Three concurrent OTX pulses published on 2026-11-19 expose a maturing criminal tooling ecosystem spanning desktop and mobile platforms: the ROMULUS distribution platform pushing CNCMachineRMS RAT and LegionLoader through ClickFix social-engineering chains, active exploitation of a DLL side-loading flaw in Siemens Software Center (CVE-2026-110936), and the emergence of Bazuka — a modular Android fraud framework with NFC relay, overlay, and LLM integration capabilities aimed squarely at the financial sector.
Threat Summary
Collectively, these pulses describe a single dominant delivery methodology — ClickFix — being industrialized as a malware-as-a-service distribution layer. Since late September 2026, the ROMULUS platform has been observed impersonating legitimate software (including a trojanized Stardock installer) and abusing novel lures such as ChatGPT Custom GPTs to funnel victims into self-executing infection chains. Two separate payload chains are operated in parallel: one delivering CNCMachineRMS, a remote access trojan using a proprietary storage format, and a second delivering LegionLoader, a well-known commodity loader with Babadeda crypter heritage.
The same adversary cluster — attributed to Romulus in the Siemens pulse — is simultaneously exploiting CVE-2026-110936, a DLL side-loading vulnerability in Siemens Software Center v3.5.8.7. Attackers bundle a genuine, digitally signed copy of the application with malicious DLLs distributed through unofficial channels; the signed binary loads the attacker DLL without validation. This is a textbook software supply chain pattern targeting industrial environments, and its convergence with ClickFix lures suggests a single operator running both opportunistic crimeware and targeted industrial intrusion tooling.
On the mobile front, Bazuka (discovered late October 2026) represents a generational leap over typical banking trojans: a modular fraud framework with a dropper/downloader, core component, and 23 specialized modules covering overlays, keylogging, SMS/2FA interception, NFC card relay, cryptocurrency theft, ADB bridging, and reported LLM integration for social engineering automation. It was discovered alongside the RatOn malware family during an NFC relay investigation.
Objective: credential and financial theft at scale (desktop RAT + mobile banking fraud), with a secondary industrial espionage or initial-access vector via Siemens software supply chain abuse.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
ROMULUS Platform (Distribution)
- Distribution method: ClickFix social engineering — fake CAPTCHA/fix-it prompts, impersonated software installers (Stardock), and abuse of ChatGPT Custom GPTs as lure infrastructure.
- Chains: Parallel delivery of CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader through distinct infection chains, indicating load-balancing of victim traffic across payload families.
CNCMachineRMS RAT
- Payload behavior: Full remote access trojan capability (command execution, file operations, surveillance).
- Anti-analysis: Proprietary storage format for configuration/stolen data, complicating static extraction and sandbox triage.
- Delivery: DLL sideloading — malicious DLL loaded by a legitimate, often signed, host binary; Babadeda crypter linkage per tagging.
- Persistence: Typically established via Run keys or scheduled tasks under the sideloaded host process context; hunt for unsigned DLLs adjacent to signed executables.
LegionLoader
- Commodity loader used to stage secondary payloads; historically distributed via fake installer sites. Its co-occurrence with CNCMachineRMS under ROMULUS suggests tiered monetization: loader slots sold to other actors while the RAT serves the operator directly.
CVE-2026-110936 Exploitation (Siemens Software Center 3.5.8.7)
- Vector: DLL side-loading — genuine digitally signed Software Center binary shipped with attacker-controlled DLLs via unofficial download channels.
- Behavior: Application loads the malicious DLL without signature/path validation, granting code execution under a trusted signed process — evading application allowlisting and many EDR heuristics.
- Risk: Industrial/OT environments running Siemens tooling; supply chain trust abuse.
Bazuka Mobile Fraud Framework
- Architecture: Dropper/downloader → core component → 23 specialized modules (overlays, keylogging, SMS and 2FA interception, NFC relay, crypto wallet theft, ADB bridging).
- C2 communication: Multi-channel C2 over the
brokerok.orginfrastructure — dedicated subdomains for API (c2api), data exfiltration (c2data), proxying (c2proxy), and WebSocket command channels (c2ws), indicating separation of C2 planes for resilience. Secondary domaingargona.cashsuggests monetization/cashing-out infrastructure. - Targeting: Finance sector; NFC relay enables contactless card cloning/POS fraud at physical proximity.
IOC Analysis
The pulses provide three indicator classes, each requiring different operationalization:
- IPv4 (93.152.213.151, 95.181.213.21): C2 and staging servers. Block at egress firewall/proxy; add to EDR network IOC feeds. Retro-hunt NetFlow/proxy logs for 90 days — ClickFix victims beacon quickly after execution.
- Domains/hostnames (brokerok.org + c2api./c2data./c2proxy./c2ws. subdomains, gargona.cash, wizardexpensive.com): Sinkhole or DNS-block. The four-subdomain C2 plane structure of Bazuka means partial blocking is insufficient — wildcard-block
*.brokerok.org.wizardexpensive.comis the ClickFix lure/distribution domain for the Siemens sideloading campaign; alert on DNS resolution as an early-stage tripwire. - FileHash-SHA256 (9 hashes): CNCMachineRMS/LegionLoader payloads and the trojanized Siemens Software Center bundle. Push to EDR block lists and use for retro-hunting via file creation events. Note: hashes for sideloaded DLLs rotate frequently — behavioral detection on the sideload pattern is more durable than hash blocking.
Tooling: Hash lookups via VirusTotal/OTX pulsing; domain intel via passive DNS (confirm brokerok.org resolution to 95.181.213.21); YARA against the proprietary CNCMachineRMS storage format where samples are available; mobile fleets require MTD/MDM telemetry for Bazuka indicators.
Detection Engineering
---
title: DLL Sideloading via Legitimate Signed Binary - ROMULUS / CVE-2026-110936
id: 7f2a1c4e-romulus-0001-2026a1b2c3d4
status: experimental
description: Detects a signed legitimate executable loading an unsigned DLL from a non-standard directory, matching CNCMachineRMS, LegionLoader, and Siemens Software Center CVE-2026-110936 sideloading chains.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection_signed_host:
Image|contains:
- '\Users\'
- '\Temp\'
- '\AppData\Local\'
- '\ProgramData\'
Signed: 'true'
selection_unsigned_dll:
SignatureStatus: 'unsigned'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '.dll'
filter_system_paths:
ImageLoaded|contains:
- '\Windows\System32\'
- '\Windows\SysWOW64\'
- '\Program Files\'
condition: selection_signed_host and selection_unsigned_dll and not filter_system_paths
level: high
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1574.002
- attack.persistence
falsepositives:
- Legitimate portable applications bundling unsigned plugins
fields:
- Image
- ImageLoaded
- Hashes
- User
date: 2026/11/19
---
title: ClickFix Social Engineering Execution - PowerShell or mshta via RunMRU-Style Paste Execution
id: 7f2a1c4e-romulus-0002-2026e5f6a7b8
status: experimental
description: Detects ClickFix-pattern execution where users paste malicious commands into Run dialog or terminal, spawning PowerShell/mshta/curl download cradles as seen in ROMULUS CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader chains.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\explorer.exe'
- '\RunDialog.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\curl.exe'
- '\cmd.exe'
selection_cmdline:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'hidden'
- 'enc'
- 'FromBase64String'
- 'IEX'
- 'Invoke-WebRequest'
- 'DownloadString'
- 'mshta http'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child and 1 of selection_cmdline
level: high
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1204.002
falsepositives:
- IT admin scripted remediation run interactively
fields:
- CommandLine
- ParentImage
- User
date: 2026/11/19
---
title: Bazuka / ROMULUS C2 Infrastructure Communication
id: 7f2a1c4e-romulus-0003-2026c9d0e1f2
status: experimental
description: Detects network connections to known Bazuka mobile fraud framework C2 infrastructure and ROMULUS distribution servers identified in OTX pulses.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_ip:
DestinationIp:
- '93.152.213.151'
- '95.181.213.21'
selection_domain:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'brokerok.org'
- 'gargona.cash'
- 'wizardexpensive.com'
condition: 1 of selection_*
level: critical
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1573
falsepositives:
- Threat research and sandbox detonation
fields:
- DestinationIp
- DestinationHostname
- Image
- User
date: 2026/11/19
// Hunt: ROMULUS ClickFix, DLL sideloading, and Bazuka C2 indicators (90-day lookback)
let Lookback = 90d;
let BadIPs = dynamic(["93.152.213.151", "95.181.213.21"]);
let BadDomains = dynamic(["brokerok.org", "gargona.cash", "wizardexpensive.com", "c2api.brokerok.org", "c2data.brokerok.org", "c2proxy.brokerok.org", "c2ws.brokerok.org"]);
let BadHashes = dynamic(["0457414c4504b70115798eee9c8384a8bf9e793461ffb2e0661a6dcc6ed4809f","3cd1484cc5bf10e22d79784beba58a75d7b126c46efb5e1a85d6aab884447621","6761aad48a3f987238994d92bca97e4b8550e0150607bd67b47b1b6366a371fc","91a22cf3154944897cbcaffc7d20d4596e972d280ee134197d41d8d8eefb0fe2","a27cafb84876a3374ef4aba1062345def6cd0b029eaf8e0dc44fa24fc943f3c6","b59a21a8d4c0c11a9ecbbdbe2a2938499c99c5ebb210c9c6db9683c7ad19f4c4","d3fda1e6cf886fd530bf62e2d16c39ad23ed12a2c933fc211f1f4876ceaa033e","3fdcc7d7d049a89711fb31fb236940a1c5a09d899143ffd20c3c41fb1f2cf491","f4d7c5321bb0d1bda439304a753bcf9b467b98ca53c7e9493b9c2c3451092e4a"]);
let NetworkHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where RemoteIP in (BadIPs) or RemoteUrl has_any (BadDomains)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, ActionType;
let HashHits = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where SHA256 in (BadHashes)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
let ClickFixBehavior = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe","curl.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("hidden","FromBase64String","IEX","DownloadString","Invoke-WebRequest","-enc ")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
NetworkHits
| union HashHits
| union ClickFixBehavior
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
# ROMULUS / CNCMachineRMS / CVE-2026-110936 IOC Hunt - run elevated on endpoints
$BadIPs = @('93.152.213.151','95.181.213.21')
$BadDomains = @('brokerok.org','gargona.cash','wizardexpensive.com','c2api.brokerok.org','c2data.brokerok.org','c2proxy.brokerok.org','c2ws.brokerok.org')
$BadHashes = @('0457414c4504b70115798eee9c8384a8bf9e793461ffb2e0661a6dcc6ed4809f','3cd1484cc5bf10e22d79784beba58a75d7b126c46efb5e1a85d6aab884447621','6761aad48a3f987238994d92bca97e4b8550e0150607bd67b47b1b6366a371fc','91a22cf3154944897cbcaffc7d20d4596e972d280ee134197d41d8d8eefb0fe2','a27cafb84876a3374ef4aba1062345def6cd0b029eaf8e0dc44fa24fc943f3c6','b59a21a8d4c0c11a9ecbbdbe2a2938499c99c5ebb210c9c6db9683c7ad19f4c4','d3fda1e6cf886fd530bf62e2d16c39ad23ed12a2c933fc211f1f4876ceaa033e','3fdcc7d7d049a89711fb31fb236940a1c5a09d899143ffd20c3c41fb1f2cf491','f4d7c5321bb0d1bda439304a753bcf9b467b98ca53c7e9493b9c2c3451092e4a')
Write-Host '[*] Checking DNS cache for malicious domains...'
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $e = $_.Entry; $BadDomains | Where-Object { $e -like "*$_*" } } | Format-Table Entry, Data
Write-Host '[*] Checking active network connections to C2 IPs...'
Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -in $BadIPs } | Format-Table LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, State, OwningProcess
Write-Host '[*] Checking persistence: Run keys...'
$RunKeys = @('HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run','HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run')
foreach ($key in $RunKeys) {
Get-ItemProperty -Path $key -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$_.PSObject.Properties | Where-Object { $_.Value -match 'AppData|Temp|ProgramData' -and $_.Value -match '\.exe|\.dll|rundll32|regsvr32|powershell' } |
ForEach-Object { Write-Host "[!] Suspicious Run key: $key :: $($_.Name) = $($_.Value)" }
}
}
Write-Host '[*] Checking scheduled tasks for suspicious actions...'
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$actions = ($_.Actions | Out-String)
if ($actions -match 'powershell|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32' -and $actions -match 'http|AppData|Temp|ProgramData') {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious task: $($_.TaskName) :: $actions"
}
}
Write-Host '[*] Scanning for unsigned DLLs beside signed executables (sideload pattern) in user-writable paths...'
$ScanPaths = @("$env:LOCALAPPDATA","$env:APPDATA","$env:TEMP","C:\ProgramData")
foreach ($p in $ScanPaths) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $p -Recurse -Filter *.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$sig = Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FullName
if ($sig.Status -ne 'Valid') {
$h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256).Hash.ToLower()
if ($BadHashes -contains $h) { Write-Host "[!!] KNOWN MALICIOUS DLL: $($_.FullName) [$h]" }
elseif ($_.Directory.GetFiles('*.exe') | Where-Object { (Get-AuthenticodeSignature $_.FullName).Status -eq 'Valid' }) {
Write-Host "[!] Sideload candidate: unsigned DLL $($_.FullName) beside signed EXE"
}
}
}
}
Write-Host '[*] Checking for trojanized Siemens Software Center (CVE-2026-110936)...'
Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Program Files','C:\Program Files (x86)','C:\ProgramData', "$env:LOCALAPPDATA" -Recurse -Filter '*.exe' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.VersionInfo.ProductName -match 'Siemens' -and $_.VersionInfo.ProductVersion -match '3\.5\.8\.7' } |
ForEach-Object { Write-Host "[!] Vulnerable Siemens Software Center found: $($_.FullName)" }
Write-Host '[*] Hash sweep of recent executables in user-writable paths...'
foreach ($p in $ScanPaths) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $p -Recurse -Include *.exe,*.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($h -and ($BadHashes -contains $h.ToLower())) { Write-Host "[!!] IOC HASH MATCH: $($_.FullName) [$h]" }
}
}
Write-Host '[*] Hunt complete.'
Response Priorities
Immediate (0–4 hours)
- Block
93.152.213.151,95.181.213.21at egress; wildcard-block*.brokerok.org,gargona.cash, andwizardexpensive.comat DNS/proxy layers. - Push all 9 SHA256 hashes to EDR prevention lists.
- Deploy the Sigma rules and run the KQL hunt across a 90-day window; any ClickFix-pattern execution (explorer → powershell/mshta with encoded commands) warrants immediate host isolation.
- Inventory all Siemens Software Center installations; flag any instance of v3.5.8.7 not deployed through official channels.
24 Hours
- CNCMachineRMS and LegionLoader both enable credential theft: for any host with confirmed execution, force enterprise-wide credential resets for all users who authenticated from that host, revoke active sessions and tokens, and review MFA enrollment changes.
- For Bazuka exposure: engage mobile security/MDM teams to audit managed Android fleets for sideloaded packages, suspicious accessibility-service grants, and NFC permission abuse; notify the fraud team to monitor for anomalous card-present and NFC relay transactions.
- Verify whether any OT/engineering workstations sourced Siemens Software Center from unofficial channels — treat confirmed trojanized installs as supply chain incidents, not commodity infections.
1 Week
- Block or heavily restrict user-initiated paste-into-Run/terminal execution via WDAC/AppLocker policies; ClickFix entirely depends on the victim self-executing — break that primitive.
- Enforce DLL search-order hardening and require signed DLL loads for critical signed applications; deploy attack surface reduction rules blocking unsigned DLL loads from user-writable paths.
- Establish a software provenance policy: cryptographic verification of installer origin for industrial/engineering software, with procurement controls preventing shadow downloads.
- Brief helpdesk and end users on ClickFix lures, including the novel ChatGPT Custom GPT abuse vector — user awareness is currently the weakest control in this kill chain.
Related Resources
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