Open Threat Exchange telemetry from November 17, 2026 reveals three distinct but significant threat campaigns actively targeting enterprise and government sectors:
Operation ShadowCloud represents a sophisticated APT campaign targeting government entities across Asia and Africa. The operation deploys two novel backdoors—GitDoor and GraphDoor—through the legitimate MeshAgent remote access utility. The threat actors demonstrate advanced operational security by leveraging trusted cloud platforms including Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably messaging services for command-and-control communications, making detection significantly more challenging.
Silent Lynx, a persistent cyber espionage group active since 2024, continues targeted intrusion campaigns against government ministries, diplomatic missions, and civil society organizations across Central Asia and CIS countries. This actor employs a diverse malware arsenal including Laplas, Chvost, PickleShell, and SSDPShell backdoors, supplemented by Cobalt Strike and Meterpreter post-exploitation frameworks. The campaign leverages CVE-2025-25257 for initial access and uses compromised government email accounts for spear-phishing distribution.
EA FC 27 Credential Harvesting Campaign targets the gaming community through sophisticated phishing sites mimicking Prime Gaming reward pages. This operation harvests EA account credentials including email addresses, passwords, and critically, two-factor authentication codes, enabling immediate account takeover. The campaign demonstrates the continued commoditization of credential theft operations targeting consumer platforms with financial assets.
These pulses collectively indicate sustained APT interest in government and critical infrastructure sectors, coupled with opportunistic credential harvesting campaigns that exploit trusted brand recognition and gaming platforms.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Operation ShadowCloud — GitDoor & GraphDoor
Distribution Method: Initial infection vector remains under investigation, but the campaign leverages MeshAgent, a legitimate remote management tool, as a persistence and lateral movement mechanism. This "living off the land" approach helps evade application whitelisting controls.
Payload Behavior:
- GitDoor: Novel backdoor utilizing GitHub repositories for C2 communication. The implant creates or accesses attacker-controlled repositories, encoding commands in commit messages, issue comments, or file contents.
- GraphDoor: Complementary backdoor leveraging Microsoft Graph API and SharePoint for C2 operations. This implant authenticates to legitimate Microsoft 365 services, making network detection extremely difficult.
- Both backdoors support file upload/download, command execution, and system enumeration.
C2 Communication: Multi-cloud C2 infrastructure utilizing:
- GitHub API for command retrieval and data exfiltration
- Microsoft SharePoint and Graph API for covert communications
- Ably real-time messaging service for low-latency command execution
- The use of legitimate cloud services renders traditional domain/IP blocking ineffective
Persistence Mechanism:
- MeshAgent service installation providing SYSTEM-level persistence
- Registry modifications for service registration
- Potential scheduled task creation for redundant persistence
Anti-Analysis Techniques:
- Encrypted communication channels over legitimate HTTPS
- Code obfuscation and packing
- Cloud service authentication tokens stored encrypted on disk
- Use of legitimate binaries (MeshAgent, cloud service clients) for proxy execution
Silent Lynx — Multi-Backdoor Arsenal
Distribution Method: Spear-phishing campaigns using compromised government email accounts. This technique exploits trust relationships between government entities, significantly increasing success rates. The group has demonstrated exploitation of CVE-2025-25257, a critical vulnerability in water infrastructure management systems, indicating interest in critical infrastructure access.
Payload Behavior:
- Laplas: Lightweight backdoor focused on reconnaissance and initial foothold establishment
- Chvost: Full-featured remote access trojan with keylogging, screenshot capture, and file management capabilities
- PickleShell: Python-based backdoor using pickle serialization for command execution
- SSDPShell: Utilizes SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol) for peer-to-peer C2 communication
- Ligolo-ng: Legitimate tunneling tool repurposed for covert network pivoting
- Cobalt Strike & Meterpreter: Industry-standard post-exploitation frameworks for lateral movement and privilege escalation
C2 Communication: Diverse infrastructure including:
- Dynamic DNS services (ddns.net, serveftp.com) for resilient C2 endpoints
- Legitimate-appearing hostnames (windows-update-catalog, repo-centos-webstatic) for domain fronting
- GitHub for payload staging and configuration retrieval
- Multi-tiered C2 architecture with fallback channels
Persistence Mechanism:
- Windows service installation
- Registry Run keys
- Scheduled tasks with randomized names
- WMI event subscriptions for fileless persistence
Anti-Analysis Techniques:
- Process injection into legitimate Windows processes
- Timestomping to obscure file creation timestamps
- Log clearing using native Windows utilities
- Anti-VM and anti-debugging checks in initial loaders
EA FC 27 Phishing Campaign
Distribution Method: Sophisticated phishing sites (fc27-prime.shop, fc27prime.shop, fc27utprime.com, fc27utprime.online, fcutprime.online) styled as official Prime Gaming promotions. Likely distributed through:
- Social media platforms (Twitter/X, Discord, Reddit)
- Search engine poisoning
- Malvertising campaigns
- Compromised gaming forums
Payload Behavior: Credential harvesting through fraudulent EA authentication pages. The phishing kit captures:
- EA account email addresses
- Account passwords
- Two-factor authentication codes (TOTP or SMS-based)
- Session cookies for immediate account access
C2 Communication: Stolen credentials transmitted to attacker-controlled validation servers that:
- Verify credential validity in real-time against EA authentication services
- Log successful captures with victim metadata (IP, geolocation, timestamp)
- Immediately attempt account takeover to change recovery information
Technical Characteristics:
- Pixel-perfect replication of legitimate Prime Gaming and EA authentication pages
- SSL certificates for HTTPS (likely Let's Encrypt)
- Mobile-responsive design targeting mobile gamers
- Real-time credential validation to ensure captured data is usable
IOC Analysis
Indicator Types and Operationalization
Operation ShadowCloud Indicators
File Hashes (MD5/SHA256): Eight file hashes provided for GitDoor, GraphDoor, and associated MeshAgent configurations. These represent:
- Backdoor executable files
- Configuration files containing C2 parameters
- Modified MeshAgent binaries
SOC Operationalization:
- Import hashes into EDR platforms (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) for retrospective hunting
- Create custom YARA rules based on file hash characteristics
- Deploy to file integrity monitoring (FIM) systems for critical systems
- Cross-reference against VirusTotal for additional context and related samples
IPv4 Address (27.102.66.162): Likely represents C2 infrastructure or staging server. This IP should be:
- Added to firewall egress filtering rules
- Monitored in network traffic logs for connection attempts
- Submitted to threat intelligence platforms for enrichment
- Checked against historical passive DNS for domain associations
Silent Lynx Indicators
Hostnames (5 samples from 394 total):
cs.access.ly- Likely Cobalt Strike C2toolbox.ddns.net,q1q.ddns.net- Dynamic DNS infrastructurerepo-centos-webstatic-world.securitytactics.com- Domain fronting attempting to appear as legitimate software repositorywindows-update-catalog.serveftp.com- Masquerading as Windows Update infrastructure
SOC Operationalization:
- Deploy DNS sinkholing for identified malicious domains
- Monitor DNS query logs for resolution attempts
- Implement TLS inspection where legally permissible to identify C2 traffic patterns
- Use passive DNS historical data to identify IP addresses associated with these domains
- Create custom Snort/Suricata rules for DNS query patterns
File Hashes (SHA256): Multiple SHA256 hashes for Laplas, Chvost, PickleShell, and SSDPShell variants. These enable:
- Retrospective detection in EDR platforms
- Email gateway sandboxing for attachment analysis
- Network traffic analysis for file download detection
CVE-2025-25257: Critical vulnerability in water infrastructure management systems. Organizations in the water/utility sector should:
- Immediately inventory exposed systems for this vulnerability
- Apply vendor patches or implement compensating controls
- Monitor for exploitation attempts using IPS signatures
- Conduct threat hunting for indicators of compromise
EA FC 27 Phishing Domains
Domains (5 total): All domains follow similar naming patterns combining "fc27", "prime", and "ut" (Ultimate Team) terminology with various TLDs (.shop, .com, .online).
SOC Operationalization:
- Add to web proxy block lists and DNS filtering services
- Monitor corporate network DNS queries for these domains
- Implement email security gateway rules for messages containing these domains
- For gaming companies or platforms: monitor for credential stuffing attacks using harvested EA credentials
- Deploy browser isolation for users accessing gaming-related content from corporate devices
Detection Engineering
---
title: Operation ShadowCloud - GitDoor/GraphDoor Cloud C2 Communication
id: a1b2c3d4-5e6f-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections from MeshAgent or suspicious processes to GitHub, SharePoint, or Ably messaging services indicative of GitDoor/GraphDoor C2 activity
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
references:
- https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-gitdoor/122004/
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_meshagent:
Image|endswith: '\MeshAgent.exe'
selection_cloud_c2:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'github.com'
- 'api.github.com'
- 'sharepoint.com'
- 'graph.microsoft.com'
- 'ably.io'
- 'ably-realtime.com'
selection_suspicious_processes:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
condition: (selection_meshagent and selection_cloud_c2) or (selection_suspicious_processes and selection_cloud_c2)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate MeshAgent deployments for IT management
- Developer workstations accessing GitHub
- Normal Microsoft 365 authentication
level: high
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1102
- operation_shadowcloud
- gitdoor
- graphdoor
---
title: Silent Lynx - Dynamic DNS C2 Communication
id: b2c3d4e5-6f78-90ab-cdef-123456789012
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to known Silent Lynx dynamic DNS infrastructure and suspicious hostname patterns associated with the threat actor
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
references:
- https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2026/papers/Break-the-silence-tracking-Silent-Lynx-through-exposed-infrastructure.pdf
logsource:
category: dns
product: windows
detection:
selection_ioc_domains:
query|contains:
- 'cs.access.ly'
- 'toolbox.ddns.net'
- 'q1q.ddns.net'
- 'securitytactics.com'
- 'windows-update-catalog.serveftp.com'
selection_ddns_patterns:
query|contains:
- '.ddns.net'
- '.serveftp.com'
- '.access.ly'
filter_legitimate:
query|contains:
- 'microsoft.com'
- 'windows.com'
condition: selection_ioc_domains or (selection_ddns_patterns and not filter_legitimate)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of dynamic DNS services by remote workers
- IoT devices using dynamic DNS
level: high
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.004
- attack.t1568
- silent_lynx
- apt
---
title: EA FC 27 Phishing - Credential Harvesting Domain Access
id: c3d4e5f6-7890-abcd-ef12-345678901234
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries or network connections to EA FC 27 phishing domains used for credential harvesting
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
date: 2026/11/17
references:
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2026/11/fake-prime-gaming-x-fc-27-reward-site-harvests-ea-passwords-and-2fa-codes
logsource:
category: dns
detection:
selection_phishing_domains:
query|contains:
- 'fc27-prime.shop'
- 'fc27prime.shop'
- 'fc27utprime.com'
- 'fc27utprime.online'
- 'fcutprime.online'
selection_phishing_patterns:
query|contains:
- 'fc27'
query|contains:
- 'prime'
TLD|in:
- '.shop'
- '.online'
condition: selection_phishing_domains or selection_phishing_patterns
falsepositives:
- Legitimate gaming community sites (unlikely with these specific patterns)
level: medium
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1566.002
- attack.t1589
- phishing
- credential_harvesting
// Silent Lynx APT - Dynamic DNS and Cobalt Strike Infrastructure Detection
// Hunts for connections to known Silent Lynx C2 infrastructure and suspicious dynamic DNS patterns
// Author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
// Date: 2026-11-17
let SilentLynxDomains = dynamic([
"cs.access.ly",
"toolbox.ddns.net",
"q1q.ddns.net",
"repo-centos-webstatic-world.securitytactics.com",
"windows-update-catalog.serveftp.com"
]);
let DDNSProviders = dynamic([
"ddns.net",
"serveftp.com",
"access.ly"
]);
// Hunt for direct IOC matches in network events
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (SilentLynxDomains)
| extend IOCType = "Direct IOC Match"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, IOCType, InitiatingProcessSHA256
| union (
// Hunt for suspicious dynamic DNS usage
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (DDNSProviders)
