Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-17 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
Executive Summary
On 2026-11-16, the ransomware group SHADOWBYT3$ published five new listings on its dark web leak site, naming organizations across five sectors — Energy & Utilities, Retail & E-Commerce, Education, Manufacturing, and Healthcare — concentrated in the United States and Canada. These listings represent unverified claims by a criminal threat actor. No tier in this data confirms a breach occurred; only the named organizations or their regulators can confirm that.
All five listings appeared within a single 24-hour window, suggesting a coordinated posting wave consistent with a batch detonation or a deliberate publicity push. Security teams in the affected sectors — particularly those operating VMware vCenter, Check Point gateways, Cisco FMC, or JetBrains TeamCity infrastructure — should treat this as a prompt to audit exposure against the CISA KEV entries discussed below, regardless of whether any specific claim is substantiated.
Sourcing & Verification
Of the five listings covered in this briefing, 0 were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler; all 5 appear on ransomware.live as a single source only.
Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim published on its own leak site and is not confirmation of a breach. A leak-site posting is an accusation by a criminal actor; it may be accurate, exaggerated, partially fabricated, or entirely false.
A named organization may dispute the listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question. Defenders should treat these listings as risk signals warranting verification, not as established fact.
Security Arsenal will publish corrections as warranted and welcomes contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — SHADOWBYT3$
Note: SHADOWBYT3$ is a relatively low-visibility actor in current tracking. The profile below reflects observable patterns from its leak-site behavior and TTPs consistent with comparable mid-tier ransomware operations. Where specific attribution is uncertain, we say so.
- Aliases: No widely documented aliases at this time. The stylized name (leetspeak dollar-sign suffix) follows branding conventions seen across 2024–2026-era RaaS affiliates.
- Operating model: Behavior is consistent with a RaaS affiliate or small closed group. The single-day, five-victim posting wave suggests either a batch of pre-staged intrusions published simultaneously for leverage, or an affiliate clearing a backlog of stalled negotiations.
- Ransom demands: Not publicly documented for this group. Comparable mid-tier operations targeting organizations of this profile typically demand between USD $250K and $5M, scaled to victim revenue and perceived cyber-insurance coverage.
- Initial access methods (sector-level assessment): Mid-tier ransomware crews of this profile most commonly rely on (1) exploitation of internet-facing remote access — VPN concentrators, firewalls, RDP; (2) phishing with macro- or script-based payloads; and (3) purchased access from initial access brokers (IABs). We have no evidence tying a specific named listing below to a specific vector.
- Extortion model: Double extortion is the assumed default — data theft threatened via the leak site alongside encryption. The existence of a leak site at all confirms a data-leak extortion component.
- Dwell time: Unknown for this group specifically. Industry-wide, median dwell time for ransomware operations runs roughly 4–11 days from initial access to detonation, with data staging typically occurring in the final 24–72 hours.
Current Campaign Analysis
Listings observed (all published 2026-11-16, all single-source claims)
| Organization | Sector | Country | Corroboration |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chevron Corporation | Energy & Utilities | US | Single-source claim |
| petstop | Retail & E-Commerce | US | Single-source claim |
| University of British Columbia | Education | CA | Single-source claim |
| Gorcon Construction Inc | Manufacturing | CA | Single-source claim |
| Glenmore Pharmacy & Medical Clinic | Healthcare | Not stated | Single-source claim |
Sector targeting
The spread is deliberately broad — five sectors across five victims — which is atypical of a sector-focused campaign and more consistent with opportunistic access (e.g., buying whatever access IABs are selling) than with deliberate vertical targeting. That said, two patterns stand out:
- Critical infrastructure adjacency: An energy major and a healthcare provider in the same wave suggests the group is not avoiding high-scrutiny targets, or is deliberately seeking them for negotiation leverage.
- SMB-to-enterprise mix: The listings span from a Fortune-scale energy corporation to a local pharmacy/clinic and a regional retailer — a victim-size range consistent with opportunistic rather than curated targeting.
Geographic concentration
United States (2 confirmed) and Canada (2 confirmed), with one listing's country unstated. Pure North American focus is consistent with the group's assumed English-language negotiation operations and with typical RaaS rules-of-engagement excluding CIS countries.
Posting frequency and escalation
Five listings in a single day, against a background of low prior visibility, is an escalation pattern. Two common explanations: (1) batch publication after a campaign of parallel intrusions reached the leak-or-pay deadline simultaneously; (2) a new operation or rebrand seeding its leak site to establish credibility. Defenders should watch for whether this cadence sustains over the coming weeks — sustained daily posting implies an active access pipeline; a one-off wave implies a clearing event.
CVE relevance (hypothesis — no victim-level attribution)
We have no evidence linking any specific listing above to a specific CVE. However, the following actively exploited vulnerabilities (all CISA KEV, confirmed ransomware use) represent plausible initial-access surface for organizations in these sectors, and SHADOWBYT3$-type actors routinely scan for them:
- CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication (IKEv1): Direct edge-device compromise; the classic VPN gateway entry point.
- CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password: Management-plane compromise of the firewall estate itself.
- CVE-2026-59310 — VMware vCenter path traversal: Hypervisor management-plane access — high value for mass-encryption staging, since vCenter compromise enables one-shot VM-wide detonation.
- CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity deserialization: CI/CD server compromise; software supply-chain adjacency and a frequent source of credential theft.
- CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console embedded malicious code: Developer-workstation supply-chain entry.
Treat internet-facing instances of any of the above as urgent patching priorities.
Detection Engineering
The detections below target the TTP cluster typical of this class of operation: edge/VPN exploitation, macro-based phishing execution, RDP brute forcing, PsExec/WMI lateral movement, Cobalt Strike-style beaconing, and pre-encryption data staging.
---
title: SHADOWBYT3$-Class — Suspicious Office Macro Spawning Script Interpreter
id: 8f3a1c2e-7b41-4e9d-9c10-2a6f1e5b0001
status: experimental
description: Detects Office applications spawning script interpreters or command shells, consistent with phishing-macro initial access used by mid-tier ransomware operators.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
service: sysmon
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\winword.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\cmd.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\rundll32.exe'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Rare; some legacy line-of-business Office add-ins
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1566.001
- attack.t1059
---
title: SHADOWBYT3$-Class — RDP Brute Force Followed by Successful Logon
id: 8f3a1c2e-7b41-4e9d-9c10-2a6f1e5b0002
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of failed RDP logons (Event ID 4625, LogonType 10) from a single source followed by a successful logon (4624, LogonType 10), indicative of brute-force RDP initial access.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_failed:
EventID: 4625
LogonType: 10
selection_success:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 10
condition: selection_failed | count() by IpAddress > 10
timeframe: 10m
falsepositives:
- Misconfigured RDP clients retrying stale credentials
level: high
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1110
- attack.t1021.001
---
title: SHADOWBYT3$-Class — PsExec-Style Remote Service Creation and Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 8f3a1c2e-7b41-4e9d-9c10-2a6f1e5b0003
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service installation (Event ID 7045 with suspicious service binaries) and Volume Shadow Copy deletion — a pre-encryption anti-recovery action common across ransomware playbooks.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection_service:
EventID: 7045
ServiceFileName|contains:
- 'ADMIN$'
- '\Temp\'
- 'PSEXESVC'
selection_vss:
EventID: 1
Image|endswith:
- '\vssadmin.exe'
- '\wmic.exe'
- '\bcdedit.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'delete shadows'
- 'shadowcopy delete'
- 'recoveryenabled no'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate admin PsExec usage; backup software modifying shadow copies
level: critical
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
The following Microsoft Sentinel hunt query identifies pre-ransomware staging behavior: mass file access on a single host (potential data collection) correlated with suspicious outbound transfer volume and lateral movement artifacts in the same window.
// SHADOWBYT3$-class pre-ransomware staging hunt
// Looks for: mass sensitive-file access + archive creation + unusual outbound volume, per host, in 24h windows
let Lookback = 7d;
let StagingWindow = 1h;
let SensitiveExtensions = dynamic([".csv", ".sql", ".bak", ".zip", ".7z", ".rar", ".pst", ".docx", ".xlsx", ".pdf"]);
let FileAccess =
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where FileName has_any (SensitiveExtensions)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("explorer.exe", "searchprotocolhost.exe", "mssense.exe")
| summarize FileHits = count(), DistinctFiles = dcount(FileName), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(TimeGenerated, StagingWindow)
| where FileHits > 200;
let ArchiveCreation =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where FileName in~ ("rar.exe", "7z.exe", "7za.exe", "winrar.exe", "tar.exe")
or ProcessCommandLine has_any (" a -", " -mx", ".7z", ".rar", "psexec", "\\admin$\\")
| project DeviceName, TimeGenerated, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName;
let OutboundVolume =
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public"
| summarize BytesOutApprox = count() by DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, StagingWindow)
| where BytesOutApprox > 5000;
FileAccess
| join kind=inner (ArchiveCreation) on DeviceName
| join kind=inner (OutboundVolume) on DeviceName
| project DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, FileHits, DistinctFiles, FirstSeen, LastSeen,
FileName, ProcessCommandLine, BytesOutApprox
| sort by FileHits desc
Rapid-response PowerShell script: audits for exposed RDP listeners, recently created scheduled tasks (common persistence), and shadow-copy tampering — run on suspected hosts or via your EDR's live-response capability.
# SHADOWBYT3$-class rapid triage — persistence, RDP exposure, anti-recovery artifacts
# Run elevated. Read-only; makes no changes.
Write-Host "=== [1] RDP Listener Exposure ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$rdp = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($rdp.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) {
Write-Host "[!] RDP is ENABLED on this host" -ForegroundColor Red
Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, State | Format-Table
} else {
Write-Host "[+] RDP disabled" -ForegroundColor Green
}
Write-Host "=== [2] Scheduled Tasks Created in Last 7 Days ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$info = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$reg = Get-Item "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tasks\$($_.SecurityDescriptor -ne $null; $_.TaskPath)$($_.TaskName)" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$_
} | Where-Object {
($_.Actions.Execute -notmatch 'system32|Microsoft') -and ($_.Date -gt $cutoff -or $_.LastRunTime -gt $cutoff)
} | Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, @{N='Action';E={$_.Actions.Execute}}, @{N='Args';E={$_.Actions.Arguments}} | Format-List
Write-Host "=== [3] Volume Shadow Copy Status ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if (-not $shadows) {
Write-Host "[!] NO shadow copies present — possible anti-recovery deletion (vssadmin delete shadows)" -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host " Check System event log for Event ID 7036 (VSS service) and Sysmon ID 1 for vssadmin/wmic/bcdedit execution"
} else {
$shadows | Select-Object DeviceObject, InstallDate, VolumeName | Format-Table
}
Write-Host "=== [4] Suspicious Recently Installed Services (potential PsExec-style) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object {
$_.PathName -match 'Temp|AppData|PSEXESVC|ADMIN\$' -and $_.State -eq 'Running'
} | Select-Object Name, DisplayName, PathName, StartName | Format-List
Write-Host "=== [5] Recent Failed Logons (brute-force check, last 24h) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-1)} -MaxEvents 5000 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Group-Object { $_.Properties[19].Value } | Sort-Object Count -Descending |
Select-Object Count, Name -First 10 | Format-Table
Incident Response Priorities
T-minus detection checklist (before encryption fires)
If any listed-indicator activity is present in your environment, hunt for these pre-detonation signals immediately:
- Mass file-read bursts on file shares from a single workstation or service account (staging).
- Archive utility execution (rar.exe, 7z.exe, winrar.exe) on servers that never legitimately use them.
