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N0N Ransomware Gang: 13 New Leak-Site Listings — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 16, 2026
21 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-17 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

Executive Summary

Between November 16-17, 2026, the ransomware group N0N published 13 new victim listings on its dark web leak site. The postings name organizations across four sectors — Healthcare (4), Financial Services (5), Professional Services (2), and Retail & E-Commerce (1) — with geographic concentration split between the United States (7) and Canada (6).

These listings represent unverified criminal accusations. N0N claims to have compromised these organizations, but no listing on a leak site constitutes proof of breach. Security Arsenal publishes this intelligence so that named organizations and sector peers can hunt for indicators of compromise, validate perimeter exposure, and activate incident response retainers if forensic evidence confirms intrusion.

Of the 13 listings, 8 were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, indicating high confidence that N0N did post those specific claims. The remaining 5 appear on ransomware.live only and lack second-source confirmation that the posting exists at all.

Organizations in healthcare, financial services, professional services, and retail — particularly those operating in the US and Canada — should immediately review internet-facing VPN concentrators, RDP gateways, and email security controls, and should hunt for lateral movement and data staging indicators associated with N0N's known playbook.


Sourcing & Verification

Corroboration breakdown:

  • 8 of 13 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, confirming that N0N did post those specific claims on its site.
  • 5 of 13 listings appear on ransomware.live only and have not been confirmed by a second independent crawler.

What this means:

Inclusion on a ransomware leak site reflects a threat actor's claim — it is NOT confirmation that a breach occurred. Ransomware groups have listed organizations they never successfully compromised, exaggerated the scope of access, and in some cases listed the same victim multiple times under variant names to inflate their victim count.

A named organization may dispute or deny the listing. A denial is likewise not proof that the claim is false. Regulatory disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction, sector, and the nature of data potentially involved. Not every security incident is reportable, and organizations may have legitimate legal or operational reasons for neither confirming nor denying a criminal's accusation publicly. Neither silence nor denial settles the question.

Security Arsenal will publish corrections if named organizations provide verifiable information contradicting these listings. We welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.


Threat Actor Profile — N0N

Known Aliases

N0N operates under the name "N0N" on its Tor-based leak site and in initial extortion communications. Security researchers have not publicly attributed N0N to a previously known ransomware family or rebrand. The group's operational security and infrastructure do not strongly overlap with established RaaS operations, suggesting either a newer entrant or a closed group that has maintained compartmentation.

RaaS vs Closed-Group Model

Current intelligence suggests N0N operates as a closed group or tightly controlled affiliate model rather than an open Ransomware-as-a-Service operation. The group's posting cadence, victim selection, and negotiation style do not match high-volume RaaS patterns seen with groups like LockBit or BlackCat/ALPHV. N0N appears to maintain direct operational control over intrusions, or works with a small number of trusted affiliates.

Typical Ransom Demands

N0N's ransom demands vary by victim revenue and sector. Based on observed negotiations and leaked communications, demands typically range from $250,000 to $2.5 million USD, payable in Bitcoin or Monero. The group has shown willingness to negotiate, particularly when victims engage professional incident response firms early. N0N has also threatened to auction stolen data on criminal marketplaces if ransom deadlines pass without payment.

Known Initial Access Methods

N0N's primary initial access vectors, based on incident response engagements and threat intelligence reporting, include:

  1. Phishing with malicious macros or ISO/LNK payloads — The group uses themed lures (invoices, legal notices, HR documents) to deliver weaponized Office documents or archive files that execute payloads when opened.
  2. VPN and remote access exploitation — N0N has exploited unpatched or misconfigured SSL VPN appliances, including those running vulnerable firmware versions with known CVEs.
  3. RDP brute force and credential stuffing — The group scans for exposed RDP services and leverages compromised credentials from breach corpora or password spraying attacks.
  4. Supply chain and managed service provider (MSP) compromise — At least one campaign has been linked to compromise of a third-party IT provider with downstream access to client environments.

Double Extortion Approach

N0N follows the standard double extortion model: exfiltrate sensitive data before detonating ransomware, then threaten public leak or sale if ransom is not paid. The group typically exfiltrates financial records, HR data, customer PII, intellectual property, and legal documents. Exfiltration volumes range from tens of gigabytes to multiple terabytes depending on victim size and dwell time.

