OTX pulses from June 2026 reveal a coordinated convergence of credential-harvesting campaigns exploiting AI hype and darkweb MaaS offerings. Storm-3075 is actively impersonating AI platforms (ChatGPT, Copilot, DeepSeek, Claude) through malvertising and SEO poisoning to deliver Vidar and Lumma Stealer via Hijack Loader. Concurrently, threat actor o1oo1 markets SilabRAT ($5,000/month) featuring HVNC and browser profile cloning—capabilities overlapping with Storm-3075's objectives. The attack chain consistently targets: credential theft → session hijacking → financial exfiltration, with education, finance, technology, and retail sectors as primary victims. A third campaign (UAT-8616) exploiting Cisco SD-WAN CVEs provides initial access for webshell deployment (XenShell, Godzilla), creating secondary entry points for credential theft operations.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
Storm-3075
- Distribution: Malvertising campaigns spoofing AI software downloads; SEO manipulation ranking malicious domains for AI-related queries
- Payload Behavior: Hijack Loader decrypts and executes Vidar Stealer (initial reconnaissance) followed by Lumma Stealer (bulk credential harvesting) and GhostSocks proxy for traffic obfuscation
- C2 Communication: Domain fronting through
brokeapt.cominfrastructure; AES-256 encrypted HTTP POST with custom headers mimicking legitimate AI API traffic - Persistence: Scheduled tasks via
schtasks /createwith伪装为AI update services ("C:\\Program Files\\AIUpdate\\updater.exe") - Anti-Analysis: Process hollowing into
svchost.exe; VM detection via WMI queries for hypervisor signatures; environment key checks (HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\Memory\\ImagePatchProtection)
SilabRAT (MaaS by o1oo1)
- Distribution: Darkweb forum sales targeting financially motivated actors; initial access via phishing or existing botnet infections
- Payload Behavior: Browser profile cloning via SQLite injection (
cookies.sqlite,logins.); HVNC (Hidden VNC) for invisible remote session hijacking; AsmCrypt payload encryption - C2 Communication: Custom TCP protocol over port 443 (91.199.163.124) with TLS self-signed certificates; heartbeat every 60 seconds
- Persistence: Registry run keys (
HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\WindowsUpdate) and service creation ("sc create AIUpdateService binPath=...") - Anti-Analysis: Dynamic API resolution (GetProcAddress/LoadLibrary); code obfuscation with control flow flattening
UAT-8616
- Distribution: Exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-20128, CVE-2026-20133)
- Payload Behavior: Webshell deployment (XenShell, Godzilla, Behinder) followed by Sliver C2 framework establishment; XMRig cryptocurrency mining
- C2 Communication: DNS tunneling and gsocket encrypted channels; Sliver beaconing over HTTP/3
- Persistence: Cron jobs and SD-WAN config modifications; backdoor accounts
- Anti-Analysis: Process masquerading as legitimate SD-WAN daemons; memory-only execution
IOC Analysis
Indicator Types Present:
- Domains:
brokeapt.com(C2 domain fronting),*.rongtv.xyz,*.ssffaa19.xyz(payload staging) - File Hashes: Multiple SHA256/SHA1/MD5 for Vidar, Lumma, Hijack Loader, SilabRAT payloads
- IPv4:
91.199.163.124(SilabRAT C2) - CVEs: CVE-2026-20128, CVE-2026-20133, CVE-2025-20333, CVE-2025-20362, CVE-2026-20127, CVE-2026-20122
SOC Operationalization:
- Threat Intelligence Platforms (TIPs): Import all IOCs into MISP/Anomali for automated enrichment
- EDR/XDR Integration: Push SHA256 hashes to SentinelOne, CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender for real-time execution blocking
- Network Controls: Block
brokeapt.comand*.xyzsubnets at perimeter firewalls (Palo Alto, Cisco ASA) - SIEM Correlation: Create alerts for DNS queries to known C2 domains and process creation with known payload hashes
- Vulnerability Management: Prioritize Cisco SD-WAN patching for listed CVEs (CVSS 9.8+)
Detection Engineering
---
title: Potential Vidar/Lumma Stealer Execution via Hijack Loader
id: 7f8a3c2d-1e4b-4a7f-9c6e-3d5f8a2b1c9d
description: Detects execution patterns associated with Hijack Loader delivering Vidar or Lumma Stealer, often via AI-themed lures
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/14
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/ai-brands-as-bait/
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1055
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\\svchost.exe'
- '\\explorer.exe'
Image|endswith:
- '\\\\temp\\'
- '\\\\appdata\\local\\temp\\'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-enc'
- '-w hidden'
- 'powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c'
selection_loader:
Image|contains:
- 'Hijack'
- 'Loader'
Company|contains:
- 'Unknown'
OriginalFileName|contains:
- 'hijack'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software installers using temp directories
level: high
---
title: SilabRAT Browser Profile Cloning Activity
id: 4e6d1a9c-2f3b-5d8e-7a4f-6c0e9b3d2a1e
description: Detects SQLite database access patterns consistent with browser profile cloning by SilabRAT
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/14
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/silabrat-whats-your-power/
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.collection
- attack.t1005
logsource:
category: file_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\\cookies.sqlite'
- '\\logins.'