- Shadow copy deletion or backup-service tampering (vssadmin delete shadows, bcdedit recoveryenabled no, stopped backup agents) — this is frequently the final pre-detonation step.
- New admin-tier accounts or dormant accounts suddenly active, especially with logon type 10 (RDP) or type 3 (network) at unusual hours.
- PsExec-style service creation (Event 7045) on multiple hosts from one source within minutes — lateral movement in progress.
- Unusual outbound volume to rare external IPs, Mega/paste-style services, or newly registered domains, especially overnight.
- EDR/AV tampering events: agent service stops, exclusion additions, or defender-preference registry changes.
Assets this class of actor prioritizes for exfiltration
Based on the sectors listed and standard double-extortion economics:
- Energy/Utilities: OT-adjacent documentation, engineering drawings, SCADA network diagrams, safety/environmental compliance records (regulatory pressure leverage).
- Healthcare/clinic: Patient records (PHI), insurance billing data — maximum regulatory and reputational pressure per gigabyte.
- Education: Student records, research data, HR/financial records; universities' historically open networks make bulk exfil easier.
- Retail: Customer PII, payment-adjacent data, supplier contracts.
- Construction/Manufacturing: Bids, contracts, project financials, IP/CAD files — frequently used for competitive-extortion leverage.
- Universal: Executive/HR email archives (PST exports), legal documents, cyber-insurance policies themselves (to calibrate ransom demands).
Containment actions, ordered by urgency
- Isolate, don't nuke: Network-contain affected hosts/segments via EDR isolation or switch-level ACLs. Do not power off — preserve memory for forensic scoping.
- Kill the egress path: Block identified exfil destinations at the proxy/firewall; force-quarantine outbound traffic from affected segments to an allowlist only.
- Credential reset at scale: Reset all privileged accounts and any account observed in anomalous logons; revoke sessions and tokens. Assume domain-level credential theft if a DC was touched.
- Disable exposed edge services: If VPN/firewall/RDP exploitation is suspected, take the affected service offline or behind allowlists before the actor re-enters.
- Protect backups first: Verify backup infrastructure is isolated/immutable and confirm backup agents haven't been tampered with — before any recovery planning.
- Preserve evidence: Capture triage images (memory + key logs) before remediation; leak-site negotiations create legal exposure either way.
- Engage IR/legal/comms early: Double-extortion actors set deadlines; decision-making about the leak-site claim (including public response wording) should not be improvised at hour 48.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 hours)
- Patch or mitigate the KEV set: CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point), CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), CVE-2026-59310 (vCenter), CVE-2026-63077 (TeamCity), CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console). If patching isn't possible today, remove the service from the internet or place it behind strict IP allowlisting.
- Audit all internet-facing remote access: Enumerate every RDP, VPN, and management interface reachable from the internet. Disable or VPN-gate anything that doesn't need public exposure.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/hardware key where possible) on all remote access and privileged accounts — password-only edge auth is the single most common entry point in this class of campaign.
- Deploy the Sigma detections above (or equivalents in your SIEM/EDR) and alert, don't just log, on shadow-copy deletion and Office-spawned script interpreters.
- Verify backup immutability and test one restore. Do not assume; verify.
Short-term (two weeks)
- Segment vCenter/management planes away from the general network with dedicated jump-host access; hypervisor management compromise is what turns an incident into an enterprise-wide outage.
- Deploy network-level egress filtering and TLS inspection on server segments — most exfil staging succeeds because servers can talk to arbitrary internet destinations.
- Implement tiered administration with separate admin credentials per tier; eliminate standing domain-admin logons on workstations and member servers.
- Roll out attack-surface reduction rules blocking Office child processes and script-interpreter abuse on endpoints.
- Establish dark-web monitoring for your organization's name and domains — leak-site listing is frequently the first notification victims receive. Early detection of a listing compresses response timelines materially.
- Run a tabletop on the double-extortion scenario specifically: who decides, who talks, what legal obligations trigger at the claim stage versus confirmed-breach stage.
Related Resources
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