Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-20 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
N0N Ransomware Gang: 25 New Leak-Site Listings Across US, PH, GB, MX, CA — Campaign Analysis & Detection Engineering
Executive Summary
On 2026-11-18, the N0N ransomware group posted 25 new victim listings to its dark web leak site in a single coordinated wave — the entirety of its last 100 postings tracked via ransomware.live. The listings span five countries: the United States, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Canada. Sector attribution for all 25 listings is currently unavailable ("Not Found" in the source data).
Every listing in this dataset was independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, confirming the gang made the claims. No listing in this briefing confirms a breach. These are accusations published by a criminal group, and Security Arsenal reports them as such. Enterprise security teams — particularly those operating in the five affected countries — should treat this wave as a trigger to run the detection content in this briefing, not as confirmation that any specific organization is compromised.
Sourcing & Verification
- Corroboration status: 25 of 25 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler (multi-source); 0 listings appear on a single source only. Multi-source corroboration confirms the gang published the claim — it does not confirm that any intrusion, theft, or encryption event occurred.
- What inclusion means: An organization's appearance in this briefing reflects a threat actor's claim on a criminal leak site. It is not confirmation of a breach, and no corroboration tier in our data pipeline supports that conclusion.
- Disputes and denials: A named organization may dispute or deny a listing. A denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is legally reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question; only the organization or its regulator can confirm an incident.
- Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing as warranted and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — N0N
Caveat: N0N is a comparatively opaque actor in the current ecosystem. The profile below synthesizes observable leak-site behavior with TTP patterns common to crews operating in this tier; where attribution is uncertain, it is marked as assessed rather than confirmed.
- Aliases: N0N (stylized with a zero); no confirmed rebrand lineage to a prior established family as of this publication.
- Operating model: Assessed as a closed or semi-closed operation rather than a broad affiliate-driven RaaS. The single-day, batch-style victim dump across five countries is characteristic of a crew monetizing a pre-accumulated access inventory, not of a large affiliate program publishing at varied cadence.
- Ransom demands: Not publicly documented for this crew. Based on victim geography (US/GB/CA-heavy), demands are assessed to fall in the mid-five-to-seven-figure USD range typical of crews targeting mid-market organizations.
- Initial access methods (assessed): Consistent with the broader ransomware ecosystem and the KEV-listed exposure below — exploitation of internet-facing remote access (VPN concentrators, RDP, virtual infrastructure), credential-based access, and phishing-delivered loaders. No specific initial access vector has been confirmed for any listing in this dataset.
- Extortion model: Double extortion — leak-site publication with implied data-theft threat. The batch posting pattern suggests data exfiltration (or claimed exfiltration) precedes public naming.
- Dwell time: Unknown for this crew specifically. Industry-typical dwell time for comparable actors runs from days to several weeks between initial access and detonation/publication.
Current Campaign Analysis
Sectors Being Targeted
Sector data for all 25 listings is recorded as "Not Found" in the source feed. We will not speculate about which industries the named organizations operate in. The absence of sector metadata is itself notable — it may indicate the gang published minimal victim profiling, or that enrichment pipelines have not yet resolved these entities. Defenders in all sectors within the affected geographies should treat this as applicable to them.
Geographic Concentration
| Country | Listings | Share |
|---|---|---|
| United States | 10 | 40% |
| United Kingdom | 3 | 12% |
| Mexico | 3 | 12% |
| Philippines | 2 | 8% |
| Canada | (remainder of 25; see raw feed) | — |
The US-heavy distribution is consistent with monetization-driven targeting. The presence of PH and MX listings alongside US/GB/CA suggests either opportunistic access-driven victimology (the crew publishes whatever access it obtains) or affiliate/broker-sourced access across regions.
Victim Profile
With sector data unavailable, revenue and headcount estimates cannot be responsibly produced for these specific listings. The naming convention in our dataset (anonymized pending enrichment) prevents reliable size estimation. We note only that mid-market organizations remain the statistically dominant victim class across the ecosystem this crew operates in.
Posting Frequency & Escalation
The dominant signal in this dataset is the burst pattern: all 25 listings share a single publication date (2026-11-18). Interpretations include:
- Access liquidation — the crew (or a broker feeding it) dumped a backlogged inventory of claimed victims at once, possibly to pressure multiple negotiations simultaneously.
- Proof-of-life after dormancy — a re-emerging crew demonstrating operational tempo.
- Deadline expiry wave — multiple negotiations hitting publication deadlines on the same day.
Analysts should watch for whether 2026-11-18 represents a campaign peak or the start of sustained daily posting. A second consecutive burst would materially raise the assessed threat level.
CVE Exposure — Hypothesis Only
The following CISA KEV entries represent sector-level exposure consistent with how crews in this tier gain initial access. We have no evidence linking any specific CVE to any specific N0N listing. Treat these as prioritized patching hypotheses, not attribution:
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway, improper authentication in IKEv1) — perimeter VPN exploitation is the single most common ransomware initial access vector in recent ecosystem data.
- CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC, hard-coded password) — management-plane compromise of security infrastructure enables both access and blind-spot creation.
- CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter path traversal) — hypervisor-layer access enables mass encryption of virtualized estates, the highest-impact ransomware outcome.
- CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity deserialization) — CI/CD compromise provides privileged lateral movement and supply-chain reach.
- CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console embedded malicious code) — developer-toolchain supply chain exposure.
Detection Engineering
---
title: N0N-Consistent TTP - VPN/Perimeter Anomalous Authentication Followed by Internal RDP
id: 9f1c2a10-7b3e-4d51-9a21-n0nvpn000101
status: experimental
description: Detects a successful VPN authentication from an unusual source geography or ASN followed within 60 minutes by an internal RDP logon to a server — a pattern consistent with perimeter-exploit-to-interactive-access playbooks used by crews like N0N. Relevant to CVE-2026-50751 and CVE-2026-20316 exposure.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
category: authentication
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_rdp:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 10
filter_exclude_service:
TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection_rdp and not filter_exclude_service
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative RDP from jump hosts
- VDI broker logons
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1133
- attack.t1021.001
---
title: N0N-Consistent TTP - PsExec or WMI Remote Service Creation for Lateral Movement
id: 9f1c2a10-7b3e-4d51-9a21-n0nlat000202
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service installation (Event 7045) or named-pipe usage consistent with PsExec-style lateral movement and WMI-based remote execution, observed across double-extortion crew playbooks during pre-encryption staging.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection_service_install:
EventID: 7045
selection_suspicious_names:
ServiceName|contains:
- 'PSEXESVC'
- 'PAExec'
- 'csexec'
- 'RemCom'
selection_random_bin:
ImagePath|contains:
- '\\ADMIN$\\'
- '\\IPC$\\'
- '\\Windows\\Temp\\'
condition: selection_service_install and (selection_suspicious_names or selection_random_bin)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate enterprise software distribution (SCCM, PDQ)
- IT admin tooling — baseline approved service names
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.t1021.002
---
title: N0N-Consistent TTP - Pre-Encryption Staging - Shadow Copy Deletion and Archive Exfil Staging
id: 9f1c2a10-7b3e-4d51-9a21-n0nstg000303
status: experimental
description: Detects volume shadow copy deletion via vssadmin/wmic and mass archive creation in temp directories — near-universal pre-detonation behavior across ransomware crews including double-extortion actors staging data for leak-site publication.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_vss:
Image|endswith:
- '\\vssadmin.exe'
- '\\wmic.exe'
- '\\bcdedit.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'delete shadows'
- 'shadowcopy delete'
- 'recoveryenabled no'
selection_archive:
Image|endswith:
- '\\7z.exe'
- '\\rar.exe'
- '\\winrar.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' a '
- ' -p'
- 'AppData\\Local\\Temp'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Backup software maintenance tasks
- Legitimate admin scripting — alert on server assets warrants immediate triage
level: critical
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1560.001
// N0N-consistent hunt: pre-ransomware staging & lateral movement chain (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Looks for hosts exhibiting a SEQUENCE within 4 hours: suspicious service install -> archive tool -> shadow copy deletion
let Lookback = 7d;
let Window = 4h;
let SuspiciousServices = dynamic(["PSEXESVC","PAExec","RemCom","csexec"]);
let ServiceInstalls =
Event
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback) and EventLog == "System" and EventID == 7045
| extend Rendered = tostring(RenderedDescription)
| where Rendered has_any (SuspiciousServices) or Rendered has_any (@"\ADMIN$\", @"\Windows\Temp\")
| extend Host = Computer, StageTime = TimeGenerated, Stage1 = "ServiceInstall";
let ArchiveUse =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
| where FileName in~ ("7z.exe","rar.exe","winrar.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (" -p", "AppData\\Local\\Temp")
| extend Host = DeviceName, StageTime = TimeGenerated, Stage2 = "ArchiveStaged";
let ShadowDelete =
union isfuzzy=true
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback)
| where FileName in~ ("vssadmin.exe","wmic.exe","bcdedit.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows","shadowcopy delete","recoveryenabled no")
| extend Host = DeviceName, StageTime = TimeGenerated, Stage3 = "ShadowDelete"),
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(Lookback) and EventID == 4688
| where Process has_any ("vssadmin.exe","wmic.exe")
| where CommandLine has_any ("delete shadows","shadowcopy delete")
| extend Host = Computer, StageTime = TimeGenerated, Stage3 = "ShadowDelete");
let Chained =
ServiceInstalls
| join kind=inner (ArchiveUse) on Host
| where StageTime1 < StageTime and (StageTime - StageTime1) <= Window
| join kind=inner (ShadowDelete) on Host
| where StageTime < StageTime2 and (StageTime2 - StageTime) <= Window;
Chained
| summarize FirstSeen = min(StageTime1), DetonationSignal = max(StageTime2) by Host
| extend Assessment = "Full pre-encryption staging chain observed - treat as active incident until disproven"
| project Host, FirstSeen, DetonationSignal, Assessment;
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Rapid-response posture check for N0N-consistent TTPs.
Run on servers and key endpoints. Read-only; produces a triage report.
#>
$Report = @()
$Now = Get-Date
Write-Host "[1/5] Checking RDP exposure..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server').fDenyTSConnections -eq 0
$nlaEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).UserAuthentication
$Report += [pscustomobject]@{ Check='RDP Enabled'; Finding=$rdpEnabled; Risk= if($rdpEnabled -and $nlaEnabled -ne 1){'HIGH - RDP on without NLA'}else{'Review'} }
Write-Host "[2/5] Enumerating scheduled tasks created in last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$info = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
try { $xml = [xml]($_ | Export-ScheduledTask); $created = [datetime]$xml.Task.RegistrationInfo.Date
if (($Now - $created).Days -le 7) {
$Report += [pscustomobject]@{ Check='New Scheduled Task'; Finding="$($_.TaskName) created $created"; Risk='Investigate' }
}
} catch {}
}
Write-Host "[3/5] Checking Volume Shadow Copies..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if (-not $shadows) { $Report += [pscustomobject]@{ Check='Shadow Copies'; Finding='NONE FOUND'; Risk='HIGH - possible deletion or never configured' } }
else { $shadows | ForEach-Object { $Report += [pscustomobject]@{ Check='Shadow Copies'; Finding="Present: $($_.ID) ($($_.InstallDate))"; Risk='OK' } } }
Write-Host "[4/5] Scanning for suspicious services (PsExec-style)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'PSEXESVC|PAExec|RemCom|csexec' -or $_.PathName -match 'ADMIN\$|Windows\\Temp' } |
ForEach-Object { $Report += [pscustomobject]@{ Check='Suspicious Service'; Finding="$($_.Name) -> $($_.PathName)"; Risk='HIGH' } }
Write-Host "[5/5] Recent archive-tool execution artifacts (prefetch)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ChildItem "$env:SystemRoot\Prefetch" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Name -match '^(7Z|RAR|WINRAR|VSSADMIN|WMIC|BCDEDIT)' -and $_.LastWriteTime -gt $Now.AddDays(-7) } |
ForEach-Object { $Report += [pscustomobject]@{ Check='Prefetch Artifact'; Finding="$($_.Name) last run $($_.LastWriteTime)"; Risk='Investigate' } }
$Report | Format-Table -AutoSize
$Report | Export-Csv ".\N0N_Triage_$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd_HHmm).csv" -NoTypeInformation
Write-Host "Report exported. Escalate any HIGH findings to IR immediately." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist — Before Encryption Fires
- VPN concentrator and firewall management-plane logs reviewed for anomalous admin logins (correlate with CVE-2026-50751 / CVE-2026-20316 patch status)
- New local/domain accounts created in the last 14 days, especially accounts added to privileged groups outside change windows
- Event 7045 service installations matching PsExec/RemCom patterns on servers
- Any execution of
vssadmin delete shadows,wmic shadowcopy delete, orbcdedit ... recoveryenabled no— treat as detonation imminent - Large archive creation in user temp directories or unusual SMB write volume to a single host (staging for exfiltration)
- Outbound transfer anomalies: sustained multi-GB egress to uncommon cloud storage, MEGA, or unknown endpoints
- Cobalt Strike-style beaconing: periodic small HTTPS callbacks to low-reputation domains with consistent jitter
Assets Historically Prioritized for Exfiltration (ecosystem pattern for double-extortion crews)
- File shares containing HR, legal, and financial records (maximum negotiation leverage)
- Customer/patient databases and any regulated PII
- Email archives of executives and legal counsel
- Backup catalogs and backup server credentials (to enable both exfil and destruction)
Containment Actions — Ordered by Urgency
- Isolate, don't power off any host showing shadow-copy deletion or mass archive activity (preserve memory for forensics).
- Disable the implicated account(s) and force enterprise-wide credential reset for any account with interactive logons on affected hosts; reset KRBTGT twice if domain controller compromise is plausible.
- Block egress to identified exfil destinations at the proxy/firewall; capture flows first.
- Quarantine the perimeter device (VPN/FMC) from management-plane reach and pull its logs before rotation.
- Protect backups: take backup infrastructure offline from the domain, verify immutable copies, confirm restorability.
- Engage IR retainer and counsel before any communication decision regarding the listing; do not contact the actor.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
- Patch or mitigate CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point IKEv1) and CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC hard-coded password) on any internet-facing instance; if patching is not possible, restrict management-plane access to a dedicated admin VLAN and add alerting on all administrative logins.
- Enforce NLA + MFA on RDP; disable RDP exposure to the internet entirely; require VPN/ZTNA for all remote administration.
- Enable and alert on the Sigma rules above; specifically, page on any shadow-copy deletion event on servers.
- Disable Office macros from the internet zone by default (phishing-macro kill switch).
- Verify backup immutability and offline copies today — not this week.
Short-Term (2 Weeks)
- Patch CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter) and CVE-2026-63077 (TeamCity); segment hypervisor and CI/CD management planes behind jump hosts with just-in-time access.
- Deploy egress filtering with allow-listing for server VLANs; alert on egress to consumer file-sharing services.
- Implement LAPS, tiered administration, and remove standing Domain Admin use on member servers.
- Stand up deception: canary file shares and honey credentials to catch staging activity early.
- Baseline and alert on new service installations and scheduled tasks across the server fleet.
Related Resources
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