Threat Actor Profile — QILIN
Known Aliases: Qilin, Agenda (formerly associated)
Operating Model: RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service) with affiliate network. Core team develops encryption tools and leak site infrastructure while affiliates conduct intrusion operations.
Ransom Demands: Historically $500K-$3M USD, with healthcare targets typically seeing escalated demands due to operational urgency.
Initial Access Methods:
- Phishing campaigns with malicious Office macros
- Exploitation of exposed RDP and VPN services
- Valid credentials obtained via info-stealers (RedLine, Vidar)
- Supply chain compromise through MSPs
Double Extortion Approach: Exfiltrates sensitive data (10-200GB typically) prior to encryption. Uses custom exfiltration tools disguised as legitimate network traffic. Leaks data to dedicated .onion site with countdown timers.
Dwell Time: 4-15 days before encryption detonation, with affiliates conducting reconnaissance and lateral movement during this period.
Current Campaign Analysis
Targeted Sectors
Based on the most recent 15 victims (posted 2026-06-02 to 2026-06-05), QILIN is actively targeting:
- Healthcare (20%): 3 victims including dental practices and medical facilities
- Energy (13%): 2 victims including oil/gas services
- Business Services (13%): 2 victims including engineering firms
- Consumer Services (13%): 2 victims including food and home services
- Construction (7%): 1 victim
- Hospitality and Tourism (7%): 1 victim
- Transportation/Logistics (7%): 1 victim
- Manufacturing (7%): 1 victim
- Agriculture and Food Production (7%): 1 victim
Geographic Concentration
- North America: 40% (US: 5, CA: 1)
- Europe: 40% (DE: 1, SI: 1, AT: 1, PT: 1)
- Asia-Pacific: 13% (KR: 1)
- South America: 7% (BR: 1)
Victim Profile
Targets range from small-to-medium businesses (SMBs) to mid-market enterprises ($10M-$500M revenue). Recent patterns show increased focus on:
- Healthcare providers with less mature security controls
- Regional energy infrastructure companies
- Construction and engineering firms with valuable intellectual property
Posting Frequency/Escalation Patterns
- Frequency: 1-3 victims posted daily with clustering on Tuesdays (2026-06-03 had 5 new victims)
- Escalation: Leak site countdowns typically 3-7 days
- Threat Pattern: Recent postings suggest coordinated affiliate campaigns against specific verticals
CVE Connections
The following CISA KEV vulnerabilities are likely being exploited by QILIN affiliates for initial access:
- CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console): Potential supply chain vector targeting engineering/technical environments (correlates with Pro-MEC and JNP ENG victims)
- CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect): Remote access exploitation, commonly used by ransomware groups for initial access
- CVE-2023-21529 (Microsoft Exchange): Email server exploitation for credential harvesting and persistence
- CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Secure Firewall FMC): Security control bypass, particularly relevant for Energy sector victims
- CVE-2025-52691 (SmarterTools SmarterMail): Email server exploitation similar to Exchange vector
Detection Engineering
SIGMA Rules
---
title: Potential RDP Brute Force Attack
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-g1h2-i3j4k5l6m7n8
description: Detects potential RDP brute force attacks commonly used for initial access by ransomware groups
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/06
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.credential_access
- qilin
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4625
LogonType: 10
filter:
SubjectUserName|startswith: 'DWM-'
SubjectUserName|startswith: 'UMFD-'
condition: selection | count(SubjectUserName) > 10 | by SourceIpAddress within 1m
falsepositives:
- Legitimate users mistyping passwords
- Misconfigured applications
level: high
---
title: PsExec Lateral Movement Detection
id: b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-h2i3-j4k5l6m7n8o9
description: Detects lateral movement using PsExec, a common tool used by Qilin and other ransomware groups
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/06
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1569/
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.execution
- qilin
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 5145
- 5140
ShareName|contains: 'ADMIN$'
RelativeTargetName|contains: 'PSEXESVC'
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate system administration
- Software deployment tools
level: high
---
title: Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
id: c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-i3j4-k5l6m7n8o9p0
description: Detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies, a common pre-encryption step by ransomware operators
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/06
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490/
tags:
- attack.impact
- defense_evasion
- qilin
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4656
ObjectName|contains: 'HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy'
filter:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate system administration
- Backup software operations
level: critical
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunt for potential Qilin lateral movement indicators
let Timeframe = 1d;
let HighRiskSourceIPs = materialize (
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Timeframe)
| where EventID in (4625, 4768, 4769) // Failed logons and Kerberos events
| summarize FailedAttempts = count() by IpAddress
| where FailedAttempts >= 10
| project IpAddress
);
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Timeframe)
// Detect unusual service installations (PsExec and WMI)
| where EventID in (4697, 7045)
// Look for remote executions
| union (
Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Timeframe)
| where EventID == 10 // Process execution
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "\\" and ProcessCommandLine contains "-machine"
)
| where IpAddress in (HighRiskSourceIPs)
| summarize count() by Computer, IpAddress, EventID, ProcessCommandLine
| order by count_ desc
PowerShell Rapid-Response Script
# Qilin Ransomware Quick Assessment Script
# Run with Administrator privileges
Write-Host "[+] Starting Qilin Ransomware Quick Assessment..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
# Check for exposed RDP services
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking RDP exposure..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$rdpStatus = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" -Name "fDenyTSConnections" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($rdpStatus.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) {
Write-Host "[!] RDP is ENABLED - Potential risk" -ForegroundColor Red
$rdpListeners = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name "PortNumber" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Host " RDP Port: $($rdpListeners.PortNumber)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
} else {
Write-Host "[+] RDP is DISABLED" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check for recent scheduled tasks (potential persistence)
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking for recently created scheduled tasks..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$cutoffDate = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
$recentTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {
$_.Date -gt $cutoffDate -and
$_.Author -notmatch "Microsoft|NT AUTHORITY"
}
if ($recentTasks) {
Write-Host "[!] Found $($recentTasks.Count) recently created tasks:" -ForegroundColor Red
$recentTasks | Format-Table TaskName, Author, Date -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host "[+] No suspicious scheduled tasks found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check for recently modified Volume Shadow Copies
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking Volume Shadow Copy status..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
$shadowCopies = Get-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy
if ($shadowCopies) {
$recentVSS = $shadowCopies | Where-Object { $_.InstallDate -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) }
if ($recentVSS) {
Write-Host "[+] Volume Shadow Copies active and recent" -ForegroundColor Green
$recentVSS | ForEach-Object { Write-Host " Created: $($_.InstallDate) on $($_.VolumeName)" -ForegroundColor White }
} else {
Write-Host "[!] No recent Volume Shadow Copies found" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
} else {
Write-Host "[!] No Volume Shadow Copies found" -ForegroundColor Red
}
} catch {
Write-Host "[!] Could not check Volume Shadow Copies: $_" -ForegroundColor Red
}
# Check for unusual network connections
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking for established RDP connections..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$rdpSessions = qwinsta 2>$null | Select-String "rdp-tcp"
if ($rdpSessions) {
Write-Host "[!] Active RDP sessions found:" -ForegroundColor Red
$rdpSessions
} else {
Write-Host "[+] No active RDP sessions" -ForegroundColor Green
}
Write-Host "\n[+] Assessment complete. Review findings for potential Qilin indicators." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Incident Response Priorities
T-minus Detection Checklist
- Immediate: Hunt for failed RDP authentication attempts from unusual geographic locations
- Within 1 hour: Review recent Service/Task creations in the past 24 hours
- Within 2 hours: Analyze network traffic for unexpected large outbound transfers (potential exfil)
- Within 4 hours: Check for new local administrator accounts or group memberships
Critical Assets Historically Prioritized by Qilin
- Patient records (PHI) - high extortion value
- Intellectual property (CAD designs, proprietary formulas)
- Financial data (bank accounts, payment records)
- Employee PII (SSNs, payroll data)
- Executive communications (email archives)
Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency)
- Isolate affected systems from the network immediately
- Disable RDP/VPN access for privileged accounts
- Revoke recent credential changes made in the past 7 days
- Block outbound SMB traffic at network perimeter
- Suspend domain admin accounts until verified legitimate
- Power down non-critical systems with suspected compromise
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24h)
- Disable RDP on internet-facing systems or enforce MFA
- Patch CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console) on engineering workstations
- Patch CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Secure Firewall FMC)
- Block PowerShell execution for non-administrative users
- Enable multi-factor authentication for all remote access
- Review and restrict administrative delegation to MSP accounts
Short-term (2 weeks)
- Implement network segmentation to isolate critical systems
- Deploy endpoint detection with behavioral ransomware protections
- Establish monitoring for large data transfers to non-corporate cloud storage
- Conduct penetration testing of external remote access infrastructure
- Implement 24/7 security monitoring for early detection of lateral movement
- Review and harden Exchange/Email server configurations against listed CVEs
Related Resources
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