Two fresh OTX pulses paint a convergent picture of the 2026 credential-theft economy: a Russian-speaking multi-operator intrusion campaign hiding command-and-control behind GitHub redirects, and a coordinated browser extension factory draining cryptocurrency wallets and harvesting credentials at scale. Both campaigns monetize the same commodity — stolen identity material — and both abuse trusted infrastructure to blend into legitimate enterprise traffic.
Threat Summary
Pulse 1 — Operation STANDOFF (VMRay Labs / AlienVault): A sophisticated Russian-speaking cybercriminal operation running a pay-per-install (PPI) loader ecosystem. A single shared infrastructure distributes a cocktail of commodity stealers and loaders — Raccoon Stealer, RedLine, Amadey, SmokeLoader, Socelars, Glupteba, and XMRig — while simultaneously enrolling victim machines into a proxy-botnet (residential proxy monetization). C2 servers hosted on Russian provider TimeWeb use GitHub redirects as dead-drop resolvers, allowing operators to rotate infrastructure without touching deployed malware. The campaign also tags Active Directory targeting, Telegram account farming, and AI-driven influence operations — indicating the intrusion set supports downstream operations beyond simple credential resale.
Pulse 2 — Offside Wallet Theft Factory (Socket / AlienVault): 77 Firefox browser extensions, 40 confirmed malicious, impersonating legitimate Web3 and wallet tools. The extensions exfiltrate recovery phrases, private keys, and stored credentials via a layered exfiltration chain: Supabase instances acting as remote kill-switch/config controllers, Cloudflare Workers as traffic relays, and hardcoded fallback C2 domains. This is software supply-chain compromise aimed directly at the identity layer — the browser.
Collective assessment: Both campaigns demonstrate the modern infostealer tradecraft playbook: (1) abuse of legitimate cloud/dev platforms (GitHub, Supabase, Cloudflare Workers) to evade domain reputation controls, (2) multi-payload monetization stacking (stealer + miner + proxy bot), and (3) rapid operationalization of stolen credentials into account farms, AD lateral movement, and crypto drainers. CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare) appearing in the STANDOFF indicator set suggests privilege escalation and lateral movement tooling for AD environments.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Operation STANDOFF (Russian-speaking, multi-operator)
- Distribution: Pay-per-install loader network; malvertising, cracked software, and SEO-poisoned download portals feeding a staged loader chain.
- Payload behavior: Loader (SmokeLoader/Amadey) pulls second-stage stealers (Raccoon, RedLine, Socelars) which harvest browser credentials, cookies/session tokens, crypto wallets, FTP/VPN clients, and Telegram sessions. Glupteba provides modular backdoor capability; XMRig monetizes idle CPU via cryptomining; a proxy module enrolls hosts into a residential proxy-botnet sold to other actors.
- C2 communication: Primary C2 hosted on TimeWeb (RU). Operators use GitHub-hosted redirect/dead-drop pages to resolve live C2 addresses — defeating static domain blocklists since the malware initially contacts github.com. API endpoints such as
/api/setStats.php(e.g.,wfsdragon.ru) handle victim check-in and telemetry. - Persistence: Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and (for Glupteba) WMI event subscriptions. AD targeting tags indicate follow-on privilege escalation — PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527) indicators suggest unpatched print spooler abuse for SYSTEM-level lateral movement.
- Anti-analysis: Multi-stage unpacking, environment checks for sandboxes, geofencing common in Russian-speaking crews, and dynamic C2 resolution via trusted platforms.
Offside Wallet Theft Factory (unknown attribution)
- Distribution: Mozilla Firefox Add-ons ecosystem — 77 extensions mimicking Web3 wallets, portfolio trackers, and crypto utilities.
- Payload behavior: JavaScript-based skimming of seed phrases and private keys from wallet interfaces and clipboard; credential harvesting from browser storage and web forms.
- C2 communication: Tiered exfiltration — Supabase REST endpoints act as remote configuration switches (enabling/damping theft behavior remotely), Cloudflare Workers proxy stolen data to obscure the final destination, and hardcoded C2 domains (e.g.,
browser-app.com,browsify.net) as fallback. - Persistence: Native browser extension persistence — survives reboots, updates silently, and inherits browser permissions.
- Anti-analysis: Dormant-until-triggered exfiltration gated by Supabase remote switches, delaying malicious behavior until after store review and initial install periods.
IOC Analysis
The pulses contain 214 combined indicators across these types:
| Type | Examples | Operationalization |
|---|---|---|
| Domains | listincode.com, wfsdragon.ru, topniemannpickshop.cc, browser-app.com, browsify.net | Block at DNS sinkhole, SWG/proxy, and EDR network controls. Note the .cc, .ru, .com.mx, .com.sg TLD spread — typosquatted payment/gaming lures. |
| URLs | http://wfsdragon.ru/api/setStats.php | Match on URI path patterns (/api/setStats.php) in proxy logs — path-based detection survives domain rotation. |
| FileHash-SHA256 | 08b7b064fa9a41b0…, 4d0912d575087d… | Push to EDR block lists; retrohunt across the full extension payload corpus (164 IOCs). |
| CVE | CVE-2021-34527 | Not a blocking IOC — a patching and exposure signal. Audit Print Spooler status on all domain-joined systems. |
Tooling: Import pulses into your TIP (OpenCTI, MISP, ThreatConnect) via the OTX DirectConnect API. Decode C2 configs from loader samples with Malcore/VMRay/ANY.RUN sandbox detonation; use Suricata/Zeek for URI-path network signatures; use urlscan.io historical search on the domains to uncover additional redirect chains. For the extension campaign, inventory installed browser extensions via your MDM/EDR software inventory and diff against the published malicious-extension list.
Detection Engineering
---
title: Operation STANDOFF Stealer Loader Execution and Run Key Persistence
id: 7c2f1a44-standoff-loader-0001
status: experimental
description: Detects execution and persistence patterns associated with Operation STANDOFF pay-per-install loaders (SmokeLoader, Amadey) dropping Raccoon/RedLine/Socelars stealers and establishing Run key persistence.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_runkey:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
selection_suspicious_path:
Details|contains:
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '\AppData\Roaming\'
- '\ProgramData\'
- '\Users\Public\'
filter_legit:
Details|contains:
- '\Microsoft\'
- '\Adobe\'
condition: selection_runkey and selection_suspicious_path and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
- Legitimate user-installed software registering startup items from AppData
level: high
date: 2026/08/20
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1060
- attack.t1547.001
- malware.raccoon
- malware.redline
---
title: GitHub Dead-Drop C2 Resolution Followed by Non-GitHub Inbound C2 (STANDOFF / TimeWeb)
id: 7c2f1a44-standoff-c2-0002
status: experimental
description: Detects processes performing HTTP requests to github.com (dead-drop resolver pattern) immediately followed by connections to known STANDOFF infrastructure or suspicious low-reputation domains, consistent with GitHub-redirected C2 resolution.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection_github:
c-uri|contains:
- 'raw.githubusercontent.com'
- 'github.com'
selection_c2_domains:
c-uri|contains:
- 'listincode.com'
- 'wfsdragon.ru'
- 'topniemannpickshop.cc'
- 'all-mobile-pa1ments.com.mx'
- 'buy-fantasy-gxmes.com.sg'
selection_c2_path:
cs-uri|contains:
- '/api/setStats.php'
condition: selection_c2_domains or selection_c2_path
falsepositives:
- None expected for direct IOC matches; path match may hit unrelated PHP APIs (tune per environment)
level: critical
date: 2026/08/20
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1102
- campaign.operation_standoff
---
title: Malicious Browser Extension Exfiltration via Supabase or Cloudflare Workers (Offside Wallet Theft Factory)
id: 7c2f1a44-offside-ext-0003
status: experimental
description: Detects Firefox browser processes posting data to Supabase REST endpoints or Cloudflare Workers domains associated with malicious extension exfiltration, or connecting to known Offside campaign C2 domains.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_browser:
Image|endswith:
- '\firefox.exe'
- '\plugin-container.exe'
selection_ioc:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'browser-app.com'
- 'browsify.net'
- 'e-wl.com'
- 'gemachriverdale.org'
condition: selection_browser and selection_ioc
falsepositives:
- None expected; these domains are confirmed campaign infrastructure
level: critical
date: 2026/08/20
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1041
- attack.t1176
- campaign.offside_wallet_theft
// Security Arsenal — Operation STANDOFF + Offside Wallet Theft Factory Hunt
// Hunts network IOCs, stealer process lineage, and browser extension exfiltration
let StandoffIOCs = dynamic(["listincode.com", "www.listincode.com", "wfsdragon.ru", "topniemannpickshop.cc", "all-mobile-pa1ments.com.mx", "buy-fantasy-gxmes.com.sg"]);
let OffsideIOCs = dynamic(["browser-app.com", "browsify.net", "gemachriverdale.org", "e-wl.com"]);
let AllIOCs = array_concat(StandoffIOCs, OffsideIOCs);
let NetworkHits =
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (AllIOCs) or RemoteUrl has "/api/setStats.php"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ActionType
| extend HuntType = "NetworkIOC";
let StealerProcess =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where FileName has_any ("raccoon", "redline", "amadey", "smokeloader", "socelars", "glupteba", "xmrig")
or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("raccoon", "redline", "amadey", "smokeloader")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256
| extend HuntType = "StealerProcess";
let ExtensionExfil =
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("firefox.exe", "plugin-container.exe")
