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N0N Ransomware Gang: 25 New Leak-Site Listings — Campaign Analysis, Detection Rules & Response Playbook

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 20, 2026
15 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-20 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

N0N Ransomware Gang: 25 New Leak-Site Listings — Campaign Analysis, Detection Rules & Response Playbook

Executive Summary

On 2026-11-18, the ransomware group N0N published 25 victim listings to its dark web leak site in a single coordinated dump — the largest single-day posting volume we have observed from this actor in the last 100 postings tracked via ransomware.live. Every listing carries the same publication date, which strongly suggests either a batch-detonation campaign, a bulk data dump from a single affiliate, or a deliberate "pressure wave" tactic designed to maximize visibility and overwhelm defenders.

Critical caveat up front: these are unverified claims made by a criminal organization. N0N claims to have compromised the listed organizations. A leak-site listing is an accusation, not a confirmed breach. At the time of publication, none of the 25 listed organizations (anonymized in our dataset as Company #227 through #241) have been independently confirmed as breached by the organizations themselves, regulators, or third-party incident responders.

Key observations:

  • Volume: 25 listings in the last 100 postings; 15 published in a single batch on 2026-11-18.
  • Geography: United States (heavy concentration), Philippines, United Kingdom, Mexico, Canada.
  • Sectors: Sector attribution is not available in the current dataset ("Not Found" for all 25). Defenders in the affected countries should treat this as a sector-agnostic campaign until better attribution emerges.
  • Corroboration: 15 of 25 listings were observed by two independent leak-site crawlers (confirming the gang posted the claim); 10 appear on a single source only.
  • Actionable signal: N0N's tooling and tradecraft align with known exploitation of perimeter and management-plane CVEs currently on the CISA KEV (VMware vCenter, Cisco FMC, Check Point, TeamCity). This is a hypothesis about exposure, not attribution — patch accordingly.

Sourcing & Verification

This briefing is built from live monitoring of N0N's .onion leak site via ransomware.live. Transparency about what this data does and does not mean:

  • Corroboration status: 15 of the 25 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler (tagged MULTI-SOURCE). 10 listings appear on a single source only. Multi-source corroboration confirms that the gang made the claim — it does not confirm that any breach occurred.
  • What a listing means: Inclusion on N0N's leak site reflects the threat actor's claim. It is not confirmation of a breach, and nothing in this dataset rises to that standard. Only the named organization or its regulator can confirm an incident.
  • Denials and silence: A named organization may dispute the listing. Equally, a denial is not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction, and not every incident is reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question. We report the claim as a claim, nothing more.
  • Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections promptly. We welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Victim names in this briefing are anonymized as they appear in our monitoring pipeline (Company #227–#241). We do not publish victim identities from unverified claims.

Threat Actor Profile — N0N

Model: N0N operates as a closed or semi-closed ransomware operation with characteristics consistent with a small affiliate-driven RaaS. The batch-style posting pattern (25 victims, one date) is typical of a single affiliate dumping a pipeline of access gained over weeks, then monetizing through staged leak pressure.

Aliases: No widely documented aliases in our current tracking. The group brands itself simply as "N0N" on its leak infrastructure. (Note: distinct from similarly named actors — do not conflate without infrastructure overlap evidence.)

Extortion model: Double extortion. Like the majority of modern crews, N0N's leak site implies data theft prior to encryption: victims who refuse to pay the decryption ransom face staged publication of exfiltrated data. The single-day dump suggests the gang favors shock-and-pressure negotiation over the slow-drip approach used by groups like LockBit.

Ransom demands: Not reliably documented for this actor. Based on comparable mid-tier crews targeting this geographic profile, demands typically range from low six figures to low seven figures USD, scaled to perceived victim revenue.

Initial access methods (observed tradecraft across this crew's campaign pattern):

  • Exploitation of internet-facing perimeter and management appliances (VPN concentrators, firewalls, virtualization management)
  • Phishing with macro-enabled or script-based payloads
  • Exposed or weakly protected RDP (brute force and purchased access)
  • Abuse of CI/CD and developer tooling as a supply-chain-adjacent entry point

Dwell time: Mid-tier double-extortion crews in this class typically operate with a 5–21 day dwell time between initial access and detonation/leak posting. The single-day batch posting is consistent with parallel intrusions detonated or staged together — meaning several victims may have shared an access vector or initial access broker.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sector Targeting

Sector data for all 25 listings is Not Found in the current dataset. We will not speculate. The honest read: N0N's current wave appears opportunistic rather than sector-focused, which is consistent with access-vector-driven targeting (whatever was exposed and exploitable) rather than a vertical strategy. Organizations in the five affected countries should not assume immunity because they sit outside a "typical" ransomware vertical.

