SocGholish Disruption & Okendo Supply Chain: Middle East C2 Network & RAT Surge — OTX Pulse Analysis

---
title: Potential SocGholish Fake Browser Update Script Execution
id: 98b8a8a4-1234-5678-9abc-def123456789
description: Detects execution of JScript files often associated with SocGholish fake browser update campaigns, typically executed via wscript.exe or cscript.exe.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/24
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6186a1234567890abcdef1
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\\wscript.exe'
            - '\\cscript.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.js'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration scripts
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1189
---
title: Suspicious Okendo Widget or Staging Connection
id: 8a7b6c5d-4321-8765-fedc-ba9876543210
description: Detects network connections to known malicious Okendo-related staging domains or suspicious API endpoints mimicking widget infrastructure.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/24
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6186a1234567890abcdef3
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'wigetticks.com'
            - 'wizzleticks.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.command_and_control
    - attack.t1071
---
title: AsyncRAT or NetSupport RAT Process Creation
id: 1a2b3c4d-5678-90ab-cdef-1234567890ab
description: Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with AsyncRAT and NetSupport RAT payloads often seen in Middle East C2 campaigns.
status: experimental
date: 2026/06/24
author: Security Arsenal
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6186a1234567890abcdef1
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\\AsyncRAT.exe'
            - '\\Client32.exe'
            - '\\net_support_manager.exe'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-connect'
            - '127.0.0.1' # Local tunneling often used
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate remote administration usage
level: high
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059

// Hunt for connections to SocGholish and Okendo related IoCs
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl in~ (
    "trademark.iglesiaelarca.com",
    "content.garretttrails.org",
    "promo.summat10n.org",
    "billing.roofnrack.us",
    "devel.asurans.com",
    "storehouse.beautysupplysalonllc.com",
    "samples.addisgraphix.com",
    "api-app.uppercrafteroom.com",
    "cdn-static.okendo.io",
    "api.wigetticks.com",
    "api.wizzleticks.com"
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP
| extend IoC_Type = "Hostname/URL"
| order by Timestamp desc


kql
// Hunt for process execution associated with RAT payloads
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-connect", "inject", "regsvr32") or FileName in~ ("AsyncRAT.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has @".js" or ProcessCommandLine has @".vbs"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath
| order by Timestamp desc

# IOC Hunter for Okendo Supply Chain and RAT Artifacts

$MaliciousHashes = @(
    # Insert specific file hashes if available, currently hunting for paths/registry
)

$SuspiciousPaths = @(
    "$env:APPDATA\AsyncRAT",
    "$env:TEMP\Client32.exe",
    "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\inetcache\*")

$MaliciousHosts = @(
    "trademark.iglesiaelarca.com",
    "api.wigetticks.com",
    "api.wizzleticks.com"
)

Write-Host "[*] Checking for Suspicious File Paths..."
foreach ($path in $SuspiciousPaths) {
    if (Test-Path $path) {
        Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found suspicious path: $path" -ForegroundColor Red
        Get-Item -Path $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime, Length
    }
}

Write-Host "[*] Checking DNS Cache for Malicious Hosts..."
$DnsCache = Get-DnsClientCache -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($hostEntry in $MaliciousHosts) {
    if ($DnsCache.Entry -contains $hostEntry) {
        Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found malicious host in DNS Cache: $hostEntry" -ForegroundColor Red
        $DnsCache | Where-Object { $_.Entry -eq $hostEntry }
    }
}

Write-Host "[*] Checking for NetSupport Manager processes..."
$RatProcesses = Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -like "*net*support*" -or $_.ProcessName -like "*async*rat*" }
if ($RatProcesses) {
    Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found potential RAT process running." -ForegroundColor Red
    $RatProcesses | Select-Object ProcessName, Id, Path
}