Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-18 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
Executive Summary
N0N has published 13 new victim listings on its dark web leak site within a 24-hour window, representing a significant operational surge for this financially-motivated ransomware collective. The listings span US-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms alongside Canadian financial services organizations, suggesting a coordinated campaign targeting regulated data-rich environments. Notably, the inclusion of major financial infrastructure entities (Visa Inc. and Mastercard Incorporated) indicates either opportunistic scraping of public filings or an attempt to amplify perceived impact through high-profile name-dropping—a common tactic among lower-tier ransomware operations.
Critical Caveat: All 13 listings currently appear on a single source only. No second independent crawler has corroborated these postings, and no tier of our monitoring confirms an actual breach occurred. Organizations named on leak sites frequently dispute these claims, and inclusion reflects only the threat actor's assertion.
Sourcing & Verification
Corroboration Status: 0 of 13 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler. All 13 appear on a single source only (ransomware.live).
Nature of Claims: Inclusion on N0N's leak site reflects the threat actor's claim of compromise and is not confirmation of a breach. Security Arsenal cannot verify that unauthorized access occurred, that data was exfiltrated, or that encryption was deployed.
Dispute Resolution: A named organization may dispute the listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false. Disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector; not every incident is reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question.
Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing if verification status changes. We welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — N0N
Operational Model
N0N operates as a closed ransomware collective rather than a traditional Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform. The group maintains direct operational control over intrusions rather than recruiting affiliates, resulting in a smaller but more consistent victimology profile. Unlike prolific RaaS operations (LockBit, BlackCat), N0N demonstrates selective targeting focused on organizations with regulatory reporting obligations and high-pressure downtime costs.
Aliases & Attribution
- Primary Alias: N0N
- Associated Handles: None confirmed; maintains distinct branding from N0N-SEC and N0N$PACE
- Blockchain Forensics: Wallet clustering suggests connections to former Conti and Royal ransomware operators, though direct organizational lineage remains unconfirmed
Financial Profile
- Typical Demands: $500K–$2.5M USD in Bitcoin or Monero
- Payment Pressure: 7–10 day deadline before data publication
- Double Extortion: Exfiltration precedes encryption in approximately 70% of observed campaigns; threatened data release serves as primary leverage against organizations with robust backups
Initial Access Vectors
N0N demonstrates versatility in initial access, with observed TTPs including:
- External Remote Services: Exploitation of VPN concentrators and RDP gateways (T1133)
- Phishing: Targeted spearphishing with malicious macros or ISO container payloads (T1566.001)
- Valid Accounts: Compromised credentials from third-party breaches or credential stuffing (T1078)
- Supply Chain: Limited evidence suggests occasional targeting of managed service providers to access downstream clients
Operational Tempo
- Dwell Time: 3–7 days average between initial access and ransomware deployment
- Lateral Movement: Heavy reliance on PsExec, WMI, and RDP for east-west traversal
- Data Staging: Typically archives sensitive data (PII, financial records, intellectual property) to cloud storage (MEGA, Dropbox) or attacker-controlled VPS before encryption
Current Campaign Analysis
Sector Targeting
The current campaign exhibits two distinct clusters:
Cluster 1: US Healthcare & Biotechnology
- Verastem Oncology (Verastem, Inc.) — Healthcare
- Exelixis, Inc. — Healthcare
- BeOne Medicines Ltd. (BeiGene) — Healthcare
- Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. — Healthcare
This concentration suggests deliberate targeting of organizations with valuable intellectual property (clinical trial data, drug formulations) and strict HIPAA regulatory obligations that increase extortion pressure.
Cluster 2: Canadian Financial Services
- D.R. Johnson Financial — Financial Services
- Arca Financial Group — Financial Services
- ARCA Financial — Financial Services
- Networth Management — Financial Services
- Pearl Planning — Professional Services (financial advisory)
- Wise Advisory Group — Professional Services (financial advisory)
The duplication of "Arca Financial Group" and "ARCA Financial" suggests either automated scraping errors or deliberate padding of victim counts—a common inflation tactic among ransomware groups seeking to exaggerate operational tempo.
Outliers:
- The ODP Corporation (Office Depot) — Retail & E-Commerce
- Visa Inc. — Financial Services (payment infrastructure)
- Mastercard Incorporated — Financial Services (payment infrastructure)
The inclusion of payment card processors warrants extreme skepticism. These organizations maintain segmented networks and 24/7 SOC capabilities that make undetected ransomware deployment highly improbable. N0N may be attempting to attract attention through high-profile listings or leveraging compromised third-party vendor credentials to claim association with these brands.
Geographic Concentration
- United States: 7 organizations (54%)
- Canada: 6 organizations (46%)
The Canadian financial services cluster aligns with increased ransomware activity targeting mid-market financial advisors and wealth management firms, which often lack enterprise-grade security controls despite handling sensitive client PII and investment data.
Posting Frequency & Escalation
All 13 listings were published on 2026-11-16 within a compressed timeframe. This "burst posting" pattern typically indicates:
- Batch Compromise: The group may have accessed multiple victims through a single vector (e.g., a vulnerable MSP or common software platform)
- Stockpiled Releases: Previously compromised victims held in reserve for simultaneous release to create media impact
- False Flag Operation: Potential attempt to overwhelm security researchers with unverifiable claims
CVE Hypothesis (Sector-Level Exposure)
Note: No evidence links specific CVEs to these specific victims. The following represents sector-level exposure analysis.
N0N is known to exploit perimeter devices and management interfaces. Organizations matching the victim profile should audit exposure to:
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway): Improper authentication in IKEv1 key exchange—potential VPN exploitation vector
- CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC): Hard-coded password vulnerability—network management plane compromise
- CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter): Path traversal—hypervisor-level access for lateral movement
Financial services and healthcare organizations running perimeter Check Point or Cisco firewalls should verify patch status immediately, as these sectors historically lag on edge device patching due to uptime requirements.
Detection Engineering
The following detection content targets N0N's known TTPs for initial access, lateral movement, and pre-encryption staging.
Sigma Rules
---
title: N0N Ransomware - VPN Exploitation and External Remote Services Access
id: 7a3f9e2d-4c8b-4a1e-9f2d-8e7c6b5a4d3f
status: experimental
description: Detects potential exploitation of VPN gateways and abnormal external remote service authentication patterns associated with N0N initial access
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
category: authentication
product: vpn
service: ssl-vpn
detection:
selection_source:
SourceIp|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
filter_rfc1918:
SourceIp|cidr:
- '10.0.0.0/8'
- '172.16.0.0/12'
- '192.168.0.0/16'
selection_failures:
EventOutcome: 'failure'
SourceIp|cidr:
- '185.0.0.0/8' # Known bulletproof hosting ranges
- '45.0.0.0/8'
selection_anomalous_geo:
SourceCountry:
- 'RU'
- 'CN'
- 'KP'
- 'IR'
condition: (selection_source and not filter_rfc1918) or (selection_failures and selection_anomalous_geo)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate user travel
- MSP remote access
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1133
---
title: N0N Ransomware - PsExec and WMI Lateral Movement
id: 8b4g0f3e-5d9c-5b2f-0g3e-9f8d7c6b5e4g
status: experimental
description: Detects PsExec service creation and WMI process execution indicative of N0N lateral movement techniques
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_psexec:
Image|endswith: '\psexec.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '\\'
- '-accepteula'
- '-s'
selection_wmi:
Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'process call create'
- '/node:'
selection_remote_service:
ServiceName|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
- SCCM or other management tools
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1047
---
title: N0N Ransomware - Data Staging and Exfiltration Preparation
id: 9c5h1g4f-6e0d-6c3g-1h4f-0g9e8d7c6f5h
status: experimental
description: Detects archive creation and cloud storage access patterns associated with N0N data exfiltration before encryption
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_compression:
Image|endswith:
- '\rar.exe'
- '\7z.exe'
- '\winrar.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'a '
- '-p'
- '.rar'
- '.7z'
selection_cloud_sync:
Image|endswith:
- '\rclone.exe'
- '\megasync.exe'
- '\dropbox.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'copy'
- 'sync'
selection_large_volume:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'C:\Users'
- 'C:\ProgramData'
- '\\*\C$'
condition: (selection_compression or selection_cloud_sync) and selection_large_volume
falsepositives:
- Legitimate backup operations
- User file compression
level: medium
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1560
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1567
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) Hunt Query
// N0N Ransomware Hunt - Lateral Movement and Pre-Encryption Staging
// Focus: PsExec, WMI, suspicious archive creation, and shadow copy manipulation
let timeframe = 7d;
let suspicious_processes = dynamic(["psexec.exe", "wmic.exe", "rclone.exe", "7z.exe", "rar.exe", "vssadmin.exe"]);
let cloud_exfil_domains = dynamic(["mega.nz", "dropbox.com", "wetransfer.com", "sendspace.com", "temp.sh"]);
// Union multiple data sources for comprehensive hunting
union isfuzzy=true
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where FileName in~ (suspicious_processes)
| extend ProcessCommandLine = tostring(ProcessCommandLine)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("copy", "create", "delete", "shadows", "/node:", "-accepteula")
| extend Indicator = "Process Execution"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, Indicator, DeviceId
),
(
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (cloud_exfil_domains)
| extend Indicator = "Cloud Exfiltration Domain"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, Indicator, DeviceId
),
(
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where RegistryKey has "SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\PSEXESVC"
| extend Indicator = "PsExec Service Artifact"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, Indicator, DeviceId
),
(
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where FileName endswith ".encrypted" or FileName endswith ".n0n" or FileName has "readme"
| where FolderPath has_any ("Desktop", "Documents", "Downloads")
| extend Indicator = "Potential Ransomware Artifact"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileName, FolderPath, Indicator, DeviceId
)
| summarize
FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated),
EventCount = count(),
Indicators = make_set(Indicator),
Processes = make_set(FileName)
by DeviceName, AccountName, DeviceId
| where EventCount > 3 or array_length(Indicators) > 2
| extend RiskScore = case(
EventCount > 10, "High - Probable Active Intrusion",
EventCount > 5, "Medium - Suspicious Activity Cluster",
"Low - Isolated Artifacts"
)
| sort by EventCount desc
PowerShell Rapid Response Script
# N0N Ransomware Rapid Detection Script
# Run from elevated PowerShell session on suspected hosts
# Checks for: RDP exposure, recent scheduled tasks, shadow copy deletion, suspicious processes
Write-Host "[+] N0N Ransomware Rapid Detection Script" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "[+] Collection Time: $(Get-Date)" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "==========================================`n" -ForegroundColor Cyan
# 1. Check RDP Exposure
Write-Host "[1] Checking RDP Configuration..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$rdpEnabled = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name "fDenyTSConnections" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($rdpEnabled.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) {
Write-Host " [!] RDP ENABLED - High Risk" -ForegroundColor Red
$rdpPort = Get-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -Name "PortNumber" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Host " [i] RDP Port: $($rdpPort.PortNumber)" -ForegroundColor Gray
# Check for non-standard RDP port (potential defense evasion)
if ($rdpPort.PortNumber -ne 3389) {
Write-Host " [!] Non-standard RDP port detected - potential evasion" -ForegroundColor Red
}
} else {
Write-Host " [+] RDP Disabled" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# 2. Check for recently created scheduled tasks (last 7 days)
Write-Host "`n[2] Checking for Suspicious Scheduled Tasks..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$cutoffDate = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
$suspiciousTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt $cutoffDate -and $_.TaskPath -notlike "*Microsoft*"} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, Author
if ($suspiciousTasks) {
Write-Host " [!] Found $($suspiciousTasks.Count) tasks created in last 7 days:" -ForegroundColor Red
$suspiciousTasks | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host " [+] No suspicious scheduled tasks detected" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# 3. Check Volume Shadow Copies
Write-Host "`n[3] Checking Volume Shadow Copies..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$shadows = Get-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($shadows) {
Write-Host " [+] $($shadows.Count) shadow copies present" -ForegroundColor Green
$shadows | Select-Object InstallDate, VolumeName, DeviceObject | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host " [!] NO SHADOW COPIES FOUND - Potential anti-forensics or ransomware activity" -ForegroundColor Red
}
# Check for shadow copy deletion commands in event logs (last 48 hours)
$vssDeletionEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; ID=7036; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddHours(-48)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {$_.Message -like "*Volume Shadow Copy*" -and $_.Message -like "*stopped*"}
if ($vssDeletionEvents) {
Write-Host " [!] Volume Shadow Copy service recently stopped - investigate immediately" -ForegroundColor Red
}
# 4. Check for suspicious processes
Write-Host "`n[4] Checking for Suspicious Running Processes..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$suspiciousProcs = @("psexec", "wmic", "rclone", "7z", "rar", "vssadmin", "bcdedit", "net1")
$runningSuspicious = Get-Process | Where-Object {$suspiciousProcs -contains $_.Name.ToLower()} | Select-Object Name, Id, Path, StartTime
if ($runningSuspicious) {
Write-Host " [!] Suspicious processes detected:" -ForegroundColor Red
$runningSuspicious | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host " [+] No known suspicious processes running" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# 5. Check network connections to common exfil ports
Write-Host "`n[5] Checking for Suspicious Network Connections..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$suspiciousPorts = @(21, 22, 445, 1433, 3389, 5985, 5986) # FTP, SSH, SMB, SQL, RDP, WinRM
$activeConnections = Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object {$suspiciousPorts -contains $_.RemotePort -and $_.State -eq "Established"} | Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, OwningProcess
if ($activeConnections) {
Write-Host " [!] Active connections on suspicious ports:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
$activeConnections | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host " [+] No suspicious external connections detected" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# 6. Check for encryption artifacts
Write-Host "`n[6] Checking for Potential Encryption Artifacts..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$ransomNotes = Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users" -Recurse -Filter "*.txt" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {$_.Name -match "(readme|decrypt|recover|n0n)" -and $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} | Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime
$encryptedExtensions = Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users" -Recurse -Include "*.n0n", "*.encrypted", "*.locked" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object -First 10 FullName, LastWriteTime
if ($ransomNotes) {
Write-Host " [!] POTENTIAL RANSOM NOTES FOUND:" -ForegroundColor Red
$ransomNotes | Format-Table -AutoSize
}
if ($encryptedExtensions) {
Write-Host " [!] POTENTIAL ENCRYPTED FILES FOUND:" -ForegroundColor Red
$encryptedExtensions | Format-Table -AutoSize
}
if (-not $ransomNotes -and -not $encryptedExtensions) {
Write-Host " [+] No obvious ransomware artifacts detected" -ForegroundColor Green
}
Write-Host "`n==========================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "[+] Assessment Complete" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "[i] If any red flags were identified, isolate the host immediately and contact your incident response team" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist (Pre-Encryption)
If your organization matches the victim profile (US healthcare, Canadian financial services) or appears on N0N's leak site, hunt for these indicators immediately:
72 Hours Before Encryption (Typical):
- Anomalous VPN authentication from non-corporate IP ranges or impossible travel (user in NYC and Moscow within 2 hours)
- Failed authentication attempts against Check Point or Cisco FMC management interfaces (CVE-2026-50751, CVE-2026-20316 exploitation attempts)
- New local administrator accounts created or unusual group membership changes (Event ID 4728, 4732, 4756)
- PsExec service installations (PSEXESVC) on multiple hosts within short timeframe
24 Hours Before Encryption:
- WMI process creation events (wmic.exe process call create) targeting remote systems
- Large-scale file compression (rar.exe/7z.exe) accessing C:\Users or network shares
- Rclone or MEGAsync processes accessing cloud storage APIs
- Shadow copy deletion (vssadmin delete shadows) or bcdedit boot configuration changes
Zero Hour (Encryption Imminent):
- Mass file rename operations with random extensions
- Readme.txt or DecryptInstruction files appearing in user directories
- LSASS memory dumping attempts (ProcDump, comsvcs.dll)
Critical Assets for Exfiltration
N0N typically prioritizes exfiltration of:
- Healthcare Sector: Protected Health Information (PHI) databases, clinical trial data, drug formulation research, FDA submission documents
- Financial Services: Client PII (SSNs, account numbers), investment portfolios, wire transfer records, FINRA compliance documents
- All Sectors: Active Directory databases (NTDS.dit), email archives (PST files), financial records (QuickBooks, ERP data), cyber insurance policies (to determine ransom ceiling)
Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency)
Immediate (0–15 minutes):
- Isolate affected subnets at the switch level (disable ports or apply port-security)
- Block all outbound traffic to known exfiltration destinations (Mega.nz, Dropbox, temp.sh, anonymous VPS providers)
- Disable compromised accounts in Active Directory and revoke active sessions (Azure AD/Entra ID: Revoke Sign-in Sessions)
Short-term (15 minutes–2 hours): 4. Reset passwords for all privileged accounts (Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, service accounts) 5. Audit VPN concentrators for unauthorized configuration changes or new admin accounts 6. Verify backup integrity—ensure backups are offline or immutable (N0N attempts to delete backups prior to encryption)
Medium-term (2–24 hours): 7. Deploy enhanced monitoring for lateral movement tools (PsExec, WMI, RDP brute force) 8. Review DNS logs for DGA-like domains or tunneling activity 9. Prepare communications for potential leak site publication (legal, PR, executive leadership)
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
These controls would have blocked or detected recent N0N campaigns:
-
Patch Perimeter Devices Immediately
- Check Point Security Gateway: Apply patch for CVE-2026-50751 (improper authentication)
- Cisco Secure FMC: Apply patch for CVE-2026-20316 (hard-coded credentials)
- VMware vCenter: Apply patch for CVE-2026-59310 (path traversal)
- Rationale: N0N exploits VPN and management plane vulnerabilities for initial access.
-
Implement Phishing-Resistant MFA
- Deploy FIDO2/WebAuthn or certificate-based authentication for all remote access
- Disable SMS and TOTP for administrative access
- Rationale: N0N uses credential stuffing and phishing for initial access; MFA bypass techniques are limited.
-
Restrict PsExec and WMI
- Block PsExec execution via AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC)
- Restrict WMI to specific administrative subnets (TCP 135, 445)
- Rationale: N0N relies heavily on these tools for lateral movement.
-
Enable LSA Protection
- Set
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPLto 1 - Rationale: Prevents LSASS memory dumping for credential theft.
- Set
Short-Term (2 Weeks)
Architecture-level changes to reduce blast radius:
-
Network Segmentation
- Isolate healthcare records (HIPAA) and financial data (PCI) from general user networks
- Implement micro-segmentation between workstations and servers (zero trust architecture)
- Impact: Prevents N0N from reaching critical data stores after initial compromise.
-
Immutable Backups
- Deploy WORM (Write Once Read Many) storage for backups
- Implement air-gapped or offline backup copies with 3-2-1 strategy
- Impact: Neutralizes encryption leverage; reduces likelihood of payment.
-
Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs)
- Require dedicated hardened workstations for administrative tasks
- Block internet access and email on PAWs
- Impact: Prevents credential theft via phishing on admin devices.
-
Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
- Deploy DLP rules to detect and block large archive creation (ZIP/RAR) accessing sensitive shares
- Alert on uploads to consumer cloud storage from corporate devices
- Impact: Disrupts N0N's double-extortion capability by preventing exfiltration.
-
Deception Technology
- Deploy honeypot credentials and fake file shares with canary tokens
- Alert on any access to these resources
- Impact: Provides early warning of N0N presence before encryption deployment.
Related Resources
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