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N0N Ransomware Gang: 24 Organizations Named on Leak Site — Claim Corroboration Analysis & Detection Rules

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 20, 2026
16 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-21 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

N0N Ransomware Gang: 24 Organizations Named on Leak Site — Claim Corroboration Analysis & Detection Rules

Executive Summary

Between the most recent 100 postings on its dark web leak site, the ransomware crew tracked as N0N has named 24 organizations as alleged victims, with geographic tags spanning the United States, Philippines, United Kingdom, Mexico, and Canada. All 15 listings visible in the latest crawl batch carry a publication date of 2026-11-18, indicating a bulk posting event rather than a steady drip — a pattern frequently associated with a gang clearing a backlog of intrusion set access or attempting to pressure multiple negotiation targets simultaneously.

Two critical caveats govern everything in this briefing:

  1. These are claims by a criminal organization. N0N alleges it compromised these organizations. A leak-site listing is an accusation, not evidence of a breach. No organization named below is confirmed to have suffered any intrusion.
  2. Corroboration here is shallow. Only 12 of the 24 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler — confirming the gang made the claim, not that the claim is true. Twelve listings appear on a single monitoring source only.

Sector data for this campaign is unavailable ("Not Found" in source data), so sector-level conclusions cannot be drawn — defenders in all five affected countries should treat this as a generalized elevation in claimed activity and posture accordingly, with particular attention to the detection content in this briefing, which is grounded in the TTPs N0N and comparable leak-site-driven crews are known to use.

Sourcing & Verification

  • Corroboration status: Of the 24 listings tracked in this reporting window, 12 were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler (tagged MULTI-SOURCE — meaning two independent monitoring pipelines saw the gang publish the claim). 12 appear on a single source only (SINGLE-SOURCE — no second crawler has confirmed the posting even exists on the gang's site). Listings numbered #229, #228, and #227 fall in the single-source tier, as do the nine additional single-source listings not visible in the latest crawl batch.
  • What inclusion means: Inclusion of an organization in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim and is NOT confirmation of a breach. Even the MULTI-SOURCE tier only confirms the gang published the allegation — it says nothing about whether an intrusion actually occurred. Only the organization itself or its regulator can confirm a breach.
  • Denials and silence: A named organization may dispute the listing. A denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and not every incident is legally reportable, so neither silence nor denial settles the question. We report the claim's existence and its corroboration tier, nothing more.
  • Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing if new information warrants it, and we welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — N0N

Attribution caveat: N0N is a comparatively low-signature actor in the public reporting corpus. The profile below distinguishes between what is directly observable from leak-site telemetry and what is assessed from behavioral patterns common to similarly structured crews. Assessments are labeled as such.

Aliases and structure. N0N operates its own dedicated leak site (DLS) on Tor and is tracked under that name by ransomware.live. There is no firmly established public linkage to a prior crew or rebrand lineage at this time; the all-caps-with-zero stylization should not be confused with similarly named clusters. Based on posting volume and cadence, N0N is assessed to operate as either a small closed group or a RaaS program with a limited affiliate roster — the bulk posting behavior observed on 2026-11-18 is consistent with a centralized operator publishing on behalf of affiliates rather than affiliates posting independently.

Extortion model. N0N maintains a public leak site, which means it practices at minimum double extortion: encryption (or claimed encryption) plus the threat of data publication to pressure payment. Whether data is actually exfiltrated in every case cannot be verified from leak-site data alone — some crews post listings with no underlying data to manufacture negotiation pressure. Ransom demand ranges for this actor are not publicly established; mid-tier crews of similar profile typically open demands in the low-to-mid six figures USD, scaling with perceived victim revenue.

Initial access (assessed, not victim-specific). There is no evidence linking any specific CVE or access vector to any specific organization named in this campaign. However, crews with N0N's profile are known across the ecosystem to favor: (1) exploitation of exposed remote access infrastructure (VPN concentrators, firewalls, RDP); (2) phishing with macro- or script-laden attachments; and (3) purchasing access from initial access brokers (IABs). The CISA KEV entries discussed below represent sector-level exposure hypotheses, not confirmed vectors for any named organization.

Dwell time. No reliable dwell-time data exists for N0N specifically. Industry telemetry for comparable crews places median dwell time between initial access and detonation at 4–11 days, with data staging typically occurring in the final 24–72 hours. Defenders should assume that by the time an organization appears on a leak site, any real intrusion — if it occurred — is likely weeks old, making retrospective log review essential.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sectors Targeted

Sector classification for all observed listings returned "Not Found" in source data. We will not speculate. The absence of sector metadata means defenders in every vertical should treat this campaign as relevant. If your organization operates in the five affected countries, the detection content below applies to you regardless of industry.

Geographic Concentration

The five countries tagged across N0N's recent listings:

CountryListings observed in latest batch
United States (US)8
United Kingdom (GB)3
Mexico (MX)2
Philippines (PH)1
Canada (CA)0 in visible batch (tagged in overall country set)

The US-centric skew (over half of visible listings) is consistent with the broader ransomware economy's preference for US targets — deeper pockets, higher cyber-insurance penetration, and stronger payment likelihood. The presence of Philippines and Mexico listings suggests either opportunistic access (IAB-purchased) rather than deliberate geographic strategy, or an affiliate with regional focus.

Victim Profile

With sectors unclassified and no revenue data in the source, a reliable victim profile cannot be constructed. The bulk-posting cadence (15 listings on a single day) suggests volume over selectivity — a pattern more typical of opportunistic access exploitation than of big-game hunting against named enterprises.

Posting Frequency & Escalation

The clustering of 15 listings on 2026-11-18 is the dominant signal in this dataset. Bulk postings serve several criminal purposes: (a) overwhelming negotiators across multiple simultaneous victims, (b) manufacturing an impression of scale and momentum to attract affiliates, and (c) clearing intrusions that have aged past their negotiation window. Defenders should also consider the possibility that a single-day posting spike reflects a single initial access vector exploited at scale — e.g., one vulnerable edge device family compromised across many organizations before patching caught up.

CVE Exposure Hypotheses (Sector-Level, NOT Victim-Specific)

Framing: We have no evidence any of the following CVEs was used against any organization N0N has named. These are actively exploited vulnerabilities (CISA KEV, confirmed ransomware use) that match the class of access vectors crews like N0N favor. Treat them as prioritized patch targets, not attribution.

  • CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway Improper Authentication (IKEv1) (KEV 2026-06-08): Perimeter gateway auth bypass — the single most common ransomware initial access class. If you run Check Point gateways with IKEv1 enabled, treat as urgent.
  • CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure FMC Hard-coded Password (KEV 2026-07-29): Hard-coded credentials in firewall management infrastructure. Compromise of FMC can cascade to the entire firewall estate.
  • CVE-2026-59310 — VMware vCenter Path Traversal (KEV 2026-08-18): vCenter compromise is a ransomware force multiplier — control of the hypervisor layer enables mass VM encryption, the highest-impact detonation pattern.
  • CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity Deserialization (KEV 2026-08-05): CI/CD compromise enables supply-chain-style downstream access and credential harvesting from build pipelines.
  • CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console Embedded Malicious Code (KEV 2026-05-27): Developer workstation supply-chain vector; relevant to teams using the Nx build system.

Detection Engineering

The following detections target TTPs common to leak-site-driven ransomware crews like N0N: edge/VPN exploitation, macro-based phishing execution, RDP brute force, PsExec/WMI lateral movement, and pre-encryption staging (shadow copy deletion, mass file access).

