Back to Intelligence

QILIN Ransomware Gang: 23 New Victims Posted — Construction & Manufacturing Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

SA
Security Arsenal Team
May 21, 2026
8 min read

Threat Actor Profile — QILIN

Known Aliases: Agenda, Qilin

Operational Model: Qilin operates as a sophisticated Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation with a highly modular attack framework. The group primarily targets Windows environments and has recently shifted focus to mid-sized enterprises in construction, manufacturing, and business services sectors.

Ransom Demands: Historical data indicates demands ranging from $300,000 to multi-million dollars, typically calculated at 2-5% of victim annual revenue. Recent postings suggest increased targeting of companies with $10-50M in annual revenue.

Initial Access Methods:

  • Exploitation of remote access services (VPN, RDP)
  • Phishing campaigns with weaponized attachments
  • Software supply chain compromises
  • Exploitation of public-facing applications (notably ConnectWise ScreenConnect)

Double Extortion Approach: Qilin consistently employs double extortion tactics, exfiltrating sensitive data before encryption and threatening public release if ransom demands aren't met. Data is typically staged for 2-7 days before encryption begins.

Average Dwell Time: 5-12 days between initial compromise and encryption detonation, with most data exfiltration occurring between days 3-7.

Current Campaign Analysis

Targeted Sectors

Based on the 23 recent victims posted to Qilin's leak site:

  • Construction: 33% (7 victims) - Primary focus area
  • Business Services: 17% (4 victims)
  • Manufacturing: 13% (3 victims)
  • Consumer Services: 13% (3 victims)
  • Agriculture and Food Production: 9% (2 victims)
  • Healthcare/Hospitality: 4% (1 victim each)
  • Other: 9% (4 victims)

Geographic Concentration

  • United States: 30% (7 victims)
  • Austria: 13% (3 victims)
  • United Kingdom: 13% (3 victims)
  • Canada, Spain, Argentina, Australia, Czech Republic: 9-4% (1-2 victims each)

Victim Profile

Recent victims predominantly represent mid-sized enterprises with the following characteristics:

  • Revenue range: $10M-$50M annually
  • Employee count: 50-300
  • Limited dedicated security resources
  • Heavy reliance on remote access solutions

Observed Posting Frequency

Qilin has demonstrated consistent posting patterns with 3-5 victims published daily between May 17-21, 2026, suggesting a well-established pipeline of compromised organizations.

CVE Connections as Initial Access Vectors

Recent Qilin activity shows strong correlation with exploitation of:

  • CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect): 67% of victims likely using remote management tools
  • CVE-2023-21529 (Microsoft Exchange): 33% of business service victims may have been compromised via email infrastructure
  • CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Secure Firewall): Network perimeter compromises evident in manufacturing and construction victims
  • CVE-2025-52691 & CVE-2026-23760 (SmarterMail): Email server exploitation for initial access in multiple cases

Detection Engineering

SIGMA Rules

YAML
---
title: Potential Qilin Ransomware Lateral Movement via PsExec
id: 764e075d-5e1f-4d9b-8f7f-1a2b3c4d5e6f
description: Detects potential Qilin ransomware lateral movement using PsExec with suspicious parameters
status: experimental
date: 2026/05/21
author: Security Arsenal Research Team
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - qilin
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\psexec.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 
            - ' -accepteula '
            - ' -u '
            - ' -p '
    filter_legit:
        ParentImage|endswith: 
            - '\mmc.exe'
            - '\services.msc'
            - '\taskmgr.exe'
    condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
level: high

---
title: Qilin Ransomware Data Staging via Rclone
id: 785e085d-5e1f-4d9b-8f7f-1a2b3c4d5e6f
description: Detects potential Qilin ransomware data exfiltration using Rclone tool
status: experimental
date: 2026/05/21
author: Security Arsenal Research Team
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
tags:
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1048
    - qilin
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\rclone.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 
            - 'copy '
            - 'sync '
            - 'config '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of Rclone for backup purposes
level: high

---
title: Qilin Ransomware Preparation - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 796e095d-5e1f-4d9b-8f7f-1a2b3c4d5e6f
description: Detects potential Qilin ransomware preparation by deleting Volume Shadow Copies
status: experimental
date: 2026/05/21
author: Security Arsenal Research Team
references:
    - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - qilin
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: 
            - 'delete shadows'
            - 'resize shadowstorage'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System administration tasks
level: high

KQL Hunt Query for Lateral Movement

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for potential Qilin ransomware lateral movement indicators
let timeframe = 7d;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(timeframe)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("psexec.exe", "wmic.exe", "wmiexec.ps1", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has any(
    "-accepteula", "process call create", "Invoke-WmiMethod", "New-PSSession", 
    "Enter-PSSession", "Invoke-Command", "sc.exe", "net use", "net.exe"
)
| where ProcessCommandLine has any(
    "\\\\", "C$\", "ADMIN$\", "/user:", "/password:", ":5985", ":5986"
)
| extend MachineName = DeviceName, Account = InitiatingProcessAccountName, 
          Process = FileName, CommandLine = ProcessCommandLine
| project Timestamp, MachineName, Account, Process, CommandLine, 
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

Rapid-Response Hardening Script

PowerShell
# Qilin Ransomware Hardening Script
# Checks for common indicators and applies immediate protective measures

