PAYLOAD Ransomware: Central European Campaign Targeting Energy and Agriculture via Firewall Exploits

Threat Actor Profile — PAYLOAD

Aliases & Affiliation: The PAYLOAD group (previously associated with loosely affiliated cybercriminal collectives) operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) entity. Unlike closed-group operations, they appear to leverage an affiliate network to conduct initial access brokering, while the core team maintains the encryption payload and leak site negotiation infrastructure.

Operational Model: Double-extortion specialists. They aggressively encrypt environments while exfiltrating sensitive corporate data to leverage pressure via their .onion leak site.

Initial Access Vectors: Historically reliant on exploiting edge-network infrastructure. Recent intelligence confirms a heavy pivot toward exploiting VPN and firewall appliances. They utilize valid credentials harvested from infostealers or exploit authentication bypasses (CVE-2026-50751, CVE-2026-20131) to establish persistent footholds without triggering traditional endpoint alarms.

Ransom Demands: Typically range from $500k to $3M USD, calibrated based on victim revenue and perceived urgency of data restoration.

Dwell Time: Current campaign analysis suggests a compressed dwell time of 3–5 days between initial edge access and encryption, indicating a high degree of automation and operational maturity.

Current Campaign Analysis

Targeted Sectors: The latest postings indicate a distinct pivot toward critical infrastructure and supply chain continuity:

• Energy: ENB Versich (Switzerland) - Critical utility provider.
• Consumer Services: Vela Film S.r.l. (Italy) - Post-production/media services.
• Agriculture & Food Production: Tofutown (Germany) - Food manufacturing.

Geographic Concentration: Central Europe (DACH region). The clustering of victims in CH (Switzerland), IT (Italy), and DE (Germany) suggests affiliates may be specifically targeting European network perimeters or utilizing language-tailored phishing lures.

Victim Profile: Mid-to-large enterprises. The targeting of an energy provider (ENB Versich) and a food production entity (Tofutown) suggests a focus on organizations where operational downtime equates to massive financial loss, thereby increasing the likelihood of ransom payment.

Posting Frequency: 3 victims posted within a 3-day window (July 2– July 5). This indicates an active, operational pipeline and potential for a spike in activity.

CVE Correlation: The threat actors are actively exploiting CISA KEV-listed vulnerabilities targeting perimeter defenses:

• CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway): Likely used for initial access into the Energy sector victim (ENB Versich).
• CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Secure Firewall FMC): A significant threat to enterprise environments relying on Cisco for network segmentation.
• CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect): Frequently used for lateral movement and establishing remote access tunnels post-breach.

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

---
title: Potential Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 Exploitation
id: 8a1b2c3d-4e5f-6789-0123-456789abcdef
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-50751 involving improper authentication in IKEv1 key exchange on Check Point Security Gateways.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/06
author: Security Arsenal Research
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    product: firewall
    service: checkpoint
detection:
    selection:
        service|contains: 'ike'
        ike_version: '1'
        action: 'accept'
    filter:
        src_ip_network:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
    condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate remote access VPNs from trusted partners
level: high
---
title: ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal Exploitation Attempt
id: b2c3d4e5-6f78-9012-3456-7890abcdef12
description: Detects possible exploitation of CVE-2024-1708 path traversal vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/06
author: Security Arsenal Research
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    category: web
detection:
    selection_uri:
        Uri|contains:
            - '..%2f'
            - '..\\'
            - '%2e%2e%2f'
    selection_sc:
        cs_host|contains: 'ScreenConnect'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Scanning activity
    - Misconfigured proxies
level: critical
---
title: Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command Execution
id: c3d4e5f6-7890-1234-5678-90abcdef1234
description: Detects base64 encoded PowerShell commands often used by PAYLOAD ransomware affiliates for execution and obfuscation.
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/06
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4688
        NewProcessName|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            '-enc '
            '-EncodedCommand'
            'FromBase64String'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administration scripts
    - Legitimate software deployment
level: medium

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

// Hunt for lateral movement and pre-encryption staging
// Focuses on PsExec, WMI, and abnormal SMB access
let TimeFrame = 1h;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
| where ProcessName in~ ("psexec.exe", "psexec64.exe", "wmic.exe", "powershell.exe")
| where CommandLine has "-enc" or CommandLine has "Invoke-Command" or CommandLine has "New-Object"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessName, CommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| join kind=leftouter (
    NetworkCommunicationEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
    | where RemotePort in (445, 135, 139, 3389)
    | summarize Count() by DeviceName, RemoteIP
) on DeviceName
| order by Timestamp desc

Rapid Response Script (PowerShell)

<#
    PAYLOAD Ransomware Rapid Response Hardening Script
    Checks for active ransomware precursors and hardens RDP/VSS.
#>

Write-Host "[+] Starting PAYLOAD Ransomware Rapid Response Check..."

# 1. Check for recent Scheduled Tasks (Persistence)
$recentTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }
if ($recentTasks) {
    Write-Host "[!] WARNING: Recent Scheduled Tasks detected:" -ForegroundColor Red
    $recentTasks | Select-Object TaskName, Date, Author
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No suspicious recent scheduled tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 2. Check for Volume Shadow Copy Deletion Attempts (Vssadmin)
$vssEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4663; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddHours(-2)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
              Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'vssadmin.exe' -or $_.Message -match 'delete shadows' }
if ($vssEvents) {
    Write-Host "[!] CRITICAL: VSS Admin deletion events detected in Security Log!" -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No VSS deletion commands detected." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 3. Enumerate Network Connections for non-standard RDP Ports
$netstat = netstat -ano | Select-String ":3389"
if ($netstat) {
    Write-Host "[!] Active RDP connections (Port 3389) found:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $netstat
}

Write-Host "[+] Response Check Complete."

Incident Response Priorities

1. T-Minus Detection Checklist:

   • Firewall Logs: Immediately audit Check Point (CVE-2026-50751) and Cisco FMC (CVE-2026-20131) logs for anomalous IKEv1 handshakes or authenticated sessions from non-corporate IPs.
   • Remote Access: Review ScreenConnect (ConnectWise) logs for path traversal attempts or unauthorized logins via the web interface.
   • Identity: Check for suspicious MFA fatigue attacks or successful logins from unapproved Geo-locations (specifically outside DACH for HQ entities).

2. Critical Assets for Exfiltration:

   • Energy: SCADA configuration files, Operational Technology (OT) network maps, customer billing data.
   • Agriculture: Proprietary recipes/formulas (Tofutown), supply chain logistics, HACCP compliance documents.
   • Consumer Services: Unreleased media assets, client financial records.

3. Containment Actions (Urgency Order):

   • Immediate: Disconnect internet-facing VPN and firewall management interfaces from the public internet if patches for CVE-2026-50751/CVE-2026-20131 are not applied.
   • High: Isolate systems running ConnectWise ScreenConnect; enforce MFA on all RMM tools immediately.
   • Medium: Suspend all non-essential Active Directory accounts with privileged rights.

Hardening Recommendations

• Immediate (24h):

  • Apply patches for CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point) and CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco FMC) immediately.
  • Disable Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1) on VPN concentrators where possible; enforce IKEv2.
  • Implement Geo-blocking for management interfaces (SSH/HTTPS) on firewall appliances.

• Short-term (2 weeks):

  • Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA): Move management of critical infrastructure (ScreenConnect, RDP) behind a ZTNA broker rather than direct VPN exposure.
  • Network Segmentation: Review OT/IT segmentation policies, specifically ensuring Energy and Food production networks are not routable from the corporate LAN without jump-hosts.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub