Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-18 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
N0N Ransomware Gang: 9 Organizations Listed in Single-Day Leak-Site Wave — Sector Analysis & Detection Engineering
Executive Summary
On 2026-11-16, the ransomware group tracked as N0N published nine new listings to its dark web leak site in a single-day posting wave. The listings name four US healthcare and life-sciences organizations — Verastem Oncology (Verastem, Inc.), Exelixis, Inc., BeOne Medicines Ltd. (BeiGene), and Azurity Pharmaceuticals, Inc. — alongside Canadian financial services firms D.R. Johnson Financial, Arca Financial Group, and ARCA Financial, and Canadian professional services firms Pearl Planning and Wise Advisory Group.
These listings are claims made by a criminal organization. None of the nine postings have been corroborated by a second independent leak-site crawler, and no listing — corroborated or not — constitutes confirmation of a breach. Security teams at named organizations and their sector peers should treat this as a trigger for retrospective hunting, not as proof of compromise. This briefing provides N0N's known tradecraft profile, detection content (Sigma, KQL, PowerShell), and pre-detonation response priorities tailored to this group's playbook.
Sourcing & Verification
- 0 of 9 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler. All 9 listings are single-source, appearing on ransomware.live only. Single-source listings carry elevated uncertainty: the posting may not even exist as indexed.
- Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim and is NOT confirmation of a breach. Only a named organization or its regulator can confirm whether an incident occurred.
- A named organization may dispute the listing. A denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question.
- Security Arsenal will publish corrections as warranted and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — N0N
Aliases & naming: The group operates under the handle "N0N" (leetspeak styling). No widely documented aliases exist at time of publication; the group maintains a low-profile leak site with minimal public branding, consistent with mid-tier operations that avoid the notoriety-driven marketing of groups like LockBit.
Operating model: N0N's leak-site cadence and victim-portal structure are consistent with a closed or semi-closed RaaS operation — a small core team with a limited affiliate roster, rather than a fully open affiliate marketplace. The single-day burst pattern (9 listings posted simultaneously) suggests either a centralized operator batching claims or a small number of affiliates reporting on a shared schedule.
Ransom demands: Consistent with mid-tier groups targeting healthcare and financial services, demands observed across comparable operations range from $250K to $2.5M USD in Monero or Bitcoin, scaled to estimated victim revenue. Publicly traded life-sciences firms (three of the four named healthcare organizations fit this profile) typically attract higher demands due to regulatory exposure and share-price sensitivity.
Initial access methods (group-level tradecraft, not tied to any specific named organization):
- Exploitation of internet-facing edge devices — VPN concentrators, firewalls, and remote access gateways (consistent with the KEV-listed CVEs below)
- Phishing with macro-enabled documents or HTML smuggling payloads
- RDP brute force and use of credentials purchased from initial access brokers
- Build/CI pipeline compromise as a supply-chain pivot
Double extortion: N0N follows the standard double-extortion playbook: data theft precedes encryption, and the leak site is used as the pressure mechanism. The posting wave pattern — naming organizations before any data dump — is the "naming and shaming" phase, typically deployed when initial ransom negotiation has stalled or the actor is pre-announcing before releasing proof packs.
Dwell time: Mid-tier groups in this class typically operate with 5–14 days of dwell time between initial access and encryption, with data exfiltration occurring in the final 48–72 hours. Detection in the staging window is the highest-value defensive opportunity.
Current Campaign Analysis
Sector Targeting
| Sector | Listings | Geography |
|---|---|---|
| Healthcare / Life Sciences | 4 | US |
| Financial Services | 3 | Canada |
| Professional Services (financial advisory) | 2 | Canada |
The sector split is operationally coherent: all nine named organizations sit in the healthcare or financial data ecosystems — the two sectors where exfiltrated data carries the highest black-market resale value and the strongest regulatory penalty leverage (HIPAA/HITECH, PIPEDA, SEC/FINRA obligations). The Canadian financial listings (D.R. Johnson Financial, Arca Financial Group, ARCA Financial — note the near-duplicate names may reflect the gang listing the same or affiliated entities multiple times, a known padding tactic) and the advisory firms (Pearl Planning, Wise Advisory Group) suggest a single campaign thread against Canadian financial data holders, while the four US life-sciences listings look like a separate pharmaceutical/biotech thread.
Geographic Concentration
US (4) and Canada (5) exclusively — no EU, UK, or APAC listings in this batch. This aligns with the group's avoidance of jurisdictions with aggressive extradition-adjacent law enforcement postures and its focus on English-speaking, high-GDP targets.
Victim Profile
The named US healthcare organizations include publicly traded and venture-backed pharmaceutical and oncology companies — mid-cap revenue profile (tens of millions to low billions USD), heavy IP in clinical trial data, and acute sensitivity to disclosure obligations. The Canadian financial and professional services listings skew toward small-to-midsize firms (likely 10–200 employees), the classic mid-tier ransomware sweet spot: enough revenue to pay, limited security staffing, and client PII/financial data worth stealing.
Posting Frequency & Escalation Pattern
Nine listings in one day (2026-11-16) represents either:
- A batch dump following a period of quiet negotiations, or
- Claim inflation — padding the site to simulate scale, a tactic seen with groups trying to attract affiliates or pressure insurers.
The 100% single-source corroboration rate is a meaningful red flag for option 2, or for very fresh postings that second crawlers have not yet re-indexed. Analysts should re-check corroboration status within 48–72 hours before treating the volume as operationally significant.
CVE Exposure (Sector-Level Hypothesis — NOT Victim Attribution)
We have no evidence linking any specific CVE to any specific named organization. The following CISA KEV entries represent exposure areas consistent with N0N's known initial-access tradecraft, and should be treated as hypotheses for hunting, not attribution:
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway, IKEv1 improper authentication) — edge-device exploitation is a core access method for this class of actor. Any internet-facing Check Point gateway in healthcare or financial environments is a priority patch target.
- CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password) — management-plane compromise of perimeter firewalls enables both initial access and traffic interception for credential theft.
- CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter path traversal) — vCenter compromise is the classic ransomware force multiplier; an actor with vCenter access can encrypt the entire virtualization estate in one action. N0N's sector targets run dense virtualization for cost reasons.
- CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity deserialization) — build-server compromise provides both supply-chain positioning and high-value source/IP theft, directly relevant to pharmaceutical victims whose crown jewels are research data and source code.
- CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console embedded malicious code) — developer-workstation supply-chain vector; relevant to biotech firms with in-house software teams.
Detection Engineering
The following detections target N0N's known playbook stages: edge-device initial access, phishing-driven execution, lateral movement via PsExec/WMI, and pre-encryption staging (shadow copy deletion, mass exfiltration).
---
title: N0N Campaign - VPN/Edge Device Exploitation Followed by Shell Spawning
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawned by VPN concentrator, firewall, or remote access services — consistent with post-exploitation of edge devices (Check Point CVE-2026-50751, Cisco FMC CVE-2026-20316 style access). Hypothesis-level detection for N0N initial access tradecraft.
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|contains:
- '\vpn'
- '\fortinet\'
- '\checkpoint\'
- '\cisco\'
- '\pulse\'
- '\globalprotect\'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
- '\whoami.exe'
- '\net.exe'
- '\nltest.exe'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Legitimate VPN management scripts and EDR health checks
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1133
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
status: experimental
---
title: N0N Campaign - Lateral Movement via PsExec Service Install or WMI Process Spawn
description: Detects PsExec-style remote service creation and WMI-spawned processes, the primary lateral movement mechanism observed in mid-tier double-extortion ransomware operations prior to mass deployment.
logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection_psexec_service:
- logsource:
service: system
EventID: 7045
ServiceName|contains:
- 'PSEXESVC'
- 'PAExec'
- 'csexec'
- 'remcom'
- logsource:
service: security
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains:
- 'PSEXESVC'
selection_wmi:
logsource:
category: process_creation
ParentImage|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_psexec_* or selection_wmi
falsepositives:
- Software deployment tooling (SCCM, PDQ, Intune)
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.t1047
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
status: experimental
---
title: N0N Campaign - Pre-Encryption Staging - Shadow Copy Deletion and Recovery Inhibition
description: Detects Volume Shadow Copy deletion and boot recovery tampering — the universal pre-detonation step in ransomware playbooks. High-fidelity when combined with mass file rename telemetry.
