SAFEPAY Ransomware: Aggressive German Sector Targeting & Critical Infrastructure Exploits

---
title: Potential Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 Exploit (CVE-2026-50751)
id: a1b2c3d4-5678-90ab-cdef-1234567890ab
status: experimental
description: Detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2026-50751 involving IKEv1 key exchange anomalies and authentication failures on Check Point Security Gateways.
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/06
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    product: firewall
definition:
    condition: selection
    selection:
        vendor|contains: 'Check Point'
        dst_port: 500
        protocol: 'IKE'
        status: 'failure'
        message|contains:
            - 'authentication failure'
            - 'ikev1'
            - 'invalid cookie'
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate misconfigured VPN peers
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - cve.2026.50751
    - safepay
---
title: Suspicious PowerShell Defender Tampering
id: e5f6g7h8-9012-34ab-cdef-567890123456
status: experimental
description: Detects commands often used by ransomware operators like SAFEPAY to disable Windows Defender and security logging prior to encryption.
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/06
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001/
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: powershell
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4104
    filter_scripts:
        ScriptBlockText|contains:
            - 'Set-MpPreference'
            - 'Add-MpPreference'
            - 'Disable-BitLocker'
            - 'wevtutil cl' # Clear logs
    condition: selection and filter_scripts
falsepositives:
    - Administrative scripts run by IT
level: high
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.execution
    - safepay
---
title: Massive File Deletion Shadow Copy Tampering
id: 9a8b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-0987654321ab
status: experimental
description: Detects the use of vssadmin or wmic to delete shadow copies, a common precursor to encryption by SAFEPAY affiliates.
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/06
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4688
        NewProcessName|endswith:
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\wmic.exe'
    selection_cmdline:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'delete shadows'
            - 'shadowcopy delete'
    condition: selection and selection_cmdline
falsepositives:
    - System administration tasks (rare)
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - safepay

// Hunt for lateral movement and data staging indicators associated with SAFEPAY
// Focuses on SMB access and unusual administrative tool usage
let TimeFrame = 7d;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(TimeFrame)
// Hunt for tools often used for lateral movement
| where ProcessName in~ ("psexec.exe", "psexec64.exe", "wmic.exe", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe")
// Filter for network-related arguments or specific keywords used in staging
| where ProcessCommandLine has any ("192.168", "10.0", "172.16", "copy", "move", "xcopy", "robocopy", "/share", "\\\\")
// Correlate with network connection events to the same device
| join kind=inner (DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp >= ago(TimeFrame)
    | where RemotePort in (445, 135, 139, 3389) // Common lateral movement ports
    | summarize ConnectionCount=count(), RemoteIPList=make_set(RemoteIP) by DeviceId, Timestamp
    ) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ProcessName, ProcessCommandLine, ConnectionCount, RemoteIPList, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

<#
.SYNOPSIS
    SAFEPAY Ransomware T-Minus Detection Script
.DESCRIPTION
    Scans a system for common precursors to ransomware execution associated with SAFEPAY TTPs:
    - Scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days
    - Modified Shadow Copy storage (potential tampering)
    - Suspicious PowerShell execution logs
#>

Write-Host "[+] Running SAFEPAY Pre-Encryption Diagnostic..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. Hunt for Recently Scheduled Tasks (Persistence)
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created in the last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
    $task = $_
    $taskInfo = Export-ScheduledTask -TaskName $task.TaskName -TaskPath $task.TaskPath
    if ($taskInfo.Triggers.StartBoundary) {
        $startDate = [datetime]::ParseExact($taskInfo.Triggers.StartBoundary, 'yyyy-MM-ddTHH:mm:ss', $null)
        if ($startDate -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)) {
            Write-Host "[!] Suspicious Recent Task Found: $($task.TaskName) | Author: $($taskInfo.Principal.UserId) | Action: $($taskInfo.Actions.Execute)" -ForegroundColor Red
        }
    }
}

# 2. Check Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) Health
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking Volume Shadow Copy Storage..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
    $vss = vssadmin list shadows
    if ($vss -match "No shadow copies found") {
        Write-Host "[!] WARNING: No Shadow Copies found. System may be vulnerable or already tampered with." -ForegroundColor Red
    } else {
        $shadowCount = ($vss | Select-String "Shadow Copy Volume").Count
        Write-Host "[+] Found $shadowCount Shadow Copies." -ForegroundColor Green
        # Check for recent deletions by looking at Event Log 4688 for vssadmin delete commands (requires Admin Audit Policy)
    }
} catch {
    Write-Host "[-] Error checking VSS: $_" -ForegroundColor DarkGray
}

# 3. Hunt for Defender Tampering in Event Logs
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking for Windows Defender Tampering Events (ID 5010, 1116)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
try {
    $defenderEvents = Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Where-Object { $_.TimeCreated -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24) -and $_.Id -in (5010, 1116, 1117) }
    
    if ($defenderEvents) {
        Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Recent Defender Tampering or Malware Detection Events Found:" -ForegroundColor Red
        $defenderEvents | Format-List TimeCreated, Id, Message
    } else {
        Write-Host "[+] No critical Defender events in the last 24 hours." -ForegroundColor Green
    }
} catch {
    Write-Host "[-] Could not access Defender logs." -ForegroundColor DarkGray
}

Write-Host "\n[+] Diagnostic Complete. Review RED output for immediate investigation." -ForegroundColor Cyan


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