QILIN Ransomware: Aggressive Healthcare Campaign Leveraging CVE-2026-48027

---
title: Potential ScreenConnect Authentication Bypass (CVE-2024-1708)
id: 8e8b5c2d-8f4a-4b9c-9a1e-1c2d3e4f5a6b
description: Detects potential exploitation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect path traversal vulnerability leading to authentication bypass.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
date: 2026/06/02
tags:
    - cve.2024-1708
    - attack.initial_access
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: web
detection:
    selection:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '/Bin/ScreenConnect.'
            - 'Host='
            - 'SessionID='
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative access via ScreenConnect
level: critical
---
title: Suspicious Nx Console Execution (CVE-2026-48027)
id: 1a2b3c4d-5e6f-7a8b-9c0d-1e2f3a4b5c6d
description: Detects suspicious child processes spawned by Nx Console or unexpected network connections originating from the dev environment.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/02
tags:
    - cve.2026-48027
    - attack.execution
logsource:
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\nx-console.exe'
    selection_child:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate developer build scripts
level: high
---
title: PsExec Lateral Movement Indicator
id: 9f8e7d6c-5b4a-3c2d-1e0f-9a8b7c6d5e4f
description: Detects the use of PsExec for lateral movement, a common Qilin TTP.
status: stable
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/02
tags:
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.002
logsource:
    category: process_creation
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\psexec.exe'
            - '\psexec64.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-accepteula'
            - '\\\\'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrative IT tasks
level: high

// Hunt for lateral movement and staging activity associated with Qilin
// Looks for massive file copies (staging) and VSS shadow copy deletion
let TimeFrame = 1d;
Process
| where Timestamp >= ago(TimeFrame)
| where ProcessVersionFileOriginalName in ("robocopy.exe", "powershell.exe", "vssadmin.exe", "wmic.exe")
| extend CommandLine = tostring(CommandLine)
| where CommandLine contains "copy" 
   or CommandLine contains "shadowcopy" 
   or CommandLine contains "delete"
| project Timestamp, Computer, Account, ProcessName, CommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

<#
.SYNOPSIS
    Qilin Ransomware Emergency Triage Script
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for signs of Qilin activity: recent scheduled tasks,
    unusual PowerShell processes, and Volume Shadow Copy manipulation.
#>

Write-Host "[+] Initiating Qilin Triage Check..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Check for recently created Scheduled Tasks (Common persistence)
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created in the last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$DateCutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt $DateCutoff} | Select-Object TaskName, Date, Author, Action

# 2. Check Volume Shadow Copy Status (Qilin deletes these)
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking Volume Shadow Copy Storage..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
    $vss = vssadmin list shadows /format:list
    if ($vss -match "No shadow copies found") {
        Write-Host "[!] CRITICAL: No Shadow Copies found. Possible deletion event." -ForegroundColor Red
    } else {
        Write-Host "[+] Shadow Copies detected." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
} catch {
    Write-Host "[!] Error checking VSS." -ForegroundColor Red
}

# 3. Hunt for suspicious PowerShell Encoded Commands
Write-Host "\n[*] Hunting for Encoded PowerShell in recent Event Logs..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$Events = Get-WinEvent -LogName Security -MaxEvents 500 -FilterXPath "*[System[(EventID=4688)]]" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$Suspicious = $Events | Where-Object {$_.Message -match "powershell.exe" -and $_.Message -match "-enc"}
if ($Suspicious) {
    Write-Host "[!] WARNING: Encoded PowerShell execution detected." -ForegroundColor Red
    $Suspicious | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List
} else {
    Write-Host "[+] No obvious encoded commands found in recent security logs." -ForegroundColor Green
}

Write-Host "\n[+] Triage Complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan