Threat Summary
Recent OTX Pulse data from 2026-07-31 highlights a diverse and active threat landscape involving distinct adversaries targeting various sectors. The intelligence identifies three primary threats:
- Phantom Stealer Campaigns: A .NET-based infostealer utilizing sophisticated loaders, including steganography and PowerShell, to harvest browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and session cookies. Distribution is heavily reliant on social engineering via Discord, Telegram, and cracked software lures.
- Ousaban Banking Operations: A geofenced banking Trojan campaign targeting the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal). This actor, linked to the Metamorfo/Casbaneiro families, uses phishing PDFs and VBS loaders to deliver steganographic payloads, specifically checking victim location to avoid wasting resources on non-targets.
- TAG-182 Surveillance: An Iran-nexus threat actor (linked to IRGC) disseminating "MarkiRAT" via fake Android VPN and media player applications. This campaign targets Iranian citizens domestically and abroad, leveraging social media platforms for distribution following the restoration of internet services in Iran.
Collectively, these pulses indicate a simultaneous surge in financially motivated credential theft and state-sponsored surveillance tools utilizing evasive delivery mechanisms like steganography.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Phantom Stealer (S0447)
- Type: Information Stealer
- Distribution: Phishing emails, cracked software downloads, malicious links on Discord and Telegram.
- Payload Behavior: Written in .NET. Harvests saved passwords, cookies, cryptocurrency wallet files (e.g., wallets.dat), and system fingerprints. Performs clipboard hijacking for cryptocurrency theft.
- Loader Mechanics: Employs PowerShell loaders and process injection. Notably uses steganography to hide malicious code within image files.
- C2 Communication: Establishes connections to Command & Control (C2) servers to exfiltrate stolen data.
Ousaban / Metamorfo (S0455)
- Type: Banking Trojan
- Targeting: Finance sector in Spain and Portugal.
- Distribution: Phishing emails containing malicious PDFs that redirect to attacker-controlled webpages.
- Payload Behavior: Performs environment checks (geofencing) to ensure the victim is in the Iberian region before executing the payload. Uses VBS scripts to download subsequent stages hidden in images (steganography).
- Persistence: Likely established via registry run keys or scheduled tasks (standard behavior for this family).
TAG-182 (MarkiRAT)
- Type: Mobile Surveillance Tool (Android)
- Actor: Iran-nexus (associated with Ferocious Kitten/IRGC).
- Distribution: Fake VPN services and media players distributed via Instagram and other social media channels.
- Payload Behavior: "MarkiRAT" allows for remote surveillance, including data exfiltration and device control.
- Infrastructure: Uses specific domains mimicking legitimate services (e.g., google.comesignt.website) to lure victims and route C2 traffic.
IOC Analysis
The provided indicators of compromise (IOCs) span multiple domains, allowing for a layered defense strategy:
- File Hashes (MD5, SHA1, SHA256):
- Operationalization: Critical for EDR and AV solutions. Phantom Stealer and Ousaban samples should be blocked immediately.
- Tooling: YARA rules can be generated from these hashes to scan endpoints and network shares. VirusTotal integration can automate reputation checks.
- Domains and Hostnames:
- Operationalization: Associated with the TAG-182 MarkiRAT campaign (e.g.,
yemplayer.site,microsoft.comi-site.website). These should be added to DNS blocklists (RPZ) and web proxy deny lists. - Tooling: SIEM solutions can correlate DNS queries against these domains to identify infected hosts attempting to reach C2 infrastructure.
- Operationalization: Associated with the TAG-182 MarkiRAT campaign (e.g.,
- Steganography Indicators:
- While not direct IOCs, the description of steganographic delivery suggests that large image files downloaded from suspicious URLs should be treated with suspicion. Network forensics tools capable of extracting file content from HTTP streams are necessary to analyze these payloads.
