Two OTX pulses published on 2026-11-21 expose complementary facets of the industrialized credential-theft economy currently operating out of dark web marketplaces.
The first pulse documents SiriusQT, a Windows Remote Access Trojan advertised on dark web forums since April 2026 and distributed under a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model by a reseller identified as GhostKernel. At least 30 license purchases have been observed, indicating a growing customer base of lower-skilled operators who now have access to capabilities that were previously the domain of mature intrusion sets: hidden VNC (HVNC), credential and browser theft, cryptocurrency wallet collection, clipboard hijacking, keylogging, process injection, and multi-mechanism persistence. The pulse clusters SiriusQT alongside a broader commodity RAT ecosystem — Remcos, XWorm, AsyncRAT, QuasarRAT, njRAT, Njw0rm, LV, Bladabindi, NETWIRE, and BTMob — and the UpCrypter loader, suggesting shared distribution infrastructure and crypter/packer services. Targeting spans the US, China, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, and the UK — effectively opportunistic global targeting typical of MaaS operations.
The second pulse documents a distinct but strategically related threat: a Microsoft 365 token spray-and-replay campaign observed between July and September 2026. Operators used adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing relays to capture authenticated sessions, then replayed stolen session tokens from infrastructure hosted by German provider 1337 Services GmbH. Over ten weeks, 79 organizations were compromised with 497 successful replayed sign-ins — a textb ook business email compromise (BEC) pipeline that bypasses MFA entirely because the attacker steals the post-authentication session artifact rather than the credential itself.
Collectively, these pulses illustrate the two dominant rails of modern intrusion economics: (1) commodity RAT tooling that steals credentials, wallets, and sessions directly from endpoints, and (2) identity-layer attacks that render endpoint hygiene moot by replaying cloud session tokens. Defenders must treat them as a single kill chain problem — initial access brokers feed token and credential theft operations, which feed BEC and ransomware precursors.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
SiriusQT (MaaS, reseller: GhostKernel)
- Distribution: Sold on dark web forums since April 2026 via tiered licensing. Delivery into victim environments is operator-dependent but observed clustering with the UpCrypter loader and shared packer services used by AsyncRAT/XWorm/njRAT campaigns. Common lures in this ecosystem include malspam with OneNote/ISO/IMG attachments and SEO-poisoned fake software downloads.
- Payload behavior: Full remote administration plus HVNC (hidden virtual network computing sessions invisible to the logged-in user — ideal for banking fraud), browser credential and cookie theft, cryptocurrency wallet harvesting, clipboard monitoring/replacement (crypto address swapping), keylogging, and file exfiltration.
- C2 communication: Mixed DDNS and bulletproof infrastructure. Observed IOCs include dynamic DNS hostnames (
xweb.ddns.net,afxwd.ddns.net), Russian cloud tunneling (tcp.cloudpub.ru), and the criminal marketplace domaincrax.pro— itself a known carding/cybercrime forum brand. The 505-indicator pulse is dominated by C2 hostnames and SHA-256 sample hashes. - Persistence: Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and service installation are standard across the clustered RAT families; SiriusQT advertises process injection (hollowing/dLL injection into legitimate processes such as
RegAsm.exe,svchost.exe, orexplorer.exe) which doubles as both persistence-adjacent stealth and an anti-analysis mechanism. - Anti-analysis: Commercial crypter wrapping (UpCrypter), process injection into trusted binaries, and HVNC channeling of operator activity so that network and process telemetry blends into legitimate RDP-like flows.
M365 AiTM Token Replay Campaign
- Actor: Unattributed; infrastructure concentration on 1337 Services GmbH (Germany) is a strong pivot for clustering.
- Technique: Phishing links route victims through a reverse-proxy AiTM kit (Evilginx-class). The proxy brokers the real Microsoft 365 login — including MFA — and harvests the resulting session cookie / refresh token. Tokens are then replayed from attacker-controlled IPs to establish persistent mailbox access, register attacker-controlled MFA methods or OAuth grants, and stage BEC (invoice fraud, mailbox rules, internal phishing).
- Scale: 79 organizations, 497 successful sign-ins over ~10 weeks (July–September 2026).
- Key behavioral signature: Impossible-travel or ASN-mismatch sign-ins, session reuse from hosting-provider ASNs, and
Office365/Exchangeactivity from IP ranges with no corporate VPN relationship.
IOC Analysis
The SiriusQT pulse contains 505 indicators across three types, each requiring different operationalization:
| Indicator Type | Examples | Operationalization |
|---|---|---|
| Domains | crax.pro | DNS sinkhole / proxy block; also flag DNS queries (infected hosts beacon before connections) |
| Hostnames (DDNS) | xweb.ddns.net, afxwd.ddns.net, tcp.cloudpub.ru | Block at egress; DDNS in enterprise environments is a high-fidelity anomaly — alert on any *.ddns.net resolution |
| FileHash-SHA256 | d1a1e6a2...eaec2, d6802fce...4ee (+500 more) | Push to EDR blocklists; hashes rotate quickly in crypter ecosystems, so pair with behavioral detections below |
The M365 pulse contains a single SHA-256 — treat it as an AiTM kit or relay artifact and hunt for it in web proxy and email detonation telemetry rather than endpoint hash matching.
Tooling guidance: Pull the full pulse JSON via the OTX DirectConnect API (/api/v1/pulses/{pulse_id}) and auto-ingest into your TIP (MISP, OpenCTI) with STIX/TAXII export to firewall, DNS, and EDR control planes. For DDNS indicators, resolve-and-alert beats resolve-and-block: sinkhole the domain but keep telemetry flowing so you can identify patient zero from the query logs.
Detection Engineering
---
title: SiriusQT / Commodity RAT Process Injection into Signed Windows Binaries
id: 7a3f1c2e-9d4b-4e6a-b8c1-2f5d7a9e3b01
status: experimental
description: Detects injection-prone .NET/Windows utilities spawned by script interpreters or Office processes — consistent with SiriusQT, AsyncRAT, XWorm, and njRAT crypter chains observed in OTX pulse (GhostKernel MaaS).
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/siriusqt-rat-hvnc-stealer/
date: 2026/11/21
modified: 2026/11/21
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\mshta.exe'
- '\wscript.exe'
- '\cscript.exe'
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\winword.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\msiexec.exe'
selection_child:
Image|endswith:
- '\RegAsm.exe'
- '\RegSvcs.exe'
- '\InstallUtil.exe'
- '\MSBuild.exe'
- '\aspnet_compiler.exe'
- '\PresentationHost.exe'
condition: selection_parent and selection_child
falsepositives:
- Enterprise software deployment pipelines using MSBuild
level: high
---
title: Commodity RAT Persistence via Registry Run Key or Scheduled Task
id: 8b4e2d3f-0e5c-5f7b-c9d2-3a6e8b0f4c12
status: experimental
description: Detects Run-key or scheduled-task persistence referencing user-writable paths — SiriusQT and clustered families (Remcos, AsyncRAT, XWorm, njRAT) commonly persist from AppData/Roaming or Public folders per OTX pulse indicators.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/siriusqt-rat-hvnc-stealer/
date: 2026/11/21
modified: 2026/11/21
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.t1053.005
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_key:
TargetObject|contains:
- '\CurrentVersion\Run'
- '\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
selection_path:
Details|contains:
