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N0N Ransomware Gang: 3 New Leak-Site Listings Across Africa & Middle East — Claim Analysis & Detection Rules

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 15, 2026
12 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-16 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

N0N Ransomware Gang: 3 New Leak-Site Listings Across Africa & Middle East

Executive Summary

Between 2026-11-11 and 2026-11-13, the ransomware group tracked as N0N published three new listings on its dark web leak site, naming Company #216 (BW), Company #213 (QA), and Company #212 (ET) as organizations it claims to have compromised. All three listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, confirming the gang made these claims — but no tier of this data confirms an actual breach occurred.

Key observations:

  • Geographic spread: Botswana, Qatar, and Ethiopia — an unusual Africa/Middle East concentration that deviates from the typical North America/Western Europe focus of high-volume RaaS operations.
  • Sector data: Not disclosed on the leak site ("Not Found" for all three listings). Defenders should not assume sector-specific targeting based on this sample.
  • Volume: 3 postings in N0N's most recent 100 monitored listings — a low-volume operation, consistent with either an emerging group or a closed crew in early campaign phases.
  • Attribution caveat: Low-volume groups frequently rebrand or operate as affiliates of larger RaaS programs. N0N's tooling overlaps with commodity ransomware tradecraft described below should be treated as sector-level hypothesis, not confirmed attribution.

Sourcing & Verification

  • Corroboration status: 3 of 3 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler (MULTI-SOURCE); 0 appear on a single source only. This means two independent monitoring pipelines saw N0N publish these claims.
  • What corroboration does NOT mean: Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim and is not confirmation of a breach. Leak-site postings are accusations by criminals; they are sometimes fabricated, exaggerated, recycled, or used as extortion leverage without underlying access.
  • On disputes and denials: A named organization may dispute a listing. A denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction, not every incident is reportable, and neither silence nor denial settles the question.
  • Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections as warranted and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — N0N

Attribution confidence is limited. N0N is a low-volume operation with minimal public telemetry. The following reflects observed leak-site behavior plus tradecraft consistent with comparable emerging crews; treat gang-specific claims as provisional.

AttributeAssessment
Known aliasesNone confirmed in public reporting. Monitor for rebranding — low-volume crews frequently re-emerge under new names within 6–12 months.
Operating modelUndetermined. Low posting volume is consistent with either a closed crew or a small affiliate cell renting RaaS payloads (LockBit, BlackCat/ALPHV, and Medusa builders dominate the affiliate market). No public recruitment posts attributed to N0N have been observed.
Ransom demandsNo published ransom amounts for the current listings. Comparable low-volume crews targeting mid-market organizations typically demand USD $50K–$1.5M, scaling with perceived victim revenue.
Initial access methodsUnconfirmed for N0N specifically. Emerging crews in 2026 most commonly rely on: (1) exploitation of perimeter appliances — VPN gateways, firewalls, and virtualization management planes; (2) purchased initial access from IABs; (3) phishing with malicious attachments or links to credential harvesters; (4) exposed RDP brute force.
Extortion modelLeak-site publication indicates at minimum double extortion (encryption + threatened data release). Whether N0N exfiltrates data before encryption in every case is unverified.
Dwell timeNo confirmed dwell-time telemetry for N0N. Industry median for ransomware in 2025–2026 is 4–11 days from initial access to detonation; data-staging activity typically begins 24–72 hours before encryption.

Current Campaign Analysis

Targeted Sectors

All three listings carry sector data of "Not Found" — the gang did not disclose industry verticals, and we will not guess. This itself is notable: gangs that omit sector tags are often early-stage operations that have not built out their leak-site taxonomy, or are deliberately withholding detail to increase negotiation pressure.

Geographic Concentration

ListingCountryPublished
Company #216Botswana (BW)2026-11-13
Company #213Qatar (QA)2026-11-11
Company #212Ethiopia (ET)2026-11-11

Two postings on a single day (2026-11-11) followed by a third 48 hours later suggests batch processing — the gang likely consolidated access to multiple environments before posting, a pattern associated with a single initial-access vector exploited across targets (e.g., the same vulnerable perimeter appliance class) or a single IAB selling regional access in bulk.

Victim Profile

Anonymous naming ("Company #NNN") indicates N0N is using a numbering convention rather than shaming victims by name — a tactic sometimes used during active extortion negotiation, where public naming is the escalation lever held in reserve. No revenue or employee-count data was published. Defenders should not infer organizational size from this sample.

Posting Frequency & Escalation

3 postings within 72 hours constitutes the entirety of N0N's recent observed activity. This is either a campaign burst or the group's total operational tempo. Watch for: (1) named-victim republication if negotiations fail; (2) countdown timers or partial data dumps as proof-of-access; (3) expansion beyond the BW/QA/ET corridor.

