SAFEPAY Ransomware Gang: 10 Victims in 24 Hours — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Date: 2026-09-09 | Analyst: Security Arsenal Dark Web Intelligence Team

SAFEPAY's dark web leak site lit up with 10 new victim postings in a single 24-hour window (2026-09-08) — a concentrated burst pattern consistent with either a batch-detonation event or a backlog dump following negotiations collapse. This briefing translates that live leak-site telemetry into detection engineering content for enterprise SOC teams.

Threat Actor Profile — SAFEPAY

Current Campaign Analysis

Sector Targeting (last 10 postings)

Key observation: SAFEPAY continues to favor mid-market professional services firms (assiprime.it, gsngestion.es, hbpro.pt) — organizations with valuable client data but typically under-resourced security teams. The healthcare hits (palmettoeyeinstitute.com, recoverycafe.org) are notable: a specialty eye clinic and a recovery nonprofit are classic low-maturity, high-pressure victims — small IT staff, high downtime sensitivity, elevated payment likelihood. Manufacturing targets (mcnishsteel.com, cenmar-manila.com) fit the OT-adjacent disruption extortion pattern.

Geographic Concentration

• Europe dominates this wave: AT (1), IT (1), ES (2), PT (1) — 5 of 10 victims
• Americas: US (2), CA (1), AR (1)
• APAC: PH (1)

This is a shift from SAFEPAY's historically US-centric victimology. The European cluster (especially the Spain pair posted simultaneously) suggests either a dedicated EU-focused affiliate or a single compromised MSP/managed-provider pivot. The shared 2026-09-08 publication date across all 10 strongly implies batch processing of a negotiation backlog rather than 10 simultaneous intrusions.

Victim Profile

All identifiable victims are small-to-mid-market organizations — estimated 20–500 employees, USD $3M–$80M annual revenue. No enterprise-scale targets in this wave. This is deliberate: mid-market victims have weaker backup hygiene, no 24/7 SOC, and cyber-insurance policies that historically pay out quickly.

Initial Access Vector Assessment — KEV Correlation

The CISA KEV entries above map directly onto SAFEPAY's known access playbook:

• CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway — IKEv1 improper authentication): Highest-priority correlation. Check Point VPN exploitation matches SAFEPAY's documented edge-device access pattern. Any org running unpatched Check Point gateways should assume attempted compromise.
• CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect path traversal → RCE): MSP/RMM tooling abuse — consistent with the simultaneous multi-victim pattern in this wave.
• CVE-2025-60710 (Windows link-following privilege escalation): Used post-access for local privesc before lateral movement.
• CVE-2023-21529 (Exchange deserialization): Authenticated Exchange RCE — relevant for victims with on-prem Exchange.
• CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console malicious code): Supply-chain vector; developer workstations as initial foothold.

Assessment: The Check Point and ScreenConnect CVEs are the most probable initial vectors for this campaign wave. Both enable unauthenticated or low-friction access at scale.

Detection Engineering

The following Sigma rules target SAFEPAY's documented TTP chain: VPN/edge exploitation → RDP/PsExec lateral movement → shadow copy deletion → data staging. Deploy all three.

---
title: SAFEPAY Ransomware - Volume Shadow Copy Deletion Pre-Encryption
id: 8f3a2c1e-9d4b-4e5a-b6c7-safepay00001
status: production
description: Detects vssadmin/wmic/bcdedit shadow copy deletion and boot recovery tampering, a consistent pre-encryption step in SAFEPAY intrusions. High-fidelity when correlated with non-admin execution context.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/09/09
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
level: high
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
      - '\bcdedit.exe'
      - '\wbadmin.exe'
  selection_cmd_vss:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'shadowcopy delete'
      - 'delete catalog'
  selection_cmd_boot:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
      - 'ignoreallfailures'
  condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cmd_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate backup maintenance scripts (rare on endpoints)
fields:
  - Image
  - CommandLine
  - ParentImage
  - User
---
title: SAFEPAY Ransomware - PsExec or Remote Service Creation Lateral Movement
id: 8f3a2c1e-9d4b-4e5a-b6c7-safepay00002
status: production
description: Detects PsExec-style lateral movement via remote service creation (Event 7045/4697) and ADMIN$ share execution patterns observed in SAFEPAY ransomware staging.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/09/09
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection_event:
    EventID: 7045
  selection_svc:
    ServiceName|contains:
      - 'PSEXESVC'
      - 'PAExec'
      - 'csexec'
    ServiceFileName|contains:
      - 'ADMIN$'
      - '\\.\pipe\'
      - '%SystemRoot%\PSEXESVC.exe'
  condition: selection_event and selection_svc
level: high
tags:
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1021.002
  - attack.t1569.002
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate admin tooling - baseline approved PsExec usage per host
fields:
  - ServiceName
  - ServiceFileName
  - ComputerName
---
title: SAFEPAY Ransomware - Rclone or Cloud Exfiltration Tool Execution
id: 8f3a2c1e-9d4b-4e5a-b6c7-safepay00003
status: production
description: Detects execution of rclone and similar sync/exfil utilities with copy/move to remote storage flags - SAFEPAY's primary data exfiltration method before leak-site posting.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/09/09
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\rclone.exe'
      - '\megacmd.exe'
      - '\MEGAsync.exe'
      - '\filezilla.exe'
      - '\winscp.exe'
  selection_flags:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ' copy '
      - ' move '
      - ' sync '
      - '--transfers'
      - '--bwlimit'
      - 'mega.nz'
  condition: selection_img and selection_flags
level: high
tags:
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1567.002
  - attack.t1105
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate cloud backup agents - allowlist by signed binary path
fields:
  - Image
  - CommandLine
  - User
  - ParentImage

