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SiriusQT RAT MaaS + GhostKernel Reseller Network, 29-Domain Banking Phishing Kit & GCP LLMjacking: OTX Pulse Analysis — Enterprise Detection Pack

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 21, 2026
10 min read

Three concurrent OTX pulses paint a coherent picture of a credential-theft-centric threat economy operating across endpoints, web infrastructure, and cloud control planes.

Pulse 1 — SiriusQT RAT (GhostKernel): Group-IB-tracked research documents SiriusQT, a Windows Remote Access Trojan advertised on dark web forums since April 2026 and resold under a Malware-as-a-Service model by a broker identified as GhostKernel. At least 30 confirmed license purchases indicate an active and growing affiliate base. SiriusQT is not a commodity loader — it ships with HVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing), credential theft, cryptocurrency wallet collection, clipboard monitoring, keylogging, process injection, and layered persistence. The pulse's IOC set (505 indicators) also fingerprints co-circulating families — RedLine Stealer, XWorm, AsyncRAT, Remcos, QuasarRAT, njRAT, Netwire, LV, Bladabindi, and BTMob — suggesting GhostKernel operates as a distribution hub bundling SiriusQT alongside established RAT/stealer payloads. Targeting spans the US, UK, EU, China, and Russia, i.e., opportunistic global monetization rather than a focused espionage mission.

Pulse 2 — 29-Domain Banking Phishing Kit: Netskope-tracked activity shows a single phishing kit template deployed across 29 disposable fake-bank domains since late September 2026, targeting US and Canadian financial customers. The kit's operational fingerprint is sloppy-but-effective: every cloned site shares an identical tagline, bank routing number, and support phone number — a detection gift. Objectives are credential harvesting plus full PII collection, feeding account takeover and identity fraud pipelines.

Pulse 3 — LLMjacking via GCP Phishing: Wiz-documented campaigns abuse sponsored search ads to phish privileged GCP users through fake login pages. Post-compromise, attackers manipulate organizational policies to disable security guardrails, mint service accounts with Gemini API access, invite attacker-controlled external identities, and run LLM workloads on the victim's billing account — LLMjacking. Stolen cloud credentials are the entry point; cloud resource monetization is the payoff.

Collective assessment: These are three expressions of the same criminal supply chain — harvest credentials (endpoint stealer, fake banking portals, cloud login phishing), then monetize them (RAT resale, bank fraud, cloud billing abuse). Identity is the perimeter being attacked in all three.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

SiriusQT (reseller: GhostKernel)

  • Distribution: MaaS licensing via dark web forums (active since April 2026); delivered through the broader GhostKernel ecosystem that also pushes RedLine, XWorm, AsyncRAT, and njRAT variants. Typical initial access vectors for this family cluster are malspam, cracked-software lures, and SEO-poisoned downloads.
  • Payload behavior: HVNC sessions allowing invisible interactive control (designed to defeat fraud-detection on banking sessions), browser credential and cookie theft, cryptocurrency wallet harvesting, clipboard hijacking (crypto-address swapping), and keylogging.
  • C2 communication: Heavy reliance on dynamic DNS — xweb.ddns.net, afxwd.ddns.net, and tunneling service tcp.cloudpub.ru — a classic commodity-RAT pattern enabling low-cost, disposable C2. crax.pro functions as a panel/storefront domain.
  • Persistence: Registry Run keys and scheduled tasks are the standard mechanism for this RAT family cluster, frequently from user-writable paths (%AppData%, %ProgramData%).
  • Anti-analysis: Process injection into legitimate processes to mask C2 beacons and evade per-process network controls; packed .NET payloads typical of the njRAT/AsyncRAT lineage.

Banking Phishing Kit (actor unknown)

  • Distribution: 29 lookalike domains (brayfinance.online, qtbnk.com, oakmontfb.com, allyunitybn.com, etc.) imitating US/Canadian banks.
  • Payload behavior: Cloned login and PII-collection flows; identical tagline, routing number, and support phone across all sites — a static artifact set ideal for web-content detection.

GCP LLMjacking (actor unknown)

  • Distribution: Sponsored search ads serving typosquat Google login pages (groosl.com, groonl.com, gboogl.com, gcslom.com, gpoosl.com).
  • Post-compromise chain: Privileged credential theft → org-policy manipulation to disable guardrails → service account creation with Gemini API scopes → external account invitation → cross-tenant LLM abuse billed to the victim. No malware on disk — this is pure identity/control-plane abuse, meaning detection must live in cloud audit logs and IdP telemetry, not EDR.