CVE Exposure — Hypothesis Only

No evidence links any specific CVE to any specific listing above. The following are CISA KEV entries with confirmed ransomware use representing the class of perimeter exposure emerging gangs exploit. Organizations in the affected regions should treat these as priority patch/audit items:

  • CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication (IKEv1 key exchange). Perimeter VPN gateways are the single most common initial-access vector for mid-tier ransomware crews.
  • CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password. Firewall management planes grant direct lateral access to segmentation controls.
  • CVE-2026-59310 — VMware vCenter path traversal. Hypervisor management compromise enables mass-encryption of virtualized estates — the highest-impact ransomware outcome.
  • CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity deserialization. CI/CD server compromise yields credential stores and build-pipeline access (supply-chain staging).
  • CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console embedded malicious code. Developer-workstation supply-chain exposure.

Detection Engineering

The following detections target the tradecraft clusters most relevant to emerging ransomware crews: perimeter exploitation follow-on activity, pre-encryption staging, and lateral movement. Tune to environment baselines before production deployment.

YAML
---
title: Suspicious Process Execution Following VPN/Firewall Management Plane Access
id: 8f3a2c1e-9d4b-4e7a-b2c5-1a6f0d3e8a11
status: experimental
description: Detects reconnaissance and credential-dumping tool execution on or immediately adjacent to perimeter appliances (VPN gateways, firewall management servers) consistent with post-exploitation after perimeter CVE exploitation (e.g., CVE-2026-50751, CVE-2026-20316 class activity).
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
references:
  - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_tools:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\whoami.exe'
      - '\netstat.exe'
      - '\nltest.exe'
      - '\ipconfig.exe'
      - '\qwinsta.exe'
      - '\arp.exe'
  selection_cred:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\rundll32.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'comsvcs.dll'
      - 'MiniDump'
  selection_lsass:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'lsass'
  filter_baseline:
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - '\svchost.exe'
      - '\services.exe'
  condition: (selection_tools and not filter_baseline) or (selection_cred and selection_lsass)
level: high
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.credential_access
  - attack.t1003
  - attack.t1082
---
title: Ransomware Pre-Staging — VSS Deletion and Backup Tampering
id: 2b7d4f9a-3c1e-4a8d-9f0b-5e2c7a1d6b44
status: experimental
description: Detects Volume Shadow Copy deletion, backup catalog tampering, and boot configuration changes that precede ransomware detonation across virtually all ransomware families.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_vssadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'resize shadowstorage'
  selection_wmic:
    Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy'
  selection_bcdedit:
    Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
      - 'bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures'
  selection_wbadmin:
    Image|endswith: '\wbadmin.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete catalog'
      - 'delete systemstatebackup'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
---
title: Data Staging and Exfiltration via Rclone or Compression Utilities
id: 5e1a8c3d-7f2b-4d9e-a1c6-3b8f0e2d5a77
status: experimental
description: Detects use of rclone, 7z/rar mass compression of document directories, and curl/wget to file-sharing infrastructure — consistent with double-extortion data staging prior to leak-site publication.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/16
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_rclone:
    Image|endswith: '\rclone.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'copy'
      - 'sync'
      - 'move'
  selection_compression:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\7z.exe'
      - '\7za.exe'
      - '\rar.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' -p'
      - 'a -r'
  selection_paths:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '\Shares\'
      - '\Finance\'
      - '\HR\'
      - '\Legal\'
      - '\Backup\'
  condition: selection_rclone or (selection_compression and selection_paths)
level: high
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1560
  - attack.t1567
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt: Pre-ransomware staging — suspicious compression, VSS tampering, and mass file renames
// across endpoints in a 72h window. Correlate hosts firing >1 signal for triage priority.
let Window = 3d;
let VssTamper = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Window)
| where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete shadows")
   or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "recoveryenabled no")
   or (FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete")
| project VssTime=Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, VssCmd=ProcessCommandLine;
let Staging = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Window)
| where FileName in~ ("rclone.exe","7z.exe","7za.exe","rar.exe","megacmd.exe")
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("mega.nz","transfer.sh","file.io","anonfiles")
| project StageTime=Timestamp, DeviceName, StageCmd=ProcessCommandLine;
let MassRename = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Window)
| where ActionType == "FileRenamed"
| summarize RenameCount=count(), ExtList=make_set(FileExtension) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where RenameCount > 500
| project RenameHour=Timestamp, DeviceName, RenameCount, ExtList;
VssTamper
| join kind=fullouter Staging on DeviceName
| join kind=fullouter MassRename on DeviceName
| project DeviceName, VssTime, VssCmd, StageTime, StageCmd, RenameHour, RenameCount, ExtList
| extend SignalCount = iif(isnotempty(VssTime),1,0) + iif(isnotempty(StageTime),1,0) + iif(isnotempty(RenameHour),1,0)
| where SignalCount >= 2
| order by SignalCount desc, DeviceName asc
PowerShell
# Rapid-response audit: scheduled tasks created in last 7 days, VSS state, and RDP exposure.
# Run as administrator on suspect hosts or via remote execution at scale.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)

