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N0N Ransomware Gang: 14 New Leak-Site Listings — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 16, 2026
15 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-16 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

N0N Ransomware Gang: 14 New Leak-Site Listings — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

Executive Summary

On 2026-11-16, ransomware.live monitoring observed 14 new victim listings on the dark web leak site operated by the N0N ransomware group. The claims heavily target the Healthcare sector in the United States and Financial Services and Professional Services in Canada, with one outlier in Botswana. A leak-site posting is an accusation by a criminal actor, not a confirmed breach. No organization listed has been confirmed breached by this data. Defenders in the named sectors should treat this as sector-level threat intelligence and validate their own telemetry against the detection content in this briefing.

Sourcing & Verification

This briefing is derived from automated monitoring of the N0N leak site via ransomware.live. Of the 14 listings covered, 11 were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, and 3 appear on a single source only. Multi-source observation confirms only that the gang published the claim; it does not confirm that any intrusion, data theft, or encryption occurred.

Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim and is NOT confirmation of a breach. A named organization may dispute a listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is reportable, so neither silence nor denial settles the question. Security Arsenal will publish corrections and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — N0N

N0N is an emerging ransomware operation observed in leak-site monitoring ecosystems. Public attribution and granular operational detail for N0N remain limited compared to established brands such as LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV, or Play. Analysts should treat the following as working assessments based on observed behavior across comparable RaaS and closed-group operations, not as confirmed N0N-specific doctrine.

Known aliases: No widely documented aliases at the time of publication. Track for rebrands; many mid-tier groups cycle names to evade sanctions and reputational damage.

Operating model: Unclear whether N0N operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service program recruiting affiliates or as a closed group. The breadth of sectors and geographies in a single-day posting wave is consistent with either an affiliate-driven model or a small team running automated intrusion pipelines.

Ransom demands: Specific N0N demand ranges are not publicly documented. Comparable mid-tier operations typically issue demands scaled to victim revenue, ranging from low five figures for small professional services firms to seven figures for large healthcare and financial targets.

Initial access methods: Mid-tier ransomware operations commonly rely on phishing with macro- or script-based loaders, exploitation of exposed remote access services (VPN concentrators, RDP gateways), purchase of access from initial access brokers, and exploitation of known perimeter CVEs. The related CVE set listed below reflects sector-level exposure the gang is hypothesized to exploit; there is no evidence tying any specific CVE to any specific named listing in this briefing.

Extortion model: The presence of a leak site with named listings strongly indicates a double-extortion approach — data theft followed by threatened publication if payment is not made. Triple extortion (DDoS, customer notification pressure) cannot be ruled out but is not confirmed.

Dwell time: Not documented for N0N specifically. Industry telemetry for comparable operations places median dwell time between initial access and encryption at 1 to 11 days, with many intrusions compressing to under 72 hours in 2025-2026. Defenders should assume a short window between first suspicious signal and detonation.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sectors Targeted

Based on the 2026-11-16 listing wave, N0N's claimed targeting skews heavily toward regulated, data-rich sectors:

  • Healthcare: 5 claimed listings (Verastem Oncology, Exelixis, Inc., BeOne Medicines Ltd. (BeiGene), Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc., plus the broader healthcare concentration)
  • Financial Services: 5 claimed listings (D.R. Johnson Financial, Arca Financial Group, ARCA Financial, Networth Management, Visa Inc., Mastercard Incorporated — note Arca/ARCA may represent a duplicate listing by the gang)
  • Professional Services: 2 claimed listings (Pearl Planning, Wise Advisory Group)
  • Retail & E-Commerce: 1 claimed listing (The ODP Corporation (Office Depot))
  • Unresolved/Not Found: 1 listing (Company #216)

The concentration in healthcare and financial services is consistent with double-extortion economics: both sectors hold regulated data (PHI, PII, financial records) where threatened disclosure creates regulatory and litigation pressure on top of operational disruption.

Geographic Concentration

Claimed victims cluster in the United States (8 listings) and Canada (5 listings), with a single outlier in Botswana (Company #216, published 2026-11-13, single-source). The US/CA focus aligns with the typical targeting of English-speaking, high-revenue economies by financially motivated ransomware crews.

Victim Profile

The claimed list spans a wide revenue band: large-cap public companies (Verastem Oncology, Exelixis, BeiGene, The ODP Corporation, Visa, Mastercard) alongside small and mid-sized Canadian financial advisory and professional services firms. This barbell pattern — enterprise names plus SMB advisory firms — is characteristic of affiliate-driven campaigns where affiliates pursue whatever access is available, or of opportunistic scanning where any vulnerable perimeter asset is fair game regardless of size. Note that the Visa Inc. and Mastercard Incorporated listings are single-source only and should be treated with additional caution; payment-card brands are frequent targets of fabricated or exaggerated leak-site claims intended to inflate a gang's reputation.

Posting Frequency and Escalation

13 of the 14 listings were published on a single day, 2026-11-16, with one listing three days earlier. A single-day bulk posting wave is a recognizable pattern: gangs often batch-publish victims to maximize media impact, to pressure multiple negotiations simultaneously, or to clear a backlog of stalled negotiations. It can also indicate a newly operational group seeding its leak site. Defenders should watch whether N0N sustains weekly cadence or whether this wave is a one-time splash.

CVE Exposure (Hypothesis Only)

There is no evidence linking any specific CVE to any named listing. However, the following CISA KEV entries represent actively exploited, ransomware-relevant exposure in the kinds of environments N0N's claimed victims operate, and are reasonable hypothesis space for initial access:

  • CVE-2026-59310 — Broadcom VMware vCenter path traversal. vCenter compromise is a classic precursor to mass hypervisor encryption.
  • CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity deserialization. Build-server compromise enables supply-chain style lateral movement and credential theft.
  • CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center hard-coded password. Management-plane compromise of perimeter security infrastructure.
  • CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication in IKEv1. Perimeter VPN gateway compromise, a frequent ransomware entry point.
  • CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console embedded malicious code. Developer-workstation supply chain exposure.

Prioritize patch verification against this KEV set as a sector-level exposure reduction measure, not as incident confirmation for any named organization.

Detection Engineering

The following detection content targets TTPs common to mid-tier ransomware operations matching N0N's observed profile: perimeter/VPN initial access, macro- and script-based phishing execution, RDP brute force, PsExec/WMI lateral movement, Cobalt Strike-style beaconing, and pre-encryption data staging. Tune thresholds to your environment before production deployment.

YAML
---
title: N0N-Style Ransomware - RDP and VPN Brute Force Followed by Successful Logon
id: 7f3a1c2e-9b4d-4e6a-a1f2-n0n000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of failed external authentication attempts against RDP (4625) or VPN-adjacent logon types followed by a successful logon (4624 Type 3/10) from the same source, consistent with ransomware initial access via brute-forced remote access as observed in mid-tier crew campaigns.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_failed:
        EventID: 4625
        LogonType:
            - 3
            - 10
    selection_success:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType:
            - 3
            - 10
    filter_internal:
        IpAddress|startswith:
            - '10.'
            - '172.16.'
            - '192.168.'
    condition: selection_failed and selection_success and not filter_internal
timeframe: 15m
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1133
    - attack.t1078
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user password mistyping from remote locations
    - Vulnerability scanners
---
title: N0N-Style Ransomware - PsExec or WMI Remote Execution for Lateral Movement
id: 7f3a1c2e-9b4d-4e6a-a1f2-n0n000000002
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service creation (7045) and process execution patterns consistent with PsExec-style tooling or WMI-based lateral movement, a hallmark of pre-encryption ransomware staging across mid-tier operations.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_psexec:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\PSEXESVC.exe'
            - '\psexec.exe'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\services.exe'
    selection_wmi:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\rundll32.exe'
    selection_suspicious_names:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\psexesvc.exe'
            - '\remcomsvc.exe'
            - '\paexec.exe'
            - '\csexecsvc.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
level: high
tags:
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1569.002
    - attack.t1047
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tooling and software deployment systems
    - EDR and IT management agents
---
title: N0N-Style Ransomware - Data Staging and Shadow Copy Tampering Before Encryption
id: 7f3a1c2e-9b4d-4e6a-a1f2-n0n000000003
status: experimental
description: Detects pre-encryption behaviors common across ransomware crews - archive creation with compression utilities in bulk, Volume Shadow Copy deletion, and backup catalog tampering - indicating imminent detonation or active double-extortion staging.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_vss:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'vssadmin delete shadows'
            - 'vssadmin Delete Shadows'
            - 'wmic shadowcopy delete'
            - 'bcdedit'
            - 'wbadmin delete catalog'
            - 'wbadmin delete systemstatebackup'
    selection_staging:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\rar.exe'
            - '\7z.exe'
            - '\7za.exe'
            - '\winrar.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' a -'
            - '.rar'
            - '.7z'
    selection_exfil_tools:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\rclone.exe'
            - '\megasync.exe'
            - '\filezilla.exe'
            - '\winscp.exe'
            - '\psftp.exe'
            - '\curl.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.t1560.001
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate backup administration
    - Developer archiving workflows (rar/7z hits should be correlated with vss events or mass file access)
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// N0N-style ransomware hunt: pre-detonation staging, lateral movement, and exfil signals
// Microsoft Sentinel / Defender XDR — lookback 7 days
// Correlates: mass file access + compression + shadow copy tampering + rare outbound transfer
let Lookback = 7d;
let StagingProcs = dynamic(["rar.exe","7z.exe","7za.exe","winrar.exe","rclone.exe","megasync.exe","filezilla.exe","winscp.exe"]);
let ShadowCopyCmds = dynamic(["vssadmin delete shadows","wmic shadowcopy delete","wbadmin delete catalog","bcdedit"]);
let Compression = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
    | where FileName has_any (StagingProcs)
    | project CompressTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let ShadowTamper = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (ShadowCopyCmds)
    | project VssTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine;
let MassFileAccess = DeviceFileEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
    | where ActionType == "FileModified" or ActionType == "FileRenamed"
    | summarize FileOps=count(), DistinctExtensions=dcount(FileExtension) by DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
    | where FileOps > 5000 or DistinctExtensions > 25;
let RareOutbound = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
    | where RemoteIPType == "Public"
    | summarize BytesSent=sum(SentBytes), ConnCount=count(), RemoteIPs=dcount(RemoteIP) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName
    | where BytesSent > 2000000000 // ~2GB staged outbound from a single process
    | extend ExfilProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName;
Compression
| join kind=inner (ShadowTamper) on DeviceName
| join kind=leftouter (MassFileAccess) on DeviceName
| join kind=leftouter (RareOutbound) on DeviceName
| project DeviceName, AccountName, CompressTime, VssTime, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, FileOps, DistinctExtensions, BytesSent, RemoteIPs, ExfilProcess
| order by CompressTime asc;
PowerShell
<#
.SYNOPSIS
    N0N-campaign rapid triage script — checks exposed RDP, recent scheduled tasks,
    shadow copy integrity, and suspicious newly created local admins.
    Run elevated on suspect hosts. Read-only; makes no changes.
.NOTES
    Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence — 2026-11-16
#>

$Report = [ordered]@{}
$Now = Get-Date
$Window = $Now.AddDays(-7)

# 1. Is RDP enabled and listening?
$Report['RDP_Enabled'] = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).fDenyTSConnections -eq 0
$Report['RDP_Listening'] = [bool](Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$Report['NLA_Required'] = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -Name UserAuthentication -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).UserAuthentication -eq 1

# 2. Scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days (persistence/staging)
$Report['Recent_Scheduled_Tasks'] = Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
    $info = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    [PSCustomObject]@{
        TaskName   = $_.TaskName
        TaskPath   = $_.TaskPath
        Author     = $_.Author
        State      = $_.State
        LastRun    = $info.LastRunTime
    }
} | Where-Object { $_.LastRun -gt $Window }

# Also enumerate raw task files by creation date (catches tasks created then never run)
$Report['New_Task_Files_7d'] = Get-ChildItem "$env:SystemRoot\System32\Tasks" -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Where-Object { $_.CreationTime -gt $Window } |
    Select-Object FullName, CreationTime

# 3. Volume Shadow Copy status
$Report['Shadow_Copies'] = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Select-Object ID, InstallDate, VolumeName, DeviceObject
$Report['VSS_Service_State'] = (Get-Service VSS -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Status

# 4. Recently created local administrator accounts
$Admins = Get-LocalGroupMember -Group 'Administrators' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$Report['Local_Admins'] = $Admins | Select-Object Name, ObjectClass, PrincipalSource
$Report['New_Local_Users_7d'] = Get-LocalUser -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Where-Object { $_.PasswordLastSet -gt $Window -or $_.LastLogon -gt $Window } |
    Select-Object Name, Enabled, LastLogon, PasswordLastSet

# 5. Recently modified vssadmin/bcdedit/wbadmin execution artifacts (prefetch)
$Report['VSS_Prefetch_Artifacts'] = Get-ChildItem "$env:SystemRoot\Prefetch" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'VSSADMIN|BCDEDIT|WBADMIN|WMIC' -and $_.LastWriteTime -gt $Window } |
    Select-Object Name, LastWriteTime

# 6. Failed logon burst check (RDP brute force signal)
$Report['Failed_Logon_4625_7d'] = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=$Window} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Group-Object { $_.Properties[19].Value } |
    Sort-Object Count -Descending |
    Select-Object -First 10 Name, Count

$Report | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5 | Out-File "$env:TEMP\n0n_triage_$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd_HHmmss).json"
Write-Output "Triage complete. Output written to $env:TEMP"
$Report

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist (Before Encryption Fires)

Ransomware detonation is the last step in a chain. Catch the earlier links:

  1. Authentication anomalies: bursts of 4625 failures followed by a 4624 success on internet-facing RDP/VPN; impossible-travel logins; new account creation on VPN concentrators.
  2. Persistence artifacts: scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days, new services (7045), Run-key additions, especially under non-administrative user contexts.
  3. Lateral movement tooling: PsExec service binaries (PSEXESVC), WmiPrvSE-spawned cmd/powershell, remcomsvc/paexec/csexecsvc variants, unexpected SMB admin-share (ADMIN$, C$) writes.
  4. Discovery commands in bulk: nltest, net group "Domain Admins", AdFind, SharpHound/BloodHound collectors, arp/ipconfig sweeps from a single host.
  5. Staging: rar/7z/WinRAR execution against large directory trees, staging folders in user profiles or C:\ProgramData, rclone/megasync/WinSCP/FileZilla presence on servers.
  6. Defense tampering: vssadmin delete shadows, bcdedit recoveryenabled no, wbadmin delete catalog, EDR service stop attempts, wevtutil log clearing.
  7. Beaconing: periodic low-and-slow HTTPS/DNS to rare external hosts, especially from servers that never normally browse.

Critical Assets This Profile Prioritizes for Exfiltration

For healthcare and financial-sector targets matching this campaign's claimed profile, prioritize monitoring and egress control around:

  • Electronic health record databases, research/clinical trial data, and IP stores (biotech/pharma victims)
  • Financial customer PII, wire/ACH records, investment account data, and M&A documents (financial services victims)
  • Email archives of executive, legal, and finance mailboxes (negotiation leverage)
  • Backup infrastructure credentials and backup catalogs (pre-encryption sabotage target)
  • Domain controllers and identity stores (NTDS.dit, AD CS, federation signing keys)

Containment Actions Ordered by Urgency

  1. Isolate suspected hosts from the network (EDR network isolation) — do NOT power off; preserve memory for forensic capture.
  2. Block the egress path: emergency egress filtering to known exfil destinations and sinkhole identified C2 domains at the perimeter and DNS layer.
  3. Disable or expire credentials used in the intrusion window, prioritizing privileged accounts, service accounts, and VPN/RDP-capable accounts; assume domain-wide compromise if a DC was touched.
  4. Disable inbound remote access (RDP/VPN) at the perimeter if initial access vector is unconfirmed; require re-enablement only through hardened jump paths.
  5. Snapshot and preserve forensic evidence: memory, volatile data, prefetch, ShimCache, Amcache, USN journal, and VPN/firewall logs before rotation.
  6. Verify backup integrity and offline/isolation status BEFORE any restore planning; confirm shadow copies and backup catalogs were not tampered with.
  7. Engage legal/comms early on data-leak exposure assessment — double extortion means the clock runs on disclosure obligations even if encryption never fired.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 hours)

  1. Verify patch status against the CISA KEV set relevant to your estate: CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter), CVE-2026-63077 (TeamCity), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point IKEv1), CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console). Emergency-patch or isolate any unpatched instance.
  2. Disable or ACL-off internet-facing RDP entirely; if RDP is required, force it behind VPN with MFA and NLA enabled. Audit for 3389 exposure with external scanning.
  3. Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys preferred) on all remote access, email, and privileged accounts; disable legacy auth protocols.
  4. Deploy or tune the Sigma and KQL detections in this briefing; alert on shadow copy deletion, rar/7z on servers, and PsExec/WMI patterns.
  5. Enable and verify tamper protection on EDR agents; alert on any EDR service stop or sensor disable event.
  6. Block execution of rclone, megasync, WinSCP, FileZilla, and similar exfil-capable tools on servers via AppLocker/WDAC unless explicitly required.
  7. Confirm offline/immutable backup copies exist and that backup admin credentials are separate from domain credentials.

Short-Term (2 weeks)

  1. Segment the network: isolate backup infrastructure, EHR/financial databases, and domain controllers into protected zones with default-deny east-west rules and monitored jump hosts.
  2. Implement identity attack surface reduction: tiered administration, LAPS for local admin passwords, removal of standing Domain Admin membership, and gMSA for service accounts.
  3. Deploy egress data controls: DLP or proxy-based egress filtering alerting on multi-GB outbound transfers from servers, especially to consumer cloud storage.
  4. Harden macro and script execution: block Office macros from the internet (Mark-of-the-Web enforcement), constrain PowerShell via Constrained Language Mode for non-admins, and enable script block logging centrally.
  5. Establish 24/7 detection coverage (in-house SOC or MDR) with a ransomware-specific runbook drilled on the T-minus checklist above — median dwell times under 72 hours make business-hours-only monitoring a structural failure.
  6. Conduct a crown-jewel data inventory for your sector (PHI, financial PII, research IP) and apply focused monitoring and encryption-at-rest with tightly held keys.

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