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Phorpiex, Mozi, Mirai: Direct-to-IP C2 Tactics — OTX Pulse Analysis

SA
Security Arsenal Team
August 4, 2026
5 min read

Threat Summary

Recent intelligence from AlienVault OTX highlights a significant shift in malware command-and-control (C2) tradecraft. Analysis of 4 million dynamic malware reports indicates that 45.32% of active malware samples are utilizing Direct-to-IP (D2IP) communication strategies. By hard-coded IP addresses rather than resolving domain names, threat actors are successfully bypassing DNS-based security controls, including DNS sinkholing and filtering layers.

The campaign involves multiple malware families—including Phorpiex, Mozi, Mirai, SectopRAT, and Boatnet—targeting the Education, Government, and Transportation sectors. The primary objective is to maintain persistent C2 channels that are resilient to domain takedowns and difficult to detect via standard network monitoring logs that focus on DNS queries.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

Phorpiex (Trik)

  • Type: Worm / Ransomware Dropper
  • Distribution: Spam campaigns, illegal software cracks.
  • Behavior: Utilizes a modular architecture to spread via removable drives and LAN. The recent samples analyzed use hardcoded IPv4 addresses for C2 to download ransomware payloads (e.g., AvosLocker) or conduct crypto-jacking.

Mozi

  • Type: IoT Botnet / Worm
  • Target: Routers, DVRs, and IoT devices.
  • Behavior: Uses a DHT-based P2P network overlay but relies on D2IP for initial infection and loader retrieval. It exploits weak telnet/SSH credentials.

Mirai & Boatnet

  • Type: DDoS Botnets
  • Behavior: Boatnet appears to be a variant or related cluster targeting maritime/logistics sectors (transportation vertical). Both utilize D2IP to receive attack commands, ensuring that even if DNS infrastructure is locked down, the botnet remains operational.

Common Tactics: DNS Bypass

The adversaries specifically employ "DNS bypass" techniques. By avoiding A or AAAA record lookups, they evade:

  1. RPZ (Response Policy Zone) blocking.
  2. Network-based DNS firewall alerts.
  3. Traditional IOC lists that focus on domain names.

IOC Analysis

The provided Pulse contains high-confidence indicators compromised of 4 external IPv4 addresses and 3 file hashes.

  • IPv4 Addresses (5 total): 103.245.236.146, 154.92.19.71, 178.16.54.109, 91.92.243.29, 194.76.227.94.
    • Action: These should be immediately blocked at the perimeter firewall and proxy servers.
  • File Hashes:
    • MD5: 083d5895283755a910b5c59d60a5348b
    • SHA1: 0d94bf4d0418061907ff7977e3f25a463cb25188
    • SHA256: 9639f7ebc6a6d69d7bf5b8bc869e7783a1406088f192868624ad8919e9bfd1d4
    • Action: Upload to EDR detection lists and scan historical endpoints for presence.

SOC Tooling: Operationalize these via SIEM correlation (matching outbound flows to these IPs) and EDR threat hunting modules (querying for the SHA256 hash).

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

YAML
title: Potential Malware Direct-to-IP C2 Communication
id: 4b05d0f8-9f5a-4f8e-8c1a-3d0a1b2c3d4e
description: Detects suspicious processes establishing network connections to non-local IP addresses on common C2 ports without prior DNS resolution, indicative of D2IP tactics observed in Phorpiex and Mozi campaigns.
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/08/04
status: experimental
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/622e1c3e941c2240563840a4/
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071.001
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationPort:
            - 80
            - 443
            - 8080
            - 8443
    filter_localhost:
        DestinationIp:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
            - '127.0.0.0/8'
    filter_known_good:
        Image|contains:
            - '\Program Files\'
            - '\Windows\System32\'
    condition: selection and not filter_localhost and not filter_known_good
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software calling hard-coded IP updates (rare)
level: high
---
title: Phorpiex Worm Persistence via Registry Run Keys
id: a9f2b3c4-d5e6-4789-8012-345678901234
description: Detects persistence mechanisms often used by Phorpiex (Trik) worm creating run keys with obscure names.
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/08/04
status: experimental
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: registry_set
detection:
    selection:
        TargetObject|contains: '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
        Details|contains:
            - 'rundll32.exe'
            - 'powershell.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts
level: medium
---
title: Mozi IoT Botnet Inbound Connection Attempt
id: b1c2d3e4-f5a6-4789-b0c1-234567890123
description: Detects inbound connections on ports commonly scanned by Mozi and Mirai botnets targeting IoT devices.
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/08/04
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: firewall
    product: paloalto
detection:
    selection:
        destination_port:
            - 23
            - 2323
            - 80
            - 8080
        action: 'allowed'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Authorized management of network infrastructure
level: medium

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for Direct-to-IP connections to OTX listed IOCs
let IOCs = dynamic(["103.245.236.146", "154.92.19.71", "178.16.54.109", "91.92.243.29", "194.76.227.94"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (IOCs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionType
| summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by count_ desc

PowerShell Hunt Script

PowerShell
<#
.SYNOPSIS
    IOC Hunt for Phorpiex/Mozi File Hashes and Network Connections.
.DESCRIPTION
    Scans the C: drive for specific SHA256 hashes and checks active TCP connections.
#>

$TargetHashes = @(
    "9639f7ebc6a6d69d7bf5b8bc869e7783a1406088f192868624ad8919e9bfd1d4",
    "0d94bf4d0418061907ff7977e3f25a463cb25188"
)

$MaliciousIPs = @(
    "103.245.236.146",
    "154.92.19.71",
    "178.16.54.109",
    "91.92.243.29",
    "194.76.227.94"
)

Write-Host "[+] Checking for file indicators..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { 
    $_.Length -gt 0kb -and $_.Extension -in ".exe", ".dll", ".ps1" 
} | ForEach-Object {
    $hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
    if ($TargetHashes -contains $hash) {
        Write-Host "[!] MALICIOUS FILE FOUND: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
}

Write-Host "[+] Checking active network connections for known C2 IPs..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$connections = Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($ip in $MaliciousIPs) {
    $hits = $connections | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -eq $ip }
    if ($hits) {
        $hits | ForEach-Object {
            $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
            Write-Host "[!] C2 CONNECTION DETECTED: RemoteIP $ip connected by PID $($_.OwningProcess) ($($proc.ProcessName))" -ForegroundColor Red
        }
    }
}

Response Priorities

  • Immediate:

    • Block all listed IPv4 indicators at the edge firewall and proxy.
    • Push the SHA256 hash 9639f7ebc6a6d69d7bf5b8bc869e7783a1406088f192868624ad8919e9bfd1d4 to EDR isolation lists.
    • Identify hosts with outbound connections to the listed IPs and isolate from the network.
  • 24 Hours:

    • Execute the PowerShell hunt script across all endpoints in the Education and Government segments.
    • Review DNS logs for any failed resolutions or anomalous traffic patterns preceding D2IP connections.
    • Identify if credential dumping tools (associated with Phorpiex) were executed on compromised hosts.
  • 1 Week:

    • Implement stricter "Zero Trust" egress filtering: block direct internet access for endpoints unless mediated by a proxy.
    • Review segmentation controls for IoT devices (Mirai/Mozi targets) to prevent lateral movement.
    • Update security policies to alert on high-entropy processes connecting to non-reserved IPs on non-standard ports.

Related Resources

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