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N0N Ransomware Gang: 25 New Leak-Site Listings in a Single-Day Posting Wave — Geographic Analysis & Detection Rules

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 20, 2026
17 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-20 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

Executive Summary

The ransomware group tracked as N0N has published a wave of 25 new victim claims on its dark web leak site, with the most recent batch posted in a single day on 2026-11-18. The listings name organizations across five countries — the United States, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Canada — with a clear US-heavy concentration in the observed sample. Every listing in this wave was independently observed by two separate leak-site crawlers, confirming the gang published the claims; none of the listings confirm that any named organization actually suffered a breach.

Key observations:

  • Single-day batch posting: All 15 most recent listings in our sample were published on 2026-11-18. This bulk-dump pattern is characteristic of groups that backlog victims and release them together to maximize pressure and media pickup.
  • Sector data unavailable: No industry sector data was recoverable for any listing in this wave. Defenders in all verticals should treat this as relevant, not just traditionally targeted sectors.
  • Geographic spread: US (8 of 15 in sample), GB (3), MX (2), PH (1), with CA present in the group's country targeting metadata.
  • Unverified claims: These are accusations by a criminal actor. Inclusion in this briefing reflects what N0N posted, not what has been proven.

This briefing provides detection engineering content (Sigma, KQL, and rapid-response scripting) mapped to the tradecraft typical of N0N's operational cluster, plus incident response priorities for organizations that discover themselves named on the leak site or detect pre-encryption staging activity.

Sourcing & Verification

This briefing is built from leak-site monitoring data collected via ransomware.live on 2026-11-20. Readers must understand the following before acting on any name in this report:

  • Corroboration of the claim, not the breach: 25 of 25 listings in the current N0N posting wave were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler; 0 appear on a single source only. Multi-source observation confirms that the gang did publish these claims on its leak site. It does not confirm that any breach occurred. No corroboration tier in this dataset confirms a breach — only the named organization or its regulator can do that.
  • Claims are accusations: A leak-site posting is an accusation made by a criminal enterprise, frequently used as an extortion lever. Some groups post fabricated, recycled, or exaggerated claims. Inclusion of an organization in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim and is not confirmation of a breach.
  • Denials and silence are both inconclusive: A named organization may dispute the listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false. Disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction, sector, and data type, and not every incident is legally reportable — so neither silence nor a public denial settles the question.
  • Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing as verified information becomes available. We welcome contact from any organization named in N0N's listings at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — N0N

Aliases: No publicly confirmed aliases or rebrands have been documented for N0N as of this publication date. Analysts should be alert to the possibility that N0N is a rebrand or splinter of a prior operation — the bulk-dump posting cadence and clean leak-site infrastructure are consistent with operators who have run a RaaS or private program before.

Operating model (assessed): N0N's leak-site structure and posting tempo are consistent with a mid-tier Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) or tightly controlled closed affiliate program. The single-day release of 15+ listings suggests either a backlog of negotiated-and-stalled victims being pressure-published, or a genuine operational surge. No public evidence currently confirms an open affiliate recruitment model; treat this as unassessed until recruitment posts surface on underground forums.

Ransom demands: No verified ransom figures are available in this dataset. Groups at this operational tier typically demand low-to-mid six figures USD for small and mid-market victims, scaling against perceived victim revenue. Do not treat any figure as authoritative for N0N until negotiation artifacts or victim disclosures emerge.

Initial access methods (assessed, not confirmed for specific victims): For groups of this profile, the most probable initial access vectors — presented here as hypothesis for hunting purposes — are:

  • Exposed remote services: RDP brute forcing or credential stuffing against internet-facing RDP/VPN gateways, especially appliances lagging on patching.
  • Phishing with macro or script payloads: Maldoc-driven execution chains leading to loaders (e.g., Cobalt Strike, Sliver, or commodity crypters).
  • Known exploited vulnerabilities: Perimeter and management-plane CVEs (see CVE hypothesis section below).
  • Access brokers: Purchasing pre-established access from initial access brokers (IABs), which would explain the geographic diversity of the posting wave.

Extortion model: The existence of a named-victim leak site confirms a double extortion playbook — data theft threatened alongside (or instead of) encryption. Defenders must hunt for staging and exfiltration activity, not just encryption precursors.

Dwell time: No confirmed dwell-time telemetry exists for N0N. The sector baseline for groups of this tier is 3–11 days from initial access to detonation, with exfiltration typically occurring in the final 24–72 hours. Assume you have hours, not days, once staging indicators appear.

Current Campaign Analysis

Posting frequency and escalation pattern

N0N's last 100 leak-site postings include 25 recent victims, and the 15 most recent listings in our sample were all published on a single day — 2026-11-18. Batch-dump posting of this kind is a deliberate pressure tactic: it maximizes simultaneous media coverage, overwhelms victim negotiation positions, and signals operational momentum to potential affiliates and buyers. Watch for a second wave within 7–14 days; groups that dump in batches frequently hold a reserve.

Geographic concentration

The observed sample breaks down as: United States (8), United Kingdom (3), Mexico (2), Philippines (1), with Canada also present in the group's targeting metadata. The US dominance is consistent with the broader ransomware economy's focus on US mid-market organizations, where cyber insurance coverage and regulatory pressure create strong payment incentives. The GB/MX/PH/CA spread suggests opportunistic access rather than deliberate regional specialization — again pointing toward purchased or scanner-derived access rather than targeted intrusion campaigns.

Sector targeting

No sector data was recoverable for any listing in this wave. We will not speculate about which industries are represented in the victim set. The defensive implication is that no sector should deprioritize this briefing — the detection content below is sector-agnostic by design.

Victim profile

With sectors unresolvable and no revenue data published on the leak site, victim size cannot be reliably estimated. The absence of named household brands in the sample (all listings are currently anonymized as "Company #NNN" pending naming) is typical of the pressure-publication phase, where groups post redacted entries first and name victims later if negotiations stall. Expect the redacted entries to be replaced with named organizations if payment deadlines pass.

CVE hypothesis — initial access surface (NOT victim attribution)

The following CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities are confirmed in use by ransomware actors generally and represent the kind of perimeter exposure a group at N0N's tempo most plausibly exploits. We have no evidence linking any of these CVEs to any specific N0N listing. This is a sector-level exposure hypothesis for prioritizing patching and hunting:

  • CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication (IKEv1): VPN gateway compromise is the single most common access path for mid-tier ransomware groups. If you run Check Point gateways with IKEv1 enabled, treat this as emergency priority.
  • CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center hard-coded password: Management-plane compromise of network security infrastructure gives actors both access and the ability to blind your perimeter logging.
  • CVE-2026-59310 — VMware vCenter path traversal: Hypervisor management-plane access enables one-shot mass encryption of entire virtual estates — the highest-impact ransomware outcome. vCenter should never be internet-reachable and should be patched within 72 hours of any KEV addition.
  • CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity deserialization: CI/CD server compromise provides both initial access and a software supply-chain pivot. TeamCity instances are frequently internet-exposed and infrequently patched.
  • CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console embedded malicious code: A developer-workstation supply-chain vector; relevant if your developers use the affected Nx tooling.

Prioritize these in the order: Check Point > Cisco FMC > vCenter > TeamCity > Nx, adjusted for your actual exposure.

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

The following rules target the tradecraft cluster assessed as most likely for this operation: RDP brute force initial access, PsExec/WMI-style lateral movement, and pre-encryption shadow copy destruction. Deploy all three and tune thresholds to your baseline.