- '\AppData\Roaming\'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '\Users\Public\'
- '%TEMP%'
condition: selection_key and selection_path
falsepositives:
- Legitimate per-user software updaters (Slack, Teams) — baseline and exclude known-good hashes
level: medium
---
title: Outbound Connection to Dynamic DNS or Known SiriusQT C2 Infrastructure
id: 9c5f3e4a-1f6d-6a8c-d0e3-4b7f9c1a5d23
status: experimental
description: Detects DNS resolution of dynamic DNS providers and specific SiriusQT C2 hostnames from the OTX pulse (xweb.ddns.net, afxwd.ddns.net, tcp.cloudpub.ru, crax.pro). DDNS resolution from servers is especially anomalous.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
references:
- https://www.group-ib.com/blog/siriusqt-rat-hvnc-stealer/
date: 2026/11/21
modified: 2026/11/21
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071
- attack.t1568.001
logsource:
category: dns
product: windows
detection:
selection_specific:
query|contains:
- 'xweb.ddns.net'
- 'afxwd.ddns.net'
- 'tcp.cloudpub.ru'
- 'crax.pro'
selection_ddns:
query|endswith:
- '.ddns.net'
- '.duckdns.org'
- '.no-ip.com'
- '.hopto.org'
filter_workstations:
Computer|contains: '-WS'
condition: selection_specific or (selection_ddns and not filter_workstations)
falsepositives:
- Lab environments, small-office remote access tools
level: high
// SiriusQT C2 + M365 Token Replay correlation hunt — Microsoft Sentinel
// Part 1: Endpoint network events to SiriusQT C2 / DDNS infrastructure
let SiriusC2 = dynamic(["xweb.ddns.net","afxwd.ddns.net","tcp.cloudpub.ru","crax.pro"]);
let EndpointHits = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(14d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (SiriusC2) or RemoteUrl endswith ".ddns.net"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort;
// Part 2: M365 sign-ins replayed from hosting ASNs / suspicious replay pattern
let SuspiciousSignins = SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where ResultType == 0
| where NetworkLocationDetails has "1337 Services" or IPAddress startswith "45." or IPAddress startswith "193."
| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), SigninCount=count(), IPs=make_set(IPAddress), Apps=make_set(AppDisplayName) by UserPrincipalName
| where SigninCount > 2;
// Part 3: Identity risk — legacy auth or token replay heuristics post-AiTM
let TokenReplay = SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where ResultType == 0
| where AuthenticationRequirement == "multiFactorAuthentication" and TokenIssuerType == "AzureAD"
| join kind=inner (SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(90d)
| where ResultType == 0
| summarize Locations=make_set(Location), DistinctASNs=dcount(NetworkLocationDetails) by UserPrincipalName
| where DistinctASNs > 3) on UserPrincipalName;
EndpointHits
| union (SuspiciousSignins | project TimeGenerated=LastSeen, DeviceName=strcat("IDENTITY:", UserPrincipalName), InitiatingProcessFileName="SigninLogs", InitiatingProcessCommandLine=strcat("IPs: ", tostring(IPs)), RemoteUrl="", RemoteIP="", RemotePort=0)
| order by TimeGenerated desc
# Security Arsenal — SiriusQT / Commodity RAT Endpoint Hunt
# Run elevated on suspect hosts. Outputs artifacts to console; pipe to CSV for fleet sweeps via GPO/Intune/EDR live response.
