---
title: Potential Qilin Ransomware Activity - PowerShell Encoded Payload
id: 4a3b2c1d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
description: Detects base64 encoded PowerShell command lines often used by Qilin loaders to obfuscate injection logic.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/06/14
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/threat-research/qilin-ttps
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|endswith: '\\powershell.exe'
    CommandLine|contains: ' -e ' 
    CommandLine|contains: 'AAABAAI=' # Generic header check, adjust per environment
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative scripts
level: high
---
title: ScreenConnect Authentication Anomaly (CVE-2024-1708)
id: b1c2d3e4-5f6a-7b8c-9d0e-1f2a3b4c5d6e
description: Detects potential exploitation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect path traversal allowing unauthenticated access.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/06/14
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 5156
    DestPort: 8040
    DestPort: 8041
    SourceAddress|contains:
      - 'Tor' # Use known threat intel feeds if available
      - 'VPN' # Or correlate with VPN logs
  filter:
    SourceAddress:
      - '10.0.0.0/8'
      - '192.168.0.0/16'
      - '172.16.0.0/12'
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate remote administration by known IPs
level: critical
---
title: Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via VssAdmin
description: Detects commands used to delete Volume Shadow Copies, a common pre-encryption step for Qilin.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/06/14
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    EventID: 4688
    NewProcessName|endswith:
      - '\\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'shadowcopy delete'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - System admin maintenance
level: high

// Hunt for Qilin lateral movement and staging
// Looks for suspicious SMB file copies and rapid service creation
let TimeRange = 1h;
let SuspiciousProcesses = dynamic(["powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "pwsh.exe"]);
let AdminShares = dynamic(["ADMIN$", "C$", "IPC$"]);
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(TimeRange)
| where EventID in (5140, 5145) // Share access
| where ShareName in (AdminShares)
| join kind=inner (
    SecurityEvent 
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(TimeRange) 
    | where EventID == 4688 
    | where NewProcessName in (SuspiciousProcesses)
) on Account, Computer
| project TimeGenerated, Account, Computer, ShareName, ProcessName = NewProcessName, CommandLine
| distinct TimeGenerated, Account, Computer, ShareName, CommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc

<#
.SYNOPSIS
    Rapid Response Script for Qilin Indicators of Compromise
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for recent scheduled tasks (persistence), VSS deletion attempts, and suspicious PowerShell processes.
#>

Write-Host "[+] Initiating Qilin IOE Scan..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for Scheduled Tasks created in last 24 hours
Write-Host "[*] Checking for suspicious Scheduled Tasks created in last 24h..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$DateCutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-1)
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -ge $DateCutoff } | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, Author, Actions | Format-Table -AutoSize

# 2. Check for VSS Deletion Events in System Log
Write-Host "[*] Checking System Event Log for VSS Deletion (EventID 7036/1 from VSS)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; StartTime=$DateCutoff; ID=1} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
Where-Object {$_.Message -like '*delete*' -and $_.Message -like '*shadow*'} | 
Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List

# 3. Hunt for Encoded PowerShell processes (Parent/Child)
Write-Host "[*] Scanning for high-risk PowerShell processes..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Where-Object { 
    $_.Name -eq 'powershell.exe' -and 
    $_.CommandLine -match '-e[ncodedcommand]' -and 
    $_.CommandLine.Length -gt 200 
} | Select-Object ProcessId, ParentProcessId, CommandLine

Write-Host "[+] Scan Complete." -ForegroundColor Green


# Incident Response Priorities

**T-minus Detection Checklist (Pre-Encryption):**
1.  **VPN Gateway Logs:** Immediately review Check Point Security Gateway logs for authentication anomalies related to CVE-2026-50751.
2.  **Remote Access:** Audit ConnectWise ScreenConnect logs for successful logins outside of business hours or from impossible travel locations.
3.  **Lateral Movement:** Trigger alerts on any `PsExec` or `WMI` execution attempts originating from non-admin workstations.

**Critical Assets for Exfiltration:**
Qilin historically prioritizes:
*   Legal case files and client databases (high extortion value).
*   Executive HR records and financial documents.
*   CAD/Design files (in Manufacturing/Engineering contexts).

**Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency):**
1.  **Isolate:** Disconnect identified infected hosts from the network immediately; pull the plug if shutdown is not possible (to prevent VSS wipe logic on reboot).
2.  **Reset Credentials:** Force reset of all domain admin credentials and service account passwords used on VPN concentrators.
3.  **Block Access:** Revoke external access for ScreenConnect and RDP protocols at the firewall level until the vulnerability is confirmed patched.

# Hardening Recommendations

**Immediate (24h):**
*   **Patch:** Apply the emergency patch for **CVE-2026-50751** on all Check Point Security Gateways immediately.
*   **Patch:** Update ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances to the latest secure version to mitigate **CVE-2024-1708**.
*   **MFA:** Enforce strict MFA on all VPN and remote desktop entry points.

**Short-term (2 weeks):**
*   **Network Segmentation:** Ensure sensitive Legal/Finance file servers are on a separate VLAN with strict firewall rules (Zero Trust).
*   **Egress Filtering:** Block outbound SMB (TCP 445) and non-standard HTTP/HTTPS ports to prevent data exfiltration.
*   **Audit:** Conduct a full audit of local administrator memberships on endpoints to limit lateral movement paths.