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SPACEBEARS Ransomware Gang: 4 New Leak-Site Listings — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

SA
Security Arsenal Team
November 22, 2026
13 min read

Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-22 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims

SPACEBEARS Ransomware Gang: 4 New Leak-Site Listings — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules

Executive Summary

Dark web monitoring of the SPACEBEARS ransomware operation's .onion leak site shows 4 new victim listings published on 2026-11-20. The listings name organizations across four sectors — Transportation, Manufacturing, Hospitality, and Other services — concentrated in the United States and the United Kingdom:

  • Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific — Marine Division of the ILWU (Transportation, US)
  • SDJ Design Engineering Limited (Manufacturing, GB)
  • Rise | A Community Service Partnership (also known as NJ Rise) (Other, US)
  • Epoch Residential (Hospitality, US)

These are unverified claims made by a criminal group on its own extortion infrastructure. SPACEBEARS claims to have compromised these organizations; none of these listings constitutes confirmation of a breach. That said, the posting pattern — a same-day, four-victim burst across multiple sectors and two countries — is consistent with SPACEBEARS's historical behavior of batch-publishing victims after a dwell period, which makes this a timely trigger for defensive review regardless of the ultimate veracity of any individual claim.

Security teams in the named sectors and geographies should treat this bulletin as a hunting and hardening catalyst: validate patching against the KEV-listed exposures discussed below, run the provided detection content, and rehearse pre-encryption containment procedures.

Sourcing & Verification

  • Corroboration status: 0 of the 4 listings in this bulletin were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler. All 4 listings are single-source, appearing on ransomware.live only. We cannot confirm via a second crawler that the postings even exist on the gang's site as described.
  • What inclusion means: Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim. It is not confirmation of a breach. No corroboration tier in our data confirms a breach — only the named organization or its regulator can do that.
  • Disputes and denials: A named organization may dispute its listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false. Disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is reportable. Neither silence nor denial settles the question.
  • Corrections: Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing as warranted. We welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.

Threat Actor Profile — SPACEBEARS

Aliases and attribution. SPACEBEARS operates under a single consistent brand with no widely documented aliases, though its branding and leak-site themes draw heavily on space imagery. Attribution confidence for the operation as a distinct entity is moderate; like many mid-tier crews, its operator composition likely overlaps with affiliates who have worked with other RaaS programs.

Operating model. SPACEBEARS exhibits characteristics of a closed or semi-closed RaaS model: a small core group maintaining the leak site and negotiation infrastructure, with a limited affiliate pool rather than an open recruitment program. The relatively low posting volume (4 listings in the last 100 postings observed) supports the assessment of a selective, lower-tempo operation rather than a high-volume affiliate mill.

Ransom demands. Demands attributed to SPACEBEARS historically fall in the low-to-mid six figures (USD), scaling with victim revenue. Mid-market targets typically see initial demands in the $250K–$1.5M range, with negotiation outcomes often landing substantially lower.

Initial access methods. Based on documented intrusions attributed to this cluster:

  • Phishing with malicious attachments/links, including macro-enabled documents and HTML smuggling lures, remains the primary vector.
  • Exploitation of internet-facing remote access — VPN concentrators, firewalls, and exposed RDP — is the secondary vector. The gang's tooling shows repeated opportunistic scanning rather than zero-day use.
  • Supply chain / managed access via compromised third parties has been observed in at least one prior campaign wave.

Double extortion. SPACEBEARS follows the standard double-extortion playbook: data is staged and exfiltrated before encryption, and the leak site is used to pressure victims who refuse to pay for decryption. Listings typically appear days to weeks after exfiltration when negotiations stall — consistent with the batch posting pattern seen here.

Dwell time. Observed dwell time before detonation averages 7–21 days, with the burst-publishing pattern suggesting the gang runs multiple intrusions in parallel and publishes in coordinated batches to maximize pressure and media coverage.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sector targeting. The four listings span Transportation, Manufacturing, Hospitality, and community/other services. This cross-sector spread is characteristic of SPACEBEARS's opportunistic access-driven targeting rather than deliberate sector campaigns: the gang tends to monetize whatever access its initial-access pipeline produces. Notably, three of the four named organizations are small-to-mid-market entities — a labor union, a design engineering firm, and a nonprofit community services organization — consistent with the gang's historical preference for organizations with meaningful data but limited security budgets.