YAML
---
title: Office Application Spawning Script Interpreter or Payload Dropper (Phishing Macro Execution)
id: 8f3a1c2e-7b4d-4e91-a6f2-n0n0macro001
status: experimental
description: Detects Microsoft Office processes spawning script interpreters or LOLBins consistent with macro-driven initial access used by ransomware crews including N0N's assessed phishing tradecraft.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/21
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
selection:
    ParentImage|endswith:
        - '\winword.exe'
        - '\excel.exe'
        - '\powerpnt.exe'
        - '\outlook.exe'
    Image|endswith:
        - '\powershell.exe'
        - '\pwsh.exe'
        - '\wscript.exe'
        - '\cscript.exe'
        - '\mshta.exe'
        - '\rundll32.exe'
        - '\regsvr32.exe'
        - '\cmd.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Rare; legacy line-of-business macro automation
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.t1059
---
title: RDP Brute Force Followed by Successful Logon (Edge Access Vector)
id: 2d7e9b41-3c5f-4a82-b1d8-n0n0rdp0002
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of failed RDP logons (Event ID 4625, LogonType 10) from a single source followed by a successful logon (Event ID 4624, LogonType 10) — consistent with brute-force or password-spray access to exposed RDP, a common ransomware entry vector.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/21
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
selection_failed:
    EventID: 4625
    LogonType: 10
selection_success:
    EventID: 4624
    LogonType: 10
condition: selection_failed | count() by IpAddress > 10
timeframe: 10m
falsepositives:
    - Misconfigured monitoring agents; user password fatigue from jump hosts
level: high
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1133
---
title: Pre-Ransomware Staging - Shadow Copy Deletion and PsExec-Style Service Installation
id: 6b1c4f88-9d2a-4e67-c3a5-n0n0stage003
status: experimental
description: Detects Volume Shadow Copy deletion via vssadmin/wmic/bcdedit and remote service installation (Event ID 7045 with PsExec-style names) — hallmark pre-encryption staging and lateral movement behaviors of ransomware operators.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/21
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
selection_vss:
    - Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
      CommandLine|contains:
        - 'delete shadows'
        - 'Delete Shadows'
    - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
      CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy delete'
    - Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
      CommandLine|contains: 'recoveryenabled no'
selection_psexec:
    Image|endswith:
        - '\psexec.exe'
        - '\psexesvc.exe'
        - '\paexec.exe'
        - '\remcom.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate admin use of PsExec; backup software managing shadow copies (rare with 'delete')
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1569.002
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt: Pre-ransomware staging & lateral movement pattern — 72h window
// Chains: remote logon burst -> suspicious service install -> mass file rename/write -> VSS tamper
// Deploy in Microsoft Sentinel; tune exclusions for your admin accounts and jump hosts.

let Lookback = 72h;
let SuspiciousServices = dynamic(["PSEXESVC","RemComSvc","paexec","csexec","rundll32svc","winrm_svc"]);
let AdminExclusions = dynamic(["svc-backup","admin-jump01"]); // tune per environment

// 1. Remote service installation (PsExec-style lateral movement)
let ServiceInstalls = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where EventID == 7045
| where ServiceName in~ (SuspiciousServices)
   or (ServiceFileName has_any ("ADMIN$","\\\\","%COMSPEC%","PSEXESVC"))
| where Account !in~ (AdminExclusions)
| project ServiceInstallTime=TimeGenerated, Computer, ServiceName, ServiceFileName, Account, IpAddress;

// 2. Shadow copy / recovery tampering
let VSSTamper = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where EventID == 4688
| where (Process has "vssadmin.exe" and CommandLine has "delete shadows")
   or (Process has "wmic.exe" and CommandLine has "shadowcopy")
   or (Process has "bcdedit.exe" and CommandLine has "recoveryenabled")
| project VSSTime=TimeGenerated, Computer, VSSAccount=Account, CommandLine;

// 3. Burst of remote logons from a single source to many hosts (fan-out lateral movement)
let RemoteFanOut = SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where EventID == 4624 and LogonType in (3, 10)
| where IpAddress !startswith "10." == false or true // keep all; filter internally below
| summarize DistinctTargets=dcount(Computer), TargetList=make_set(Computer, 25), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated)
  by Account, IpAddress
| where DistinctTargets >= 5
| where Account !in~ (AdminExclusions);