- '\\history.sqlite'
- '\\places.sqlite'
Image|contains:
- '\\AppData\\Roaming\\'
- '\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\'
selection_process:
ProcessName|endswith:
- '.exe'
Company:
- 'Unknown'
OriginalFileName|contains:
- 'SilabRAT'
- 'Hijack'
filter_legit:
Image|contains:
- '\\Mozilla Firefox\\'
- '\\Google\\Chrome\\'
- '\\Microsoft\\Edge\\'
condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
- Legitimate browser backup tools
level: critical
---
title: Cisco SD-WAN Vulnerability Exploitation Indicators
id: 5d7e2b1d-3g4c-6f9d-8b5g-7d1f0c4e3b2f
description: Detects potential exploitation of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN vulnerabilities by UAT-8616
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/14
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/cisco-sd-wan-exploitation/
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.exploitation
- attack.t1190
logsource:
category: web
product: firewall
detection:
selection_cve:
cs-method|contains:
- 'POST'
cs-uri-query|contains:
- 'vpnportal'
- 'sdwan'
- 'vmanage'
selection_webshell:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- 'XenShell'
- 'Godzilla'
- 'Behinder'
sc-status:
- 200
- 500
selection_exploit:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- '%2F..%2F'
- 'path traversal'
- 'authentication bypass'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate SD-WAN management access
level: high
kql
// KQL Hunt for AI-themed credential theft activity
let Hashes = pack_array(
"0a26238f6c516de5885457c93042531aa59bc206a9537cebf5267cedc6c68531",
"25270cc429ada8028b5b33220ed412c47907ecceea7377d608fac5af01bed56a",
"5455341ed1bbe75a664fca2dd0794c508e1874f75360253a7ff5bc119bc92d80",
"56d722b0331bf0aaa86bb37483486c6dff6ad9427fc473ed7c3226c21a9bdd23",
"d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa",
"3a6adbe0081b2488e0f137496e92591e0c29148154b2d99faadab9cc435b879b",
"79f8da9f9fb4ac7c16d9c210f1f6ef418357a3e7bf602b1dd03a490596fa58c5",
"fb56e66920c84ef9e51db0ea23144f5755daef97cbff8613b05ab56d0dc9d623",
"fbce30a0c852972fdc24f1b6a7c270512a50ef1a7c6c88c88b92a2dcbdfdd023"
);
let C2Domains = pack_array(
"brokeapt.com",
"rongtv.xyz",
"ssffaa19.xyz"
);
let C2IPs = pack_array(
"91.199.163.124"
);
// Process execution with known hashes
DeviceProcessEvents
| where SHA256 in~ Hashes
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| union (
// Network connections to C2 infrastructure
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl in~ C2Domains or RemoteIP in~ C2IPs
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, InitiatingProcessFileName
)
| union (
// File creation related to AI-themed lures
DeviceFileEvents
| where FileName contains "AI" or FolderPath contains "AI" or InitiatingProcessFileName contains "AI"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
)
| order by Timestamp desc
powershell
# PowerShell Hunt Script for Vidar/Lumma Stealer and SilabRAT Indicators
# Run as Administrator
$ErrorActionPreference = "SilentlyContinue"
# Known malicious hashes from OTX pulses
$MaliciousHashes = @(
"0a26238f6c516de5885457c93042531aa59bc206a9537cebf5267cedc6c68531",
"25270cc429ada8028b5b33220ed412c47907ecceea7377d608fac5af01bed56a",
"5455341ed1bbe75a664fca2dd0794c508e1874f75360253a7ff5bc119bc92d80",
"56d722b0331bf0aaa86bb37483486c6dff6ad9427fc473ed7c3226c21a9bdd23",
"d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa",
"3a6adbe0081b2488e0f137496e92591e0c29148154b2d99faadab9cc435b879b",
"79f8da9f9fb4ac7c16d9c210f1f6ef418357a3e7bf602b1dd03a490596fa58c5",
"fb56e66920c84ef9e51db0ea23144f5755daef97cbff8613b05ab56d0dc9d623",
"fbce30a0c852972fdc24f1b6a7c270512a50ef1a7c6c88c88b92a2dcbdfdd023"
)
# C2 infrastructure
$MaliciousDomains = @(
"brokeapt.com",
"rongtv.xyz",
"ssffaa19.xyz"
)
$MaliciousIPs = @(
"91.199.163.124"
)
# Suspicious process paths
$SuspiciousPaths = @(
"C:\\Program Files\\AIUpdate",
"$env:APPDATA\\AIUpdate",
"$env:TEMP\\hijack"
)
# Suspicious scheduled task names
$SuspiciousTasks = @(
"AIUpdate",
"WindowsUpdateService"
)
# Registry persistence locations
$PersistenceKeys = @(
"HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\WindowsUpdate",
"HKCU:\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\AIUpdate"
)
Write-Host "[+] Starting IOC Hunt for Storm-3075 and SilabRAT Activity..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
# Check for malicious processes
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for running malicious processes..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$Processes = Get-Process | Where-Object {$_.Path -ne $null}
$MaliciousProcesses = @()
foreach ($Process in $Processes) {
$Hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $Process.Path -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($Hash -in $MaliciousHashes) {
$MaliciousProcesses += $Process
}
}
if ($MaliciousProcesses.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found $($MaliciousProcesses.Count) malicious processes:" -ForegroundColor Red
$MaliciousProcesses | Format-Table Id, ProcessName, Path -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host "[-] No malicious processes found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check for suspicious files
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for suspicious files..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$SuspiciousFiles = @()
foreach ($Path in $SuspiciousPaths) {
if (Test-Path $Path) {
$Files = Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Recurse -File -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
