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PIXELLEAKS Ransomware Gang: 5 New Leak-Site Claims Targeting Finance, Tech & Logistics — Detection Rules & Hunt Queries

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 21, 2026
13 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-21 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

Executive Summary

PIXELLEAKS, a ransomware operation monitored via its .onion leak site, published five new victim listings on 2026-11-20. The group claims to have compromised organizations across Financial Services, Technology, and Transportation, with a geographic footprint spanning Sweden and Egypt plus additional unconfirmed locations. Every listing in this batch was independently observed by two separate leak-site crawlers, confirming the gang made these claims — but no listing in this data constitutes confirmation of an actual breach.

The named listings are notable for their infrastructure specificity: an MT5 algorithmic trading farm running funded accounts on a Windows server, a GCP-hosted domain controller for an internal bastion domain, a Nasdaq-listed Swedish AI/IT firm (Aixia Group AB), a Laravel-based logistics intranet (Kingsport Cargo), and an Oracle ERP hosting provider in Alexandria, Egypt (Arab Software Computer / ASCON). Whether or not each claim holds, the pattern tells defenders where PIXELLEAKS is hunting: virtualization management planes, CI/CD infrastructure, ERP hosting, and internet-facing remote access.

Financial services firms operating trading infrastructure, technology companies with exposed build pipelines or domain controllers, and transportation/logistics operators with web-application intranets should treat this campaign as a trigger for immediate threat hunting using the detection content below.

Sourcing & Verification

  • Corroboration status: 5 of 5 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler; 0 appear on a single source only. This means two independent monitoring pipelines saw the gang publish each claim.
  • What corroboration does NOT mean: Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim and is not confirmation of a breach. Leak-site postings are accusations made by criminals and may be exaggerated, fabricated, recycled from older incidents, or based on trivial access (e.g., a single compromised credential) inflated into a 'full compromise' narrative.
  • Disputes and denials: A named organization may dispute a listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false. Disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is legally reportable — so neither silence nor denial settles the question. Only the organization or its regulator can confirm an incident.
  • Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing as warranted and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — PIXELLEAKS

Aliases: PIXELLEAKS is tracked under its leak-site branding; no widely adopted alternate aliases have been confirmed in our telemetry. Analysts should pivot on leak-site infrastructure and victimology rather than name alone.

Operating model: PIXELLEAKS exhibits characteristics consistent with a small closed group or a lean RaaS operation — low posting volume (5 listings in the most recent 100 tracked postings) suggests selective victimology rather than spray-and-pray affiliate volume.

Ransom demands: Demand figures are not disclosed in the current batch. Groups with this victim profile (mid-cap technology and financial infrastructure) typically open negotiations in the mid-six-to-low-seven-figure USD range, scaling to perceived ability to pay.

Known initial access methods: Based on the infrastructure types named in this campaign, PIXELLEAKS's access patterns plausibly include:

  • Exploitation of internet-facing network edge devices (VPN concentrators, firewall management interfaces)
  • Compromise of virtualization management planes (vCenter) for mass-hypervisor access
  • Abuse of CI/CD and developer tooling (build servers, IDE extensions) as supply-chain footholds
  • Phishing-delivered initial payloads and brute-forced or credential-stuffed RDP exposure

Double extortion: Yes — consistent with current ransomware economics, PIXELLEAKS operates a leak site, indicating data-theft-plus-encryption pressure. Listings appear designed to maximize reputational leverage (naming the trading platform, ERP vendor, and exchange listing status of victims).

Dwell time: Not directly observable from leak-site data. Comparable groups average 5–11 days from initial access to detonation, with data staging often beginning 48–72 hours before encryption.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sector targeting (this batch):

SectorListings
Technology3
Financial Services1
Transportation1

Geographic concentration: Sweden (SE) and Egypt (EG) are the confirmed countries; three listings carry no confirmed geography. The spread suggests opportunistic targeting of exposed infrastructure rather than a region-specific geopolitical motive.

Victim profile: The batch skews toward mid-market and infrastructure-adjacent organizations: a funded-account algo-trading operation, a Nasdaq-listed Swedish AI/IT firm (Aixia Group AB), a regional ERP hosting provider (Arab Software Computer / ASCON in Alexandria), and a logistics operator with a Laravel-based intranet (Kingsport Cargo). The fourth listing names an internal domain controller ('bastion.internal', GCP-hosted, tagged GRATEFUL-V1) — unusually, this describes infrastructure rather than a corporate entity, which may indicate the gang is advertising access rather than a completed extortion event. Estimated revenue exposure ranges from small-cap (trading farm, cargo operator) to listed mid-cap (Aixia Group AB).

Posting frequency / escalation: All five listings appeared on 2026-11-20 in a single burst. Burst posting is a classic pressure tactic — maximizing media and analyst attention in a 24-hour window — and also occurs when a gang clears a backlog of access-broker acquisitions.

CVE exposure hypothesis (sector-level, NOT victim-attributed): We have no evidence linking any specific named listing to any specific CVE. However, the infrastructure types PIXELLEAKS names in this campaign map closely to vulnerabilities currently on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog with confirmed ransomware use:

  • CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter path traversal) — direct relevance to any victim running virtualized estates; vCenter compromise enables hypervisor-wide encryption.
  • CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity deserialization) — relevant to technology-sector victims with build pipelines; TeamCity servers hold source code, secrets, and deployment credentials.
  • CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password) — edge-device management plane exposure.
  • CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication in IKEv1) — VPN edge exposure consistent with remote-access initial entry.
  • CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console embedded malicious code) — developer-tool supply-chain vector, relevant to the technology-heavy victim mix.

Defenders in the affected sectors should validate patch posture against all five KEV entries regardless of attribution.

Detection Engineering

The following detections target the TTP chain consistent with this campaign's profile: edge/VPN exploitation, credential-based RDP access, lateral movement via PsExec/WMI, Cobalt Strike-style beaconing, and pre-encryption data staging and shadow copy deletion.

YAML
---
title: Suspicious RDP Logon Burst Following VPN Authentication
id: 9f3a1c2e-pxl-0001-a1b2-c3d4e5f60001
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of RDP network logons (Type 3/10) from a single source against multiple hosts within a short window, consistent with ransomware operators pivoting from VPN/edge access into internal estates. Tuned for PIXELLEAKS-style access-broker handoff behavior.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
  category: logon
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4624
    LogonType:
      - 3
      - 10
  filter_vpn_range:
    IpAddress|startswith:
      - '10.'
      - '172.16.'
      - '192.168.'
  condition: selection and not filter_vpn_range
timeframe: 15m
level: high
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1078
  - attack.t1133
date: 2026/11/21
---
title: PsExec or WMI Remote Service Creation Followed by Mass File Renames
id: 9f3a1c2e-pxl-0002-a1b2-c3d4e5f60002
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service creation (PsExec-style, EventID 7045) or WMI process execution followed within 30 minutes by high-volume file rename events, indicating lateral movement transitioning into encryption staging.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection_service:
    EventID: 7045
    ServiceFileName|contains:
      - 'PSEXESVC'
      - '\\ADMIN$\\'
      - '\\IPC$\\'
  selection_wmi:
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\WmiPrvSE.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: 'process call create'
  condition: selection_service or selection_wmi
timeframe: 30m
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.lateral_movement
  - attack.t1021.002
  - attack.t1047
  - attack.t1569.002
date: 2026/11/21
---
title: Data Staging and Shadow Copy Deletion Pre-Ransomware Indicators
id: 9f3a1c2e-pxl-0003-a1b2-c3d4e5f60003
status: experimental
description: Detects the classic pre-detonation sequence — vssadmin/wmic shadow copy deletion combined with archive-tool execution (rar, 7z) against high-value directories — observed across double-extortion operations including groups with PIXELLEAKS's profile.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_shadow:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'vssadmin delete shadows'
      - 'wmic shadowcopy delete'
      - 'bcdedit'
      - 'wbadmin delete catalog'
  selection_staging:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\rar.exe'
      - '\7z.exe'
      - '\7za.exe'
      - '\winrar.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' a '
      - ' -p'
  condition: selection_shadow or selection_staging
level: high
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1560.001
date: 2026/11/21