Detection Engineering
The following detection logic is designed to identify the specific behaviors and infrastructure associated with these OTX pulses.
title: Phantom Stealer PowerShell Loader and Shellcode Execution
id: 6635c89d-0e8a-4b2f-9a1c-1b8a0c9d2e3f
description: Detects PowerShell activity characteristic of Phantom Stealer loading, specifically the use of Add-Type, shellcode injection, or encoded commands often used in conjunction with steganography payloads.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/31
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6635c89d-0e8a-4b2f-9a1c-1b8a0c9d2e3f
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1055
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_pwsh:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Add-Type'
- 'System.Reflection.Assembly::Load'
- 'VirtualAlloc'
- '-EncodedCommand'
selection_img_load:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'FromBase64String'
- 'Invoke-Expression'
filter_legit_admin:
ParentImage|contains: '\System32\'
condition: selection_pwsh and selection_img_load and not 1 of filter_legit_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate system administration scripts
level: high
---
title: Ousaban Banking Trojan VBS and Geofencing Activity
id: 7746d90e-1f9b-5c3g-0b2d-2c9b1d0e3f40
description: Detects the execution of VBS scripts followed by network connections characteristic of the Ousaban banking trojan distribution chain involving geo-checks and payload downloads.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/31
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/7746d90e-1f9b-5c3g-0b2d-2c9b1d0e3f40
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_vbs:
Image|endswith:
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '.vbs'
selection_network:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'download'
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
- 'Invoke-WebRequest'
condition: selection_vbs and selection_network
falsepositives:
- Legacy IT automation scripts
level: high
---
title: TAG-182 MarkiRAT C2 Infrastructure Connection
id: 8857e01f-2g0c-6d4h-1c3e-3d0c2e1f4g51
description: Detects network connections to known TAG-182 MarkiRAT Command and Control domains identified in OTX Pulse data.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/31
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/8857e01f-2g0c-6d4h-1c3e-3d0c2e1f4g51
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_c2:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'yemplayer.site'
- 'comi-site.website'
- 'comesignt.website'
- 'google.comesignt.website'
- 'microsoft.comi-site.website'
condition: selection_c2
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
kql
// Hunt for Phantom Stealer and Ousaban File Hashes
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FolderPath endswith ".exe" or FolderPath endswith ".vbs" or FolderPath endswith ".ps1"
| where SHA256 in (
"2d5003d9318ae85eb22de99d19705a3cd7bf8e5c3349df979dfb3bdfa080908e",
"b588caa5365451a6c60fd73fec5b73f13ac41bcc2a3a3bed7244df5917a62f32",
"be119a21bedc3a79bf4dea8bcf5adf18304997a01ea23e276b9c31be37b789ab",
"382233c398cbc35dcee845ee17046815f37588a382a8106bfb9b0252ea803961",
"790945e17a51691483455a11af2efcbe15f2b473b65b151f50287623d1468516",
"528a46842744366b57edfc6fe2810ca7df43900db75126cd1c78f32957143364",
"d4eb4ff02df659fdeec17d36b77084627469623bb3c7d16383d257404b52d1c3",
"400eb6a94810323a1fc5f8ab31c682fe765aaec2cc61b37c31d719c7e45c9a6c"
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
// Hunt for TAG-182 MarkiRAT Network Indicators
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl in (
"yemplayer.site",
"comesignt.website"
)
| where RemoteUrl contains "comi-site.website" or RemoteUrl contains "comesignt.website" or RemoteUrl contains "google.comesignt.website"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
powershell
# IOC Hunt Script for Phantom Stealer, Ousaban, and MarkiRAT Artifacts
# Requires Administrator Privileges
Write-Host "Starting Hunt for OTX Pulse Artifacts..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
# 1. Check for File Hash presence (Common download folders/user profiles)
$hashes = @(
"2d5003d9318ae85eb22de99d19705a3cd7bf8e5c3349df979dfb3bdfa080908e",
"b588caa5365451a6c60fd73fec5b73f13ac41bcc2a3a3bed7244df5917a62f32",
"be119a21bedc3a79bf4dea8bcf5adf18304997a01ea23e276b9c31be37b789ab",
"382233c398cbc35dcee845ee17046815f37588a382a8106bfb9b0252ea803961",
"790945e17a51691483455a11af2efcbe15f2b473b65b151f50287623d1468516",
"528a46842744366b57edfc6fe2810ca7df43900db75126cd1c78f32957143364",
"d4eb4ff02df659fdeec17d36b77084627469623bb3c7d16383d257404b52d1c3",
"400eb6a94810323a1fc5f8ab31c682fe765aaec2cc61b37c31d719c7e45c9a6c"
)
$pathsToScan = @("C:\Users\", "C:\ProgramData\", "C:\Windows\Temp")
Write-Host "Scanning for known malicious file hashes..."
foreach ($path in $pathsToScan) {
if (Test-Path $path) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($hashes -contains $hash) {
Write-Host "[MATCH] Malicious file found: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
}
# 2. Check for Suspicious Persistence (Run Keys)
Write-Host "Checking Registry Run Keys for suspicious persistence..."
$runKeys = @(
"HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce",
"HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
)
$suspiciousPatterns = @("discord", "telegram", "crypto", "wallet", "update", "microsoft-edge")
foreach ($key in $runKeys) {
if (Test-Path $key) {
Get-ItemProperty -Path $key -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty | ForEach-Object {
$valueName = $_.Name
$valueData = (Get-ItemProperty -Path $key).$valueName
foreach ($pattern in $suspiciousPatterns) {
if ($valueData -match $pattern) {
Write-Host "[SUSPICIOUS] Potential persistence in $key : $valueName -> $valueData" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
}
}
}
# 3. Check Hosts File for MarkiRAT C2 Domains
Write-Host "Checking HOSTS file for MarkiRAT domains..."
$hostsPath = "C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts"
$maliciousDomains = @(
"yemplayer.site",
"comi-site.website",
"comesignt.website",
"google.comesignt.website",
"microsoft.comi-site.website"
)
if (Test-Path $hostsPath) {
$hostsContent = Get-Content $hostsPath
foreach ($domain in $maliciousDomains) {
if ($hostsContent -match $domain) {
Write-Host "[MATCH] Malicious domain found in HOSTS file: $domain" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
Write-Host "Hunt Complete."
Response Priorities
Immediate (0-4 hours)
- Block IOCs: Implement immediate blocks on all listed file hashes, domains (specifically TAG-182 infrastructure), and URLs on perimeter firewalls, proxies, and EDR solutions.
- Isolate Infected Hosts: Scan endpoints for the specific file hashes provided. Isolate any devices returning positive matches.
- Hunt for Steganography: Identify any unusual image downloads (JPG/PNG/BMP) executed via scripts or PowerShell, specifically those originating from Discord or Telegram.
24 Hours
- Credential Auditing: Given the credential theft capabilities of Phantom Stealer and Ousaban, initiate forced password resets for high-privilege accounts and accounts used for banking/financial systems.
- Session Termination: Revoke all active session tokens and cookies for corporate web applications to mitigate the impact of stolen session cookies.
- Mobile Threat Check: For organizations with Android fleets or BYOD, scan for applications resembling "VPN" or "Media Players" connecting to the TAG-182 infrastructure.
1 Week
- Architecture Hardening: Restrict the execution of PowerShell and WScript/CScript to only signed scripts or specific administrative users.
- Geo-Fencing: Implement network-based geo-blocking (where business-appropriate) to hinder the geofencing checks performed by Ousaban, preventing the malware from receiving its payload.
- User Awareness: Conduct specific security awareness training focused on the dangers of downloading "cracked" software and unsolicited PDFs, particularly those targeting banking credentials.
Related Resources
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