Back to Intelligence

SPACEBEARS Ransomware: Global Surge in Tech & Business Services — CVE-Driven Attacks & Detection Engineering

SA
Security Arsenal Team
July 21, 2026
5 min read

Threat Actor Profile — SPACEBEARS

SPACEBEARS is an emerging ransomware operation that has rapidly escalated its activity in mid-2026. Operating with a high degree of technical sophistication, the group functions primarily as a closed collective with potential RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service) elements.

  • Known Aliases: None confirmed at this time.
  • Operational Model: Closed-group / affiliate hybrid.
  • Typical Ransom Demands: $500,000 – $5,000,000 USD, tailored to victim revenue.
  • Initial Access Methods: SPACEBEARS distinguishes itself through the aggressive exploitation of edge perimeter vulnerabilities (Check Point, Cisco Firewalls) and remote management software (ConnectWise ScreenConnect) rather than relying solely on phishing.
  • Double Extortion: Yes. The group operates a dedicated .onion leak site where stolen data is published 7-10 days post-encryption if demands are unmet.
  • Average Dwell Time: 3–7 days. The group moves rapidly from initial foothold to data exfiltration, minimizing the window for detection.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sectors & Geographic Focus

Based on intelligence from the dark web leak site dated 2026-07-21, SPACEBEARS has posted three (3) new victims:

  • DoAllTech (Technology, KR)
  • Anpra SAS (Business Services, CO)
  • BiesSse Group (Business Services, IT)

The campaign indicates a focused pivot towards Technology and Business Services. Geographically, the group is opportunistic, with simultaneous impacts in Asia (KR), South America (CO), and Europe (IT).

Victim Profile

The targets are mid-to-large enterprises likely possessing complex network infrastructures reliant on the specific security vendors currently being exploited.

CVE Correlation & Attack Vector

This wave of compromises is strongly correlated with the active exploitation of the following CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV):

  • CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway): Used for initial perimeter bypass via IKEv1 authentication flaws.
  • CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Secure Firewall FMC): Likely leveraged for lateral movement and security control disabling.
  • CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect): Utilized for persistent remote access and deployment of payloads.

Detection Engineering

SIGMA Rules

YAML
---
title: Potential Check Point IKEv1 Exploitation (CVE-2026-50751)
id: 41b8835c-2f1a-4a5e-9f3d-1b2c3d4e5f6a
description: Detects potential exploitation attempts against Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 vulnerabilities associated with SPACEBEARS operations.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/21
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    product: firewall
    service: checkpoint
detection:
    selection:
        product: 'VPN'
        type: ' decryption_failure' or type: 'ike_failure'
    filter_main_version:
        vpn_version|contains: 'IKEv1'
    filter_main_payload:
        payload_size|gt: 1000 # Anomaly often associated with exploit payloads
    condition: selection and filter_main_version and filter_main_payload
falsepositives:
    - Misconfigured VPN clients
level: high
---
title: Suspicious ConnectWise ScreenConnect Web Request (CVE-2024-1708)
id: 5c2a9947-3e2b-4b6f-a0e1-c2d3e4f5a6b7
description: Detects path traversal patterns in ConnectWise ScreenConnect logs indicative of authentication bypass attempts.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/21
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
logsource:
    category: webserver
detection:
    selection_uri:
        cs-uri-query|contains:
            - '..'
            - '%2e%2e'
    selection_app:
        cs-host|contains: 'ScreenConnect'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Web vulnerability scanning
level: critical
---
title: SPACEBEARS Lateral Movement via WMI
id: 6d3b0058-4f3c-5d7g-b1f2-d3e4f5g6a7b8
description: Identifies lateral movement patterns consistent with SPACEBEARS using WMI for remote process creation.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/07/21
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4688
        NewProcessName|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
        ParentProcessName|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    filter_legit_spooler:
        CommandLine|contains: 'Print' # Filter print spooler noise
    condition: selection and not filter_legit_spooler
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration
level: medium

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

Hunt for suspicious PowerShell execution often chained after ScreenConnect exploitation.

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for PowerShell processes spawned by ScreenConnect host service
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe"
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-enc", "-encodedcommand", "DownloadString", "IEX")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

PowerShell Response Script

Rapid triage script to check for signs of SPACEBEARS persistence and data staging.

PowerShell
<#
.SYNOPSIS
    SPACEBEARS Triage Script
.DESCRIPTION
    Checks for scheduled tasks created in the last 48h and suspicious Volume Shadow Copy activity.
#>

Write-Host "[*] SPACEBEARS Triage: Checking for persistence and encryption precursors..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

$DateCutoff = (Get-Date).AddHours(-48)

# Check for recently created scheduled tasks (Common persistence mechanism)
Write-Host "[+] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created/modified in last 48h..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt $DateCutoff} | ForEach-Object {
    $TaskInfo = $_ | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo
    Write-Host "ALERT: Task found - $($_.TaskName)" -ForegroundColor Red
    Write-Host "   Last Run: $($TaskInfo.LastRunTime) | Author: $($_.Author)" -ForegroundColor DarkGray
}

# Check for vssadmin deletion attempts (Shadow Copy destruction)
Write-Host "[+] Checking Security Event Log for Process Creation (vssadmin)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$Events = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; ID=4688} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
           Where-Object {$_.TimeCreated -gt $DateCutoff -and $_.Message -match 'vssadmin.exe' -and $_.Message -match 'delete'}

if ($Events) {
    Write-Host "CRITICAL: vssadmin delete commands detected." -ForegroundColor Red
    $Events | Select-Object TimeCreated, Message | Format-List
} else {
    Write-Host "No vssadmin deletion events found in last 48h." -ForegroundColor Green
}

Incident Response Priorities

T-minus Detection Checklist

  1. Log Analysis: Immediately search Check Point and Cisco logs for the specific CVE signatures listed above.
  2. RMM Audit: Audit ConnectWise ScreenConnect logs for path traversal (../) or anomalous administrative logins.
  3. PowerShell: Hunt for encoded PowerShell commands (-enc) originating from non-admin contexts.

Critical Assets at Risk

Based on current victimology (Tech & Business Services), prioritize:

  • Source code repositories and IP.
  • Client PII/CRM databases.
  • Financial accounting systems.

Containment Actions

  1. Segmentation: Isolate management planes (FMC, Check Point management servers) from the general network.
  2. Access Revocation: Revoke all local admin credentials on exposed jump boxes.
  3. Shutdown: Temporarily shut down ScreenConnect/ConnectWise services until patches are verified.

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

  • Patch: Apply patches for CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point) and CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise) immediately.
  • Block: Enforce Geo-IP blocking for non-business critical regions (KR, CO, IT) if not required.
  • MFA: Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all VPN and RMM access points.

Short-term (2 Weeks)

  • Architecture: Implement a dedicated Out-of-Band (OOB) management network for security appliance administration.
  • EDR: Deploy EDR sensors on all perimeter management servers to detect exploit attempts.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

darkwebransomware-gangspacebearsransomwaretechnologybusiness-servicescve-exploitinitial-access

Is your security operations ready?

Get a free SOC assessment or see how AlertMonitor cuts through alert noise with automated triage.