Threat Actor Profile — QILIN
Aliases & Structure: QILIN (formerly known as Agenda. in some circles due to code overlap) operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. They aggressively recruit affiliates, offering a Rust-based encrypted payload customizable for each target.
Tactics & Economics: QILIN employs a classic double-extortion strategy: exfiltrating sensitive data (blueprints, financial records, client PII) before encrypting systems. Ransom demands vary significantly, typically ranging from $200,000 to $2 million USD depending on victim revenue and urgency.
Initial Access & Dwell Time: The group and its affiliates are opportunistic but technically proficient. Initial access is frequently gained via:
- Exposed Remote Management Tools: Specifically exploiting vulnerabilities in remote monitoring and management (RMM) software like ConnectWise ScreenConnect.
- Email Server Flaws: Exploiting authentication bypasses and file upload vulnerabilities in mail servers like SmarterMail.
- Phishing: Malicious macros or links leading to credential harvesting.
Average dwell time is short, often 3-5 days from initial access to encryption, designed to outpace detection capabilities of standard SOC shifts.
Current Campaign Analysis
Campaign Date: 2026-05-21 Observed Victim Count: 15 new postings in the last 72 hours.
Sector Targeting
Analysis of the recent leak site data reveals a distinct pivot toward blue-collar and critical supply chain industries:
- Construction (26%): Victims include CJ Architects (US), Air Conditioning Florida & partners (US), and RCR Industrial Flooring (AU).
- Agriculture and Food Production (20%): Victims include Vial Agro (AR), Fruits Queralt (ES), and The Taylor Provisions (GB).
- Healthcare (6%): Salter HealthCare (GB) indicates a willingness to target critical care providers despite increased scrutiny.
Geographic Concentration
The campaign is globally dispersed but has dense clusters in:
- United Kingdom: 4 victims (Hamer Childs, Porter W Yett, Taylor Provisions, Salter HealthCare).
- United States: 4 victims (including multi-entity construction firms).
- Europe & Americas: Single confirmed hits in CZ, AR, AT, ES, CA, and AU.
CVE Correlation & Attack Vector
This campaign correlates strongly with the recent addition of specific CVEs to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) list:
- CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect): Highly likely used for initial access against the Business Services and Construction sectors, where RMM tools are ubiquitous for remote IT support.
- CVE-2025-52691 & CVE-2026-23760 (SmarterTools SmarterMail): The authentication bypass and unrestricted file upload vulnerabilities are probable vectors for the Agri-Food and Manufacturing victims, where on-premise mail servers remain common.
Victim Profile
The victimology suggests a focus on the upper-middle market. Companies like Buckeye Paper (Manufacturing) and Monir Precision Monitoring (Manufacturing) suggest revenue ranges between $10M - $100M USD—organizations large enough to pay a significant ransom but often lacking dedicated 24/7 security operations centers.
Detection Engineering
Sigma Rules
title: Potential QILIN Ransomware Activity - ScreenConnect Exploitation
id: 0c8f1a2b-3d4e-5f6a-7b8c-9d0e1f2a3b4c
description: Detects potential exploitation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708) often used by QILIN affiliates for initial access.
status: experimental
date: 2026/05/21
author: Security Arsenal Research
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- cve.2024.1708
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains:
- '/SessionManager.ashx'
- '/Bin/*'
c-uri-query|contains:
- '..'
- '%2e%2e'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate (but buggy) web client usage
level: critical
---
title: SmarterMail Authentication Bypass or File Upload Attempt
date: 2026/05/21
id: d4e5f6g7-8h9i-0j1k-2l3m-4n5o6p7q8r9s
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious patterns associated with CVE-2025-52691 and CVE-2026-23760 on SmarterMail instances.