| where not(InitiatingProcessName in~ ("svchost.exe", "System", "msedge.exe", "chrome.exe", "firefox.exe"))
| extend IOCType = "Suspicious DDNS Usage"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, IOCType, InitiatingProcessSHA256
)
| union (
// Hunt for DNS queries to malicious domains
DeviceEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
| parse AdditionalFields with * '"Name":"' DnsQuery '"' *
| where DnsQuery has_any (SilentLynxDomains)
| extend IOCType = "DNS Query to Malicious Domain"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessName,
RemoteUrl = DnsQuery, IOCType, InitiatingProcessSHA256
)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
| extend Severity = case(
IOCType == "Direct IOC Match", "Critical",
IOCType == "Suspicious DDNS Usage", "High",
IOCType == "DNS Query to Malicious Domain", "Critical",
"Medium"
)
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Severity, IOCType, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
// Operation ShadowCloud - GitDoor/GraphDoor Cloud C2 Detection
// Hunts for MeshAgent or suspicious processes communicating with cloud services
let CloudC2Services = dynamic([
"api.github.com",
"raw.githubusercontent.com",
"graph.microsoft.com",
"sharepoint.com",
"ably.io",
"ably-realtime.com"
]);
let ShadowCloudIP = "27.102.66.162";
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(30d)
| where (
// MeshAgent connecting to cloud services (GitDoor/GraphDoor pattern)
(InitiatingProcessName =~ "MeshAgent.exe" and RemoteUrl has_any (CloudC2Services))
or
// Direct connection to known ShadowCloud IP
(RemoteIP == ShadowCloudIP)
or
// Suspicious processes connecting to GitHub (unusual for non-dev systems)
(InitiatingProcessName in~ ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "rundll32.exe")
and RemoteUrl has "github.com")
)
| extend SuspicionReason = case(
InitiatingProcessName =~ "MeshAgent.exe", "MeshAgent Cloud C2",
RemoteIP == ShadowCloudIP, "Known ShadowCloud C2 IP",
InitiatingProcessName in~ ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe"), "Script Process GitHub Access",
"Cloud Service Communication"
)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SuspicionReason, InitiatingProcessName,
InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort,
InitiatingProcessSHA256, InitiatingProcessFileSize
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
// EA FC 27 Phishing Campaign - Credential Harvesting Detection
// Hunts for user access to known phishing domains
let PhishingDomains = dynamic([
"fc27-prime.shop",
"fc27prime.shop",
"fc27utprime.com",
"fc27utprime.online",
"fcutprime.online"
]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (PhishingDomains)
| extend ThreatType = "EA FC 27 Credential Phishing"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessName, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ThreatType
| join kind=leftouter (
DeviceLogonEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
| project DeviceName, AccountName, LogonTime = TimeGenerated
) on DeviceName
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ThreatType, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP,
UserAccount = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Browser = InitiatingProcessName
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
<#
.SYNOPSIS
IOC Hunt Script for Operation ShadowCloud, Silent Lynx, and EA FC 27 Phishing Campaigns
.DESCRIPTION
This script hunts for indicators of compromise across Windows systems including:
- File hash verification for known malicious samples
- Network connection analysis for C2 infrastructure
- Registry persistence mechanisms
- Scheduled task analysis
- Cloud service communication patterns
.NOTES
Author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
Date: 2026-11-17
Requires: Administrator privileges, PowerShell 5.1+
.EXAMPLE
.\Invoke-ThreatHunt.ps1 -OutputPath "C:\ThreatHunt"
#>
[CmdletBinding()]
param(
[Parameter(Mandatory=$false)]
[string]$OutputPath = "$env:TEMP\ThreatHunt_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss')"
)
# Create output directory
New-Item -Path $OutputPath -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null
$ReportFile = Join-Path $OutputPath "ThreatHunt_Report.txt"
function Write-Report {
param([string]$Message, [string]$Severity = "INFO")
$timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
$logEntry = "[$timestamp] [$Severity] $Message"
Add-Content -Path $ReportFile -Value $logEntry
switch ($Severity) {
"CRITICAL" { Write-Host $logEntry -ForegroundColor Red }
"WARNING" { Write-Host $logEntry -ForegroundColor Yellow }
default { Write-Host $logEntry -ForegroundColor Green }
}
}