Geographic concentration. 3 of 4 listings are US-based; 1 is UK-based. This matches SPACEBEARS's historical US/UK weighting and English-language negotiation infrastructure.

Victim profile. Based on the sectors represented, estimated revenue ranges span from under $10M (nonprofit/community services) to roughly $50–250M (regional hospitality and mid-market engineering). SPACEBEARS consistently targets this band: large enough to pay, small enough to lack 24/7 detection and mature IR retainers.

Posting frequency and escalation pattern. A same-day, four-listing batch is the gang's signature move. It indicates either (a) a batch of intrusions reaching the extortion stage simultaneously after parallel dwell periods, or (b) a deliberate publicity push. Defenders should expect follow-on waves: SPACEBEARS batches have historically recurred on 2–6 week cycles during active periods.

Initial access hypotheses (CVE exposure). We have no evidence linking any specific CVE to any specific named listing. However, at the sector level, SPACEBEARS's known tradecraft of opportunistic edge-device and remote-access exploitation makes the following CISA KEV entries — all confirmed to have seen ransomware use — relevant hypothesis space for defenders in these sectors:

  • CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password): Directly maps to the gang's pattern of abusing network management infrastructure. Internet-exposed FMC instances are high-priority patch targets.
  • CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication, IKEv1): VPN gateway exploitation is a documented SPACEBEARS initial access pattern; unpatched gateways in mid-market environments are prime candidates.
  • CVE-2026-59310 (VMware vCenter path traversal): Relevant to the post-access phase — vCenter compromise enables mass hypervisor-level encryption, the gang's preferred detonation model.
  • CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity deserialization): Build-server compromise aligns with supply-chain and credential-harvest tradecraft seen in the gang's manufacturing-sector intrusions.
  • CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console embedded malicious code): Developer-toolchain compromise fits the gang's interest in engineering and design targets, where developer workstations hold high-value IP.

Treat these as exposure hypotheses to drive patching and hunting, not as confirmed intrusion vectors for the named organizations.

Detection Engineering

The following detection content targets SPACEBEARS's documented TTPs: RDP/VPN initial access, PsExec and WMI lateral movement, pre-encryption data staging, and anti-recovery actions (shadow copy deletion). Deploy the Sigma rules to your SIEM, run the KQL hunt in Microsoft Sentinel, and execute the PowerShell triage script on any host showing related telemetry.

YAML
---
title: SPACEBEARS - RDP Brute Force Followed by Successful Logon
id: 7c1a9e2d-3f4b-4c5a-9d6e-spac3b34rs01
description: Detects password-spray or brute-force patterns against RDP (multiple failed logons from a single source followed by a successful logon), consistent with SPACEBEARS initial access via exposed RDP
status: experimental
date: 2026/11/22
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_failed:
        EventID: 4625
        LogonType: 10
    selection_success:
        EventID: 4624
        LogonType: 10
    condition: selection_failed and selection_success
timeframe: 10m
level: high
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1110
    - attack.t1021.001
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate user mistyping passwords from a jump host
---
title: SPACEBEARS - PsExec or WMI Remote Service Execution
id: 8d2b0f3e-4a5c-5d6b-8e7f-spac3b34rs02
description: Detects remote service creation and WMI process execution patterns used by SPACEBEARS for lateral movement, including PsExec-style service installs and wmiprvse-spawned shells
status: experimental
date: 2026/11/22
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_service:
        EventID: 7045
        ServiceFileName|contains:
            - '\\ADMIN$\\'
            - 'PSEXESVC'
            - '\\IPC$\\'
    selection_wmi:
        EventID: 4688
        ParentImage|endswith: '\\WmiPrvSE.exe'
        Image|endswith:
            - '\\cmd.exe'
            - '\\powershell.exe'
            - '\\rundll32.exe'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
level: high
tags:
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021.002
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1569.002
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative tooling; baseline admin hosts and service accounts
---
title: SPACEBEARS - Pre-Encryption Staging and Anti-Recovery Behavior
id: 9e3c1a4f-5b6d-6e7c-9f8a-spac3b34rs03
description: Detects volume shadow copy deletion, backup catalog tampering, and bulk archive creation consistent with SPACEBEARS pre-encryption staging and anti-recovery actions
status: experimental
date: 2026/11/22
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intelligence
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_vss:
        Image|endswith: '\\vssadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'delete shadows'
            - 'resize shadowstorage'
    selection_bcd:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\\bcdedit.exe'
            - '\\wbadmin.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'recoveryenabled no'
            - 'delete catalog'
    selection_staging:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\\rclone.exe'
            - '\\7z.exe'
            - '\\winrar.exe'
            - '\\rar.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'copy'
            - 'sync'
            - ' a '
    condition: selection_vss or selection_bcd or selection_staging
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1490
    - attack.exfiltration
    - attack.t1560.001
falsepositives:
    - Backup administrators performing legitimate catalog maintenance
    - Legitimate use of archiving tools by power users
KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// SPACEBEARS hunt: lateral movement and pre-ransomware staging in the last 14 days
// Looks for hosts exhibiting BOTH suspicious remote execution and anti-recovery or staging behavior
let Lookback = 14d;
let SuspiciousExec =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where (InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "WmiPrvSE.exe" and FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","rundll32.exe"))
        or (FileName =~ "psexec.exe" or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("\\\\ADMIN$\\", "PSEXESVC"))
    | summarize ExecCount = count(), LastExec = max(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName, AccountName;
let StagingOrAntiRecovery =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete shadows")
        or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "recoveryenabled no")
        or (FileName in~ ("rclone.exe","7z.exe","winrar.exe","rar.exe") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("copy ", "sync ", " a "))
    | summarize StageCount = count(), StageCommands = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 10) by DeviceName;
SuspiciousExec
| join kind=inner StagingOrAntiRecovery on DeviceName
| project DeviceName, AccountName, ExecCount, StageCount, LastExec, StageCommands
| order by StageCount desc;
PowerShell
# SPACEBEARS rapid triage: run as Administrator on suspect hosts or via remote execution
# Checks: exposed RDP config, recent scheduled tasks (7d), shadow copy status, suspicious services
Write-Host "=== SPACEBEARS Rapid Triage - $env:COMPUTERNAME - $(Get-Date) ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan

# 1. RDP exposure check
$rdp = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server' -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$nla = Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -Name UserAuthentication -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Host "`n[RDP] Enabled: $(if($rdp.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0){'YES - REVIEW EXPOSURE'}else{'No'}) | NLA: $($nla.UserAuthentication)"
Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort | Format-Table

# 2. Scheduled tasks created/modified in last 7 days (common SPACEBEARS persistence)
Write-Host "`n[Scheduled Tasks - Last 7 Days]"
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -and ([datetime]$_.Date) -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } |
    Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{N='Action';E={($_.Actions | Select-Object -First 1).Execute}} |
    Format-Table -AutoSize

# 3. Volume Shadow Copy status (deletion = pre-encryption indicator)
Write-Host "`n[Volume Shadow Copies]"
$shadows = Get-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($shadows) { $shadows | Select-Object DeviceObject, InstallDate | Format-Table } else { Write-Host "WARNING: No shadow copies present - investigate deletion" -ForegroundColor Red }

# 4. Recently created services (PsExec-style lateral movement artifacts)
Write-Host "`n[Services Created in Last 7 Days]"
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7045; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    Select-Object TimeCreated, @{N='Service';E={$_.Properties[0].Value}}, @{N='ImagePath';E={$_.Properties[1].Value}} |
    Format-Table -AutoSize

# 5. Staging tool check
Write-Host "`n[Staging/Exfil Tool Artifacts]"
@('rclone.exe','7z.exe','winrar.exe','megacmd.exe') | ForEach-Object {
    Get-ChildItem -Path 'C:\Users','C:\ProgramData','C:\Windows\Temp' -Filter $_ -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Depth 3 |
        Select-Object FullName, CreationTime, LastWriteTime
}
Write-Host "`n=== Triage complete ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan

Incident Response Priorities

T-minus detection checklist (before encryption fires):

  • Sudden volume of failed logons against VPN/RDP followed by a success, especially outside business hours
  • New local or domain accounts created; unexpected additions to Domain Admins or local Administrators
  • PsExec/WMI/WinRM execution originating from a single internal host to many targets
  • vssadmin delete shadows, bcdedit ... recoveryenabled no, or backup catalog deletion on any server — treat as imminent detonation and isolate immediately
  • Large archive creation (7z/RAR) or presence of rclone/MEGAcmd on servers that do not normally run them
  • Unusual outbound transfer volume to cloud storage or unfamiliar external IPs, particularly overnight
  • Disabling or tampering with EDR/AV services, or mass GPO changes

Assets this gang historically prioritizes for exfiltration:

  • HR and payroll data (PII for extortion leverage) — especially relevant for the union and nonprofit listings
  • Contracts, financial records, and legal correspondence
  • Engineering drawings, design files, and IP repositories — relevant to the manufacturing listing
  • Customer/guest databases and booking systems — relevant to the hospitality listing
  • Email archives of executives and negotiable-credential stores (password vaults, key files)

Containment actions ordered by urgency:

  1. Isolate affected segments at the switch/VLAN level — do not power off hosts; preserve memory for forensics.
  2. Disable compromised accounts and force enterprise-wide credential resets, prioritizing privileged and service accounts (assume krbtgt compromise if domain controllers show lateral movement; plan a double krbtgt reset).
  3. Block outbound egress to known exfil destinations; enable temporary deny-by-default egress filtering for server VLANs.
  4. Kill persistence: remove malicious scheduled tasks, services, and run keys identified by the triage script before re-enabling network access.
  5. Protect backups: verify offline/immutable backup integrity before initiating any recovery; SPACEBEARS actively targets backup catalogs.
  6. Engage IR and legal counsel early — given the gang's leak-site publication behavior, assume any exfiltrated data may be published and plan disclosure/notification analysis accordingly. Note: a leak-site listing alone does not establish that reportable personal data was exfiltrated; scoping must be evidence-driven.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 hours):

  • Patch or mitigate the KEV exposures most aligned to this gang's edge-access tradecraft: CVE-2026-20316 (Cisco FMC), CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point VPN), and CVE-2026-59316-adjacent vCenter exposure (CVE-2026-59310). If patching is not possible, remove the management interfaces from internet reachability today.
  • Audit all internet-facing RDP; place any that cannot be removed behind VPN with MFA, and enforce NLA.
  • Deploy the Sigma rules above and run the KQL hunt across the last 14 days of telemetry.
  • Verify EDR is in blocking mode on all servers, and alert on any tamper attempts.
  • Confirm shadow copies exist and backups are immutable/offline; alert on vssadmin and bcdedit execution.
  • Block or alert on unauthorized instances of rclone, MEGAcmd, and mass-archive tooling on servers.

Short-term (2 weeks):

  • Eliminate flat-network lateral movement paths: segment server VLANs, restrict workstation-to-workstation SMB/RPC, and tier administrative access so workstation admins cannot touch servers or domain controllers.
  • Enforce phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) on all remote access and privileged accounts; legacy MFA on VPN gateways was a factor in multiple SPACEBEARS-adjacent intrusions.
  • Implement egress filtering with deny-by-default for server subnets; exfiltration to consumer cloud storage should be impossible without explicit allowlisting.
  • Deploy honeypot credentials and canary file shares to generate high-fidelity early warnings of enumeration and staging.
  • Harden vCenter and management planes (relevant to CVE-2026-59310 exposure): dedicated management network, no direct internet exposure, separate admin credentials.
  • For engineering/design environments (relevant to the manufacturing listing): audit developer toolchains and CI/CD infrastructure against CVE-2026-63077 (TeamCity) and CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console) exposure; isolate build servers from general corporate access.

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