The following Sentinel hunt query surfaces pre-ransomware lateral movement and staging behavior — new admin-share service installs, suspicious logon fan-out, and encryption-preparation process execution across the estate over a rolling 7-day window.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// PIXELLEAKS pre-ransomware hunt: lateral movement + staging + shadow deletion
// Lookback: 7 days | Scope: all Windows endpoints and servers
let lookback = 7d;
let suspiciousProcs = dynamic(["psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","wmic.exe","vssadmin.exe","bcdedit.exe","rar.exe","7z.exe","7za.exe","winscp.exe","rclone.exe","megacmd.exe"]);
let staging =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
    | where FileName in~ (suspiciousProcs)
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows","shadowcopy delete","delete catalog","-p","a -m5","--transfers","copy \\") or FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe")
    | project StagingTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
let logonFanout =
    DeviceLogonEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
    | where LogonType in ("Network","RemoteInteractive")
    | where IsLocalAdmin == true or AccountName has "admin"
    | summarize DistinctTargets=dcount(DeviceName), TargetList=make_set(DeviceName), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by AccountName, RemoteIP=bin(RemoteIP, 0s)
    | where DistinctTargets >= 5;
let newServices =
    Event
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
    | where EventLog == "System" and EventID == 7045
    | where EventData has_any ("PSEXESVC","ADMIN$","rclone","sync")
    | extend ServiceName = tostring(parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data.[0].['#text'])
    | project ServiceInstallTime=TimeGenerated, Computer, ServiceName;
logonFanout
| join kind=leftouter (staging) on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountName
| join kind=leftouter (newServices) on $left.TargetList has $right.Computer
| project AccountName, RemoteIP, DistinctTargets, FirstSeen, LastSeen, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, ServiceName
| order by FirstSeen asc

The following rapid-response script audits a host for the highest-signal pre-encryption indicators: exposed RDP listeners, scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days (a common persistence/detonation mechanism), shadow copy status, and recently created local admin accounts.

PowerShell
# PIXELLEAKS Rapid Triage — run elevated on suspected hosts
# Checks: RDP exposure, new scheduled tasks (7d), VSS status, new local admins
param([int]$DaysBack = 7)
$report = [ordered]@{}
$cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-$DaysBack)

Write-Host "=== [1/4] RDP Listener & Exposure Check ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$rdp = Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report.RDPListening = [bool]$rdp
if ($rdp) {
    Write-Warning "RDP is LISTENING on 3389"
    $nla = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -Name UserAuthentication -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).UserAuthentication
    $report.NLAEnabled = ($nla -eq 1)
    if ($nla -ne 1) { Write-Warning "NLA is DISABLED — brute-force exposure" }
}

Write-Host "=== [2/4] Scheduled Tasks Created in Last $DaysBack Days ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$newTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -and ([datetime]$_.Date) -gt $cutoff } |
    Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{N='Action';E={$_.Actions.Execute}}
$report.NewScheduledTasks = $newTasks
$newTasks | Format-Table -AutoSize
$suspiciousTaskPatterns = 'psexec|rclone|7z|rar|vssadmin|bcdedit|powershell.*-enc|certutil'
$newTasks | Where-Object { "$($_.Action) $($_.TaskName)" -match $suspiciousTaskPatterns } |
    ForEach-Object { Write-Warning "SUSPICIOUS TASK: $($_.TaskName) -> $($_.Action)" }

Write-Host "=== [3/4] Volume Shadow Copy Status ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report.ShadowCopyCount = @($shadows).Count
if (@($shadows).Count -eq 0) {
    Write-Warning "ZERO shadow copies present — possible pre-encryption deletion (T1490)"
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7036} -MaxEvents 50 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
        Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'VSS|Volume Shadow' -and $_.TimeCreated -gt $cutoff } |
        Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List
}

Write-Host "=== [4/4] Local Admin Accounts Created in Last $DaysBack Days ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$admins = Get-LocalGroupMember -Group 'Administrators' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report.AdminMembers = ($admins | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Name)
foreach ($m in $admins) {
    try {
        $u = Get-LocalUser ($m.Name -split '\\')[-1] -ErrorAction Stop
        if ($u.PasswordLastSet -and $u.PasswordLastSet -gt $cutoff) {
            Write-Warning "Recent admin credential change: $($u.Name) at $($u.PasswordLastSet)"
        }
    } catch {}
}

Write-Host "=== Triage Summary ===" -ForegroundColor Green
$report.GetEnumerator() | ForEach-Object { Write-Host "$($_.Key): $($_.Value)" }
$report | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 4 | Out-File "$env:TEMP\pixelleaks_triage_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').json"
Write-Host "Report saved to $env:TEMP"

Incident Response Priorities

T-minus detection checklist (before encryption fires):

  1. New or unexpected services installed via ADMIN$/IPC$ (EventID 7045) — especially PSEXESVC.
  2. Shadow copy deletion commands (vssadmin delete shadows, wmic shadowcopy delete, bcdedit recovery-flag changes).
  3. Archive tool execution (rar/7z) against file servers, ERP exports, database dumps, or source repositories.
  4. Egress anomalies: large outbound transfers to unfamiliar cloud storage, MEGA, or rclone remotes — particularly from servers matching this campaign's profile (ERP hosts, build servers, trading infrastructure).
  5. Single account authenticating to 5+ hosts within 15 minutes (see KQL above).
  6. Disabled or tampered EDR/AV services; cleared event logs (EventID 1102).
  7. New scheduled tasks with encoded PowerShell or LOLBin actions.

Assets this profile of gang prioritizes for exfiltration:

  • ERP and financial database exports (directly relevant to the ASCON Oracle ERP hosting claim)
  • Source code and CI/CD secrets (relevant to the TeamCity-adjacent technology targeting)
  • Trading strategies, account data, and brokerage records (relevant to the MT5 trading-farm claim)
  • Identity infrastructure: NTDS.dit, domain controller backups, GCP/AWS credential material (relevant to the 'bastion.internal' domain controller listing)
  • Contracts, customer PII, and shipment/manifest data (relevant to the logistics claim)

Containment actions, ordered by urgency:

  1. Isolate identity infrastructure first — if a domain controller is implicated, assume credential compromise; initiate tiered credential reset (krbtgt twice, then privileged accounts).
  2. Block egress at the perimeter for non-business cloud storage and known exfil tooling; retention of data matters more than uptime at this stage.
  3. Disable exposed RDP/VPN access pending credential reset; enforce NLA and MFA immediately.
  4. Snapshot and preserve suspected staging hosts before remediation — volatile evidence supports both investigation and any future regulatory notification decisions.
  5. Segment backup infrastructure from production and verify offline/immutable copies before anything else is touched.
  6. Engage IR retainer and counsel early — disclosure clocks (including Nasdaq listing rules and EU member-state regimes relevant to the SE and EG geographies) may already be running for organizations that confirm an incident.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 hours):

  • Patch or isolate all five CISA KEV entries relevant to your stack: CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter), CVE-2026-63077 (TeamCity), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point IKEv1), CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console — audit developer workstations for the malicious extension version).
  • Enforce MFA on all remote access (VPN, RDP gateways, cloud consoles); disable legacy IKEv1 where present.
  • Restrict vCenter, FMC, and TeamCity management interfaces to dedicated management VLANs with jump-host-only access.
  • Block rclone, MEGA clients, and non-approved archive utilities at the proxy and via AppLocker/WDAC.
  • Deploy the Sigma rules and KQL query above; run the triage script on domain controllers, ERP hosts, and build servers.
  • Verify shadow copies exist and backups are immutable and tested — do not assume.

Short-term (2 weeks):

  • Implement tiered administration (Tier 0 isolation for DCs and hypervisor management); the 'bastion.internal' listing shows gangs specifically advertise domain-controller access.
  • Deploy egress filtering with TLS inspection on server VLANs; servers should not have unrestricted internet egress.
  • Move CI/CD infrastructure (TeamCity and similar) behind identity-aware proxies; rotate all pipeline secrets on any exposure suspicion.
  • Establish canary credentials and decoy file shares to generate high-fidelity early warning of lateral movement.
  • Contract or validate 24/7 monitoring coverage — burst-posting gangs detonate on weekends and holidays disproportionately.
  • Tabletop the double-extortion scenario: legal, comms, and exec leadership should rehearse the leak-site-publication decision tree before it happens.

Key Takeaways

  1. PIXELLEAKS published five claims on 2026-11-20 targeting Financial Services, Technology, and Transportation — all corroborated as claims by dual crawlers, none confirmed as breaches.
  2. Named listings include Aixia Group AB (SE), Arab Software Computer / ASCON (EG), Kingsport Cargo, an MT5 trading farm, and a GCP-hosted domain controller — the last suggesting possible access-for-sale behavior.
  3. The infrastructure profile maps to five actively exploited CISA KEV vulnerabilities; patch validation is warranted regardless of attribution.
  4. Pre-encryption detection is the highest-leverage control: shadow copy deletion, archive staging, and admin-share service creation precede detonation by hours to days.
  5. Organizations named on leak sites should investigate the claim, preserve evidence, and may contact Security Arsenal — silence and denial are equally non-determinative.

Related Resources

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