foreach ($File in $Files) {
$Hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $File.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($Hash -in $MaliciousHashes) {
$SuspiciousFiles += $File
}
}
}
}
if ($SuspiciousFiles.Count -gt 0) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found $($SuspiciousFiles.Count) suspicious files:" -ForegroundColor Red
$SuspiciousFiles | Format-Table FullName, Length, LastWriteTime -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host "[-] No suspicious files found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check for scheduled tasks
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for suspicious scheduled tasks..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$SuspiciousScheduledTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$SuspiciousTasks -contains $_.TaskName}
if ($SuspiciousScheduledTasks) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found suspicious scheduled tasks:" -ForegroundColor Red
$SuspiciousScheduledTasks | Format-Table TaskName, State, Author -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host "[-] No suspicious scheduled tasks found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check registry persistence
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking registry persistence..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$PersistenceFound = $false
foreach ($Key in $PersistenceKeys) {
if (Test-Path $Key) {
$Value = Get-ItemProperty -Path $Key -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($Value) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Persistence key found at $Key" -ForegroundColor Red
$Value | Format-List
$PersistenceFound = $true
}
}
}
if (-not $PersistenceFound) {
Write-Host "[-] No registry persistence found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check DNS cache for C2 domains
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking DNS cache for C2 domains..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$DNSEntries = Get-DnsClientCache | Where-Object {$MaliciousDomains -contains $_.Entry}
if ($DNSEntries) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found C2 domain DNS entries:" -ForegroundColor Red
$DNSEntries | Format-Table Entry, Data, Status -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host "[-] No C2 domain DNS entries found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check network connections to C2 IPs
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking network connections to C2 IPs..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$Connections = Get-NetTCPConnection | Where-Object {$MaliciousIPs -contains $_.RemoteAddress}
if ($Connections) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found connections to C2 IPs:" -ForegroundColor Red
$Connections | Format-Table LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, State -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host "[-] No connections to C2 IPs found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Check browser profile access (SilabRAT indicator)
Write-Host "\n[*] Checking for browser profile access (SilabRAT)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$BrowserPaths = @(
"$env:APPDATA\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles",
"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data",
"$env:LOCALAPPDATA\\Microsoft\\Edge\\User Data"
)
$SuspiciousAccess = $false
foreach ($Path in $BrowserPaths) {
if (Test-Path $Path) {
$RecentAccess = Get-ChildItem -Path $Path -Recurse -Include "cookies.sqlite","logins." -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object {$_.LastAccessTime -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(-24)}
if ($RecentAccess) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Recent browser profile access detected at $Path" -ForegroundColor Red
$RecentAccess | Format-Table FullName, LastAccessTime -AutoSize
$SuspiciousAccess = $true
}
}
}
if (-not $SuspiciousAccess) {
Write-Host "[-] No suspicious browser profile access found" -ForegroundColor Green
}
Write-Host "\n[+] IOC Hunt Complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Response Priorities
Immediate (0-4 hours):
- Block all listed domains (
brokeapt.com,*.rongtv.xyz,*.ssffaa19.xyz) at perimeter and DNS resolvers - Block IP
91.199.163.124at firewalls - Deploy file hash blocks for all listed SHA256 hashes in EDR/XDR platforms
- Isolate hosts with confirmed IOCs or suspicious process execution patterns
- Disable unused services on Cisco SD-WAN controllers pending patch validation
24 Hours:
- Conduct credential audit for users who may have accessed AI-themed phishing sites
- Force password reset for accounts with potential exposure to Vidar/Lumma credential theft
- Review browser session cookies and tokens for suspicious activity
- Validate Cisco SD-WAN patches (CVE-2026-20128, CVE-2026-20133) deployment across infrastructure
- Hunt for Hijack Loader and SilabRAT persistence mechanisms across enterprise endpoints
1 Week:
- Implement application allow-listing for AI-related software downloads
- Deploy browser isolation for high-risk users accessing AI platforms
- Harden SD-WAN management interfaces (MFA, network segmentation, anomaly detection)
- Enhance SOC playbooks for malvertising detection and response
- Establish threat hunting queries for ongoing monitoring of AI-themed credential theft campaigns
Related Resources
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