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("supabase.co", "workers.dev") and RemoteUrl has_any (OffsideIOCs)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| extend HuntType = "ExtensionExfil";
union NetworkHits, StealerProcess, ExtensionExfil
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
# Security Arsenal — STANDOFF & Offside Endpoint IOC Hunt (run via EDR Live Response or GPO)
# Checks: Run key persistence, suspicious AppData binaries, extension hashes, network IOCs
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$report = @()
# 1. Run/RunOnce key persistence pointing to user-writable paths
$runKeys = @('HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
'HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce',
'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce')
foreach ($key in $runKeys) {
Get-ItemProperty $key | ForEach-Object {
$_.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object {
$_.Value -match 'AppData|ProgramData|Users\\Public|Temp' -and
$_.Value -notmatch 'Microsoft|Adobe|OneDrive|Teams|Slack'
} | ForEach-Object {
$report += [PSCustomObject]@{ Check='RunKeyPersistence'; Location=$key; Name=$_.Name; Value=$_.Value }
}
}
}
# 2. Scheduled tasks launching from user-writable directories
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {
($_.Actions.Execute -match 'AppData|ProgramData|Users\\Public') -and
($_.Actions.Execute -notmatch 'Microsoft|Adobe|Google|OneDrive')
} | ForEach-Object {
$report += [PSCustomObject]@{ Check='ScheduledTask'; Location=$_.TaskPath; Name=$_.TaskName; Value=$_.Actions.Execute }
}
# 3. Offside extension payload hash sweep across user profiles
$badHashes = @('08b7b064fa9a41b06774315d944ffddff705ab727222a0c3bcac64a77553bf2f',
'4d0912d575087dab5f468214a2fd259bc386472a8b2b93b6e2441cde4bd941cb',
'26427220b9965e22deca0e617657c2c65b78f750183355d1265c147818367bd7',
'252119fc48ad93b0c930d7a62fb49420cf8986716539e4e9d4d5c1bad700d435')
Get-ChildItem 'C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles' -Recurse -Include *.xpi,*.js -File |
ForEach-Object {
$h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLower()
if ($badHashes -contains $h) {
$report += [PSCustomObject]@{ Check='MaliciousExtensionHash'; Location=$_.FullName; Name=$_.Name; Value=$h }
}
}
# 4. Active/historical network connections to campaign IOCs
$iocDomains = @('listincode.com','wfsdragon.ru','topniemannpickshop.cc','browser-app.com','browsify.net','e-wl.com')
Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $_.State -eq 'Established' } | ForEach-Object {
$proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess
$report += [PSCustomObject]@{ Check='ActiveConnection'; Location=$_.RemoteAddress; Name=$proc.ProcessName; Value=$_.RemotePort }
}
$dnsCache = Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $d = $_.Entry; $iocDomains | Where-Object { $d -match $_ } }
$dnsCache | ForEach-Object {
$report += [PSCustomObject]@{ Check='DNSCacheHit'; Location='DnsClientCache'; Name=$_.Entry; Value=$_.Data }
}
$report | Format-Table -AutoSize
if ($report) { $report | Export-Csv "$env:TEMP\arsenal_ioc_hunt_$(Get-Date -Format yyyyMMdd_HHmm).csv" -NoTypeInformation }
Response Priorities
Immediate (0–4 hours)
- Push all 214 OTX indicators to DNS sinkhole, secure web gateway, and EDR block lists — prioritize the STANDOFF C2 domains and the four confirmed Offside extension C2s.
- Deploy the Sigma rules and run the Sentinel KQL hunt across a 14-day lookback; execute the PowerShell hunt on any host showing loader or extension hits.
- Search proxy/Zeek logs for the URI pattern
/api/setStats.phpand for github.com requests immediately followed by connections to low-reputation infrastructure (dead-drop pattern). - Audit enterprise browser extension inventories; remove any extension matching the Offside factory list and quarantine affected endpoints.
24 Hours
- Treat any host with a stealer process hit as fully credential-compromised: force password resets for all users who authenticated from that host, revoke active sessions and OAuth tokens, and rotate any credentials stored in browsers on the device.
- If crypto wallet extensions were present, assume seed phrase compromise — migrate wallets to new keys immediately; do not attempt to "secure" the old wallet.
- Verify AD integrity on STANDOFF-affected hosts: review privileged group membership changes, new service accounts, and Print Spooler (CVE-2021-34527) patch status across domain controllers and print servers.
- Check for proxy-botnet enrollment: unexpected outbound listening ports, unknown tunneling processes, and abnormal egress bandwidth patterns.
1 Week
- Architecture hardening against the observed vectors: restrict browser extension installation via enterprise policy (allowlist-only for Firefox/Chrome); block or alert on egress to
workers.devand unsanctioned Supabase projects from endpoints; implement DNS filtering on high-risk TLDs (.cc, .ru) for general users. - Enforce FIDO2/phishing-resistant MFA to blunt the value of stolen credentials and session tokens.
- Disable or constrain Print Spooler where not required; validate CVE-2021-34527 remediation fleet-wide.
- Establish continuous OTX pulse ingestion into your TIP with automated IOC aging and enrichment so the next loader rotation is caught at the dead-drop stage, not the exfiltration stage.
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub
Is your security operations ready?
Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.