Write-Output "=== [1] Scheduled tasks created in last 7 days ==="
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt $cutoff } |
  Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{N='Action';E={($_.Actions | ForEach-Object { $_.Execute + ' ' + $_.Arguments }) -join '; '}} |
  Format-List

Write-Output "=== [2] Volume Shadow Copy inventory (should NOT be empty on protected hosts) ==="
$shadows = Get-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy
if ($null -eq $shadows) { Write-Output "WARNING: No shadow copies present — investigate for T1490 tampering." }
else { $shadows | Select-Object ID, InstallDate, VolumeName | Format-Table -AutoSize }

Write-Output "=== [3] VSS deletion events (System log, last 7 days) ==="
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=4101,4100; StartTime=$cutoff} |
  Select-Object TimeCreated, Id, Message | Format-List

Write-Output "=== [4] RDP exposure check ==="
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server').fDenyTSConnections
$nla = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp').UserAuthentication
Write-Output ("RDP enabled: " + ($(if($rdpEnabled -eq 0){'YES — verify this is intentional'}else{'No'})))
Write-Output ("NLA enforced: " + ($(if($nla -eq 1){'Yes'}else{'NO — enable NLA immediately or restrict RDP to VPN'})))

Write-Output "=== [5] Failed logon burst (4625, last 7 days, top source IPs) ==="
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=$cutoff} |
  ForEach-Object { if ($_.Properties[19].Value -match '^\d') { $_.Properties[19].Value } } |
  Group-Object | Sort-Object Count -Descending | Select-Object -First 10 Name, Count | Format-Table -AutoSize

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist (before encryption fires)

  1. VSS deletion or bcdedit tampering — the single highest-fidelity pre-detonation signal. Alert at severity critical, page on-call.
  2. Mass file renames or entropy spikes on file servers and hypervisor datastores.
  3. New local admin or service accounts created outside change windows; additions to Domain Admins/Enterprise Admins.
  4. Compression utilities (7z, rar, rclone) executing against shares containing finance, HR, or legal data.
  5. Abnormal outbound volume to file-sharing or cloud-storage domains from servers that historically don't egress.
  6. PsExec/WMI process creation on hosts within minutes of each other — lateral-movement cadence.
  7. Security tooling tampering: EDR service stops, sensor uninstalls, or Windows Defender exclusions added via GPO or local policy.

Assets This Threat Class Prioritizes for Exfiltration

Based on double-extortion economics (not N0N-confirmed): financial records, HR/payroll PII, legal and M&A documents, insurance policies (used to calibrate ransom demands), backup catalogs, and credentials stores. Data staged from these repositories maximizes extortion leverage.

Containment — Ordered by Urgency

  1. Isolate, don't power off. Network-quarantine affected hosts via EDR; volatile memory holds decryption-relevant artifacts.
  2. Block egress to known exfil infrastructure and suspend outbound cloud-storage access from server VLANs.
  3. Disable compromised accounts and force enterprise-wide credential resets — krbtgt twice if domain compromise is suspected.
  4. Protect backups immediately: verify immutability/offline state before the actor finds them; ransomware crews enumerate backup infrastructure first.
  5. Preserve evidence: memory captures, logs (retention frequently expires mid-investigation), and the ransom note/leak-site URL.
  6. Engage counsel and IR retainer early — disclosure obligations in BW/QA/ET jurisdictions differ materially; the Qatar PDPL and Botswana DPA have distinct notification triggers.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 hours)

  • Patch perimeter appliances: Check Point gateways (CVE-2026-50751), Cisco Secure FMC (CVE-2026-20316), vCenter (CVE-2026-59310). If patching is not possible within 24h, restrict management-plane access to a dedicated admin subnet or take the interface off the internet.
  • Enforce MFA on all remote access — VPN, RDP gateways, and remote management tooling. Audit for legacy IKEv1 aggressive-mode configs.
  • Block or alert on vssadmin delete shadows, bcdedit recoveryenabled no, and wbadmin delete catalog at the EDR level.
  • Verify backup immutability and test one restore. Offline/immutable copies are the single control that converts ransomware from existential to inconvenient.
  • Deploy the Sigma and KQL detections above in monitor mode; escalate after tuning.

Short-Term (2 weeks)

  • Segment management planes (hypervisor, backup, firewall management) from user and server VLANs; require jump-host access with session recording.
  • Application control (WDAC/AppLocker) restricting script interpreters and compression utilities on servers.
  • Egress filtering with category-based blocking of file-sharing domains; alert on server-initiated uploads above baseline.
  • Tiered administration to eliminate standing Domain Admin logons on servers and workstations.
  • Deception: canary files on high-value shares and honey credentials — early-warning tripwires with near-zero false positives.

Related Resources

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