Geographic Concentration

CountryListings (of 25 sample)Notes
United States~11Clear primary focus
United Kingdom3Secondary
Mexico2Secondary
Philippines1Emerging footprint
Canada1Minor presence

The US/GB/CA/MX/PH spread maps to English-language business infrastructure and regions with mature cyber-insurance markets — a hallmark of crews optimizing for payment probability.

Victim Profile

Without confirmed sector or revenue data, we assess the victim profile as mid-market to upper mid-market organizations — the sweet spot for crews of this size: large enough to pay six-to-seven figures, small enough to lack 24/7 detection coverage. The batch pattern reinforces this: enterprise-scale targets usually get individual, high-drama postings, not bulk dumps.

Posting Frequency & Escalation

  • All 25 tracked listings were published 2026-11-18 — a single-day surge.
  • Interpretation options: (a) bulk detonation of a shared access pipeline; (b) an affiliate settling scores by dumping its full book; (c) deliberate PR surge to establish the N0N brand. All three are consistent with a newer or re-emerging crew building reputation.
  • Watch item: if follow-on postings include proof packs or countdown timers, the campaign is in the pressure phase and non-paying listed organizations face staged data release.

CVE Exposure — Hypothesis, Not Attribution

We have no evidence linking any specific CVE to any specific N0N listing. However, N0N-class crews exploiting perimeter and management-plane devices should be evaluated against these actively exploited, CISA KEV-listed vulnerabilities — all confirmed in ransomware operations broadly:

  • CVE-2026-59310 — VMware vCenter path traversal. vCenter compromise = keys to the virtualization kingdom. Ransomware crews prize it because encrypting the hypervisor layer detonates dozens of workloads at once. If your vCenter is unpatched, assume exposure.
  • CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password. Management-plane access to your firewall fleet — a favorite for disabling egress filtering before exfiltration.
  • CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication (IKEv1). VPN gateway bypass; classic initial access for this actor class.
  • CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity deserialization. Unauthenticated RCE on build servers — code signing keys, secrets, and a trusted path into production.
  • CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console embedded malicious code. Developer supply-chain entry; watch for developer workstations as patient zero.

Treat these as sector-level exposure to hunt against, not as confirmed N0N initial vectors.

Detection Engineering

The following detections target the TTPs this class of actor uses across the kill chain: perimeter exploitation follow-on activity, lateral movement, and pre-encryption staging. Tune thresholds to your baseline.

YAML
---
title: N0N-Class Ransomware — Suspicious Process Spawning from Management/Perimeter Services
description: Detects command shell or script interpreter execution as a child of VPN, firewall management, vCenter, or CI/CD service processes — consistent with post-exploitation of CVE-2026-59310, CVE-2026-20316, CVE-2026-50751, or CVE-2026-63077.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  parent_services:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\vpxd.exe'
      - '\vmware-vmon.exe'
      - '\teamcity-server.exe'
      - '\cscmd.exe'
      - '\fw1.exe'
      - '\vpnd.exe'
      - '\pmangel.exe'
  child_shells:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
      - '\wscript.exe'
      - '\cscript.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
  condition: parent_services and child_shells
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate appliance management scripts and health checks
level: high
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1190
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
date: 2026/11/20
---
title: N0N-Class Ransomware — Lateral Movement via PsExec or WMI Remote Execution
description: Detects PsExec-style service creation, ADMIN$ writes, and WMI-spawned processes indicative of hands-on-keyboard lateral movement in the pre-detonation phase.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_psexec:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\PSEXESVC.exe'
      - '\psexec.exe'
      - '\paexec.exe'
      - '\csexec.exe'
  selection_wmi:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\pwsh.exe'
  selection_service:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'ADMIN$'
      - '\\system32\\'
    Image|endswith: '\sc.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'create'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Administrative tooling (SCCM, PDQ Deploy, authorized remote administration)
level: high
tags:
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1021.002
  - attack.t1047
  - attack.t1569.002
date: 2026/11/20
---
title: N0N-Class Ransomware — Pre-Encryption Staging and Shadow Copy Tampering
description: Detects Volume Shadow Copy deletion, backup catalog tampering, boot config changes, and mass archive creation typical of the final pre-detonation window in double-extortion operations.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_vss:
    - Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
      CommandLine|contains:
        - 'delete shadows'
        - 'resize shadowstorage'
    - Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
      CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy'
  selection_bcdedit:
    Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'recoveryenabled'
      - 'ignoreallfailures'
  selection_wbem:
    Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'delete'
  selection_archive:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\rar.exe'
      - '\7z.exe'
      - '\winrar.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' a '
      - '-p'
      - '-m5'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Backup maintenance windows, IT archiving tasks (rar/7z)
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
  - attack.t1560.001
  - attack.defense_evasion
date: 2026/11/20

Hunt query for Microsoft Sentinel: surfaces hosts showing the classic pre-ransomware sequence — new service installs or WMI remote execution followed within hours by shadow copy tampering, plus mass file reads consistent with data staging.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// N0N-class pre-detonation hunt: lateral movement followed by staging/destruction prep
let lookback = 14d;
let stagingHosts =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows", "shadowstorage", "recoveryenabled", "ignoreallfailures")
       or (FileName in~ ("rar.exe", "7z.exe", "winrar.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has " a ")
    | summarize StagingEvents = count(), FirstStaging = min(TimeGenerated), LastStaging = max(TimeGenerated),
                Commands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 20) by DeviceName, DeviceId, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
let lateralHosts =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
    | where FileName in~ ("PSEXESVC.exe", "psexec.exe", "paexec.exe")
       or (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "WmiPrvSE.exe" and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe"))
       or (FileName =~ "sc.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_all ("create", "\\\\"))
    | summarize LateralEvents = count(), FirstLateral = min(TimeGenerated),
                RemoteTools = make_set(FileName, 10) by DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
let exfilSignal =
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
    | where RemoteUrl has_any ("mega.nz", "transfer.sh", "file.io", "gofile.io", "anonfiles", "temp.sh", "wetransfer")
       or RemotePort in (21, 22) and RemoteIPType == "Public"
    | summarize ExfilDestinations = make_set(RemoteUrl, 10), ExfilPorts = make_set(RemotePort) by DeviceName;
stagingHosts
| join kind=inner lateralHosts on DeviceName
| where FirstLateral <= FirstStaging  // movement precedes staging — the attacker's path
| join kind=leftouter exfilSignal on DeviceName
| project DeviceName, FirstLateral, FirstStaging, LateralEvents, StagingEvents, RemoteTools, ExfilDestinations, Commands
| order by FirstStaging asc;

Rapid-response triage script: enumerates exposed RDP listeners, scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days, shadow copy state, and recently created local admins — the four fastest checks when an N0N-class listing names your organization or sector.

PowerShell
# N0N Rapid Triage — run elevated on suspect hosts or via your EDR live-response shell
$report = @()

# 1. RDP exposure check
$rdp = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$nla = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -Name UserAuthentication -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='RDP'; Detail="Enabled=$(-not $rdp.fDenyTSConnections); NLA=$($nla.UserAuthentication)"}

# 2. Scheduled tasks created in last 7 days
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -and ([datetime]$_.Date) -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } |
  ForEach-Object { $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='NewTask'; Detail="$($_.TaskName) | $($_.TaskPath) | $($_.Date)"} }

# 3. Volume Shadow Copy inventory (ransomware prep often deletes or resizes these)
try {
  $shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction Stop
  $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='VSS'; Detail="Shadow copies present: $($shadows.Count)"}
} catch { $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='VSS'; Detail='NONE FOUND or access denied — investigate immediately'} }

# 4. Local admins created or modified in last 7 days
Get-LocalGroupMember -Group 'Administrators' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
  $u = Get-LocalUser -Name ($_.Name -split '\\')[-1] -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  if ($u -and $u.PasswordLastSet -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)) {
    $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='AdminAccount'; Detail="$($u.Name) password set $($u.PasswordLastSet)"}
  }
}

# 5. Recent vssadmin/bcdedit evidence in PowerShell history and event log
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7036} -MaxEvents 50 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'Volume Shadow Copy' } |
  ForEach-Object { $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='VSSServiceEvent'; Detail="$($_.TimeCreated): $($_.Message.Substring(0,[Math]::Min(120,$_.Message.Length)))"} }

$report | Format-Table -AutoSize
$report | Export-Csv "$env:TEMP\n0n_triage_$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd_HHmm).csv" -NoTypeInformation
Write-Host "`nTriage complete. Review any VSS=NONE, unexpected new tasks, or fresh admin accounts first." -ForegroundColor Yellow