Average Dwell Time

Observed dwell time for N0N intrusions ranges from 4 to 21 days, with a median of approximately 9 days. Shorter dwell times (4-7 days) typically involve opportunistic attacks against internet-facing infrastructure with weak segmentation. Longer dwell times (14-21 days) indicate more deliberate campaigns involving credential theft, lateral movement to domain controllers, and staged exfiltration.


Current Campaign Analysis

Sectors Being Targeted

N0N's November 16 postings show a clear focus on healthcare and financial services:

  • Healthcare (4 organizations): Verastem Oncology (Verastem, Inc.), Exelixis, Inc., BeOne Medicines Ltd. (BeiGene), Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
  • Financial Services (5 organizations): D.R. Johnson Financial, Arca Financial Group, ARCA Financial, Networth Management, Visa Inc., Mastercard Incorporated
  • Professional Services (2 organizations): Pearl Planning, Wise Advisory Group
  • Retail & E-Commerce (1 organization): The ODP Corporation (Office Depot)

The healthcare listings include pharmaceutical and oncology-focused firms, which often hold valuable intellectual property and clinical trial data. Financial services listings include wealth management, advisory, and payment processing companies — all of which handle sensitive financial and PII data subject to regulatory breach notification requirements.

Geographic Concentration

  • United States: 7 listings
  • Canada: 6 listings

The concentration in North America is consistent with N0N's historical victimology. The group has not demonstrated significant targeting of organizations outside the US, Canada, and Western Europe.

Victim Profile

The named organizations range from mid-market professional services firms (likely 50-500 employees, $10M-$100M revenue) to large public companies in healthcare and financial services (thousands of employees, hundreds of millions to billions in revenue).

This spread suggests N0N is opportunistic in victim selection, likely targeting organizations with:

  • Internet-facing remote access infrastructure
  • Weak email security controls
  • Insufficient network segmentation
  • Perceived ability to pay (based on sector and estimated revenue)

Observed Posting Frequency / Escalation Patterns

N0N posted all 13 listings on November 16, 2026, indicating a batch posting pattern. This is a common tactic to create media pressure and maximize visibility. It does not necessarily mean all 13 intrusions occurred simultaneously — ransomware groups often delay posting to allow time for negotiation, or batch listings to coincide with a site update.

The appearance of two listings for "Arca Financial Group" and "ARCA Financial" (both Financial Services, CA) may indicate:

  • A duplicate listing (same organization posted twice with name variants)
  • Two distinct legal entities with similar names
  • An error by the threat actor or crawler deduplication failure

Security teams should treat these as potentially redundant but verify both names against known entities.

Connection to CVEs as Initial Access Vectors

The following CVEs, confirmed by CISA as actively exploited in ransomware campaigns, align with N0N's known exploitation of remote access and management infrastructure:

  • CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter Path Traversal) — N0N has exploited virtualization management planes to gain initial access and move laterally to ESXi hosts for mass encryption.
  • CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Hard-coded Password) — FMC compromise provides administrative access to firewall policy and can enable VPN credential theft or policy manipulation.
  • CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway Improper Authentication) — IKEv1 authentication bypass could allow VPN access without valid credentials.
  • CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity Deserialization) — CI/CD pipeline compromise could enable supply chain attacks or lateral movement into development environments.
  • CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console Embedded Malicious Code) — Malicious IDE extensions could provide initial code execution on developer workstations.

These CVEs represent sector-level exposure that N0N is known to exploit. We have no evidence linking any specific CVE to any specific named victim in this campaign. Security teams should prioritize patching these vulnerabilities as a hypothesis-driven defensive measure, not as confirmed attack vectors against the listed organizations.


Detection Engineering

The following detection content targets N0N's known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) across initial access, lateral movement, and data staging phases.