The Sentinel query below hunts the full SAFEPAY staging sequence — suspicious auth from edge devices, remote service installs, shadow copy deletion, and exfil tooling — pivoted on a 7-day window matching their dwell time.

// SAFEPAY Pre-Ransomware Staging Hunt - Microsoft Sentinel
// Looks for the kill-chain sequence: service creation -> shadow deletion -> exfil tooling
// across the same host within a 72h window (matches SAFEPAY staging tempo)
let Lookback = 7d;
let StagingWindow = 72h;
let ServiceInstalls =
    SecurityEvent
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where EventID == 7045 or EventID == 4697
    | where ServiceName has_any ("PSEXESVC", "PAExec", "csexec")
       or ServiceFileName has_any ("ADMIN$", "PSEXESVC")
    | project SvcTime=TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, ServiceName, ServiceFileName;
let ShadowDeletion =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete shadows")
       or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "shadowcopy delete")
       or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "recoveryenabled no")
    | project VssTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine;
let ExfilTools =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where FileName has_any ("rclone.exe", "megacmd.exe", "MEGAsync.exe", "winscp.exe")
       or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("mega.nz", "--transfers", "--bwlimit")
    | project ExfilTime=TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ExfilCmd=ProcessCommandLine;
ServiceInstalls
| join kind=inner (ShadowDeletion | extend Computer = DeviceName) on Computer
| join kind=inner (ExfilTools | extend Computer = DeviceName) on Computer
| where (VssTime - SvcTime) between (0min .. StagingWindow)
   and (ExfilTime - VssTime) between (0min .. StagingWindow)
| project Computer, Account, SvcTime, ServiceName, VssTime, ProcessCommandLine, ExfilTime, ExfilCmd
| order by SvcTime asc

Use this PowerShell script for rapid triage on any host suspected of SAFEPAY staging — it enumerates the exact artifacts this group leaves behind.

# SAFEPAY Rapid Triage Script - Run on any host flagged by the hunt above
# Collects: recent services, scheduled tasks, shadow copies, RDP exposure, exfil tools
# Output: C:\IR-Triage\safepay-triage-<hostname>-<timestamp>.txt

$OutDir = "C:\IR-Triage"
New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $OutDir -Force | Out-Null
$Report = "$OutDir\safepay-triage-$env:COMPUTERNAME-$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd-HHmmss').txt"
$Cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)

"=== SAFEPAY RAPID TRIAGE - $(Get-Date) - $env:COMPUTERNAME ===" | Out-File $Report

"`n[1] SERVICES CREATED IN LAST 7 DAYS (PsExec/staging artifacts)" | Out-File $Report -Append
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7045; StartTime=$Cutoff} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List | Out-File $Report -Append

"`n[2] SCHEDULED TASKS CREATED/MODIFIED IN LAST 7 DAYS" | Out-File $Report -Append
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt $Cutoff } |
  Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, State, Date | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-File $Report -Append

"`n[3] VOLUME SHADOW COPIES (empty output = possible SAFEPAY deletion)" | Out-File $Report -Append
vssadmin list shadows 2>&1 | Out-File $Report -Append

"`n[4] RDP EXPOSURE CHECK" | Out-File $Report -Append
$RDP = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
"RDP Enabled: $(if ($RDP.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) {'YES - EXPOSED'} else {'No'})" | Out-File $Report -Append
Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, OwningProcess | Format-Table | Out-File $Report -Append