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist — Before Encryption Fires

If your organization appears on N0N's leak site (or a peer's does), assume you are in the dwell window and hunt for:

  1. Shadow copy deletion or resize commands — the single highest-fidelity pre-detonation signal (Rule 3 above).
  2. New local/domain admin accounts or password resets in the last 14 days — persistence before the push.
  3. PsExec/WMI service installs on servers that never normally see them (Rule 2 + KQL).
  4. Mass archive creation (rar/7z with passwords) in user directories, file shares, or temp paths — staging for exfil.
  5. Egress spikes to consumer file-sharing or MEGA-class destinations from servers, not workstations.
  6. EDR/AV tampering events: agent uninstalls, exclusion additions, Safe Mode boot configuration changes (bcdedit).
  7. Backup infrastructure access anomalies — Veeam/CommVault console logins from unusual sources; N0N-class actors target backups first.

Critical Assets This Actor Class Prioritizes for Exfiltration

  • File servers and SharePoint/OneDrive roots — contracts, HR, financials (maximum extortion leverage)
  • Backup catalogs and snapshots — destroy recoverability before detonation
  • Email archives of executive/legal teams — negotiation leverage and regulator bait
  • Virtualization management (vCenter/ESXi) — blast-radius multiplier at detonation
  • CI/CD secrets stores (relevant given TeamCity/Nx exposure on the KEV) — lateral keys and supply-chain leverage

Containment Actions — Ordered by Urgency

  1. Isolate at the identity layer first: disable suspicious accounts, force reset of all privileged credentials (twice, to invalidate tickets), revoke active sessions and tokens.
  2. Segment the virtualization and backup planes immediately — even before confirming the vector. These are the detonation targets.
  3. Block egress to known exfil destinations at the proxy/firewall; alert on large outbound transfers to uncategorized IPs.
  4. Snapshot evidence before remediation: memory and triage images from the suspected patient zero — you need to find the access vector or they will return.
  5. Patch the five KEV CVEs above across your estate, prioritizing anything internet-facing or management-plane.
  6. Engage external IR and legal/comms early — if you are on the leak site, assume a countdown exists whether or not one is displayed.
  7. Do not rebuild from domain-joined infrastructure until the identity plane is proven clean; treat AD as potentially compromised until proven otherwise.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

  • Patch or isolate VMware vCenter (CVE-2026-59310), Cisco Secure FMC (CVE-2026-20316), Check Point gateways (CVE-2026-50751), and TeamCity servers (CVE-2026-63077). If you cannot patch, pull the management interfaces off any routable-from-outside path.
  • Disable IKEv1 aggressive mode on Check Point gateways where feasible; enforce certificate-based authentication.
  • Enforce MFA on all remote access (VPN, RDP gateways, vCenter SSO) and kill any RDP exposed directly to the internet.
  • Deploy the three Sigma rules above and the Sentinel hunt; baseline PsExec/WMI usage now so tomorrow's anomaly stands out.
  • Enable tamper protection on EDR/AV agents and alert on exclusion changes.
  • Verify backup immutability: confirm offline or object-lock copies actually restore — test one today.
  • Block consumer file-sharing domains at egress for server VLANs.

Short-Term (2 Weeks)

  • Tiered administration model: separate admin accounts and workstations for identity, virtualization, and backup planes. N0N-class actors die on this hill — one compromised admin can't reach detonation targets.
  • Remove macro execution paths: block Office macros from the internet zone by default; enforce Attack Surface Reduction rules.
  • Segment CI/CD and developer tooling (TeamCity, build agents, package tooling) away from production and identity infrastructure; rotate all secrets stored in build systems.
  • Deploy canary files and decoy credentials on file servers and admin endpoints — cheap, near-zero-false-positive early warning for staging activity.
  • Stand up leak-site monitoring for your organization and brands through your threat intel provider or Security Arsenal's managed service — knowing you're listed 48 hours before a journalist calls is worth the entire program.
  • Egress filtering architecture: default-deny outbound for servers, with explicit allow lists; ransomware crews depend on unrestricted exfil paths.
  • Tabletop the double-extortion scenario with legal, comms, and executives now — decide your posture on negotiation, disclosure, and regulator notification before you're reading your own name on a leak site.

Security Arsenal monitors ransomware leak infrastructure continuously. If your organization appears in N0N's listings — or any gang's — contact our incident response team before engaging with the actor.

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