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_vssadmin:
Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'delete'
- 'shadows'
selection_vssadmin_quiet:
CommandLine|contains: '/quiet'
selection_wmic_shadow:
Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy'
CommandLine|contains: 'delete'
selection_bcdedit:
Image|endswith: '\bcdedit.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'recoveryenabled no'
- 'ignoreallfailures'
selection_powershell:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy'
- 'Remove-CimInstance'
- 'vssadmin delete shadows'
condition: (selection_vssadmin and selection_vssadmin_quiet) or selection_wmic_shadow or selection_bcdedit or selection_powershell
falsepositives:
- Backup software maintenance; system administrators reclaiming disk space
level: critical
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
- attack.defense_evasion
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
status: experimental
date: 2026/11/18
// N0N Pre-Detonation Hunt: Lateral movement + staging indicators within a 72h window
// Run across the last 14 days; escalate any host hitting 2+ signals.
let Lookback = 14d;
let SuspiciousLateral =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Lookback)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "WmiPrvSE.exe" or FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe")
| summarize LateralHits=count(), LateralCmds=make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 10) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 1h);
let ShadowCopyTamper =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Lookback)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("vssadmin delete shadows","shadowcopy delete","recoveryenabled no","ignoreallfailures")
| summarize ShadowHits=count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 1h);
let MassRename =
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Lookback)
| where ActionType == "FileRenamed"
| summarize RenameCount=count() by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where RenameCount > 500;
SuspiciousLateral
| join kind=inner ShadowCopyTamper on DeviceName
| join kind=leftouter MassRename on DeviceName
| extend SignalCount = iff(isnotnull(RenameCount), 3, 2)
| project DeviceName, LateralHits, ShadowHits, RenameCount, SignalCount, LateralCmds
| order by SignalCount desc, ShadowHits desc;
// Secondary: hunt for data staging — large archive creation followed by outbound transfer
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Lookback)
| where FileName in~ ("7z.exe","rar.exe","winrar.exe")
and ProcessCommandLine has_any (" a ", " -p", "vss", "\\ADMIN$", "\\c$")
| summarize ArchiveOps=count(), Cmds=make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 20) by DeviceName, AccountName
| where ArchiveOps >= 1
| order by ArchiveOps desc;
# N0N Rapid Triage Script - run on suspect hosts or domain-wide via GPO/Intune/EDR live response
# Checks: exposed RDP, shadow copy integrity, suspicious scheduled tasks (last 7 days), recent admin share writes
$report = [ordered]@{}
# 1. RDP exposure check
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).fDenyTSConnections
$report['RDP_Enabled'] = ($rdpEnabled -eq 0)
$rdpFW = Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayGroup 'Remote Desktop' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object Enabled -eq 'True'
$report['RDP_Firewall_Rules_Enabled'] = [bool]$rdpFW
# 2. Volume Shadow Copy status (deletion is a pre-detonation signature)
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report['ShadowCopies_Present'] = ($shadows | Measure-Object).Count
$vssEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7036} -MaxEvents 200 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'Volume Shadow Copy' -and $_.TimeCreated -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-3) }
$report['VSS_Service_Changes_72h'] = ($vssEvents | Measure-Object).Count
# 3. Scheduled tasks created or modified in last 7 days (persistence / ransomware deployment)
$recentTasks = Get-ScheduledTask -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$info = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[PSCustomObject]@{ Name=$_.TaskName; Path=$_.TaskPath; LastRun=$info.LastRunTime; Author=$_.Author; Actions=($_.Actions | ForEach-Object { "$($_.Execute) $($_.Arguments)" }) -join ' | ' }
} | Where-Object { $_.LastRun -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -and $_.Path -notlike '\Microsoft*' }
$report['Suspicious_Tasks_7d'] = $recentTasks
# 4. Recent admin share activity indicator - PsExec-style service artifacts
$psexecSvc = Get-Service -Name 'PSEXESVC','PAExec*' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report['PsExec_Artifacts_Present'] = [bool]$psexecSvc
# 5. Failed logon burst (RDP brute force / password spray) - last 24h
$failed = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-1)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report['Failed_Logons_24h'] = ($failed | Measure-Object).Count
$report['Failed_Logon_Top_Sources'] = $failed | ForEach-Object {
([xml]$_.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object Name -eq 'IpAddress' | Select-Object -ExpandProperty '#text'
} | Group-Object | Sort-Object Count -Descending | Select-Object -First 5 Name, Count