"`n[5] EXFIL TOOL PRESENCE (rclone/mega/winscp/filezilla)" | Out-File $Report -Append
Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\','C:\Users\*\Downloads','C:\ProgramData' -Recurse -Include 'rclone.exe','megacmd.exe','winscp.exe','filezilla.exe' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Depth 4 |
  Select-Object FullName, CreationTime | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-File $Report -Append

"`n[6] FAILED LOGON SPIKE (RDP brute force indicator)" | Out-File $Report -Append
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=$Cutoff} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
  Group-Object { $_.Properties[19].Value } | Sort-Object Count -Descending |
  Select-Object -First 10 Name, Count | Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-File $Report -Append

"`nTriage complete: $Report" | Out-File $Report -Append
Write-Host "[+] Report written to $Report" -ForegroundColor Green

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist (Before Encryption Fires)

If you catch these artifacts, you are likely inside SAFEPAY's 3–10 day dwell window — you have hours, not days:

• vssadmin delete shadows or bcdedit recoveryenabled no on ANY host (Rule 1 above) — this is the 1-hour warning
• New services named PSEXESVC/PAExec or services executing from ADMIN$ (Rule 2)
• rclone/MEGAsync/winscp execution, especially with --transfers or --bwlimit flags (Rule 3)
• Check Point / ScreenConnect services restarted or config modified in last 14 days — assume credential harvest
• Domain Admin logons from VPN-assigned IP ranges at off-hours
• Large compressed archives (.zip/.7z/.rar >500MB) appearing in user profiles or temp dirs

Assets SAFEPAY Prioritizes for Exfiltration

Based on leak-site sample releases across their victim history:

1. File shares containing financial data — accounting exports, payroll, banking records
2. HR/PII stores — for healthcare victims, this means patient records (palmettoeyeinstitute.com victim class is high-risk for PHI extortion)
3. Client/project databases — professional services victims' client lists and contracts (used for secondary pressure)
4. Email archives from executive mailboxes — negotiation leverage
5. Backup server credentials/configs — they hunt Veeam/BackupExec configs to disable recovery before encryption

Containment Actions — Ordered by Urgency

1. Isolate, don't reboot the affected host — SAFEPAY encryptors sometimes trigger on reboot detection
2. Disable compromised accounts including all accounts that authenticated from VPN in the dwell window; force全域 password + Kerberos krbtgt double-reset if DA compromise suspected
3. Block exfil egress — deny rclone endpoints (mega.nz, *.backblazeb2.com) at the proxy/firewall immediately, org-wide
4. Disable PsExec/WMI lateral paths — temporarily block inbound 445/135 between workstations via host firewall GPO
5. Protect backups — take backup infrastructure off the domain or enforce immutable/offline copies NOW
6. Preserve volatile evidence — memory capture on staging hosts before remediation; SAFEPAY's Cobalt Strike beacons live in memory
7. Check the leak site — if you're posted, the exfil already happened; shift from prevention to legal/comms/regulatory response

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

Short-Term (2 Weeks)

1. Eliminate flat lateral movement paths — enforce workstation-to-workstation SMB/RDP deny rules; tier administrative accounts so DA creds never touch member servers.
2. VPN → ZTNA migration planning — SAFEPAY and peer groups are feasting on perimeter VPN auth flaws (Check Point KEV trend). Move to identity-anchored access with device posture checks.
3. Immutable backups with isolated recovery environment — offline/immutable copies plus a tested restore runbook. SAFEPAY specifically hunts Veeam credentials.
4. Egress filtering with TLS inspection on exfil channels — deny-by-default for unsanctioned cloud storage.
5. Attack surface monitoring — continuous external scanning for exposed RDP (3389), ScreenConnect (8040/8041), and VPN portals; this gang's victim profile skews toward orgs with visible, unpatched edge services.
6. Healthcare/professional-services-specific: if you hold PHI or client PII, assume double-extortion impact — pre-draft breach notification workflows and validate data inventory so you know what's exfiltratable.

Analyst Bottom Line

SAFEPAY's 10-victim single-day burst is a mid-market harvest, not a targeted campaign — small healthcare providers, regional professional services firms, and manufacturers with exposed edge infrastructure. The European concentration and simultaneous posting dates point to bulk processing of a shared access vector, with Check Point (CVE-2026-50751) and ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708) as the prime suspects. If you run either, patch and hunt today. If you're in a targeted sector, deploy the detection content in this briefing and verify your backups are immutable — SAFEPAY's encryptor fires fast once staging completes.

Security Arsenal continues monitoring SAFEPAY's leak site and affiliate chatter. Next update on material change in victim cadence or tooling.

Related Resources

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