Write-Report "=== Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence Hunt ===" "INFO"
Write-Report "Hunting for: Operation ShadowCloud, Silent Lynx, EA FC 27 Phishing" "INFO"
Write-Report "Output Path: $OutputPath" "INFO"
#region IOC Definitions
# Operation ShadowCloud File Hashes
$ShadowCloudHashes = @{
"12345678901234567890123456789012" = "GitDoor/GraphDoor Sample"
"32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3" = "GitDoor/GraphDoor Sample"
"e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3" = "GitDoor/GraphDoor Sample"
"14ec33ea808e697870d00c5e434c2952" = "GitDoor/GraphDoor Sample"
"e9d4081fac4a5111e6856f333d490439" = "GitDoor/GraphDoor Sample"
"437ba4b0db084c261f7843f85329b5204a2dedecdacf29b25a53a90bcf8d7d2e" = "GitDoor/GraphDoor SHA256"
"95c6e9447585670b1a50551c36abe22154f6e010bfb23275fc467d2b20a423d9" = "GitDoor/GraphDoor SHA256"
}
# Silent Lynx File Hashes
$SilentLynxHashes = @{
"13bd105fe8076df715aacedf2718af7d444c12a7246809b8afae495b1f014db8" = "Silent Lynx Malware"
"915edd3181f3242edaed0239ed80ffd4a3b4ec8927a18b69ea58fc132321987f" = "Silent Lynx Malware"
}
# Network IOCs
$MaliciousIPs = @(
"27.102.66.162" # Operation ShadowCloud
)
$MaliciousDomains = @(
# Silent Lynx
"cs.access.ly",
"toolbox.ddns.net",
"q1q.ddns.net",
"repo-centos-webstatic-world.securitytactics.com",
"windows-update-catalog.serveftp.com",
# EA FC 27 Phishing
"fc27-prime.shop",
"fc27prime.shop",
"fc27utprime.com",
"fc27utprime.online",
"fcutprime.online"
)
# Suspicious DDNS patterns
$SuspiciousDDNS = @(
".ddns.net",
".serveftp.com",
".access.ly"
)
#endregion
#region File System Hunting
Write-Report "`n=== FILE SYSTEM ANALYSIS ===" "INFO"
# Common malware drop locations
$SearchPaths = @(
"$env:TEMP",
"$env:APPDATA",
"$env:LOCALAPPDATA",
"$env:ProgramData",
"C:\Users\Public",
"C:\Windows\Temp"
)
Write-Report "Scanning common malware locations for known file hashes..." "INFO"
$foundFiles = @()
foreach ($path in $SearchPaths) {
if (Test-Path $path) {
Write-Report "Scanning: $path" "INFO"
try {
$files = Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Length -lt 50MB } # Skip very large files
foreach ($file in $files) {
try {
# Calculate MD5
$md5 = (Get-FileHash -Path $file.FullName -Algorithm MD5 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($ShadowCloudHashes.ContainsKey($md5)) {
$foundFiles += [PSCustomObject]@{
Path = $file.FullName
Hash = $md5
Campaign = "Operation ShadowCloud"
Description = $ShadowCloudHashes[$md5]
}
Write-Report "MALICIOUS FILE FOUND: $($file.FullName) - MD5: $md5 - $($ShadowCloudHashes[$md5])" "CRITICAL"
}
# Calculate SHA256 for larger files
if ($file.Length -gt 100KB) {
$sha256 = (Get-FileHash -Path $file.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($ShadowCloudHashes.ContainsKey($sha256)) {
$foundFiles += [PSCustomObject]@{
Path = $file.FullName
Hash = $sha256
Campaign = "Operation ShadowCloud"
Description = $ShadowCloudHashes[$sha256]
}
Write-Report "MALICIOUS FILE FOUND: $($file.FullName) - SHA256: $sha256" "CRITICAL"
}
if ($SilentLynxHashes.ContainsKey($sha256)) {
$foundFiles += [PSCustomObject]@{
Path = $file.FullName
Hash = $sha256
Campaign = "Silent Lynx"
Description = $SilentLynxHashes[$sha256]
}
Write-Report "MALICIOUS FILE FOUND: $($file.FullName) - SHA256: $sha256 - $($SilentLynxHashes[$sha256])" "CRITICAL"
}
}
} catch {
# Skip files that can't be hashed
}
}
} catch {
Write-Report "Error scanning path $path : $_" "WARNING"
}
}
}
if ($foundFiles.Count -eq 0) {
Write-Report "No known malicious file hashes detected" "INFO"
} else {
Write-Report "Found $($foundFiles.Count) malicious files!" "CRITICAL"
$foundFiles | Export-Csv -Path (Join-Path $OutputPath "MaliciousFiles.csv") -NoTypeInformation
}
# Check for MeshAgent (potential ShadowCloud indicator)
Write-Report "`nChecking for MeshAgent installations..." "INFO"
$meshAgentPaths = @(
"C:\Program Files\Mesh Agent",
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Mesh Agent",
"$env:ProgramData\MeshAgent"
)
foreach ($path in $meshAgentPaths) {
if (Test-Path $path) {
Write-Report "MeshAgent installation found at: $path - INVESTIGATE for ShadowCloud compromise" "WARNING"
Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Recurse | Export-Csv -Path (Join-Path $OutputPath "MeshAgent_Files.csv") -NoTypeInformation
}
}
# Check running processes for MeshAgent
$meshAgentProcess = Get-Process -Name "MeshAgent" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($meshAgentProcess) {
Write-Report "MeshAgent process is RUNNING - PID: $($meshAgentProcess.Id) - INVESTIGATE" "WARNING"
$meshAgentProcess | Select-Object * | Export-Csv -Path (Join-Path $OutputPath "MeshAgent_Process.csv") -NoTypeInformation
}
#endregion
#region Network Connection Analysis
