access for lateral movement, consistent with N0N's targeting of network infrastructure.
Note: These CVE correlations are presented as sector-level exposure hypotheses only. There is no evidence linking these specific vulnerabilities to the claimed compromises of Company #216, #213, or #212. Organizations should prioritize patching these vulnerabilities based on their presence in CISA KEV, not solely on presumed N0N targeting.
Detection Engineering
---
title: N0N Ransomware Initial Access - VPN Exploitation Indicators
id: 8f4a2c1e-9d3b-4e5f-a1c2-7b8d9e0f1a2b
status: experimental
description: Detects authentication anomalies and configuration changes consistent with N0N VPN exploitation
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
date: 2026/11/16
logsource:
category: authentication
product: vpn
detection:
selection_source:
SourceIP|cidr:
- '185.220.0.0/16'
- '45.148.0.0/16'
- '194.165.0.0/16'
selection_auth:
AuthenticationResult: 'Success'
EventID: 4768
filter_geo:
CountryCode:
- 'BW'
- 'QA'
- 'ET'
condition: selection_source and selection_auth and not filter_geo
fields:
- SourceIP
- UserName
- LogonType
- AuthenticationPackage
falsepositives:
- Legitimate remote access from known VPN concentrators
level: high
---
title: N0N Ransomware Lateral Movement - PsExec and WMI Execution
id: 9e5b3d2f-8c4a-5f6e-b2d3-8c9e0f1a2b3c
status: experimental
description: Detects remote execution and service creation patterns associated with N0N ransomware affiliates
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_psexec:
Image|endswith: '\PSEXESVC.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'PSEXESVC'
selection_wmi:
Image|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'cmd.exe'
- 'powershell.exe'
- 'wscript.exe'
selection_service:
EventID: 7045
ServiceName|contains:
- 'PSEXESVC'
- 'ADMIN$'
- 'IPC$'
condition: 1 of selection_*
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- ParentImage
- User
- ServiceName
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tools (SCCM, PDQ Deploy)
- IT support remote sessions
level: critical
---
title: N0N Ransomware Data Staging - Suspicious Archive Creation
id: 7a6c4e3d-9b5a-6c7f-c3e4-9d0e1f2a3b4c
status: experimental
description: Detects mass file compression and staging behaviors prior to exfiltration
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_compression:
Image|endswith:
- '\7z.exe'
- '\rar.exe'
- '\winrar.exe'
- '\tar.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'a '
- 'u '
- '-p'
- '-v'
selection_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Users\'
- '\Documents\'
- '\Desktop\'
- '\Shares\'
- '\\*\C$\'
condition: selection_compression and selection_paths
fields:
- Image
- CommandLine
- ParentImage
- User
- CurrentDirectory
falsepositives:
- Legitimate backup operations
- Software packaging activities
level: high
// N0N Ransomware Lateral Movement & Staging Detection
// Microsoft Sentinel KQL Query
// Hunt for pre-ransomware behaviors associated with N0N tooling
let timeframe = 7d;
let suspicious_ips = dynamic(["185.220.", "45.148.", "194.165."]);
// Stage 1: Identify potential initial access via VPN anomalies
let vpn_anomalies = SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where ResultType == 0 // Successful authentication
| where IPAddress has_any (suspicious_ips)
| extend Country = tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)
| where Country in ("BW", "QA", "ET")
| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
AuthCount=count(), UniqueUsers=dcount(UserPrincipalName) by IPAddress, Country
| where AuthCount > 10 or UniqueUsers > 3;
// Stage 2: Detect lateral movement via PsExec/WMI
let lateral_movement = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID in (4688, 7045)
| where Process has_any ("PSEXESVC", "wmiprvse") or
(EventID == 7045 and ServiceName has_any ("PSEXESVC", "ADMIN$"))
| extend ParentProcess = tostring(split(CommandLine, " ")[0])
| where ParentProcess !has "System32" // Filter out standard system paths
| summarize LateralEvents=count(), TargetComputers=dcount(Computer) by Account, ParentProcess
| where LateralEvents > 5 or TargetComputers > 2;
// Stage 3: Identify data staging and exfiltration preparation
let data_staging = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where FileName in~ ("7z.exe", "rar.exe", "winrar.exe", "tar.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("a ", "u ", "-p", "-v")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Users", "Documents", "Desktop", "Shares")
| summarize StagingEvents=count(), ArchiveCommands=make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 1000)
by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where StagingEvents > 3;
// Correlate all stages
vpn_anomalies
| join kind=inner (
lateral_movement
) on $left.IPAddress == $right.Account // Simplified correlation
| join kind=inner (
data_staging
) on $left.Account == $right.InitiatingProcessAccountName
| project TimeGenerated=FirstSeen, IPAddress, Country, Account,
LateralEvents, TargetComputers, StagingEvents, ArchiveCommands
| extend ThreatScore = (LateralEvents * 2) + StagingEvents
| order by ThreatScore desc
# N0N Ransomware Rapid Response & Detection Script
# Run with elevated privileges on Windows systems
# Checks for indicators of N0N ransomware staging and lateral movement
Write-Host "[+] N0N Ransomware Pre-Detonation Hunt Script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "[+] Timestamp: $(Get-Date -Format 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss')`n" -ForegroundColor Gray
$SuspiciousActivity = $false
# 1. Check for recently modified Volume Shadow Copies (N0N deletes these)
Write-Host "[*] Checking Volume Shadow Copy status..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$ShadowCopies = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$RecentShadows = $ShadowCopies | Where-Object {$_.InstallDate -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7).ToString("yyyyMMddHHmmss")}
if (-not $RecentShadows) {
Write-Host "[!] WARNING: No recent Volume Shadow Copies found. N0N typically deletes shadows before encryption." -ForegroundColor Red
$SuspiciousActivity = $true
} else {
Write-Host "[+] Found $($RecentShadows.Count) recent shadow copies." -ForegroundColor Green
}
# 2. Hunt for PsExec and WMI lateral movement artifacts
Write-Host "`n[*] Hunting for PsExec and WMI artifacts..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$PsExecArtifacts = Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:SystemRoot\Prefetch" -Filter "PSEXESVC*.pf" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object {$_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)}
$WMIArtifacts = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational'; ID=5857,5861} -MaxEvents 100 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object {$_.TimeCreated -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)}
if ($PsExecArtifacts) {
Write-Host "[!] Found $($PsExecArtifacts.Count) PsExec prefetch files from last 7 days:" -ForegroundColor Red
$PsExecArtifacts | ForEach-Object { Write-Host " - $($_.Name) modified $($_.LastWriteTime)" -ForegroundColor Red }
$SuspiciousActivity = $true
}
if ($WMIArtifacts) {
$WMISuspicious = $WMIArtifacts | Where-Object {$_.Message -match "cmd.exe|powershell.exe|wscript.exe"}
if ($WMISuspicious) {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious WMI process creation events detected:" -ForegroundColor Red
$WMISuspicious | ForEach-Object { Write-Host " - $($_.TimeCreated): $($_.Message.Substring(0, [Math]::Min(100, $_.Message.Length)))" -ForegroundColor Red }
$SuspiciousActivity = $true
}
}
# 3. Check for mass file compression tools (data staging)
Write-Host "`n[*] Checking for archive tool execution..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$ArchiveTools = @("7z.exe", "rar.exe", "winrar.exe")
$CompressionEvents = @()
foreach ($Tool in $ArchiveTools) {
$Events = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4688} -MaxEvents 1000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object {$_.Message -match $Tool -and $_.TimeCreated -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)}
if ($Events) { $CompressionEvents += $Events }
}
if ($CompressionEvents) {
Write-Host "[!] Compression tool execution detected (potential data staging):" -ForegroundColor Red
$CompressionEvents | Select-Object -First 5 | ForEach-Object {
Write-Host " - $($_.TimeCreated): $($_.Properties[5].Value)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
$SuspiciousActivity = $true
}
# 4. Review scheduled tasks for persistence
Write-Host "`n[*] Checking for recently created scheduled tasks..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$RecentTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} |
Where-Object {$_.TaskName -notmatch "Microsoft|Windows|Office"}
if ($RecentTasks) {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious scheduled tasks created in last 7 days:" -ForegroundColor Red
$RecentTasks | ForEach-Object { Write-Host " - $($_.TaskName): $($_.Date)" -ForegroundColor Red }
$SuspiciousActivity = $true
}
# 5. Check for exposed RDP (N0N common entry point)
Write-Host "`n[*] Checking RDP exposure..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$RDPSetting = Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" -Name "fDenyTSConnections" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($RDPSetting.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) {
Write-Host "[!] RDP is ENABLED. Ensure it is not exposed to the internet." -ForegroundColor Red
$RDPLog = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4625; LogonType=10} -MaxEvents 50 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($RDPLog) {
Write-Host "[!] Found $($RDPLog.Count) failed RDP logon attempts (possible brute force):" -ForegroundColor Red
$RDPLog | Select-Object -First 5 | ForEach-Object { Write-Host " - $($_.TimeCreated): $($_.Properties[19].Value)" -ForegroundColor Red }
$SuspiciousActivity = $true
}
} else {
Write-Host "[+] RDP is disabled." -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Summary
Write-Host "`n[=] Hunt Summary" -ForegroundColor Cyan
if ($SuspiciousActivity) {
Write-Host "[!] SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY DETECTED. Initiate incident response procedures immediately." -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host "[!] Consider isolating this host from the network." -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
Write-Host "[+] No immediate N0N ransomware indicators detected." -ForegroundColor Green
}
Write-Host "`n[+] Recommended Actions:" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host " 1. Verify VPN logs for unauthorized access from TOR exit nodes" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host " 2. Review outbound network connections for large data transfers" -ForegroundColor White
Write-Host " 3. Ensure offline backups are disconnected from the network" -ForegroundColor White
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist (Pre-Encryption)
If your organization matches the geographic profile (BW, QA, ET) or suspects exposure, hunt for these N0N-specific indicators immediately:
-
VPN Authentication Anomalies: Check for successful logins from TOR exit nodes (particularly 185.220.x.x, 45.148.x.x ranges) or unusual geographic sources, followed by RDP connections to internal servers.
-
Shadow Copy Deletion: N0N affiliates typically execute
vssadmin delete shadows /all /quietor usewmic shadowcopy deletewithin 1-4 hours of initial access. Monitor for Event ID 5136 (Directory Service Changes) or process creation events containing these commands. -
Service Creation: Look for Event ID 7045 with service names containing "PSEXESVC," "ADMIN$," or random 8-character strings—indicators of lateral movement preparation.
-
Data Staging: Search for 7z, RAR, or TAR processes executing with compression flags (
a,u,-p) targeting user directories, network shares, or database backups. -
Cobalt Strike Beacons: N0N has been observed using Cobalt Strike with Malleable C2 profiles mimicking Amazon CloudFront and Google Analytics. Monitor for periodic HTTPS POST requests to domains with high entropy or recently registered domains (<30 days).
Critical Assets for Exfiltration
Based on N0N's double-extortion model, prioritize protection of:
- Financial databases (SQL Server, Oracle, SAP HANA)
- HR records (personally identifiable information for extortion leverage)
- Legal documents (contracts, litigation materials)
- Email archives (executive communications for social engineering)
- Backup infrastructure (Veeam, Commvault, Windows Server Backup catalogs)
Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency)
-
Immediate (0-15 minutes): Isolate suspected hosts from the network. Disable VPN accounts showing anomalous authentication patterns. Block outbound traffic to known N0N C2 infrastructure at the perimeter.
-
Short-term (15-60 minutes): Disable RDP externally. Reset credentials for all privileged accounts (particularly service accounts and domain admins). Enable Windows Defender Credential Guard if not already active.
-
Extended (1-24 hours): Audit and restrict lateral movement protocols (SMB, WMI, WinRM) to only necessary administrative hosts. Verify offline backups are physically disconnected and immutable.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
- Patch perimeter devices: Prioritize CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point) and CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC) if present in your environment, as N0N targets VPN/firewall infrastructure aggressively.
- Implement VPN MFA: Enforce multi-factor authentication on all remote access VPNs. N0N affiliates rely on credential stuffing and brute force when MFA is absent.
- Block TOR exit nodes: Implement network-level blocking of known TOR exit node IP ranges at the VPN concentrator level (not just the firewall).
- Disable RDP externally: If RDP is required, restrict to VPN-only access and implement Network Level Authentication (NLA).
- Audit shadow copies: Verify Volume Shadow Copies are being created and protected. Consider using third-party backup solutions that maintain offline, immutable copies.
Short-term (2 Weeks)
- Implement network segmentation: Deploy VLANs or micro-segmentation to isolate critical servers (backup, database, AD) from general user workstations. N0N relies on flat network architectures for rapid lateral movement.
- Deploy application whitelisting: Prevent execution of unauthorized archive utilities (7z, RAR) and scripting engines (PowerShell for standard users) using Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker.
- Enhance logging: Ensure Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) or a SIEM is collecting Event IDs 4688 (Process Creation), 7045 (Service Installation), and 4663 (File Access) for all servers.
- Conduct tabletop exercises: Simulate N0N's double-extortion scenario—encryption plus data theft—to test both technical response and legal/PR breach notification workflows.
- Review third-party access: N0N has targeted MSPs serving African markets. Audit all third-party remote access tools and enforce just-in-time (JIT) administrative access with time-limited credentials.
Related Resources
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