Recent OTX pulses indicate a coordinated surge in credential theft and cyber-espionage activity spanning multiple regions and sectors. The primary threats identified include Phantom Stealer, a sophisticated .NET infostealer utilizing steganography and PowerShell loaders; Ousaban (Metamorfo), a banking Trojan specifically targeting the Iberian Peninsula with geofencing capabilities; and OctLurk/SilkLurk, backdoors linked to state-sponsored espionage targeting Central Asian government entities.
Collectively, these campaigns demonstrate a heavy reliance on social engineering (fake tax notices, phishing PDFs) and evasion techniques (steganography, environment checks). The common objective across these disparate threat actors is the harvesting of financial credentials, session cookies, and sensitive government data for sale on the dark web or for strategic leverage.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Phantom Stealer
- Type: .NET-based Infostealer
- Distribution: Phishing emails, cracked software, malicious links on Discord/Telegram.
- Behavior: Harvests browser credentials, saved passwords, session cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and system fingerprints. Utilizes clipboard hijacking for crypto theft.
- Techniques: Employs PowerShell loaders and steganography to hide malicious shellcode within images. Uses process injection to evade detection.
Ousaban (Metamorfo)
- Type: Banking Trojan
- Target: Financial sector users in Spain and Portugal.
- Distribution: Phishing PDFs redirecting to malicious webpages.
- Behavior: Performs environment checks (geofencing) to ensure the victim is located in the Iberian Peninsula before executing. Steals banking credentials and OTPs.
- Techniques: Uses VBS scripts to download steganographic images containing the payload.
OctLurk & SilkLurk
- Type: Backdoor / Remote Access Trojan (RAT)
- Target: Government, Healthcare, and Education in Central Asia (Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, etc.).
- Behavior: Credential harvesting, lateral movement, and cyber-espionage.
- Techniques: Utilizes PlugX variants, Impacket for lateral movement, and custom tools like LurkProxy.
Regional Phishing (India & Chile)
- India: Campaigns impersonating the Income Tax Department distributing malware via WhatsApp (fake notices) and
ITD.zipfiles. - Chile: Large-scale domain rotation impersonating the 'PasasteSinTAG' portal to harvest credentials using TLDs like .cyou, .top, and .click.
IOC Analysis
The provided pulses contain a mix of File Hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256), Domains, and Hostnames.
- File Hashes: Multiple variants of Phantom Stealer and Ousaban binaries. SOC teams should immediate block these hashes on endpoints and gateways.
- Domains: A list of over 100 domains, primarily associated with the PasasteSinTAG phishing kit (e.g.,
pasastesintag.pics) and Indian tax phishing (e.g.,gov-xnui.com). These should be added to DNS sinkholes and web proxy blocklists. - Operationalization:
- SIEM: Correlate file hashes against
SysmonEvent ID 1 (Process Create) andDeviceFileEvents. - EDR: Hunt for processes connecting to the listed domains.
- Threat Intel: Ingest OTX pulses directly into detection platforms to automate blocking.
- SIEM: Correlate file hashes against
Detection Engineering
---
title: Phantom Stealer PowerShell Execution Pattern
id: 20260731-001
description: Detects PowerShell execution patterns often used by Phantom Stealer loaders involving downloading content and base64 decoding or reflection.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/31
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4688
NewProcessName|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DownloadString'
- 'IEX'
- 'FromBase64String'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrative scripts
level: high
---
title: Ousaban VBS Steganography Download
id: 20260731-002
description: Detects VBS scripts downloading image files, a technique used by Ousaban to retrieve steganographic payloads.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/31
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4688
NewProcessName|endswith: '\wscript.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '.vbs'
filter:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.jpg'
- '.png'
- '.bmp'
- '.jpeg'
condition: selection and filter
falsepositives:
- Low
level: high
---
title: PasasteSinTAG Phishing Domain Access
id: 20260731-003
description: Detects network connections to domains associated with the PasasteSinTAG phishing campaign targeting Chile.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/31
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1566.002
logsource:
category: network_connection
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'pasastesintag'
- 'parastesintago'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate access to pasastesinTAG (verify context)
level: critical
kql
// Hunt for Phantom Stealer and Ousaban File Hashes
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where SHA256 in (
'2d5003d9318ae85eb22de99d19705a3cd7bf8e5c3349df979dfb3bdfa080908e',
'b588caa5365451a6c60fd73fec5b73f13ac41bcc2a3a3bed7244df5917a62f32',
'd4eb4ff02df659fdeec17d36b77084627469623bb3c7d16383d257404b52d1c3'
)
or MD5 in (
'031ae066a8188e5fea8d3d7981a2166c',
'18205d398e5df7d38705dbdc700ccb46',
'62944e26b36b1dcace429ae26ba66164'
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, MD5, InitiatingProcessAccountName
powershell
# IOC Hunt Script for Phantom Stealer Persistence and Artifacts
# Requires Administrative Privileges
$MD5Hashes = @(
"031ae066a8188e5fea8d3d7981a2166c",
"18205d398e5df7d38705dbdc700ccb46",
"26c0aee6c79935ee6da46e6444f1c109",
"62944e26b36b1dcace429ae26ba66164"
)
$SHA256Hashes = @(
"2d5003d9318ae85eb22de99d19705a3cd7bf8e5c3349df979dfb3bdfa080908e",
"d4eb4ff02df659fdeec17d36b77084627469623bb3c7d16383d257404b52d1c3",
"23b122deea347dbe2407c1542c1cc6caaafca537eb5d1950a4ed7c8a69395dbb"
)
$Domains = @(
"pasastesintag.pics",
"laoshunfa.xyz",
"gov-xnui.com",
"confbase.mdpsupport.net"
)
Write-Host "[+] Hunting for Phantom Stealer and Ousaban IOCs..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
# Check File Hashes
Write-Host "[*] Checking file hashes on system drive..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Length -gt 0kb -and $_.Length -lt 10mb } | ForEach-Object {
$fileHash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm MD5).Hash.ToLower()
if ($MD5Hashes -contains $fileHash) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Match found for MD5 $fileHash at $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
$fileHash256 = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLower()
if ($SHA256Hashes -contains $fileHash256) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Match found for SHA256 $fileHash256 at $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
# Check Hosts File for Phishing Domains
Write-Host "[*] Checking hosts file for malicious domains..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$HostsPath = "$env:windir\System32\drivers\etc\hosts"
if (Test-Path $HostsPath) {
$HostsContent = Get-Content $HostsPath
foreach ($domain in $Domains) {
if ($HostsContent -match $domain) {
Write-Host "[!] WARNING: Domain $domain found in hosts file." -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
}
Write-Host "[+] Hunt complete." -ForegroundColor Green
# Response Priorities
* **Immediate**:
* Block all listed domains and file hashes at the perimeter, proxy, and endpoint levels.
* Hunt for the presence of `wscript.exe` launching image downloads or PowerShell performing base64 decoding.
* **24 Hours**:
* If credential-theft malware (Phantom/Ousaban) is suspected, force a password reset for high-privilege accounts and users in targeted regions (Iberia, India, Chile, Central Asia).
* Review logs for access to the "PasasteSinTAG" spoof domains.
* **1 Week**:
* Implement application-specific controls to block unsigned .NET binaries or macros from the internet.
* Conduct security awareness training focused on tax-season phishing and brand impersonation (PasasteSinTAG).
* Update geofencing policies to restrict access from non-corporate regions where applicable.
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub
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