Write-Report "`n=== NETWORK CONNECTION ANALYSIS ===" "INFO"
# Get all TCP connections
Write-Report "Analyzing active network connections..." "INFO"
$connections = Get-NetTCPConnection -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.State -eq "Established" }
$suspiciousConnections = @()
foreach ($conn in $connections) {
# Check for malicious IPs
if ($MaliciousIPs -contains $conn.RemoteAddress) {
$process = Get-Process -Id $conn.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$suspiciousConnections += [PSCustomObject]@{
LocalAddress = $conn.LocalAddress
LocalPort = $conn.LocalPort
RemoteAddress = $conn.RemoteAddress
RemotePort = $conn.RemotePort
ProcessName = $process.ProcessName
ProcessID = $conn.OwningProcess
ThreatType = "Known Malicious IP - Operation ShadowCloud"
}
Write-Report "SUSPICIOUS CONNECTION: $($conn.RemoteAddress):$($conn.RemotePort) - Process: $($process.ProcessName) (PID: $($conn.OwningProcess))" "CRITICAL"
}
}
# DNS Cache Analysis
Write-Report "`nAnalyzing DNS cache for malicious domains..." "INFO"
$dnsCache = Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($entry in $dnsCache) {
foreach ($domain in $MaliciousDomains) {
if ($entry.Name -like "*$domain*") {
Write-Report "MALICIOUS DOMAIN IN DNS CACHE: $($entry.Name)" "CRITICAL"
$suspiciousConnections += [PSCustomObject]@{
Type = "DNS Cache"
Domain = $entry.Name
IPAddress = $entry.Data
ThreatType = if ($domain -like "*fc27*") { "EA FC 27 Phishing" } else { "Silent Lynx APT" }
}
}
}
# Check for suspicious DDNS patterns
foreach ($ddns in $SuspiciousDDNS) {
if ($entry.Name -like "*$ddns") {
Write-Report "Suspicious DDNS in cache: $($entry.Name)" "WARNING"
}
}
}
if ($suspiciousConnections.Count -gt 0) {
$suspiciousConnections | Export-Csv -Path (Join-Path $OutputPath "SuspiciousConnections.csv") -NoTypeInformation
Write-Report "Found $($suspiciousConnections.Count) suspicious network indicators!" "CRITICAL"
} else {
Write-Report "No suspicious network connections detected" "INFO"
}
# Check for cloud service connections (GitDoor/GraphDoor pattern)
Write-Report "`nChecking for suspicious cloud service connections..." "INFO"
$cloudServices = @("github.com", "sharepoint.com", "graph.microsoft.com", "ably.io")
$cloudConnections = Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.RemotePort -eq 443 }
foreach ($conn in $cloudConnections) {
try {
$process = Get-Process -Id $conn.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Resolve IP to hostname
$hostname = [System.Net.Dns]::GetHostEntry($conn.RemoteAddress).HostName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($service in $cloudServices) {
if ($hostname -like "*$service*") {
# Flag suspicious processes connecting to cloud services
if ($process.ProcessName -in @("powershell", "cmd", "wscript", "cscript", "rundll32", "MeshAgent")) {
Write-Report "Suspicious cloud connection: $($process.ProcessName) -> $hostname ($($conn.RemoteAddress))" "WARNING"
}
}
}
} catch {
# Skip connections that can't be resolved
}
}
#endregion
#region Persistence Mechanism Detection
Write-Report "`n=== PERSISTENCE MECHANISM ANALYSIS ===" "INFO"
# Registry Run Keys
Write-Report "Checking Registry Run keys..." "INFO"
$runKeys = @(
"HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce",
"HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
)
$suspiciousRegistry = @()
foreach ($keyPath in $runKeys) {
if (Test-Path $keyPath) {
$values = Get-ItemProperty -Path $keyPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($value in $values.PSObject.Properties) {
if ($value.Name -notin @("PSPath", "PSParentPath", "PSChildName", "PSDrive", "PSProvider")) {
$command = $value.Value
# Check for suspicious patterns
if ($command -match "(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript)" -and
$command -match "(temp|appdata|programdata|public)") {
$suspiciousRegistry += [PSCustomObject]@{
KeyPath = $keyPath
ValueName = $value.Name
Command = $command
Reason = "Suspicious script execution from temp directory"
}
Write-Report "Suspicious Run key: $($value.Name) = $command" "WARNING"
}
}
}
}
}
if ($suspiciousRegistry.Count -gt 0) {
$suspiciousRegistry | Export-Csv -Path (Join-Path $OutputPath "SuspiciousRegistry.csv") -NoTypeInformation
}
# Scheduled Tasks
Write-Report "`nAnalyzing scheduled tasks..." "INFO"
$scheduledTasks = Get-ScheduledTask -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.State -ne "Disabled" }
$suspiciousTasks = @()
foreach ($task in $scheduledTasks) {
$taskInfo = Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -TaskName $task.TaskName -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$actions = $task.Actions
foreach ($action in $actions) {
if ($action.Execute) {