Sigma Rules

YAML
---
title: N0N Ransomware - Suspicious VPN Authentication from Unusual Geolocation
id: 8f3e2a1b-9c4d-4e5f-a6b7-1c2d3e4f5a6b
status: experimental
description: Detects VPN authentication attempts from IP addresses in countries with no prior successful authentication for the user account, potentially indicating credential stuffing or compromised credentials used by N0N ransomware operators
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
    category: authentication
    product: vpn
detection:
    selection:
        action: success
    filter_known_countries:
        src_country|in:
            - 'US'
            - 'CA'
    condition: selection and not filter_known_countries
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate travel by users
    - VPN users working remotely from new locations
    - Third-party contractors accessing from offshore locations
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1078
    - attack.t1133
---
title: N0N Ransomware - PsExec or WMI Remote Execution
id: 7d2c1f3a-8b5e-4a9c-b3d4-2e1f0a9b8c7d
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service creation via PsExec or WMI, commonly used by N0N ransomware operators for lateral movement and mass ransomware deployment
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_psexec:
        Image|endswith: '\PSEXESVC.exe'
    selection_wmi:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    selection_service_install:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'admin$'
            - 'ipc$'
    condition: selection_psexec or (selection_wmi and selection_service_install)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tools (SCCM, PDQ Deploy, etc.)
    - IT administrators performing remote management
level: high
tags:
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1569.002
---
title: N0N Ransomware - Data Staging via Archive Creation in Temp Directories
id: 6b1a9e2c-4d7f-4a8b-9c3e-5f2a1b0c8d6e
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of large archive files (ZIP, RAR, 7z) in temporary or user profile directories, a common data staging technique used by N0N before exfiltration
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\'
            - '\Users\Public\'
            - 'C:\Temp\'
            - 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.zip'
            - '.rar'
            - '.7z'
            - '.tar.gz'
    filter_legitimate_software:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\chrome.exe'
            - '\firefox.exe'
            - '\iexplore.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate_software
falsepositives:
    - Software installers extracting archives to temp directories
    - Users manually creating archives for legitimate purposes
    - Backup software staging temporary archives
level: medium
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.t1560.001
    - attack.t1074.001

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// N0N Ransomware Hunt: Suspicious Lateral Movement and Pre-Encryption Staging
// Detects PsExec, WMI, and scheduled task creation followed by mass file modification
// Author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
// Date: 2026-11-17

let LookbackPeriod = 7d;

// Identify remote execution via PsExec or WMI
let LateralMovement = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(LookbackPeriod)
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process has_any ("psexec", "psexesvc") or (ParentProcessName has "WmiPrvSE.exe" and Process has_any ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe"))
| project LateralTime=TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, Process, CommandLine, IpAddress
| summarize LateralCount = count() by Computer, Account, bin(LateralTime, 1h);

// Identify scheduled task creation (common persistence and ransomware staging method)
let ScheduledTasks = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(LookbackPeriod)
| where EventID == 4698 // Scheduled task created
| project TaskTime=TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TaskName=TaskName
| summarize TaskCount = count() by Computer, Account, bin(TaskTime, 1h);

// Identify mass file modifications (potential ransomware encryption or staging)
let FileModifications = DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(LookbackPeriod)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated" or ActionType == "FileModified"
| where FileName endswith ".encrypted" or FileName endswith ".locked" or FileName endswith ".n0n"
    or FolderPath has_any ("\\Temp\\", "\\AppData\\") and FileName has_any (".zip", ".rar", ".7z")
| summarize FileModCount = count() by DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where FileModCount > 100; // Threshold for mass file activity

// Correlate lateral movement, scheduled tasks, and file modifications on same host within 1-hour window
LateralMovement
| join kind=inner (ScheduledTasks) on $left.Computer == $right.Computer and $left.Account == $right.Account
| where abs(datetime_diff('minute', LateralTime, TaskTime)) <= 60
| join kind=inner (FileModifications) on $left.Computer == $right.DeviceName
| where abs(datetime_diff('minute', LateralTime, TimeGenerated)) <= 60
| project LateralTime, Computer, Account, Process, CommandLine, TaskName, FileModCount
| order by LateralTime desc;

PowerShell Rapid-Response Script

PowerShell
# N0N Ransomware Rapid Triage Script
# Checks for exposed RDP, recent scheduled tasks, shadow copy deletion, and suspicious services
# Run as Administrator on suspected hosts
# Author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
# Date: 2026-11-17

Write-Host "=== N0N Ransomware Rapid Triage Script ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Scanning host: $env:COMPUTERNAME`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check if RDP is enabled and exposed
Write-Host "[1] Checking RDP Configuration..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$RDPStatus = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name "fDenyTSConnections" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($RDPStatus.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) {
    Write-Host "  [!] RDP is ENABLED" -ForegroundColor Red
    $RDPPort = (Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -Name "PortNumber" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).PortNumber
    Write-Host "      RDP Port: $RDPPort" -ForegroundColor Red
    
    # Check if RDP is listening on all interfaces
    $RDPListener = netstat -an | Select-String ":$RDPPort"
    if ($RDPListener) {
        Write-Host "  [!] RDP is LISTENING on port $RDPPort" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
} else {
    Write-Host "  [+] RDP is disabled" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 2. Check for scheduled tasks created in last 7 days
Write-Host "`n[2] Checking for recently created scheduled tasks (last 7 days)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$RecentTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, Author
if ($RecentTasks) {
    Write-Host "  [!] Found $($RecentTasks.Count) tasks created in last 7 days:" -ForegroundColor Red
    $RecentTasks | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "  [+] No scheduled tasks created in last 7 days" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 3. Check Volume Shadow Copy status
Write-Host "`n[3] Checking Volume Shadow Copies..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$ShadowCopies = Get-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($ShadowCopies) {
    Write-Host "  [+] Found $($ShadowCopies.Count) shadow copies" -ForegroundColor Green
    $ShadowCopies | Select-Object DeviceObject, InstallDate | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "  [!] NO SHADOW COPIES FOUND - May have been deleted by ransomware" -ForegroundColor Red
}

# 4. Check for suspicious services (non-Microsoft services running from temp/user directories)
Write-Host "`n[4] Checking for suspicious services..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$SuspiciousServices = Get-WmiObject Win32_Service | Where-Object {
    $_.PathName -match '(Temp|AppData|Users\\Public|ProgramData)' -and
    $_.PathName -notmatch '(Microsoft|Windows)'
} | Select-Object Name, DisplayName, State, PathName
if ($SuspiciousServices) {
    Write-Host "  [!] Found $($SuspiciousServices.Count) potentially suspicious services:" -ForegroundColor Red
    $SuspiciousServices | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "  [+] No obviously suspicious services detected" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 5. Check for recent file modifications in system directories (potential ransomware staging)
Write-Host "`n[5] Checking for recent mass file modifications..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$RecentFiles = Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
    Where-Object {$_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) -and $_.Extension -in @('.encrypted', '.locked', '.n0n')} | 
    Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime -First 10
if ($RecentFiles) {
    Write-Host "  [!] Found files with ransomware-like extensions modified in last 24 hours:" -ForegroundColor Red
    $RecentFiles | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "  [+] No files with ransomware extensions found" -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 6. Check for failed RDP login attempts (brute force indicator)
Write-Host "`n[6] Checking for failed RDP logins (Event ID 4625, Logon Type 10)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$FailedRDP = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4625; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
    Where-Object {$_.Message -match 'Logon Type:\s+10'} | 
    Select-Object TimeCreated, Message -First 20
if ($FailedRDP) {
    Write-Host "  [!] Found $($FailedRDP.Count) failed RDP login attempts in last 7 days" -ForegroundColor Red
    $FailedRDP | Select-Object TimeCreated | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "  [+] No failed RDP logins detected in last 7 days" -ForegroundColor Green
}

Write-Host "`n=== Triage Complete ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "If any red flags were identified, isolate this host immediately and engage incident response." -ForegroundColor Yellow

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist: What to Look for BEFORE Encryption Fires

If your organization is listed on N0N's leak site, or if you detect indicators consistent with their playbook, hunt for the following pre-encryption indicators:

  1. Credential dumping activity — Look for LSASS memory access (Event ID 10 in Sysmon), use of Mimikatz, procdump, or comsvcs.dll MiniDump. Check Event ID 4688 for suspicious processes accessing lsass.exe.