# Function to check for recent scheduled tasks (potential Qilin persistence)
function Check-ScheduledTasks {
    Write-Host "Checking for recently created scheduled tasks..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $tasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) }
    if ($tasks) {
        Write-Host "Found recent scheduled tasks:" -ForegroundColor Red
        $tasks | Format-Table TaskName, Date, Author, State
    } else {
        Write-Host "No suspicious recent scheduled tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

# Function to check for modified Volume Shadow Copies
function Check-ShadowCopies {
    Write-Host "Checking Volume Shadow Copy status..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    try {
        $vss = vssadmin list shadows
        if ($vss -match "No shadow copies") {
            Write-Host "WARNING: No Volume Shadow Copies found - potential deletion." -ForegroundColor Red
        } else {
            $shadowCount = ($vss | Select-String "Shadow Copy Volume").Count
            Write-Host "Found $shadowCount Volume Shadow Copies." -ForegroundColor Green
        }
    } catch {
        Write-Host "Could not check Volume Shadow Copies: $_" -ForegroundColor Red
    }
}

# Function to enumerate RDP connections
function Check-RDPConnections {
    Write-Host "Checking recent RDP connections..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $rdpEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4624; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
        Where-Object {$_.Message -match 'Logon Type: 10'} |
        Select-Object TimeCreated, @{N='User';E={$_.Properties[5].Value}}, @{N='SourceIP';E={$_.Properties[18].Value}}
    
    if ($rdpEvents) {
        Write-Host "Recent RDP connections found:" -ForegroundColor Yellow
        $rdpEvents | Format-Table -AutoSize
    } else {
        Write-Host "No recent RDP connections found." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

# Function to check for exposed RDP
function Check-ExposedRDP {
    Write-Host "Checking if RDP is exposed..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
    $rdpStatus = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" -Name "fDenyTSConnections" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    if ($rdpStatus.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) {
        Write-Host "WARNING: RDP is enabled. Consider disabling or securing with MFA." -ForegroundColor Red
        
        # Check firewall rules
        $firewallRules = Get-NetFirewallRule -DisplayGroup "Remote Desktop" | Where-Object {$_.Enabled -eq 'True'}
        if ($firewallRules) {
            Write-Host "RDP is allowed through firewall. Check scope restrictions." -ForegroundColor Red
        }
    } else {
        Write-Host "RDP is disabled." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
}

# Execute all checks
Write-Host "========================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "QILIN RANSOMWARE SECURITY CHECK" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "========================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host ""

Check-ScheduledTasks
Write-Host ""
Check-ShadowCopies
Write-Host ""
Check-RDPConnections
Write-Host ""
Check-ExposedRDP
Write-Host ""
Write-Host "========================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "CHECK COMPLETE" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Write-Host "========================================" -ForegroundColor Cyan

Incident Response Priorities

T-minus Detection Checklist

  • Monitor for unusual RDP and VPN access patterns from new geographic locations
  • Check for new scheduled tasks created with SYSTEM privileges
  • Identify suspicious PowerShell execution with encoded commands
  • Monitor for large file transfers to unknown destinations (exfiltration >100MB)
  • Watch for unexpected service restarts and new services
  • Look for VSSAdmin commands to delete shadow copies
  • Monitor for process execution patterns consistent with Qilin (e.g., 7z, WinRAR, Rclone)

Critical Assets This Gang Historically Prioritizes for Exfiltration

  • Customer databases and PII
  • Financial records and accounting data
  • Architectural designs and blueprints (construction sector)
  • Manufacturing processes and proprietary formulas
  • Executive email archives
  • Employee data (HR records)
  • Contracts and M&A documentation

Containment Actions Ordered by Urgency

  1. IMMEDIATE: Isolate systems showing signs of compromise from the network
  2. URGENT: Disable or restrict all VPN accounts with recent suspicious activity
  3. HIGH PRIORITY: Block known Qilin C2 domains and IP addresses
  4. HIGH PRIORITY: Reset credentials for all accounts with elevated privileges
  5. MEDIUM PRIORITY: Disable unnecessary remote access protocols (RDP, WinRM)
  6. MEDIUM PRIORITY: Implement temporary network segmentation

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24h)

  1. Patch CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect) immediately
  2. Apply security updates for Microsoft Exchange (CVE-2023-21529)
  3. Patch Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (CVE-2026-20131)
  4. Update SmarterMail installations (CVE-2025-52691, CVE-2026-23760)
  5. Enforce MFA on all VPN and RDP access points
  6. Implement strict allow-listing for RDP and VPN access
  7. Review and restrict privileged access to minimum necessary
  8. Temporarily block execution of common Qilin tools (Rclone, WinRAR, 7z) on critical systems

Short-term (2 weeks)

  1. Deploy comprehensive EDR solutions across all endpoints
  2. Implement application allow-listing policies
  3. Conduct security awareness training focused on phishing
  4. Implement robust backup and recovery procedures with offline copies
  5. Segment network to limit lateral movement opportunities
  6. Deploy deception technology (honeypots) to detect early reconnaissance
  7. Conduct a thorough external attack surface assessment
  8. Review and enhance incident response playbooks specific to ransomware

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

darkwebransomware-gangqilinransomwareconstructionmanufacturingdata-exfiltrationremote-access

Is your security operations ready?

Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.