YAML
---
title: RDP Brute Force Followed by Successful Logon
id: 8a1f4c2e-7b3d-4e9a-b5c6-0000000000a1
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of failed RDP logons (EventID 4625, LogonType 10) from a single source — a precursor pattern to ransomware initial access via exposed RDP, consistent with the access profile assessed for N0N-type operations.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
  definition: Requires Windows Security Event Log auditing of logon failures.
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4625
    LogonType: 10
  condition: selection | count(IpAddress) by WorkstationName > 10
timeframe: 10m
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate users with expired cached credentials retrying RDP
  - Misconfigured service accounts
level: high
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1133
  - attack.t1110
---
title: PsExec-Style Remote Service Installation
id: 8a1f4c2e-7b3d-4e9a-b5c6-0000000000a2
status: experimental
description: Detects installation of remote execution services (PsExec, PAExec, RemCom patterns) on endpoints — a hallmark lateral movement technique in pre-ransomware intrusion chains, including operations consistent with N0N's assessed playbook.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
  definition: Requires Windows System Event Log (EventID 7045).
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 7045
    ServiceName|contains:
      - 'PSEXESVC'
      - 'PAExec'
      - 'RemCom'
      - 'csexecsvc'
  selection_path:
    EventID: 7045
    ImagePath|contains:
      - '\\ADMIN$\\'
      - '\\\\IPC$'
      - '%COMSPEC%'
  condition: selection or selection_path
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative use of PsExec by IT staff
  - Some EDR and software deployment tools
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1021.002
  - attack.t1569.002
---
title: Volume Shadow Copy Deletion Before Encryption
id: 8a1f4c2e-7b3d-4e9a-b5c6-0000000000a3
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies or backup catalogs via vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit, or wbadmin — near-universal pre-encryption behavior across ransomware families and a high-fidelity T-minus indicator.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/20
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_vss:
    Image|endswith: '\\vssadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'delete shadows'
  selection_wmic:
    Image|endswith: '\\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy delete'
  selection_bcdedit:
    Image|endswith: '\\bcdedit.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
      - 'bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures'
  selection_wbadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\\wbadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'delete catalog'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Rare backup software maintenance operations
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
  - attack.t1562

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel Pre-Ransomware Staging Hunt

This query hunts the pre-encryption staging window: suspicious archive-tool execution on servers, remote service creation, and shadow copy tampering, correlated per device within a 24-hour window. Run it against the last 7 days and alert on any device hitting two or more signals.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
let lookback = 7d;
let archiveTools = dynamic(["rar.exe", "7z.exe", "7za.exe", "winrar.exe", "peazip.exe"]);
let staging = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
    | where FileName in~ (archiveTools)
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (" a ", " u ", "-p")
    | project StagingTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
let shadowDelete = DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows", "shadowcopy delete", "delete catalog", "recoveryenabled no", "bootstatuspolicy")
    | project ShadowTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ShadowCmd=ProcessCommandLine;
let remoteSvc = DeviceEvents
    | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
    | where ActionType == "ServiceInstalled" or (AdditionalFields has "PSEXESVC")
    | extend ServiceName = tostring(AdditionalFields.ServiceName)
    | where ServiceName has_any ("PSEXESVC", "PAExec", "RemCom", "csexecsvc")
    | project SvcTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ServiceName;
let stagingDevices = staging | summarize arg_max(StagingTime, *) by DeviceName;
let shadowDevices = shadowDelete | summarize arg_max(ShadowTime, *) by DeviceName;
let svcDevices = remoteSvc | summarize arg_max(SvcTime, *) by DeviceName;
stagingDevices
| join kind=fullouter (shadowDevices) on DeviceName
| join kind=fullouter (svcDevices) on DeviceName
| extend SignalCount = (iif(isnotempty(StagingTime),1,0) + iif(isnotempty(ShadowTime),1,0) + iif(isnotempty(SvcTime),1,0))
| where SignalCount >= 2
| project DeviceName, StagingTime, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName, ShadowTime, ShadowCmd, SvcTime, ServiceName, SignalCount
| order by SignalCount desc;

Tuning guidance: If your environment legitimately uses 7-Zip on build servers, add an exclusion for known build paths rather than dropping the archive signal — archive staging on a server that never normally archives is one of the highest-value pre-ransomware signals you can catch.

