Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-19 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
SOULGROUP Ransomware Gang: 26 New Leak-Site Claims in a Single-Day Posting Wave
Executive Summary
On 2026-11-19, the SOULGROUP ransomware operation published 26 new victim claims to its dark web leak site in a single posting wave — one of the heaviest single-day disclosure events we have tracked from this crew. The claims skew heavily toward the United States and toward sectors with high-pressure payment incentives: Healthcare (5 named organizations), Professional Services (3), Technology (3), Retail & E-Commerce, Energy & Utilities, Manufacturing, and Financial Services.
Every listing in this wave is single-source. None of the 26 postings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, and no tier of this data confirms that any breach actually occurred. A leak-site posting is an accusation by a criminal actor. Treat every name below as an unverified claim, and treat this briefing as defensive preparation — not confirmation of compromise.
Organizations in healthcare, professional services, and mid-market manufacturing should treat this wave as a prompt to review internet-facing exposure (VPN concentrators, RDP, virtualization management planes) and to hunt for pre-encryption staging behavior described in the Detection Engineering section below.
Sourcing & Verification
- Corroboration status: 0 of 26 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler. All 26 listings appear on a single source (ransomware.live aggregation of SOULGROUP's .onion site) only.
- What a listing means: Inclusion on a leak site reflects the threat actor's claim. It is not confirmation of a breach, an intrusion, or data theft. Only the named organization or its regulator can confirm an incident.
- Disputes and denials: A named organization may dispute the listing. A denial is likewise not proof the claim is false — disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question.
- Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing as new information becomes available. We welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — SOULGROUP
Note: Public reporting on SOULGROUP remains thin compared to long-tracked operations like LockBit or BlackCat. The profile below reflects observed leak-site behavior and reporting across the ransomware ecosystem; where firm attribution is not possible, we say so.
- Aliases: No widely corroborated aliases are publicly established. The crew brands itself as "SOULGROUP" on its .onion disclosure site.
- Operating model: Behavior is consistent with a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) or affiliate-driven model: high-volume, same-day batch posting across unrelated sectors and geographies is characteristic of multiple affiliates working a shared locker/leak infrastructure rather than a single closed intrusion team. This remains an assessment, not a confirmed fact.
- Ransom demands: Demand sizing in this cohort typically tracks victim revenue, ranging from low six figures for small professional-services firms to seven figures for healthcare and energy victims. Specific demand figures for this wave are not public.
- Initial access methods (typical for this cohort): Exploitation of internet-facing remote access (VPN concentrators, firewall management planes), exposed or weakly authenticated RDP, and phishing with macro- or script-based payloads. Bulk posting waves like this one often trace back to access purchased from initial access brokers (IABs) weeks earlier.
- Extortion model: Double extortion — data theft claimed before or alongside encryption, with leak-site publication used as payment pressure. The 2026-11-19 wave follows that pattern: names published first, data "proof" typically staged later.
- Dwell time: For comparable mid-tier RaaS crews, observed dwell time from initial access to detonation commonly runs 3–14 days; the batch nature of this posting wave suggests intrusions (if real) were staged over prior weeks and disclosed simultaneously.
Current Campaign Analysis
Organizations Named in the 2026-11-19 Posting Wave
SOULGROUP has listed the following organizations on its leak site. All are single-source, unverified claims:
| Organization | Sector (as listed) | Country |
|---|---|---|
| SHOPBOT TOOLS, INC. | Retail & E-Commerce | US |
| Noble Inc. | Energy & Utilities | US |
| United Medical Doctors | Healthcare | US |
| METO Systems | Technology | US |
| Nephrology Associates | Healthcare | US |
| Mid-Cumberland Human Resource Agency | Professional Services | US |
| The Vant Group | Professional Services | US |
| Sky Solutions | Technology | PA |
| Merritt Woodwork | Manufacturing | US |
| Laempe Reich | Other | US |
| Park Place Behavioral Health Care | Healthcare | US |
| Codinter | Technology | US |
| Aurora Health Management | Healthcare | US |
| Metro Tulsa Foot | Healthcare | US |
| Maglin, Miskiv & Associates | Professional Services | US |
(The full 26-listing set spans the sectors and countries summarized above; only these 15 were enumerated with detail in our source feed.)
Sector Targeting
- Healthcare is the standout. Five of fifteen detailed listings are healthcare providers or health-management organizations — specialty clinics, behavioral health, and nephrology practices. These organizations hold PHI, run lean IT teams, and face acute operational pressure, making them classic extortion targets.
- Professional services and technology round out the middle: HR agencies, law/consulting firms, and software/services companies — organizations that hold third-party client data, giving the actor secondary-extortion leverage.
- Retail, energy, and manufacturing singletons suggest opportunistic affiliate activity rather than a deliberate vertical strategy.
Geographic Concentration
Overwhelmingly United States (14 of 15 detailed listings), with single listings in PA (Panama), ES (Spain), AR (Argentina), CA (Canada), and EG (Egypt) across the full 26. This is a US-centric campaign with opportunistic spillover — consistent with affiliates working English-language access broker inventory.
Victim Profile
The named organizations are predominantly small-to-mid-market: regional medical practices, a regional HR agency, a woodwork manufacturer, boutique professional-services firms. Revenue estimates for this profile typically run $5M–$250M. Notably absent are Fortune-500-scale enterprises — this is a volume campaign against the soft mid-market, not a big-game hunt.
Posting Frequency / Escalation Pattern
A 26-claim single-day wave is an escalation signal in itself. Bulk posting typically means one of three things: (1) a negotiation deadline batch expired simultaneously, (2) the crew is clearing backlog to project momentum and attract affiliates, or (3) the operation is preparing to rebrand or exit and is dumping inventory. Watch for a follow-on wave within 7–10 days; if it does not materialize, hypothesis (2) or (3) gains weight.
Initial Access Hypotheses — KEV-Listed Exposure (NOT Victim Attribution)
We have no evidence linking any specific CVE to any specific named organization above. The following is sector-level exposure analysis of vulnerabilities SOULGROUP-cohort actors are positioned to exploit, per CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog:
- CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway, improper authentication in IKEv1): VPN-edge exploitation is the most common initial access route for mid-market ransomware campaigns. Any organization running unpatched Check Point gateways should assume hostile interest.
- CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC, hard-coded password): Firewall management plane compromise gives actors network-wide visibility and policy control — a force multiplier for staging exfiltration.
- CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter path traversal): Hypervisor management-plane access enables the "encrypt the whole estate at once" detonation pattern that defines modern ransomware impact. Healthcare and manufacturing victims frequently run consolidated VMware estates.
- CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity deserialization): CI/CD compromise is a supply-chain-shaped entry vector relevant to the technology-sector listings.
- CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console embedded malicious code): Developer-toolchain poisoning; relevant to software shops like those named in the technology listings.
If any of these products are internet-facing in your environment, patch or mitigate before you finish reading this briefing.
Detection Engineering
The detections below target the TTPs this cohort consistently uses: edge/VPN initial access, legitimate-tool lateral movement (PsExec, WMI), and pre-encryption staging (shadow copy deletion, mass file staging). Tune thresholds to your environment before production deployment.
---
title: SOULGROUP Cohort - Pre-Encryption Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 8f2a1c4e-7b3d-4e9a-a1f5-soulgroup001
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion or resizing of Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin, wmic, or PowerShell — a near-universal pre-encryption step observed in mid-market ransomware campaigns matching the SOULGROUP posting pattern.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
service: null
detection:
selection_vssadmin:
Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'delete shadows'
- 'resize shadowstorage'
selection_wmic:
Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'shadowcopy'
selection_ps:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
- '\pwsh.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy'
- 'Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy'
- '.Delete()'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate backup maintenance scripts (rare — baseline first)
level: high
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
date: 2026/11/19
---
title: SOULGROUP Cohort - Remote Service Execution via PsExec or Admin Share
id: 8f2a1c4e-7b3d-4e9a-a1f5-soulgroup002
status: experimental
description: Detects lateral movement via PsExec-style service installation and ADMIN$ share writes — the dominant lateral movement pattern in volume ransomware affiliate operations.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_psexec:
Image|endswith:
- '\psexec.exe'
- '\psexesvc.exe'
- '\paexec.exe'
- '\csexec.exe'
selection_service_install:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'ADMIN$'
- '\\system32\\'
ParentImage|endswith: '\services.exe'
selection_renamed:
OriginalFileName: 'psexesvc.exe'
condition: selection_psexec or selection_renamed or (selection_service_install and selection_psexec)
falsepositives:
- IT administration tools (SCCM, PDQ Deploy) — allowlist known deployment accounts and hosts
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1569.002
date: 2026/11/19
---
title: SOULGROUP Cohort - Suspicious Authentication Burst on VPN or RDP Edge
id: 8f2a1c4e-7b3d-4e9a-a1f5-soulgroup003
status: experimental
description: Detects high-frequency failed logon bursts followed by success on remote access services (RDP/Terminal Services) — indicative of brute force or password-spray initial access consistent with edge-exploitation campaigns.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_failed:
EventID: 4625
LogonType:
- 3
- 10
timeframe: 10m
condition: selection_failed | count() by SourceAddress > 25
falsepositives:
- Misconfigured service accounts, legacy scanners — baseline by source IP
level: medium
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1110
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1133
date: 2026/11/19
// SOULGROUP-cohort pre-ransomware staging hunt — Microsoft Sentinel
// Looks for the kill-chain sequence: mass file access/staging + shadow copy tampering + remote service creation,
// correlated on the same host within a 6-hour window.
let lookback = 7d;
let StagingHosts =
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where FileName endswith ".zip" or FileName endswith ".rar" or FileName endswith ".7z"
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\Users\\", "\\ProgramData\\", "\\Temp\\")
| summarize ArchiveCount = count(), Archives = make_set(FileName, 20) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where ArchiveCount >= 5;
let ShadowTamper =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows", "resize shadowstorage", "shadowcopy delete", "bcdedit", "recoveryenabled no")
| project DeviceName, TamperTime = Timestamp, TamperCmd = ProcessCommandLine;
let RemoteSvc =
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(lookback)
| where ActionType == "ServiceInstalled"
| extend SvcName = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).ServiceName)
| where SvcName has_any ("PSEXESVC", "PAExec", "csexec") or SvcName matches regex "^[A-Za-z0-9]{6,8}$"
| project DeviceName, SvcTime = Timestamp, SvcName;
StagingHosts
| join kind=inner ShadowTamper on DeviceName
| join kind=inner RemoteSvc on DeviceName
| where TamperTime between (Timestamp .. Timestamp + 6h)
| project DeviceName, FirstStaging = Timestamp, ArchiveCount, Archives, TamperCmd, SvcName, SvcTime
| sort by FirstStaging asc;
# SOULGROUP rapid-response triage script — run on suspected hosts or domain-wide via GPO/SCCM
# Collects: recent scheduled tasks, shadow copy state, RDP exposure, suspicious services
# Output: JSON report per host for SOC ingestion
$report = [ordered]@{
Hostname = $env:COMPUTERNAME
CollectionTimeUTC = (Get-Date).ToUniversalTime().ToString('o')
NewScheduledTasks = @()
ShadowCopies = @()
RdpExposure = @()
SuspiciousSvcs = @()
}
# 1) Scheduled tasks created or modified in the last 7 days
$cutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
try {
$report.NewScheduledTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$info = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
[pscustomobject]@{
TaskName = $_.TaskName
TaskPath = $_.TaskPath
Author = $_.Author
LastRunTime = $info.LastRunTime
Actions = ($_.Actions | ForEach-Object { "$($_.Execute) $($_.Arguments)" }) -join '; '
}
} | Where-Object { $_.LastRunTime -gt $cutoff -and $_.TaskPath -notlike '\Microsoft\*' }
} catch { $report.NewScheduledTasks = "ERROR: $($_.Exception.Message)" }
# 2) Volume Shadow Copy state — absence on a server is a red flag
try {
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$report.ShadowCopies = if ($shadows) {
$shadows | ForEach-Object { [pscustomobject]@{ ID = $_.ID; InstallDate = $_.InstallDate; Volume = $_.VolumeName } }
} else { "NONE FOUND — investigate immediately if this is a server" }
} catch { $report.ShadowCopies = "ERROR: $($_.Exception.Message)" }
# 3) RDP exposure: enabled? NLA on? Listening port?
try {
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server').fDenyTSConnections -eq 0
$nla = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).UserAuthentication
$port = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).PortNumber
$report.RdpExposure = [pscustomobject]@{ RdpEnabled = $rdpEnabled; NLAEnabled = ($nla -eq 1); Port = $port }
} catch { $report.RdpExposure = "ERROR: $($_.Exception.Message)" }
# 4) Suspicious services: random short names, non-standard binary paths
try {
$report.SuspiciousSvcs = Get-CimInstance Win32_Service | Where-Object {
($_.Name -match '^[A-Za-z0-9]{6,8}$' -and $_.Name -notin @('wuauserv','WinDefend')) -or
($_.PathName -match 'Temp|AppData|ProgramData' -and $_.PathName -notmatch 'Program Files')
} | ForEach-Object { [pscustomobject]@{ Name = $_.Name; State = $_.State; Path = $_.PathName; StartMode = $_.StartMode } }
} catch { $report.SuspiciousSvcs = "ERROR: $($_.Exception.Message)" }
$outPath = "C:\ProgramData\soulgroup_triage_$($env:COMPUTERNAME)_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd_HHmmss').json"
$report | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 5 | Out-File -FilePath $outPath -Encoding UTF8
Write-Output "Triage report written to $outPath"
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist — Before Encryption Fires
If you see these in sequence on any host, treat it as an active pre-detonation stage, not isolated noise:
- Credential access burst: Impossible-travel or burst VPN/RDP logons, especially on service accounts that never touch remote access.
- Discovery commands:
net group "Domain Admins",nltest /dclist:,arp -a,quser— from workstations, in clusters. - Staging archives: Multi-GB
.zip/.rar/.7zfiles appearing inProgramDataor user temp paths (the KQL above hunts exactly this). - Defensive tampering:
vssadmin delete shadows,bcdedit ... recoveryenabled no, backup-agent services stopped or uninstalled, EDR sensor service stop attempts. - Outbound anomalies: Sustained multi-hundred-MB/hour egress to consumer file-sharing (MEGA, GoFile, Dropbox) or unfamiliar cloud storage from servers.
Assets This Cohort Prioritizes for Exfiltration
Based on the victim mix, expect targeting of: patient/PHI databases and EHR exports (healthcare listings), payroll and HR records (HR agency and professional-services listings), client files and engagement data (consulting/legal listings), CAD/CAM designs and ERP exports (manufacturing), and domain controller NTDS.dit + backup catalogs universally. Anything that maximizes regulatory-notification pain is leverage.
Containment Actions — Ordered by Urgency
- Isolate, don't power off. Network-quarantine suspect hosts (EDR isolation or switch-level). Preserving RAM matters for forensic scoping.
- Kill the edge. Disable suspect VPN accounts, force global credential reset for any account with recent anomalous remote logons, and block identified exfil destinations at the egress proxy.
- Protect backups first. Verify backup infrastructure is segmented, offline/immutable copies exist, and backup admin credentials are rotated — before touching anything else.
- Snapshot the hypervisor plane. If vCenter is in scope (see CVE-2026-59310 exposure above), capture authentication logs and audit events before remediation wipes them.
- Engage IR retainer and counsel early. For organizations named on the leak site — whether or not you find intrusion evidence — engage legal counsel on notification posture and consider proactive dark-web monitoring of the listing for proof-package releases.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 hours)
- Patch or mitigate the KEV edge devices: Check Point gateways (CVE-2026-50751), Cisco Secure FMC (CVE-2026-20316), vCenter (CVE-2026-59310), TeamCity (CVE-2026-63077), and audit developer workstations for compromised Nx Console builds (CVE-2026-48027). If patching isn't possible today, pull the management interfaces off the internet.
- Enforce MFA on every remote access path — VPN, RDP gateways, and third-party remote tooling. The US mid-market victims in this wave are exactly the profile that runs VPN without MFA.
- Block or alert on
vssadmin delete shadowsandbcdeditexecution outside approved maintenance windows (Sigma rule 1 above). - Disable Office macros from the internet via Mark-of-the-Web policy if not already done — phishing remains a top-three vector for this cohort.
- Verify shadow copies exist on file servers and that backup credentials are not domain-admin reuse.
Short-Term (2 weeks)
- Segment the backup plane. Immutable, off-domain backups with separate credentials. This single control converts most ransomware events from existential to inconvenient.
- Deploy lateral-movement detection for PsExec/WMI/remote service creation (Sigma rule 2 and the KQL hunt above), with automatic host isolation on high-confidence hits.
- Egress filtering and DLP-lite: Alert on sustained large-volume outbound transfers to non-corporate cloud storage; default-deny rare destinations.
- Tier-0 hardening: Restrict Domain Admin logons to PAWs; disable NTLMv1; enable LSA Protection; gMSA for service accounts.
- Attack surface reduction: RDP off the internet entirely (behind VPN+ MFA or ZTNA broker); audit all internet-facing services against asset inventory — the unknown edge device is the one that gets you listed.
- Tabletop the leak-site scenario. The named organizations in this wave may or may not be breached — but your comms, legal, and exec teams should know exactly what happens if your name appears on a .onion site Monday morning.
Analyst's Bottom Line
A 26-claim single-day wave from a mid-tier crew is a stress test for the mid-market, not a precision campaign. Every one of the named organizations carries an unverified accusation, and none of this data confirms a single intrusion. But the defensive posture required is identical either way: patch the edge, watch for staging behavior, protect your backups, and know your leak-site response playbook before you need it.
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