Recent intelligence from the AlienVault OTX community has uncovered a new ransomware family, Prinz Eugen, attributed to the emerging threat actor ROOTBOY. First observed in April 2026, this campaign represents a significant evolution in adversary tooling, shifting to a Go-based architecture for cross-platform compilation and evasion. The operation aggressively targets the Finance, Government, and Education sectors across South Africa, France, the US, and Canada.

The attack chain involves the abuse of Remote Management and Monitoring (RMM) tools—specifically RemotePC—to gain initial access, followed by the deployment of PowerShell stagers hosted on a specific IP infrastructure (212.80.7.74). Once inside, the Prinz Eugen encryptor utilizes ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption, focusing on recently modified files to inflict maximum operational damage before victims can respond. The actor employs rigorous anti-forensic techniques, including memory scrubbing and self-deletion, to complicate incident response efforts.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

• Adversary: ROOTBOY
• Malware Family: Prinz Eugen (Go-based Ransomware)
• Initial Access: Suspected abuse of legitimate RMM software (RemotePC) to bypass perimeter defenses.
• Payload Behavior:
  • Encryption: Utilizes the robust ChaCha20-Poly1305 algorithm.
  • Targeting Logic: Prioritizes files with recent modification timestamps to ensure critical, active data is locked.
  • Persistence: Mechanisms inferred include potential registry manipulation via PowerShell stagers.
  • Anti-Analysis: Features memory scrubbing to clear artifacts and self-deletion routines post-execution.
• C2 & Infrastructure: Uses a mix of clearnet IP infrastructure for payload delivery (212.80.7.74) and Tor (.onion) hidden services for ransom payment negotiation and leak site operations.

IOC Analysis

The pulse provides 17 actionable indicators. SOC teams should focus on the following breakdown:

• Network Infrastructure: The IP 212.80.7.74 acts as the primary C2 and payload host. It serves malicious PowerShell scripts (serverscan.ps1, stager/ps1). The domain stndrdbnk.cc is associated with the actor's operations.
• File Artifacts: A single SHA256 hash (686213cc11d36af764de824801bced9366dfca3823fe0d51b752f74149bcf1f4) is provided for the main encryptor binary.
• Financial: A Bitcoin address (bc1q2ztpcvqdaptej6uu2ywt9mrlatx6envu34rf0v) is used for ransom payments.
• Operationalization: Immediate blocking of the IP and domain is required on firewalls and proxies. EDR solutions should be configured to hunt for the specific file hash. The Tor domains should be blocked at the DNS level if policy permits.

Detection Engineering

title: Prinz Eugen PowerShell Stager Detection id: 4e8f2a7b-9c1d-4f5e-8b3a-1d2e3f4a5b6c description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns associated with Prinz Eugen stagers hosted on 212.80.7.74 status: experimental date: 2026/07/25 author: Security Arsenal references: - https://otx.alienvault.com/ tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: - '\powershell.exe' - '\pwsh.exe' CommandLine|contains: - 'Invoke-WebRequest' - 'IEX' - 'DownloadString' selection_url: CommandLine|contains: - '212.80.7.74' - 'stndrdbnk.cc' - '/stager/' condition: selection and selection_url falsepositives: - Legitimate administration scripts using this specific IP (unlikely) level: critical

title: Prinz Eugen C2 Network Connection id: 5f9g3b8c-0d2e-5g6f-9c4b-2e3f4a5b6c7d description: Detects outbound network connections to known Prinz Eugen C2 infrastructure status: experimental date: 2026/07/25 author: Security Arsenal references: - https://otx.alienvault.com/ tags: - attack.command_and_control - attack.t1071.001 logsource: category: network_connection detection: selection_ip: DestinationIp|contains: - '212.80.7.74' selection_domain: DestinationHostname|contains: - 'stndrdbnk.cc' condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Rare; this IP is not associated with legitimate traffic level: high

title: Suspicious Go Binary Execution with Anti-Forensic Behavior id: 6g0h4c9d-1e3f-6h7g-0d5c-3f4g5h6i7j8k description: Detects execution of unsigned Go binaries exhibiting file modification behavior consistent with ransomware status: experimental date: 2026/07/25 author: Security Arsenal references: - https://otx.alienvault.com/ tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1486 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: - '.exe' selection_go: Company|contains: 'Unknown' or Company: null CommandLine|contains: - '-encrypt' - '-lock' condition: selection_img and selection_go falsepositives: - Legitimate Go binaries lacking metadata level: medium

// Hunt for Prinz Eugen Network Activity
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has "212.80.7.74" or RemoteUrl has "stndrdbnk.cc" or RemoteIP == "212.80.7.74"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc

// Hunt for Prinz Eugen File Hash
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where SHA256 == "686213cc11d36af764de824801bced9366dfca3823fe0d51b752f74149bcf1f4"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// Hunt for PowerShell Stager Execution
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ProcessVersionInfoProductName contains "PowerShell"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "212.80.7.74" or ProcessCommandLine has "stndrdbnk.cc" or ProcessCommandLine has "/stager/"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc


powershell
# Prinz Eugen IOC Hunt Script
# Requires Admin Privileges

$IOC_Hash = "686213cc11d36af764de824801bced9366dfca3823fe0d51b752f74149bcf1f4"
$IOC_IP = "212.80.7.74"
$IOC_Domain = "stndrdbnk.cc"

Write-Host "[*] Scanning for Prinz Eugen Malware Artifacts..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for File Hash Presence
Write-Host "[+] Scanning for malicious file hash..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$Drives = Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem | Select-Object -ExpandProperty Root
foreach ($Drive in $Drives) {
    try {
        Get-ChildItem -Path $Drive -Recurse -ErrorAction Stop | 
        Where-Object { !$_.PSIsContainer } | 
        ForEach-Object {
            $Hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
            if ($Hash -eq $IOC_Hash) {
                Write-Host "[!] MALICIOUS FILE FOUND: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
            }
        }
    } catch {
        # Ignore access denied errors
    }
}

# 2. Check Active Network Connections
Write-Host "[+] Checking active network connections to C2 IP..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$Connections = Get-NetTCPConnection -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -eq $IOC_IP }
if ($Connections) {
    Write-Host "[!] C2 CONNECTION DETECTED:" -ForegroundColor Red
    $Connections | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
    Write-Host "[-] No active connections to $IOC_IP found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

# 3. Check DNS Cache
Write-Host "[+] Checking DNS cache for malicious domains..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$DNSEntries = Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.Entry -like "*$IOC_Domain*" }
if ($DNSEntries) {
    Write-Host "[!] DNS CACHE HIT FOUND FOR: $IOC_Domain" -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
    Write-Host "[-] No DNS cache entries found." -ForegroundColor Green
}

Write-Host "[*] Hunt complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan


# Response Priorities

*   **Immediate:** Block the IP address `212.80.7.74` and domain `stndrdbnk.cc` on all perimeter firewalls, proxies, and secure web gateways. Kill any active processes connecting to `212.80.7.74`.
*   **24h:** Conduct a thorough hunt for the SHA256 hash `686213cc...` across all endpoints. Audit RemotePC and other RMM logs for unauthorized access sessions matching the timeframe of the IOCs.
*   **1 Week:** Review and harden RMM security configurations, enforcing MFA and strict allow-listing for remote access origins. Implement memory dump acquisition capabilities to counter the memory scrubbing techniques in future iterations.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub