Between November 3–13, 2026, a coordinated campaign targeted managed service providers (MSPs) and enterprise organizations by abusing ScreenConnect remote access infrastructure. The operation enrolled over 2,200 unauthorized guest sessions across 118 ScreenConnect servers belonging to 109 separate organizations, masquerading as legitimate endpoints using cryptocurrency exchange-themed naming conventions.
The attackers exploited CVE-2026-84869, a vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect that enables unauthorized session creation. Fake sessions displayed screenshots of trading desktops from platforms including KuCoin and ProBit to blend with legitimate administrative activity. The infrastructure primarily originated from IONOS hosting networks, suggesting deliberate obfuscation of origin points.
This campaign demonstrates a shift in targeting RMM platforms as initial access vectors into downstream customer environments. By compromising MSP ScreenConnect instances, threat actors position themselves for supply-chain style attacks affecting multiple client organizations simultaneously.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Distribution Method:
- Exploitation of CVE-2026-84869 in unpatched ScreenConnect servers
- Direct session enrollment without legitimate authentication
- No phishing or social engineering required for initial access
Payload Behavior:
- Creation of persistent guest sessions with crypto exchange-themed display names
- Session screenshots mimicking legitimate trading workstation activity
- Deployment of file-based payloads (7 SHA256 hashes identified)
- Potential for lateral movement into managed customer networks
C2 Communication:
- Primary infrastructure hosted on IONOS cloud services
- Encrypted ScreenConnect protocol abuse for command execution
- Legitimate RMM traffic blending with malicious session activity
Persistence Mechanism:
- Rogue guest sessions maintained in ScreenConnect server databases
- Potential registry modifications for RMM client auto-reconnect
- Service creation for payload execution upon system boot
Anti-Analysis Techniques:
- Use of legitimate remote access software to evade detection
- Display name spoofing to appear as authorized crypto trading infrastructure
- Screenshot presentation to satisfy visual verification checks
IOC Analysis
Indicator Types Present:
- CVE: CVE-2026-84869 — Patch immediately if running vulnerable ScreenConnect versions
- FileHash-SHA256 (7 hashes): Malicious payloads deployed via compromised sessions. These represent secondary stage binaries, configuration files, or persistence modules
SOC Operationalization:
- Hash Blocking: Import all SHA256 hashes into EDR block lists and threat intelligence platforms
- Vulnerability Scanning: Prioritize identification of ScreenConnect servers vulnerable to CVE-2026-84869
- Session Auditing: Review ScreenConnect session logs for unauthorized guest enrollments
- Network Monitoring: Alert on IONOS IP ranges communicating with ScreenConnect infrastructure
Recommended Tooling:
- YARA: Deploy hash-based rules for file detection
- Suricata/Zeek: Network detection for ScreenConnect protocol anomalies
- ConnectWise Audit Logs: Forensic review of session creation events
Detection Engineering
---
title: ScreenConnect Unauthorized Guest Session Creation
id: 9a8b7c6d-5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f7a6b5c4d
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious guest session enrollment in ScreenConnect servers potentially exploiting CVE-2026-84869
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/17
references:
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/fake-crypto-exchange-sessions-screenconnect
logsource:
product: connectwise
service: screenconnect
detection:
selection_event:
EventType: 'SessionCreated'
SessionType: 'Guest'
selection_crypto_names:
Name|contains:
- 'KUCOIN'
- 'PROBIT'
- 'BINANCE'
- 'COINBASE'
- 'KRAKEN'
selection_suspicious:
GuestName|contains:
- 'BACKUP-'
- 'SRV-'
- '-TRADING'
- 'EXCHANGE'
condition: selection_event and (selection_crypto_names or selection_suspicious)
falsepositives:
- Legitimate MSP-managed crypto trading infrastructure
- Authorized backup server naming conventions
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1078
---
title: ScreenConnect Malicious Payload Execution
id: 8b7c6d5e-4f3a-2b1c-0d9e-8f7a6b5c4d3e
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of known malicious payloads associated with ScreenConnect compromise campaign
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/17
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_hashes:
- '008839ef2a2d54e9efa47013bb23c773d3a152f351e9dfd3b2f4dd27086121df'
- '45136a9ab47015c4334b881df9daf824a72347daae0b5730ce3bd7d42b204bf2'
- 'b55ce5130cd2623017cca29318341f6b4656e3a1dc5ab82ce704e912d0d17535'
- 'bea82efc82672225cf29eb869972670754f15941bc61b9e5801ffd41c5c39e5f'
- 'c15b008b0296b1bc9e0f979e6f25b780e3e89edabb344c7ee8c284a1a140f0d7'
- 'e73020645e7a11a90865d93bd7f3d797585f49ef72b1ac7354392a2da7fbd91f'
- 'f6d37291c4948b974caf2e9e7e8ca9c2173d2779d1ec0a391488706bbd1a995c'
condition: selection_hashes
falsepositives:
- None expected for confirmed malicious hashes
level: critical
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
---
title: Suspicious ScreenConnect Network Connection from IONOS Infrastructure
id: 7c6d5e4f-3a2b-1c0d-9e8f-7a6b5c4d3e2f
status: experimental
description: Identifies ScreenConnect servers communicating with known malicious IONOS-hosted infrastructure
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/11/17
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection_process:
Image|endswith: '\ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe'
selection_ionos:
DestinationIp|cidr:
- '74.208.0.0/16'
- '82.165.0.0/16'
- '217.160.0.0/16'
- '212.227.0.0/16'
condition: selection_process and selection_ionos
falsepositives:
- Legitimate IONOS-hosted ScreenConnect relay servers
- MSP infrastructure hosted on IONOS
level: medium
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071
// Hunt for ScreenConnect exploitation and suspicious session activity
let timeRange = 14d;
let cryptoKeywords = dynamic(["KUCOIN", "PROBIT", "BINANCE", "COINBASE", "KRAKEN", "BACKUP-PROBIT", "TRADING"]);
// DeviceProcessEvents: Detect ScreenConnect processes spawning suspicious child processes
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeRange)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("ScreenConnect", "ScreenConnect.ClientService")
| where FileName !has_any ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "msiexec.exe") // Filter common admin tools
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| where SHA256 in (
"008839ef2a2d54e9efa47013bb23c773d3a152f351e9dfd3b2f4dd27086121df",
"45136a9ab47015c4334b881df9daf824a72347daae0b5730ce3bd7d42b204bf2",
"b55ce5130cd2623017cca29318341f6b4656e3a1dc5ab82ce704e912d0d17535",
"bea82efc82672225cf29eb869972670754f15941bc61b9e5801ffd41c5c39e5f",
"c15b008b0296b1bc9e0f979e6f25b780e3e89edabb344c7ee8c284a1a140f0d7",
"e73020645e7a11a90865d93bd7f3d797585f49ef72b1ac7354392a2da7fbd91f",
"f6d37291c4948b974caf2e9e7e8ca9c2173d2779d1ec0a391488706bbd1a995c"
)
| extend AlertSeverity = "Critical"
| union (
// DeviceNetworkEvents: ScreenConnect communicating with suspicious infrastructure
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeRange)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has "ScreenConnect"
| where RemoteIP has_any ("74.208.", "82.165.", "217.160.", "212.227.")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName
| extend AlertSeverity = "High"
)
| union (
// SecurityEvent: Windows event logs for service installation via ScreenConnect
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeRange)
| where EventID == 7045 // Service installation
| where ServiceName has_any (cryptoKeywords)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ServiceName, ServiceFileName, Account
| extend AlertSeverity = "High"
)
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
#Requires -RunAsAdministrator
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Hunt script for ScreenConnect CVE-2026-84869 compromise indicators
.DESCRIPTION
Checks for unauthorized sessions, malicious payloads, and persistence mechanisms
associated with the crypto exchange impersonation campaign.
#>
$report = @{
Hostname = $env:COMPUTERNAME
Timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
ScreenConnectInstalled = $false
SuspiciousSessions = @()
MaliciousFiles = @()
PersistenceArtifacts = @()
NetworkConnections = @()
}
# Check if ScreenConnect is installed
$scPaths = @(
"${env:ProgramFiles}\ScreenConnect*",
"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\ScreenConnect*",
"$env:ProgramData\ScreenConnect*"
)
foreach ($path in $scPaths) {
if (Test-Path $path) {
$report.ScreenConnectInstalled = $true
Write-Host "[+] ScreenConnect found: $path" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
# Check for malicious file hashes
$maliciousHashes = @(
"008839ef2a2d54e9efa47013bb23c773d3a152f351e9dfd3b2f4dd27086121df",
"45136a9ab47015c4334b881df9daf824a72347daae0b5730ce3bd7d42b204bf2",
"b55ce5130cd2623017cca29318341f6b4656e3a1dc5ab82ce704e912d0d17535",
"bea82efc82672225cf29eb869972670754f15941bc61b9e5801ffd41c5c39e5f",
"c15b008b0296b1bc9e0f979e6f25b780e3e89edabb344c7ee8c284a1a140f0d7",
"e73020645e7a11a90865d93bd7f3d797585f49ef72b1ac7354392a2da7fbd91f",
"f6d37291c4948b974caf2e9e7e8ca9c2173d2779d1ec0a391488706bbd1a995c"
)
Write-Host "[*] Scanning for malicious file hashes..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$searchPaths = @(
"$env:TEMP",
"$env:APPDATA",
"$env:LOCALAPPDATA",
"$env:ProgramData",
"${env:ProgramFiles}\ScreenConnect*",
"$env:USERPROFILE\Downloads"
)
foreach ($searchPath in $searchPaths) {
if (Test-Path $searchPath) {
Get-ChildItem -Path $searchPath -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
ForEach-Object {
try {
$hash = Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($maliciousHashes -contains $hash.Hash) {
