Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-19 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
N0N Ransomware Gang: 25 New Leak-Site Listings in 24 Hours — Campaign Analysis & Detection Rules
Executive Summary
Between 2026-11-18 and 2026-11-19, the ransomware group tracked as N0N listed 25 organizations on its dark web leak site, with every observed posting dated 2026-11-18. All 25 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, confirming the gang published these claims — not that any breach occurred. The listed organizations span the United States (9), United Kingdom (3), Mexico (2), and Philippines (1) among the 15 most recent postings, with Canada also appearing in the group's broader targeting footprint. Sector attribution was not disclosed for any listing in this batch.
The volume and same-day clustering of these postings is consistent with a mass-claim campaign — a pattern where a ransomware operation dumps a large victim batch at once, often weeks after initial intrusions, to maximize extortion pressure and media attention. Security teams operating in the affected geographies should treat this as a trigger to review exposure on the edge-device and remote-access CVEs N0N-class actors are known to exploit, and to deploy the detections in this briefing.
Sourcing & Verification
- 25 of 25 listings in this report were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler (multi-source); 0 appear on a single source only. Multi-source observation confirms the gang published the claim — it does not confirm any breach.
- Inclusion of an organization in this briefing reflects the threat actor's accusation only. No tier in this dataset confirms a breach occurred. Only the named organization or its regulator can confirm an incident.
- A named organization may dispute a listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and not every incident is reportable, so neither silence nor denial settles the question.
- Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing as warranted and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — N0N
Aliases: N0N is tracked under its self-styled branding on its Tor-based leak infrastructure. No widely adopted alternate aliases have been confirmed by the research community at this time; monitoring continues for rebranding, which is common when leak sites draw sustained law-enforcement attention.
Operating model: N0N's posting cadence and leak-site structure are consistent with a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) or affiliate-driven model, in which a core operator group maintains the encryptor, negotiation infrastructure, and leak site while affiliates execute intrusions. The same-day bulk posting pattern observed here — 15+ listings published 2026-11-18 alone — typically indicates multiple affiliates uploading victim data in a coordinated push, or a backlog being published at once for leverage.
Ransom demands: Specific demand figures for this campaign are not visible from leak-site telemetry. Actors in this class typically calibrate demands to victim revenue, ranging from low six figures against SMBs to multi-million-dollar demands against mid-market enterprises, with a double-extortion structure: pay to decrypt, and pay again (or instead) to prevent data publication.
Initial access methods (group-class TTPs): Actors operating under this profile are assessed to rely on a blend of:
- Exploitation of perimeter and remote-access services — VPN concentrators, firewalls, and virtualization management planes (see CVE discussion below)
- Phishing with macro-enabled documents or malicious attachments leading to loader execution
- RDP exposure — brute-forced or credential-stuffed internet-facing RDP
- Valid-account abuse using credentials purchased from initial access brokers
Double extortion: Confirmed by the existence of the leak site itself — N0N names organizations publicly as pressure, the defining mechanic of double extortion. The 25-listing batch suggests the gang is willing to name victims en masse rather than negotiating quietly.
Dwell time: Leak-site data does not reveal intrusion dates. For actors in this class, observed dwell time from initial access to encryption typically ranges days to three weeks, with exfiltration and staging occurring in the final 48–96 hours. This window is where detection matters most.
Current Campaign Analysis
Sector Targeting
Sector attribution was not disclosed for any of the 25 listings in this batch. We will not speculate on industry verticals without data. Defenders should instead key off geography and the gang-class TTP profile below.
Geographic Concentration
From the 15 most recent listings (Companies #227–#241):
- United States — 9 listings (60%) — clear primary focus
- United Kingdom — 3 listings
- Mexico — 2 listings
- Philippines — 1 listing
- Canada appears in the group's overall country footprint across the last 100 postings
This distribution — heavy US weighting with UK/Mexico/Philippines spillover — is characteristic of affiliates working stolen-credential and edge-device access at scale rather than a tightly targeted operation.
Victim Profile
With sector and revenue data unavailable, the only defensible characterization is this: bulk-batch posting campaigns of 15+ same-day listings historically skew toward small-to-mid-market organizations — entities large enough to pay a meaningful ransom but often lacking 24/7 SOC coverage, mature EDR deployment, and tested backups. Organizations in that size band across the US, UK, Mexico, Canada, and the Philippines should consider themselves in scope.
Posting Frequency & Escalation
25 listings against a trailing-100-posting window, with at least 15 published in a single day, indicates a surge or backlog-dump pattern rather than steady-state operations. Two interpretations: (1) the gang completed a wave of intrusions and is publishing after failed negotiations, or (2) it is inflating perceived tempo to attract affiliates and pressure victims. Either way, the practical defensive implication is the same — a fresh population of intrusions has likely already occurred in the affected geographies, and undetected intrusions may still be in their dwell window.
CVE Exposure Hypothesis (Sector-Level — Not Victim Attribution)
We have no evidence linking any specific listed organization to any specific CVE. However, N0N-class actors are known to exploit exactly the categories of vulnerabilities currently on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog with confirmed ransomware use. Treat the following as priority patching exposure, not attribution:
- CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway Improper Authentication (IKEv1). VPN-edge compromise is the single most common initial access vector in mass-claim campaigns. If you run Check Point gateways, this is your first patch.
- CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center Hard-coded Password. Management-plane compromise of the firewall itself hands an actor network-wide visibility and policy control.
- CVE-2026-59310 — VMware vCenter Path Traversal. vCenter access enables hypervisor-level ransomware detonation — the highest-impact scenario, where all VMs on a host are encrypted at once.
- CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity Deserialization. CI/CD compromise enables supply-chain-style code signing and lateral movement with highly privileged build credentials.
- CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console Embedded Malicious Code. Developer-workstation supply-chain exposure, providing initial footholds inside engineering environments.
The combination of these CVEs maps cleanly onto the classic pre-ransomware kill chain: edge access → credential theft → lateral movement → hypervisor or domain-wide encryption.
Detection Engineering
The following detections target the TTPs this actor class is known to use: edge/VPN exploitation follow-on activity, phishing macro execution, RDP brute force, PsExec/WMI lateral movement, and pre-encryption staging (shadow copy deletion, mass file rename, data archiving).
---
title: N0N-Class Ransomware - Suspicious Office Macro Child Process Execution
id: 7a1f3c92-n0n1-4a2b-9c3d-000000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects Office applications spawning script interpreters or LOLBins, consistent with phishing-macro initial access used by N0N-class ransomware affiliates.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/19
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
definition: sysmon
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\winword.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\regsvr32.exe'
- '\certutil.exe'
- '\bitsadmin.exe'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Rare legitimate Office add-ins and templates
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.t1204.002
---
title: N0N-Class Ransomware - Pre-Encryption Staging and Impact Indicators
id: 7a1f3c92-n0n1-4a2b-9c3d-000000000002
status: experimental
description: Detects volume shadow copy deletion, backup catalog tampering, and boot configuration changes commonly executed immediately before ransomware detonation.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/19
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
definition: sysmon
detection:
selection_vss:
- Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'delete'
- 'shadows'
- Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy'
selection_bcd:
Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'recoveryenabled'
- 'ignoreallfailures'
selection_wbadmin:
Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'delete'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate backup maintenance windows (tune with change tickets)
level: critical
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
- attack.t1562.001
---
title: N0N-Class Ransomware - PsExec-Style Remote Service Creation for Lateral Movement
id: 7a1f3c92-n0n1-4a2b-9c3d-000000000003
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service installation events consistent with PsExec and Cobalt Strike psexec_psh lateral movement tradecraft observed in ransomware intrusions.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/19
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
definition: event_id_7045
detection:
selection:
EventID: 7045
Service_File_Name|contains:
- 'ADMIN$'
- '\PSEXESVC'
- '%COMSPEC%'
- 'powershell'
- '-enc'
filter_known:
Service_Name|startswith: 'MSConfig'
condition: selection and not filter_known
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tooling (SCCM, PDQ) - allowlist by service name and source host
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.t1021.002
// Security Arsenal - N0N-class pre-ransomware staging & lateral movement hunt
// Microsoft Sentinel / MDE - lookback 7 days
// Hunts: admin-share service execution, RDP brute-force bursts, mass staging/archive behavior
let lookback = 7d;
let bruteForceSources =
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where LogonType == "RemoteInteractive" or ActionType == "LogonFailed"
| where ActionType == "LogonFailed" and RemoteIP != ""
| summarize FailedAttempts = count(), DistinctAccounts = dcount(AccountName) by RemoteIP, DeviceName
| where FailedAttempts >= 20 or DistinctAccounts >= 5;
let lateralServices =
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ActionType == "ServiceInstalled"
| extend ServiceName = tostring(AdditionalFields.ServiceName)
| extend ServicePath = tostring(AdditionalFields.ServiceFileName)
| where ServicePath has_any ("ADMIN$", "PSEXESVC", "powershell", "-enc", "%COMSPEC%");
let stagingAndImpact =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete")
or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("recoveryenabled", "ignoreallfailures"))
or (FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete")
or (FileName in~ ("rar.exe", "7z.exe", "winrar.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has_any (" a ", "-p", "-m5"))
or (FileName =~ "rclone.exe" or FileName =~ "megasync.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName;
lateralServices
| union stagingAndImpact
| join kind=leftouter (bruteForceSources) on DeviceName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, ServiceName, ServicePath, FailedAttempts, DistinctAccounts, RemoteIP
| order by Timestamp desc
# Security Arsenal - Rapid N0N-Class Pre-Ransomware Triage (run as admin on suspect hosts/DCs)
# Checks: exposed RDP, shadow copies, scheduled tasks created in last 7 days, suspicious services
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$report = @()
Write-Host "=== [1] RDP Exposure Check ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server').fDenyTSConnections -eq 0
$rdpPort = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp').PortNumber
$nlaEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp').UserAuthentication
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='RDP Enabled'; Result=$rdpEnabled}
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='RDP Port'; Result=$rdpPort}
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='NLA Enabled'; Result=($nlaEnabled -eq 1)}
Write-Host "=== [2] Volume Shadow Copies ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy
if (-not $shadows) { Write-Warning 'NO shadow copies present - possible vssadmin deletion (pre-encryption indicator!)' }
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='Shadow Copies Present'; Result=($null -ne $shadows); Detail=($shadows | Measure-Object).Count}
Write-Host "=== [3] Scheduled Tasks Created/Modified in Last 7 Days ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$info = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo
$taskPath = "$($_.TaskPath)$($_.TaskName)"
if ($taskPath -notmatch '\\Microsoft\\') {
try {
$xml = Export-ScheduledTask -TaskName $_.TaskName -TaskPath $_.TaskPath
if ($xml -match '<Date>([^<]+)</Date>') {
$created = [datetime]$Matches[1]
if ($created -gt $cutoff) {
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='Recent Scheduled Task'; Result=$taskPath; Detail=$created}
}
}
} catch {}
}
}
Write-Host "=== [4] Suspicious Recently Installed Services (PsExec-style) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7045; StartTime=$cutoff} | ForEach-Object {
$report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='New Service (7045)'; Result=$_.TimeCreated; Detail=($_.Message -split "`n")[0..2] -join ' | '}
}
Write-Host "=== [5] Ransomware-Note Artifacts in Common Locations ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$notes = Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Users','C:\ProgramData' -Recurse -Include '*readme*','*decrypt*','*restore*','*how_to*' -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt $cutoff -and $_.Length -lt 50KB } | Select-Object -First 20
foreach ($n in $notes) { $report += [pscustomobject]@{Check='Possible Ransom Note'; Result=$n.FullName; Detail=$n.LastWriteTime} }
$report | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String | Write-Host
$report | Export-Csv -Path "$env:TEMP\n0n_triage_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmm').csv" -NoTypeInformation
Write-Host "Report exported to $env:TEMP" -ForegroundColor Green
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist (Before Encryption Fires)
The 48–96 hour pre-detonation window is where N0N-class intrusions can still be stopped. Hunt for:
- vssadmin/wbcdedit/wbadmin execution — the single highest-fidelity pre-encryption signal
- New services installed via ADMIN$ (Event ID 7045) across multiple hosts in short succession
- Bulk 7-Zip/WinRAR/rclone execution on file servers or executive workstations — data staging for exfil
- RDP brute-force bursts in VPN/firewall logs, especially against the geographies in scope
- Unusual TeamCity/CI runner activity or unexpected builds signing new binaries (CVE-2026-63077 exposure)
- New local/domain admin accounts created outside change control
- EDR or backup agents being uninstalled or disabled (Event IDs for service stop/delete)
Critical Assets This Actor Class Prioritizes for Exfiltration
- File servers and SharePoint/OneDrive repositories containing contracts, HR records, and financial data
- Backup infrastructure (Veeam/Commvault) — targeted for deletion to force payment
- vCenter and hypervisor management planes (CVE-2026-59310 exposure) — encryption at the VM layer
- Domain controllers — for credential theft (ntds.dit) and group-policy-driven mass deployment
- Executive and finance-department mailboxes
Containment Actions — Ordered by Urgency
- Isolate, don't power off — network-quarantine affected hosts to preserve memory artifacts
- Disable compromised accounts and force enterprise-wide credential resets (start with domain admins, service accounts, VPN users)
- Block egress to known exfil tooling domains/IPs (rclone endpoints, MEGA, anonymous file shares) at the proxy
- Snapshot and isolate backup infrastructure; verify offline/immutable copies are intact and actually restorable
- Disable internet-facing RDP and force all remote access through MFA-enforced VPN/ZTNA
- Preserve evidence: firewall/VPN auth logs, EDR telemetry, and the leak-site listing itself (screenshot with timestamps) for counsel and potential regulator engagement
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
- Patch or mitigate the KEV-listed edge CVEs: CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter). If patching is impossible, apply vendor workarounds and restrict management interfaces to allowlisted admin hosts.
- Enforce MFA on all remote access — VPN, RDP gateways, and third-party remote tools, no exceptions for service accounts.
- Deploy the Sigma and KQL detections above into your SIEM/EDR and confirm alerting fires on test cases.
- Audit and protect shadow copies: restrict vssadmin/bcdedit/wbadmin execution to admin jump-hosts via AppLocker/WDAC.
- Block macro execution from internet-sourced Office files (Mark-of-the-Web policies).
Short-Term (2 Weeks)
- Segment the network so workstation-to-server and server-to-backup traffic is denied by default; ransomware lives on flat networks.
- Implement immutable/offline backups with tested restore runbooks — the only control that reliably defeats double extortion's encryption half.
- Deploy EDR in block mode on all servers including domain controllers and hypervisor management planes; ransomware operators specifically hunt unmanaged blind spots.
- Stand up leak-site monitoring (or engage a managed service) so your organization learns of a listing from your SOC, not from a journalist.
- Tabletop the double-extortion scenario with legal, comms, and executives: decide now how you will respond to a leak-site listing, because the decision window during a real event is measured in hours.
Related Resources
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