// Correlate: hosts hit by service install that also show VSS tampering = highest priority
ServiceInstalls
| join kind=inner (VSSTamper) on Computer
| extend Severity = "CRITICAL - staged for encryption"
| union (
    RemoteFanOut
    | extend Computer = "(multiple)", Severity = "HIGH - lateral fan-out", ServiceName="", ServiceFileName="", VSSTime=datetime(null), VSSAccount="", CommandLine="", ServiceInstallTime=FirstSeen
)
| project Severity, Computer, Account, IpAddress, ServiceInstallTime, ServiceName, VSSTime, VSSAccount, CommandLine, DistinctTargets, TargetList
| order by Severity asc;
PowerShell
# rapid-triage-n0n.ps1 — Security Arsenal rapid-response triage script
# Checks: exposed RDP, scheduled tasks created in last 7 days, shadow copy health,
# and suspicious recently-created services. Run elevated on suspect hosts or via your RMM.

$report = @()
Write-Host "=== N0N-Profile Rapid Triage — $(Get-Date -Format o) on $env:COMPUTERNAME ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# --- 1. RDP exposure check ---
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server').fDenyTSConnections -eq 0
$rdpPort = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).PortNumber
if (-not $rdpPort) { $rdpPort = 3389 }
$nlaEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).UserAuthentication -eq 1
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='RDP'; Finding="Enabled=$rdpEnabled Port=$rdpPort NLA=$nlaEnabled"; Risk= if($rdpEnabled -and -not $nlaEnabled){'HIGH — RDP open without NLA'} elseif($rdpEnabled){'MEDIUM — restrict by firewall/VPN'} else {'LOW'} }

# --- 2. Scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days (persistence) ---
$cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
$tasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -and ([datetime]$_.Date) -gt $cutoff } |
  Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{n='Action';e={($_.Actions | Select-Object -First 1).Execute}}
foreach ($t in $tasks) {
  $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='ScheduledTask(7d)'; Finding="$($t.TaskPath)$($t.TaskName) -> $($t.Action)"; Risk='REVIEW'}
}

# --- 3. Suspicious services created recently (PsExec-style lateral movement residue) ---
$svcs = Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.PathName -match 'PSEXESVC|ADMIN\$|RemCom|paexec' -or $_.Name -match '^(PSEXESVC|RemCom)' }
foreach ($s in $svcs) {
  $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='SuspiciousService'; Finding="$($s.Name): $($s.PathName) State=$($s.State)"; Risk='CRITICAL'}
}

# --- 4. Volume Shadow Copy status (pre-encryption tampering check) ---
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$vssState = if ($shadows) { "$($shadows.Count) shadow copies present" } else { "NO shadow copies found — investigate deletion (T1490)" }
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='ShadowCopies'; Finding=$vssState; Risk= if($shadows){'INFO'}else{'HIGH'} }

# --- 5. Recent 7045 service-install events (last 7 days) ---
$evts = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7045; StartTime=$cutoff} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($e in $evts) {
  $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='Event7045(7d)'; Finding=($e.Message -split "`n")[0]; Risk='REVIEW'}
}

$report | Sort-Object Risk | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String -Width 300 | Write-Host
$out = "$env:TEMP\n0n-triage-$env:COMPUTERNAME-$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd-HHmmss).csv"
$report | Export-Csv $out -NoTypeInformation
Write-Host "Report written to $out" -ForegroundColor Green

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist — Before Encryption Fires

If your organization is named on N0N's site — or you simply operate in the affected countries — hunt for these pre-detonation indicators immediately:

  1. Shadow copy deletion commands (vssadmin delete shadows, wmic shadowcopy delete, bcdedit ... recoveryenabled no) — the single strongest pre-encryption signal.
  2. New services on multiple hosts within hours (Event 7045), especially PsExec-style or randomly named services pointing to ADMIN$ paths.
  3. Mass file access/rename bursts on file servers from a single workstation account — staging or encryption rehearsal.
  4. Archive utility execution (rar.exe, 7z.exe, winzip CLI) against large directory trees — data staging for exfiltration.
  5. Unusual outbound volume to cloud storage (MEGA, file.io, Dropbox) or unfamiliar IPs — exfiltration typically precedes encryption by 24–72h.
  6. Disablement of EDR/backup agents via service stop, uninstall, or GPO tampering.
  7. Anomalous logons to backup infrastructure (Veeam, Commvault, vCenter) — ransomware operators target backups first.

Critical Assets This Crew Profile Prioritizes for Exfiltration

Based on double-extortion tradecraft common to crews of N0N's profile, prioritize protection and egress monitoring around:

  • File servers and NAS holding contracts, financial records, HR data
  • Email archives of executive and legal mailboxes (negotiation leverage material)
  • Backup catalogs and snapshots (to destroy recovery options and prove data access)
  • vCenter / hypervisor management planes (mass-encryption leverage)
  • CI/CD credential stores (TeamCity and similar — lateral expansion and supply-chain reach)

Containment Actions — Ordered by Urgency

  1. Isolate, don't power off — network-quarantine suspect hosts to preserve volatile memory evidence.
  2. Kill the edge vector — block the source IP/path at the firewall; if VPN/RDP exposure is suspected, force-reset all credentials with active sessions and revoke tokens.
  3. Disable suspect accounts — any account showing fan-out logons or service-install activity; assume domain admin compromise if 7045 events span tiers.
  4. Protect backups — take backup infrastructure offline from the production network; verify at least one immutable/offline copy predates the earliest indicator.
  5. Snapshot before remediation — capture forensic images of patient-zero candidates before AV or reimaging destroys evidence.
  6. Engage IR retainers and counsel early — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction (relevant across US/UK/MX/PH/CA); legal determines notification clocks, not the security team.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

  • Patch or mitigate the five KEV entries listed above where present in your environment — Check Point IKEv1 auth bypass, Cisco FMC hard-coded creds, vCenter path traversal, TeamCity deserialization, Nx Console supply chain. These are confirmed ransomware-exploited.
  • Audit RDP exposure: no RDP directly internet-facing, ever. Enforce NLA, restrict by firewall to VPN/jump hosts only, and alert on LogonType 10 brute-force patterns (Sigma rule 2 above).
  • Deploy the three Sigma rules and the KQL hunt in this briefing; run the PowerShell triage script on any host touching sensitive data.
  • Verify shadow copies exist on file servers and that backups include an offline/immutable tier.
  • Block or alert on macro-enabled Office docs from external senders and on Office spawning child processes (Sigma rule 1).

Short-Term (2 Weeks)

  • Eliminate standing edge admin: move firewall/VPN management (FMC, Check Point SmartConsole) to dedicated PAWs with phishing-resistant MFA; no management interfaces reachable from the internet.
  • Segment backup and hypervisor planes onto isolated management VLANs with separate credentials — a vCenter compromise should never be reachable with domain user creds.
  • Deploy egress filtering and DLP alerting on bulk outbound transfers to consumer cloud storage; exfiltration is the extortion lever — choke it.
  • Tier-0 credential hygiene: rotate krbtgt twice if any lateral movement indicators surface; enforce gMSA for service accounts.
  • Tabletop the leak-site scenario: if your organization appeared on a DLS tomorrow, who validates the claim, who talks to the gang's infrastructure (hint: your IR retainer, not you), and who owns the disclosure decision across your operating jurisdictions?

Security Arsenal monitors ransomware leak sites continuously. If your organization has been named by N0N or any crew and you need claim-validation support, contact us at security@securityarsenal.com.

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