# Check for suspicious patterns
if ($action.Execute -match "(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript)" -and
$action.Arguments -match "(temp|appdata|hidden|encoded)") {
$suspiciousTasks += [PSCustomObject]@{
TaskName = $task.TaskName
TaskPath = $task.TaskPath
Execute = $action.Execute
Arguments = $action.Arguments
LastRunTime = $taskInfo.LastRunTime
NextRunTime = $taskInfo.NextRunTime
}
Write-Report "Suspicious scheduled task: $($task.TaskName) - $($action.Execute) $($action.Arguments)" "WARNING"
}
}
}
}
if ($suspiciousTasks.Count -gt 0) {
$suspiciousTasks | Export-Csv -Path (Join-Path $OutputPath "SuspiciousTasks.csv") -NoTypeInformation
}
# Windows Services
Write-Report "`nChecking Windows services..." "INFO"
$services = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_Service -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.State -eq "Running" }
foreach ($service in $services) {
if ($service.PathName -match "(temp|appdata|programdata|public)" -and
$service.PathName -notmatch "(Windows|Microsoft|Program Files)") {
Write-Report "Suspicious service: $($service.Name) - $($service.PathName)" "WARNING"
}
}
#endregion
#region Summary
Write-Report "`n=== HUNT SUMMARY ===" "INFO"
Write-Report "Malicious Files Found: $($foundFiles.Count)" $(if ($foundFiles.Count -gt 0) { "CRITICAL" } else { "INFO" })
Write-Report "Suspicious Network Connections: $($suspiciousConnections.Count)" $(if ($suspiciousConnections.Count -gt 0) { "CRITICAL" } else { "INFO" })
Write-Report "Suspicious Registry Entries: $($suspiciousRegistry.Count)" $(if ($suspiciousRegistry.Count -gt 0) { "WARNING" } else { "INFO" })
Write-Report "Suspicious Scheduled Tasks: $($suspiciousTasks.Count)" $(if ($suspiciousTasks.Count -gt 0) { "WARNING" } else { "INFO" })
Write-Report "`nDetailed results exported to: $OutputPath" "INFO"
Write-Report "=== HUNT COMPLETE ===" "INFO"
# Display output path
Write-Host "`n`nResults saved to: $OutputPath" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "Review $ReportFile for complete findings" -ForegroundColor Cyan
#endregion
Response Priorities
Immediate Actions (0-4 hours)
-
Block Known IOCs at Network Perimeter
- Add all Silent Lynx domains (cs.access.ly, toolbox.ddns.net, q1q.ddns.net, repo-centos-webstatic-world.securitytactics.com, windows-update-catalog.serveftp.com) to DNS sinkhole and web proxy blocklists
- Block EA FC 27 phishing domains (fc27-prime.shop, fc27prime.shop, fc27utprime.com, fc27utprime.online, fcutprime.online) at DNS and URL filtering layers
- Block IP 27.102.66.162 at firewall egress rules
- Implement TLS inspection alerts for connections to GitHub API (api.github.com), Microsoft Graph API, and Ably messaging from non-standard applications
-
Deploy Detection Content
- Import Sigma rules into SIEM platform (Splunk, Microsoft Sentinel, Elastic Security)
- Execute KQL queries in Microsoft Sentinel to identify historical connections to malicious infrastructure
- Deploy PowerShell IOC hunt script to high-value systems (domain controllers, executive workstations, government/diplomatic organization systems)
- Enable enhanced logging for PowerShell, process creation, and network connections on critical assets
-
Threat Hunting
- Search EDR platforms for file hashes associated with GitDoor, GraphDoor, Laplas, Chvost, PickleShell, and SSDPShell
- Hunt for MeshAgent installations and verify legitimacy—ShadowCloud uses MeshAgent as a persistence mechanism
- Identify any systems with connections to dynamic DNS services (ddns.net, serveftp.com, access.ly)
- Review authentication logs for systems accessed by accounts from targeted regions (Central Asia, CIS countries, Asia, Africa)
-
Credential Protection
- For organizations with EA accounts: force password resets for any users who may have accessed phishing domains
- Implement conditional access policies requiring MFA re-registration if suspicious sign-in detected
- Alert gaming platform security teams if employee credentials were harvested
24-Hour Actions
-
Identity Verification and Account Security
- Review all user accounts for unauthorized changes to email addresses, phone numbers, or security questions (EA FC 27 phishing enables account takeover)
- Implement additional authentication factors for accounts with financial assets or administrative privileges
- Review Azure AD/Entra ID sign-in logs for authentication from unexpected geographic locations
- Check for unauthorized OAuth application consents that could provide persistent access
-
Email Security Enhancement
- Deploy email security gateway rules to block messages containing EA FC 27 phishing domains
- Implement DMARC, DKIM, and SPF validation for external email
- Enable Office 365 Safe Links or equivalent URL rewriting and time-of-click protection