Rapid Response Hardening & Triage Script

Run this PowerShell script (elevated) on any host implicated by the detections above — or proactively on internet-adjacent servers — to assess RDP exposure, enumerate persistence added in the last 7 days, and verify shadow copy integrity.

PowerShell
# N0N Pre-Ransomware Rapid Triage — Security Arsenal (2026-11-20)
# Run elevated. Read-only; makes no system changes.
$report = @{}; $cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)

# 1. RDP exposure check
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).fDenyTSConnections -eq 0
$rdpListening = [bool](Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue)
$nla = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -Name UserAuthentication -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).UserAuthentication
$report['RDP_Enabled'] = $rdpEnabled; $report['RDP_Listening_3389'] = $rdpListening; $report['RDP_NLA_Enforced'] = ($nla -eq 1)

# 2. Scheduled tasks created in last 7 days (persistence / detonation scheduling)
$report['NewScheduledTasks'] = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -and ([datetime]$_.Date) -gt $cutoff } |
  Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{N='Author';E={$_.Author}} | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String

# 3. Suspicious processes: archive tools and shadow tampering artifacts (last 7 days of 4688 if audited)
$report['StagingProcessEvents'] = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4688; StartTime=$cutoff} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'vssadmin.*delete|wmic.*shadowcopy|rar\.exe|7z(a)?\.exe|bcdedit.*recoveryenabled|wbadmin.*delete catalog' } |
  Select-Object TimeCreated, Message -First 50 | Format-List | Out-String

# 4. Shadow copy integrity
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report['ShadowCopyCount'] = ($shadows | Measure-Object).Count

# 5. Failed RDP logon burst (EventID 4625, LogonType 10) in last 24h
$rdpFails = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-1)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'Logon Type:\s+10' }
$report['RDPFailedLogons_24h'] = ($rdpFails | Measure-Object).Count

# 6. Unexpected local admins added in last 7 days
$report['LocalAdmins'] = Get-LocalGroupMember -Group 'Administrators' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Select-Object Name, ObjectClass | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String

$report.GetEnumerator() | Sort-Object Name | ForEach-Object { "`n=== $($_.Key) ===`n$($_.Value)" }
Write-Host "`n[TRIAGE FLAGS] RDP exposed w/o NLA: $(( $rdpListening -and $nla -ne 1 )) | Shadow copies present: $($report['ShadowCopyCount'] -gt 0) | RDP fails 24h: $($report['RDPFailedLogons_24h'])" -ForegroundColor Yellow

Interpretation: Shadow copy count of 0 on a server that should have restore points, RDP listening without NLA, or any 4688 hit in section 3 is an immediate escalation trigger — isolate the host and start the IR clock.

Incident Response Priorities

T-minus detection checklist — what to look for BEFORE encryption fires

N0N's double-extortion model means the encryption detonation is the last step, not the first. In order of typical appearance in the kill chain:

  1. Authentication anomalies: RDP/VPN logon bursts from single external IPs, successful logons at unusual hours, logons to servers that rarely receive interactive sessions.
  2. Discovery commands: net group "Domain Admins" /domain, nltest /dclist, arp -a, BloodHound/SharpHound collection artifacts (large LDAP query volumes from a single host).
  3. Lateral movement: New service installations (7045), WMI process creation (EventID 4688 with parent WmiPrvSE.exe), SMB ADMIN$ writes.
  4. Staging: Archive tool execution on file/database servers, unexpected large outbound transfers to cloud storage (Mega, Rclone configs, temporary file-sharing domains).
  5. Defense impairment: Shadow copy deletion, backup catalog deletion, bcdedit tampering, security tool service stops or uninstall attempts.
  6. Detonation prep: Mass GPO changes, PsExec pushes of a single binary to many hosts, scheduled tasks created at scale.

Critical assets this profile of actor prioritizes for exfiltration

Based on the double-extortion playbook standard to this tier of operation, prioritize protection and egress monitoring on:

  • File servers and SharePoint/OneDrive estates containing HR, legal, and financial data (highest extortion leverage)
  • Backup infrastructure (Veeam, Commvault, Windows Server Backup catalogs) — targeted for both theft and destruction
  • Email archives of executive and legal mailboxes
  • Database exports containing customer PII — the regulatory-notification trigger that drives payment pressure
  • vCenter/hypervisor management plane — not for theft, but as the force multiplier for mass encryption

Containment actions, ordered by urgency

  1. Isolate, don't power off suspected staging hosts (preserve memory and volatile evidence; kill network paths instead).
  2. Disable the suspected access path: block the source IP at the edge, force password resets for any account seen in lateral movement telemetry, and revoke active sessions/tokens.
  3. Lock down remote access: if RDP or a vulnerable VPN gateway is implicated, disable internet exposure immediately and require VPN + MFA for all administrative access.
  4. Protect backups: take backup infrastructure offline from the production network, verify at least one immutable/offline copy, and confirm restore integrity before you need it.
  5. Snapshot and preserve forensic images of implicated hosts before remediation wipes evidence — you will need this for legal, regulatory, and insurance purposes regardless of whether the claim is verified.
  6. Engage IR counsel early if your organization appears on the leak site: disclosure clocks (SEC, GDPR, state breach laws) may already be running depending on what was actually taken.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 hours)

  • Patch or mitigate the KEV perimeter set: Check Point Security Gateway (CVE-2026-50751), Cisco Secure FMC (CVE-2026-20316), VMware vCenter (CVE-2026-59310), JetBrains TeamCity (CVE-2026-63077). If patching is not possible today, take the management interfaces off the internet entirely.
  • Kill internet-exposed RDP. Enforce NLA, move RDP behind VPN with MFA, and alert on any 3389 listener on a non-server VLAN.
  • Deploy the three Sigma rules above and the Sentinel staging query; route critical-level hits to a page-the-analyst path, not a queue.
  • Verify backup immutability and confirm shadow copies exist on file servers (run the triage script, section 4).
  • Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging and process command-line auditing (4688) if not already on — several detections above depend on it.
  • Search egress logs for archive-tool staging: large uploads to Mega, Rclone, temporary file-sharing services, or unusual cloud storage tenants in the last 30 days.

Short-term (2 weeks)

  • Segment the hypervisor management plane. vCenter and hypervisor hosts should live in a dedicated tier accessible only from hardened Privileged Access Workstations — mass VM encryption is the single worst-case outcome.
  • Implement Tier-0/Tier-1/Tier-2 administrative separation so that a compromised workstation credential cannot reach server or identity infrastructure.
  • Deploy canary files and decoy shares on file servers; ransomware touching a canary is a near-zero-false-positive early warning.
  • Restrict archive-tool execution via AppLocker/WDAC to approved paths and service accounts; alert on any execution elsewhere.
  • Harden against supply-chain developer tooling risk: pin and verify versions of IDE extensions and build tooling (relevant to the Nx Console CVE class), and isolate CI/CD infrastructure from general corporate egress.
  • Stand up leak-site monitoring for your own organization and brand terms so you learn of a listing from your SOC, not from a journalist.
  • Tabletop the extortion scenario: decide now, with legal and executive leadership, how you will respond to a leak-site naming — including what you will and will not confirm publicly — rather than improvising under a countdown timer.

This briefing reflects unverified claims published by a criminal threat actor and observed via ransomware.live leak-site monitoring on 2026-11-20. Security Arsenal will update or correct this briefing as verified information becomes available. Named organizations or their counsel may contact us at security@securityarsenal.com.

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