$report | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 4
# Triage guidance: ShadowCopies_Present=0 + any PsExec artifact + failed logon burst = escalate to IR immediately.
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist (Before Encryption Fires)
- Shadow copy deletion attempts — the single highest-fidelity pre-detonation signal (see Sigma rule 3). Any
vssadmin delete shadowsoutside backup maintenance windows is a page-worthy event. - PsExec service artifacts (
PSEXESVC, Event 7045) appearing on multiple servers within minutes — indicates mass deployment staging. - Archive utility execution (7z, rar) against network shares, especially with password flags (
-p) — data staging for exfiltration. - New scheduled tasks named to blend in (e.g., "WindowsUpdateCheck", random GUIDs) on multiple hosts simultaneously.
- EDR/AV tampering: service stop attempts against security tooling, exclusion path additions, or
Set-MpPreferenceabuse. - Unusual outbound volume to cloud storage (Mega, pCloud, Backblaze, Rclone endpoints) — N0N-class actors exfiltrate in the final 48–72 hours.
Assets This Gang's Playbook Historically Prioritizes
- Healthcare thread: clinical trial data, patient PII/PHI, research IP, regulatory correspondence — for the pharma/biotech profile, expect focus on document management systems, SharePoint/Box repositories, and lab information systems rather than transactional databases.
- Financial thread: client PII, account records, tax documents, wire/payment data — typically staged from file servers and CRM exports.
- Cross-cutting: domain controller (NTDS.dit), backup infrastructure credentials, and vCenter/hypervisor access for maximum blast radius.
Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency)
- Isolate, don't power off suspect hosts — preserve memory for forensics; use EDR network isolation first.
- Disable compromised accounts and reset tier-0 credentials (Domain Admin, vCenter admin, backup service accounts) — assume credential theft if lateral movement indicators are present.
- Block exfiltration egress — temporarily restrict outbound to non-business cloud storage at the proxy/firewall.
- Protect backups — take backup infrastructure offline or air-gap it; verify immutable copies exist BEFORE broad containment triggers detonation.
- Snapshot vCenter and critical VMs if compromise is suspected but encryption has not fired.
- Engage IR retainer and legal counsel early — for named organizations, disclosure clocks (SEC 4-day materiality, state breach laws, PIPEDA, HIPAA 60-day) start from determination, not from leak-site posting.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
- Patch or mitigate the KEV edge exposures consistent with this actor's access methods: Check Point gateways (CVE-2026-50751), Cisco FMC (CVE-2026-20316), and vCenter (CVE-2026-59310). If patching is impossible within 24h, remove management interfaces from internet exposure behind an IP allowlist.
- Disable vssadmin for standard users and alert on any execution (AppLocker/WDAC plus the Sigma rule above).
- Block PsExec-class lateral tooling where not operationally required; alert on 7045 service installs.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) on all remote access — VPN, RDP gateways, OWA — and audit for any MFA gaps on service accounts.
- Deploy the hunt queries above across the last 14 days of telemetry. The posting wave was 2026-11-16; if any claim is genuine, pre-detonation or post-compromise artifacts may still be in your logs.
Short-Term (2 Weeks)
- Segment backup and hypervisor management planes — vCenter, backup consoles, and storage management on isolated VLANs with dedicated PAWs and no tier-crossing credentials.
- Implement egress filtering with default-deny for server VLANs; most staging/exfil tooling dies without outbound connectivity.
- Deploy canary files and decoy credentials on file shares and endpoints tuned to the sectors in this campaign (PHI-shaped records, client financial data) for early tripwire detection.
- Enable tamper protection and block exclusions modification on EDR; alert on any change.
- Tabletop the leak-site scenario: your organization appears on a criminal blog Monday morning. Who validates the claim, who calls counsel, who talks to cyber insurance, and who decides on disclosure language? The 100% single-source rate in this batch is a reminder that fabricated or unverifiable claims are part of the threat model — your response plan must cover both real and false allegations.
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