$report.MaliciousFiles += @{
Path = $_.FullName
Hash = $hash.Hash
Size = $_.Length
Created = $_.CreationTime
}
Write-Host "[!] MALICIOUS FILE: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
} catch {}
}
}
}
# Check for suspicious registry persistence
Write-Host "[*] Checking registry persistence..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$regPaths = @(
"HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce",
"HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run",
"HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce"
)
$cryptoKeywords = @("KUCOIN", "PROBIT", "BINANCE", "COINBASE", "KRAKEN", "BACKUP", "TRADING", "EXCHANGE")
foreach ($regPath in $regPaths) {
if (Test-Path $regPath) {
$values = Get-ItemProperty -Path $regPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($prop in $values.PSObject.Properties) {
if ($prop.Name -notmatch "^PS") {
foreach ($keyword in $cryptoKeywords) {
if ($prop.Value -match $keyword) {
$report.PersistenceArtifacts += @{
Type = "Registry Run Key"
Path = $regPath
Name = $prop.Name
Value = $prop.Value
}
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious registry: $($prop.Name) = $($prop.Value)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
}
}
}
# Check scheduled tasks
Write-Host "[*] Checking scheduled tasks..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object {
$_.TaskName -match "ScreenConnect|KUCOIN|PROBIT|BACKUP" -or
$_.Actions.Execute -match "ScreenConnect"
} | ForEach-Object {
$report.PersistenceArtifacts += @{
Type = "Scheduled Task"
Name = $_.TaskName
Path = $_.TaskPath
Action = $_.Actions.Execute
Arguments = $_.Actions.Arguments
}
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious task: $($_.TaskName)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
# Check active network connections
Write-Host "[*] Checking network connections..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$ionosRanges = @("74.208.", "82.165.", "217.160.", "212.227.")
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object {
$proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$proc.ProcessName -match "ScreenConnect" -or
($ionosRanges | ForEach-Object { $_.RemoteAddress -like "$_*" }) -contains $true
} | ForEach-Object {
$report.NetworkConnections += @{
LocalAddress = $_.LocalAddress
LocalPort = $_.LocalPort
RemoteAddress = $_.RemoteAddress
RemotePort = $_.RemotePort
State = $_.State
ProcessId = $_.OwningProcess
}
}
# Check ScreenConnect session logs if available
$scLogPath = "$env:ProgramData\ScreenConnect*\*Session*"
if (Test-Path $scLogPath) {
Write-Host "[*] Analyzing ScreenConnect session logs..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-Content $scLogPath -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-String -Pattern "Guest|Session" |
ForEach-Object {
if ($_ -match "KUCOIN|PROBIT|BACKUP|TRADING|EXCHANGE") {
$report.SuspiciousSessions += $_.Line
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious session: $_" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
}
# Output report
Write-Host "`n========== HUNT REPORT ==========" -ForegroundColor Green
$report | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 4
if ($report.MaliciousFiles.Count -gt 0 -or $report.PersistenceArtifacts.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "`n[CRITICAL] Potential compromise detected! Isolate host immediately." -ForegroundColor Red
exit 1
} elseif ($report.SuspiciousSessions.Count -gt 0 -or $report.NetworkConnections.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "`n[WARNING] Suspicious activity detected. Investigate further." -ForegroundColor Yellow
exit 2
} else {
Write-Host "`n[CLEAN] No indicators of compromise found." -ForegroundColor Green
exit 0
}
Response Priorities
Immediate Actions:
- Patch all ScreenConnect servers against CVE-2026-84869 immediately
- Block all 7 SHA256 hashes at EDR and email gateway layers
- Audit existing ScreenConnect sessions for unauthorized guest enrollments
- Review IONOS IP communications with RMM infrastructure
- Reset credentials for any accounts accessed via suspicious sessions
24-Hour Actions:
- Conduct identity verification for all administrative users if credential theft is suspected
- Review MSP downstream customer environments for lateral movement indicators
- Implement conditional access policies restricting RMM session creation to authorized IP ranges
- Deploy memory analysis tools to detect fileless payloads not captured by hash-based detection
One-Week Actions:
- Architect network segmentation isolating RMM infrastructure from general user networks
- Implement just-in-time (JIT) access for ScreenConnect administrative functions
- Deploy application allowlisting on servers hosting remote access tools
- Establish baseline behavioral analytics for legitimate ScreenConnect usage patterns
- Conduct tabletop exercise simulating MSP supply-chain compromise scenario
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub
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