$siriusC2 = @('xweb.ddns.net','afxwd.ddns.net','tcp.cloudpub.ru','crax.pro')
$knownHashes = @(
'd1a1e6a2c0adc45a4cf40128e683499cd984d5803ad2e3a1ce26768a612eaec2',
'd6802fce5b918ed247ba85d6aa0545a8120cfbc3734b1c37794c4e381862d4ee',
'728e75ae848ac62aa705ed4e4c000dd3dfa2a4cf70a5adfbc56c5a9d2b017792',
'435bceaf240dd7711542a723a6988b280948e77e9953614d981d653680de9f49'
)
Write-Host "[1/5] Checking Run-key persistence for user-writable paths..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$runKeys = @('HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run',
'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce',
'HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run')
foreach ($key in $runKeys) {
if (Test-Path $key) {
Get-ItemProperty $key | Get-Member -MemberType NoteProperty | ForEach-Object {
$val = (Get-ItemProperty $key).$($_.Name)
if ($val -match 'AppData|Public|Temp') {
[PSCustomObject]@{Type='Persistence'; Key=$key; Name=$_.Name; Value=$val}
}
}
}
}
Write-Host "[2/5] Checking scheduled tasks executing from AppData/Public..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$action = $_.Actions | Select-Object -First 1
if ($action.Execute -match 'AppData|Users\\Public') {
[PSCustomObject]@{Type='ScheduledTask'; Name=$_.TaskName; Path=$_.TaskPath; Exec=$action.Execute; Args=$action.Arguments}
}
}
Write-Host "[3/5] Checking active network connections to SiriusQT C2..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
foreach ($c2 in $siriusC2) {
try {
$resolved = Resolve-DnsName $c2 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($ip in ($resolved | Where-Object {$_.IPAddress}).IPAddress) {
Get-NetTCPConnection -RemoteAddress $ip -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object {
$proc = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[PSCustomObject]@{Type='C2Connection'; C2=$c2; RemoteIP=$ip; State=$_.State; Process=$proc.ProcessName; PID=$_.OwningProcess}
}
}
} catch {}
}
Write-Host "[4/5] Checking DNS cache for DDNS / C2 resolutions (historic infections)..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object {
$_.Entry -match 'ddns\.net|duckdns|no-ip|hopto' -or ($siriusC2 | Where-Object {$_.Entry -like "*$_*"})
} | Select-Object @{n='Type';e={'DNSCache'}}, Entry, Data, TimeToLive
Write-Host "[5/5] Hash-checking recent executables in user-writable dirs..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$paths = @("$env:APPDATA","$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Temp","C:\Users\Public")
foreach ($p in $paths) {
Get-ChildItem $p -Recurse -Include *.exe,*.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object {$_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-30)} |
ForEach-Object {
$h = (Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($knownHashes -contains $h.ToLower()) {
[PSCustomObject]@{Type='HashMatch'; File=$_.FullName; SHA256=$h; LastWrite=$_.LastWriteTime}
}
}
}
Write-Host "Hunt complete. Escalate any Persistence, C2Connection, or HashMatch findings to IR immediately." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Response Priorities
Immediate (0–4 hours)
- Block the four SiriusQT C2 indicators (
crax.pro,xweb.ddns.net,afxwd.ddns.net,tcp.cloudpub.ru) at DNS resolver, web proxy, and egress firewall. Push all 505 SHA-256 hashes to EDR prevention. - Deploy the Sigma detections above and run the KQL hunt across the last 90 days of SigninLogs — the M365 campaign's window means stale compromises may still be active.
- Alert on any enterprise DNS resolution of major DDNS providers from servers; workstations may be whitelisted only after baseline review.
24 Hours
- Identity verification is mandatory: SiriusQT steals browser cookies and sessions; the M365 pulse proves stolen tokens are being replayed at scale. For any host with a detection hit: revoke all Entra ID refresh tokens, force re-authentication, reset credentials, and audit mailbox rules, OAuth grants, and MFA method registrations for the associated users.
- Audit
SigninLogsfor impossible travel and sign-ins from hosting ASNs (especially 1337 Services GmbH ranges). Any confirmed replay → full BEC scoping: check Sent Items, inbox rules auto-forwarding externally, and wire-transfer workflow logs. - Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) for finance, executives, and admins — AiTM defeats SMS, OTP, and push MFA.
1 Week
- Implement token protection / Conditional Access session binding (Continuous Access Evaluation + compliant-device requirements) so replayed tokens from foreign infrastructure fail authentication.
- Restrict execution of unsigned binaries from user-writable directories (AppLocker/WDAC) — this neuters most of the SiriusQT/UpCrypter delivery chain.
- Block DDNS categories at the proxy for all non-exceptioned assets, and add HVNC-behavior detections (hidden desktop creation, RDP session shadowing artifacts) to the EDR analytics library.
- Deliver targeted AiTM phishing awareness to finance/AP teams; this campaign's objective is BEC, and humans remain the detection layer of last resort.
Related Resources
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