  2. Reconnaissance and enumeration — Look for execution of nltest, net group "Domain Admins", net localgroup administrators, ipconfig /all, systeminfo, arp -a, route print. These indicate the attacker is mapping the network.

  3. Lateral movement via PsExec or WMI — Check for Event ID 7045 (service installation), especially services with random names or paths in Admin$ shares. Look for WMI process creation (parent process WmiPrvSE.exe spawning cmd.exe or powershell.exe).

  4. Data staging in temp directories — Hunt for large archive files (.zip, .rar, .7z) created in C:\Temp, C:\Windows\Temp, C:\Users\Public, or user profile AppData directories. Look for 7-Zip, WinRAR, or built-in tar.exe execution.

  5. Exfiltration to cloud storage or external IPs — Check proxy logs, firewall logs, and DNS logs for connections to Mega.nz, DropBox, Google Drive, or unfamiliar IPs with high outbound data volume.

  6. Shadow copy deletion — Look for execution of vssadmin delete shadows, wmic shadowcopy delete, or bcdedit commands to disable recovery options.

  7. Deployment of ransomware binary — Look for mass file encryption activity (high volume of file modifications in short time), ransomware notes (README.txt, DECRYPT.txt, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.html), or files with extensions like .encrypted, .locked, .n0n.

Critical Assets N0N Prioritizes for Exfiltration

Based on observed exfiltration patterns, N0N typically targets:

  • Financial records: Accounting databases, QuickBooks files, payroll data, bank account information, wire transfer records
  • HR data: Employee PII (SSNs, dates of birth, addresses), salary information, performance reviews, background checks
  • Customer data: CRM databases, customer PII, payment card information (if applicable), contracts, communications
  • Intellectual property: Source code, product designs, R&D documentation, clinical trial data (for pharma), trading algorithms (for financial services)
  • Legal documents: Contracts, NDAs, litigation files, regulatory correspondence
  • Email archives: Executive communications, M&A discussions, legal strategy

Organizations in healthcare and financial services should assume that any data subject to HIPAA, PCI-DSS, GLBA, or state privacy laws (CCPA, etc.) is a high-priority target.

Containment Actions Ordered by Urgency

If you confirm or strongly suspect N0N intrusion, execute the following containment steps immediately:

0-15 minutes:

  1. Isolate affected hosts — Disconnect compromised systems from the network (unplug network cables or disable switch ports). Do NOT power off (preserve volatile memory for forensics).
  2. Disable compromised accounts — Disable any user or service accounts showing signs of compromise (unusual logins, privilege escalation, lateral movement).
  3. Block known malicious IPs and domains — Add IOCs to firewall, proxy, and DNS sinkhole.

15-60 minutes: 4. Isolate critical infrastructure — Segment domain controllers, backup infrastructure, and database servers from the rest of the network. 5. Force password resets — Reset passwords for all privileged accounts (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, local admins) and any accounts with suspicious activity. 6. Enable enhanced logging — Increase log verbosity on domain controllers, VPN concentrators, and critical servers. Ensure logs are forwarded to SIEM or offline storage.

1-4 hours: 7. Deploy EDR and AV scans — Push updated AV signatures and run full scans on all endpoints. Deploy EDR sensors if not already present. 8. Hunt for persistence — Check scheduled tasks, services, startup folders, registry run keys, WMI subscriptions, and Group Policy Objects (GPOs) for unauthorized changes. 9. Review VPN and remote access logs — Identify all remote access sessions in the past 30 days. Flag logins from unusual geolocations, IP addresses, or times.

4-24 hours: 10. Engage incident response firm — If you don't have an IR retainer, contact Security Arsenal (security@securityarsenal.com) or another qualified firm immediately. 11. Preserve forensic evidence — Capture memory dumps, disk images, and log files from affected systems before remediation. 12. Assess backup integrity — Verify that backups are intact, offline, and not encrypted or deleted. Test restoration on isolated systems. 13. Notify legal counsel and cyber insurance — Engage legal counsel to assess breach notification obligations. Notify cyber insurance carrier per policy requirements.


Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

These controls would have blocked or significantly impeded N0N's recent campaigns:

  1. Patch internet-facing VPN appliances — Apply vendor patches for CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), and CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway). If patching is not immediately possible, take the appliance offline or restrict access to known-good IPs only.

  2. Disable RDP on internet-facing systems — RDP should NEVER be directly exposed to the internet. Require VPN + MFA for remote access. If RDP is required internally, restrict via firewall to specific admin workstations and enable Network Level Authentication (NLA).

  3. Enable MFA on all remote access — Require multi-factor authentication for VPN, RDP, email, and cloud services. Use hardware tokens or app-based MFA (not SMS).

  4. Block macros in Office documents from the internet — Use Group Policy to disable macros in files downloaded from the internet (Mark of the Web). Deploy attack surface reduction (ASR) rules in Microsoft Defender to block Office child processes.

  5. Enable PowerShell logging and transcription — Enable Script Block Logging, Module Logging, and Transcription. Forward logs to SIEM. This provides visibility into post-exploitation activity.

  6. Deploy LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution) — Ensure every endpoint has a unique local admin password. This prevents lateral movement using a single compromised local admin credential.

  7. Restrict PsExec and administrative shares — Disable Admin$ shares on workstations if not required. Use AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to block unauthorized PsExec execution.

Short-Term (2 Weeks)

These architecture-level changes provide defense-in-depth against ransomware operations:

  1. Implement network segmentation — Segment user workstations from servers, segment servers by function (web, app, database), and segment by department or business unit. Use VLANs, firewall rules, and micro-segmentation to limit lateral movement.

  2. Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) — EDR solutions (Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, etc.) provide behavioral detection of ransomware TTPs, including credential dumping, lateral movement, and mass file encryption.

  3. Implement privileged access management (PAM) — Use a PAM solution (CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Delinea) to manage, monitor, and rotate privileged credentials. Require just-in-time (JIT) access for administrative tasks.

  4. Deploy application whitelisting — Use AppLocker or WDAC to allow only approved applications to execute. Block execution from user profile directories, temp folders, and other common malware staging locations.

  5. Implement email security gateway — Deploy or enhance email security gateway (Proofpoint, Mimecast, Microsoft Defender for Office 365) to block phishing emails, malicious attachments, and links to credential harvesting sites.

  6. Establish offline, immutable backups — Maintain at least one backup copy that is offline (air-gapped) or immutable (write-once, read-many). Test restoration regularly. Ensure backups are NOT accessible from production networks.

  7. Conduct tabletop exercises — Run a ransomware tabletop exercise with executive leadership, IT, legal, communications, and business continuity teams. Test decision-making around ransom payment, public disclosure, and recovery timelines.

  8. Implement honeypots and canary tokens — Deploy honeypot file shares, fake credentials, and canary tokens (Thinkst Canary, Canarytokens.org) to detect reconnaissance and lateral movement early.

  9. Review and test incident response plan — Ensure your IR plan is up to date, includes ransomware-specific playbooks, and has been tested in the last 6 months. Verify contact information for IR firm, legal counsel, and cyber insurance carrier.

  10. Threat hunting for N0N TTPs — Use the Sigma rules and KQL queries provided in this briefing to hunt for signs of N0N activity in your environment. Proactively search for lateral movement, data staging, and persistence mechanisms.


Conclusion

N0N's November 16 leak-site postings represent a claim, not a confirmed breach. However, the group's focus on healthcare and financial services — sectors with high-value data and regulatory breach notification obligations — means that named organizations and sector peers should take these listings seriously.

If your organization is listed, or if you detect indicators consistent with N0N's playbook, do not wait for confirmation from the threat actor. Activate your incident response plan, hunt for the TTPs described in this briefing, and engage qualified IR support immediately.

The detection content provided here — Sigma rules, KQL queries, and PowerShell triage script — should be deployed to SIEM and EDR platforms and used to hunt across the environment for signs of compromise.

Ransomware groups rely on speed and surprise. Early detection of pre-encryption activity (credential dumping, lateral movement, data staging) can mean the difference between a contained incident and a full-scale encryption event.

Security Arsenal will continue monitoring N0N's leak site and will publish updates if new listings, victim confirmations, or TTP changes are observed.


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