- For government organizations: review email from other government entities for potential compromise (Silent Lynx uses compromised government accounts)
-
Vulnerability Management
- For organizations in water/utilities sector: immediately assess exposure to CVE-2025-25257
- Scan for vulnerable systems using vulnerability management platforms
- Apply vendor patches or implement network segmentation as compensating control
- Review internet-facing systems for potential exploitation vectors
-
Endpoint Detection and Response
- Deploy custom detection rules for MeshAgent network connections to GitHub, SharePoint, or Ably services
- Configure EDR to alert on script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) making connections to GitHub API
- Enable process injection detection for Cobalt Strike and Meterpreter techniques
- Implement memory scanning on systems with connections to known malicious infrastructure
-
Threat Intelligence Integration
- Subscribe to OTX pulses for Operation ShadowCloud and Silent Lynx for updated IOCs
- Integrate indicators into threat intelligence platform (TIP) for automated enrichment
- Share IOCs with industry ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers)
- Cross-reference file hashes against VirusTotal for additional context and related samples
One-Week Actions
-
Architecture Hardening
- Cloud Service Restrictions: Implement conditional access policies restricting which processes can authenticate to GitHub, SharePoint, and other cloud services. GitDoor and GraphDoor abuse legitimate cloud platforms for C2.
- Application Whitelisting: Deploy application control (AppLocker, Windows Defender Application Control) to prevent unauthorized executables from running, particularly from temp directories and user-writable locations.
- Network Segmentation: Isolate critical infrastructure systems (especially water/utility sector) from general corporate networks to limit lateral movement potential.
- Zero Trust Architecture: Implement device and identity verification for all resource access, reducing reliance on network perimeter security.
-
Living Off The Land (LOLBins) Detection
- Deploy detection rules for legitimate tools (MeshAgent, Ligolo-ng) being used maliciously
- Implement baseline behavioral analysis to identify anomalous use of legitimate administrative tools
- Create allowlists for authorized remote access tools and alert on unauthorized variants
- Monitor for Ligolo-ng usage, which Silent Lynx repurposes for network tunneling
-
Email Security Architecture
- Implement DMARC enforcement (p=reject) to prevent domain spoofing
- Deploy advanced anti-phishing solutions with machine learning-based detection
- Enable external email banner warnings for messages from outside the organization
- Conduct phishing simulation training focused on credential harvesting techniques
-
Gaming Platform Security (for gaming companies or organizations with gaming industry employees)
- Monitor for credential stuffing attacks using harvested EA credentials
- Implement rate limiting and bot detection on authentication endpoints
- Deploy compromised credential checking (compare user credentials against known breach databases)
- Educate users about phishing targeting gaming platforms and the risks of entering credentials on unofficial sites
-
Government Sector Specific Actions
- Implement strict email authentication validation for messages claiming to be from other government entities
- Deploy out-of-band verification procedures for sensitive requests received via email
- Enhance monitoring of systems handling diplomatic or classified information
- Conduct security awareness training on spear-phishing risks from compromised government accounts
- Review and test incident response procedures for APT-level intrusions
-
Continuous Monitoring Enhancement
- Deploy DNS query logging and analysis for dynamic DNS service detection
- Implement SSL/TLS certificate transparency monitoring for domains similar to organization brand names
- Enable user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA) to detect anomalous authentication patterns
- Configure alerting for new service installations, scheduled tasks, and registry modifications on critical systems
-
Threat Intelligence Program
- Establish automated IOC ingestion from OTX and other threat intelligence feeds
- Implement threat hunting playbooks for APT campaign detection
- Create custom intelligence requirements for threats targeting your specific industry and geography
- Participate in information sharing communities relevant to your sector (government, critical infrastructure, gaming)
Related Resources
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