IOC Analysis

The pulses deliver three actionable indicator classes:

  • Domains / hostnames (C2 and phishing): DDNS-based RAT C2 (*.ddns.net, tcp.cloudpub.ru), MaaS infrastructure (crax.pro), 29 banking-phish domains, and 8+ Google typosquats. Operationalize via DNS sinkholing, proxy/secure-web-gateway blocklists, and DNS query log retro-hunts. DDNS domains have short TTLs — alert on query, not just resolution, and expect IP churn.
  • File hashes (SHA256, 505 total in the SiriusQT pulse): Feed to EDR blocklists and sandbox retro-hunts. Because MaaS affiliates repack constantly, hashes decay fast — treat them as a 7–14 day tactical window and prioritize behavioral detection over hash matching.
  • Shared-content artifacts (phishing kit): The identical tagline, routing number, and support phone number across 29 sites are high-fidelity content indicators. Deploy them as web-proxy content-match rules and brand-monitoring searches to catch future domains from the same kit before they appear in feeds.

Tooling: Ingest OTX pulses via the OTX DirectConnect API into your TIP (MISP, OpenCTI) and push to SIEM/EDR via STIX/TAXII. Decode and detonate suspicious samples in ANY.RUN, Joe Sandbox, or Hybrid Analysis; pivot on DDNS infrastructure with PassiveTotal/SecurityTrails. For cloud-side IOCs, correlate typosquat domains against IdP sign-in logs (Entra ID / Google Workspace) rather than endpoint telemetry.

Detection Engineering

YAML
---
title: SiriusQT RAT Family - Persistence via Run Key from User-Writable Path
id: 7f3a9c21-5b2e-4d8a-9f01-3c7e8a2b4d55
status: experimental
description: Detects registry Run key persistence where the binary executes from AppData/ProgramData/Temp — consistent with SiriusQT, AsyncRAT, njRAT, XWorm and RedLine persistence behavior reported in OTX pulse activity.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/21
references:
  - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/siriusqt-rat-hvnc-stealer/
logsource:
  category: registry_set
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_key:
    TargetObject|contains:
      - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
      - '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
  selection_path:
    Details|contains:
      - '\AppData\Roaming\'
      - '\AppData\Local\'
      - '\ProgramData\'
      - '\Temp\'
  filter_legit:
    Details|contains:
      - 'OneDrive.exe'
      - 'Teams.exe'
      - 'Spotify.exe'
  condition: selection_key and selection_path and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate user-installed applications updating Run keys
level: high
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1060
  - attack.t1547.001
---
title: DNS Query to Dynamic DNS or Tunneling C2 Infrastructure - GhostKernel RAT Cluster
id: 1c4d8e62-9a3b-4f7c-b2d1-6e5f0a8c3b11
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS queries for DDNS and tunneling domains observed as SiriusQT/XWorm/AsyncRAT C2 in OTX pulse data (ddns.net, cloudpub.ru tunneling, crax.pro panel).
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/21
references:
  - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/siriusqt-rat-hvnc-stealer/
logsource:
  category: dns
detection:
  selection:
    query|contains:
      - 'xweb.ddns.net'
      - 'afxwd.ddns.net'
      - 'tcp.cloudpub.ru'
      - 'crax.pro'
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Rare; DDNS is used legitimately but these specific hosts are threat-linked
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.command_and_control
  - attack.t1071.001
  - attack.t1568.002
---
title: Phishing Kit Domain Resolution - Fake Banking and Google Typosquat Campaigns
id: 9e2b5f47-3d1a-4c8e-a6f9-2b8d4e1c7a33
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS resolution of the 29-domain fake banking kit and GCP LLMjacking typosquat infrastructure identified in OTX pulses (November 2026).
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/11/21
references:
  - https://threatlabs.netskope.com/blog/2026/11/phishing_kit_bank
  - https://www.wiz.io/blog/from-phishing-to-llmjacking
logsource:
  category: dns
detection:
  selection_banking:
    query|contains:
      - 'brayfinance.online'
      - 'firstcp.live'
      - 'securecapitalcorporationlimited.com'
      - 'qtbnk.com'
      - 'norexgo.com'
      - '1stggbinc.cc'
      - 'oakmontfb.com'
      - 'allyunitybn.com'
  selection_typosquat:
    query|contains:
      - 'groosl.com'
      - 'groonl.com'
      - 'gboogl.com'
      - 'gbrokl.space'
      - 'gbrokl.xyz'
      - 'gcoalg.com'
      - 'gcslom.com'
      - 'gpoosl.com'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - None expected; all domains are confirmed malicious
level: critical
tags:
  - attack.initial_access
  - attack.t1566.002
  - attack.t1078
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Security Arsenal — OTX Pulse Hunt: SiriusQT C2, Banking Phish Kit, LLMjacking Typosquats
// Scope: last 14 days of endpoint network telemetry
let C2Domains = dynamic(["xweb.ddns.net","afxwd.ddns.net","tcp.cloudpub.ru","crax.pro"]);
let PhishDomains = dynamic(["brayfinance.online","bank.firstcp.live","securecapitalcorporationlimited.com","qtbnk.com","norexgo.com","1stggbinc.cc","oakmontfb.com","allyunitybn.com"]);
let TyposquatDomains = dynamic(["groosl.com","groonl.com","gboogl.com","gbrokl.space","gbrokl.xyz","gcoalg.com","gcslom.com","gpoosl.com"]);
let NetworkHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (C2Domains) or RemoteUrl has_any (PhishDomains) or RemoteUrl has_any (TyposquatDomains)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| extend IOC_Type = case(
    RemoteUrl has_any (C2Domains), "RAT-C2",
    RemoteUrl has_any (PhishDomains), "Banking-Phish",
    "LLMjacking-Typosquat");
let DnsHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl endswith ".ddns.net" and InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| extend IOC_Type = "Suspicious-DDNS-NonBrowser";
union NetworkHits, DnsHits
| summarize Connections = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by IOC_Type, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| sort by LastSeen desc
PowerShell
# Security Arsenal — SiriusQT / GhostKernel RAT Cluster Endpoint Hunt
# Run elevated via EDR live response or GPO startup script. Outputs CSV per host.
$report = @()

# 1. Run-key persistence pointing to user-writable paths
$runKeys = @(
    'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
    'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce',
    'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
    'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
)
foreach ($key in $runKeys) {
    if (Test-Path $key) {
        Get-ItemProperty $key | Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty | ForEach-Object {
            $val = (Get-ItemProperty $key).$($_.Name)
            if ($val -match 'AppData|ProgramData|Temp') {
                $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='RunKey'; Detail="$($_.Name)=$val"; Path=$key}
            }
        }
    }
}

# 2. Scheduled tasks executing from suspicious paths
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
    $action = ($_.Actions | Select-Object -First 1).Execute
    if ($action -match 'AppData|ProgramData|Temp' -and $_.TaskPath -notmatch 'Microsoft') {
        $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='ScheduledTask'; Detail=$_.TaskName; Path=$action}
    }
}

# 3. Active connections / DNS cache hits for known GhostKernel C2
$c2 = 'xweb.ddns.net','afxwd.ddns.net','tcp.cloudpub.ru','crax.pro'
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object { $n=$_.Entry; $c2 | Where-Object { $n -like "*$_*" } } | ForEach-Object {
    $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='DNSCache-C2'; Detail=$_.Entry; Path=$_.Data}
}
Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Where-Object { $_.RemotePort -in 1177,1604,4444,5555,6666,7777 } | ForEach-Object {
    $proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='NetConn-CommonRATPort'; Detail="$($proc.ProcessName) -> $($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)"; Path=$proc.Path}
}

# 4. Recently created executables in AppData/ProgramData (stealer drop pattern)
Get-ChildItem "$env:APPDATA","$env:ProgramData" -Recurse -Include *.exe -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Where-Object { $_.CreationTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-14) } | ForEach-Object {
        $report += [PSCustomObject]@{Check='RecentEXE'; Detail=$_.Name; Path=$_.FullName}
    }

$report | Export-Csv "SiriusQT_Hunt_$env:COMPUTERNAME.csv" -NoTypeInformation
$report | Format-Table -AutoSize

Response Priorities

Immediate (0–4 hours):

  • Push all domains from the three pulses to DNS sinkhole, SWG, and EDR network blocklists; ingest the 505 SHA256 hashes into EDR block policy.
  • Run the KQL hunt and PowerShell sweep across the estate for DDNS C2 contact, Run-key persistence, and recent user-land executables.
  • In GCP: audit SetOrgPolicy, CreateServiceAccount, CreateServiceAccountKey, and SetIamPolicy events in the last 30 days; look for newly invited external identities and unexpected Gemini API quota consumption.

24 hours:

  • All three pulses involve credential theft — treat any host or user with a confirmed IOC hit as fully compromised. Force password resets from a clean device, revoke sessions/tokens, and re-enroll MFA for affected identities. Prioritize users with banking portal or GCP console access.
  • For GCP exposure: disable and rotate all service account keys created in the window, revoke external project members, review billing for anomalous LLM spend, and check IdP sign-in logs for the typosquat referrer domains.
  • Notify fraud teams if banking-phish domains were visited with credentials entered; enable step-up authentication on affected accounts.

1 week:

  • Block DDNS categories (*.ddns.net and similar) at the proxy for non-browser processes; require egress justification.
  • Deploy application control (WDAC/AppLocker) to deny execution from %AppData%/%ProgramData%.
  • Add the phishing kit's shared content artifacts (tagline, routing number, support phone) to brand-monitoring and web-content rules to catch the next 29 domains preemptively.
  • In GCP: enforce org-policy constraints that cannot be relaxed without break-glass approval, alert on iam.serviceAccounts.create by interactive users, and block sponsored-ad click-throughs to non-google.com login domains via browser isolation or proxy policy.
  • Dark web monitoring: track GhostKernel handles and SiriusQT license resale threads — new affiliate volume is a leading indicator of campaign expansion.

Related Resources

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