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection_path:
cs-uri-stem|contains:
- '/MVC/
- '/Services/
selection_method:
cs-method:
- 'POST'
selection_anomaly:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- 'ResetPassword'
- 'SetPassword'
- 'Upload'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Administrative password resets
level: high
---
title: Suspicious PowerShell Execution - QILIN Affiliate Pattern
date: 2026/05/21
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-g7h8-i9j0-k1l2m3n4o5p6
status: experimental
description: Detects base64 encoded PowerShell commands and typical obfuscation used by QILIN affiliates for lateral movement.
author: Security Arsenal Research
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_pwsh:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
selection_encoded:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -enc '
- ' -encodedcommand '
- 'FromBase64String'
selection_suspicious:
CommandLine|contains:
'DownloadString'
'IEX'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- System administration scripts
level: high
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunt for lateral movement and data staging associated with QILIN
// Looks for high volume file copies to admin shares and VSS manipulation
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ('robocopy.exe', 'powershell.exe', 'cmd.exe', 'powershell_ise.exe', 'cscript.exe', 'wscript.exe', 'rclone.exe')
| extend CommandLine = coalesce(CommandLine, "")
| where CommandLine has "ADMIN$"
or CommandLine has "C$"
or CommandLine has "/copy"
or CommandLine has "vssadmin"
or CommandLine has "wbadmin"
| summarize count(), make_set(FileName), make_set(CommandLine) by DeviceName, AccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where count_ > 5
| order by count_ desc
Rapid Response Script
# QILIN Response Check: Scheduled Tasks and VSS Health
# Run as Administrator on suspected endpoints
Write-Host "[+] Checking for recently modified Scheduled Tasks (Last 7 Days)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$taskInfo = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo
if ($taskInfo.LastRunTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)) {
Write-Host "WARNING: Task '$($_.TaskName)' last ran on $($taskInfo.LastRunTime)" -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host "Action: $($_.Actions.Execute)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
Write-Host "[+] Checking Volume Shadow Copy Storage Association..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
try {
$vss = Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_ShadowCopy
if ($vss.Count -lt 2) {
Write-Host "WARNING: Low number of Shadow Copies detected. Possible deletion." -ForegroundColor Red
} else {
Write-Host "INFO: $($vss.Count) Shadow Copies found." -ForegroundColor Green
}
} catch {
Write-Host "ERROR: Could not query VSS." -ForegroundColor Red
}
Write-Host "[+] Checking for common QILin ransomware extensions in user directories..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$paths = @("C:\Users\", "D:\Users\", "C:\\")
$extensions = @(".Qilin", ".encrypted", ".locked")
foreach ($path in $paths) {
if (Test-Path $path) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $path -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $extensions -contains $_.Extension } |
Select-Object -First 5 FullName |
ForEach-Object { Write-Host "ENCRYPTED FILE FOUND: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red }
}
}
---
Incident Response Priorities
-
T-Minus Detection Checklist:
- Immediate: Check web server logs for ScreenConnect
SessionManager.ashxanomalies (CVE-2024-1708). - Urgent: Audit SmarterMail servers for the
ResetPasswordpath abuse or unauthorized file uploads. - Critical: Scan for unexpected
powershell.exeparent processes spawned bysvchost.exeorw3wp.exe.
- Immediate: Check web server logs for ScreenConnect
-
Critical Assets at Risk:
- Financial Systems: Qilin aggressively targets QuickBooks databases and payroll files for extortion leverage.
- CAD/Blueprint Files: In the Construction sector,
.dwg,.pdf, and.rvtfiles are high-priority exfiltration targets.
-
Containment Actions:
- Isolate: Disconnect compromised RMM tools and email servers from the network immediately.
- Block: Network segmentation to prevent SMB (TCP 445, 139) lateral movement to domain controllers.
- Preserve: Capture memory dumps of the
powershellandw3wpprocesses before rebooting to analyze malicious payloads.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
- Patch CVE-2024-1708: Update ConnectWise ScreenConnect to the latest patched version immediately. If patching is not possible, enforce strict IP allow-listing for the web interface.
- Patch SmarterMail: Apply patches for CVE-2025-52691 and CVE-2026-23760. Disable the
ResetPasswordfunctionality externally if not required. - MFA Enforcement: Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) on all VPN, RMM, and Email logins.
Short-term (2 Weeks)
- Network Segmentation: Move RMM and Email management interfaces to a dedicated management VLAN, inaccessible from the general corporate LAN.
- Egress Filtering: Block outbound traffic to known anonymizers and non-standard ports used for C2 (e.g., DNS over HTTPS anomalies).
- Audit Remote Access: Conduct a full audit of all active RDP and VPN sessions; revoke standing access in favor of Just-In-Time (JIT) privileged access.
Related Resources
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