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Supply Chain Attack: lib-mtop & aone-cli RAT Cluster — OTX Pulse Analysis

SA
Security Arsenal Team
July 29, 2026
5 min read

A sophisticated supply chain attack has been detected targeting the software development ecosystem, specifically focusing on Alibaba's developer tools. Unknown threat actors have leveraged typosquatting and dependency confusion techniques to distribute a cross-platform Remote Access Trojan (RAT). The adversaries published malicious packages to the public npm registry impersonating legitimate private packages typically found within Alibaba's internal @ali scope.

The attack chain involves a distributed cluster of packages—specifically lib-mtop, aone-cli, smart-config-manager, and cloud-config-fetcher. These packages act as downloaders, fetching subsequent stages from malicious Alibaba Object Storage Service (OSS) buckets. The ultimate objective appears to be industrial espionage, gaining persistent remote access to development environments to steal source code, credentials, or API secrets associated with Alibaba infrastructure and DingTalk integrations.

Threat Actor / Malware Profile

  • Malware Families: lib-mtop, aone-cli
  • Distribution Method: Public npm registry via typosquatting (impersonating @ali/... internal packages) and dependency confusion.
  • Payload Behavior: The packages function as malicious downloaders. Upon installation via npm install, they execute scripts that reach out to attacker-controlled OSS endpoints to fetch secondary payloads (JavaScript, TAR archives, or binaries).
  • C2 Communication: Command and Control (C2) infrastructure is observed using Alibaba Cloud Function Compute (fcapp.run) domains, specifically diamond-cli-znsxphqell.cn-shanghai.fcapp.run, and specific OSS buckets.
  • Persistence: The malware establishes persistence by injecting itself into the node_modules directory of the victim's project, ensuring execution during the build process or application runtime.
  • Anti-Analysis: Use of legitimate cloud infrastructure (OSS and FC) for payload hosting helps blend in with legitimate network traffic, potentially bypassing basic egress filtering.

IOC Analysis

The current pulse provides 19 indicators, primarily consisting of URLs and Hostnames.

  • URLs: A significant number of IOCs point to aliyuncs.com endpoints (e.g., aone-ai-cli.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com). These are attacker-controlled OSS buckets used to host the malicious payloads (aone-cli.js, setting.js).
  • Hostnames: The indicator diamond-cli-znsxphqell.cn-shanghai.fcapp.run serves as a key C2 or callback server.

Operational Guidance: SOC teams should immediately block the listed OSS URLs and the FC hostname. While blocking the entire aliyuncs.com domain is likely not feasible due to its legitimate use by enterprises in the region, specific blocking of the identified bucket names and the fcapp.run subdomain is critical. The tooling required to decode these indicators involves standard network forensics (DNS/HTTP logs) and repository management systems (e.g., GitHub Actions, Jenkins, Artifactory) to scan for the presence of these package names in build logs.

Detection Engineering

Sigma Rules

YAML
title: Potential Malicious NPM Package Installation (lib-mtop/aone-cli)
id: 1b2c3d4e-5f6a-4b3c-2d1e-0f9e8d7c6b5a
status: experimental
description: Detects the installation of known malicious npm packages associated with the Alibaba supply chain attack.
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/678910
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/29
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\npm.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'install'
            - 'i '
    filter_main:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'lib-mtop'
            - 'aone-cli'
            - 'smart-config-manager'
            - 'cloud-config-fetcher'
            - 'aone-kit'
    condition: selection and filter_main
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate use of these specific package names (highly unlikely given context)
level: critical
---
title: Network Connection to Malicious Alibaba OSS/FC Infrastructure
id: 2c3d4e5f-6a7b-5c4d-3e2f-1a0b9c8d7e6f
status: experimental
description: Detects outbound network connections to known malicious payload hosting and C2 infrastructure used in this campaign.
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/678910
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/29
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        DestinationHostname|contains:
            - 'fcapp.run'
            - 'aone-cli-next.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com'
            - 'aone-ai-cli.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com'
            - 'aone-kit.oss-cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate traffic to Alibaba Cloud Function Compute (unlikely for generic enterprise endpoints)
level: high
---
title: File Creation - Malicious NPM Package Artifacts
id: 3d4e5f6a-7b8c-6d5e-4f3a-2b1c0d9e8f7a
status: experimental
description: Detects the creation of directories or files associated with the malicious npm package dependency chain.
references:
    - https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/678910
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/07/29
logsource:
    category: file_create
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains:
            - '\node_modules\lib-mtop'
            - '\node_modules\aone-cli'
            - '\node_modules\smart-config-manager'
            - '\node_modules\aone-kit'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Developer systems legitimately installing these packages (verify context)
level: critical

KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious infrastructure
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteUrl has "aliyuncs.com" 
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("aone-cli", "aone-kit", "lib-mtop") 
| summarize Count=count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl, AccountSid 
| order by Count desc

// Hunt for process execution involving npm install with suspicious packages
DeviceProcessEvents 
| where FileName in~ ("npm.cmd", "npm.exe", "node.exe") 
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("install", "i ") 
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("lib-mtop", "aone-cli", "smart-config-manager", "cloud-config-fetcher") 
| project DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, Timestamp

PowerShell IOC Hunt Script

PowerShell
# IOC Hunt: NPM Supply Chain Typosquatting (lib-mtop / aone-cli)
# Scans local drives for node_modules containing the malicious packages.

$MaliciousPackages = @("lib-mtop", "aone-cli", "smart-config-manager", "cloud-config-fetcher", "aone-kit")
Write-Host "[+] Scanning for malicious npm packages..." -ForegroundColor Cyan

Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem | ForEach-Object {
    $Drive = $_.Root
    Write-Host "Scanning $Drive..." -ForegroundColor DarkGray
    
    try {
        $NodeModules = Get-ChildItem -Path $Drive -Directory -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Filter "node_modules" | Select-Object -First 50 # Limit depth for performance
        
        foreach ($Mod in $NodeModules) {
            foreach ($Pkg in $MaliciousPackages) {
                $TargetPath = Join-Path $Mod.FullName $Pkg
                if (Test-Path $TargetPath) {
                    Write-Host "[!] MALICIOUS PACKAGE FOUND: $TargetPath" -ForegroundColor Red
                    # Optional: Remove-Item -Path $TargetPath -Recurse -Force
                }
            }
        }
    } catch {
        # Ignore access errors
    }
}

Write-Host "[+] Scan complete." -ForegroundColor Green


# Response Priorities

*   **Immediate:**
    *   Block all identified OSS URLs and the `diamond-cli-znsxphqell.cn-shanghai.fcapp.run` hostname at the proxy and firewall.
    *   Scan artifact repositories (npm, Artifactory) for the presence of `lib-mtop`, `aone-cli`, and related packages. Delete any versions found.
*   **24h:**
    *   Identify all developers who have executed `npm install` within the last 48 hours.
    *   Run the PowerShell hunt script on developer workstations and build servers to detect local artifacts.
    *   Rotate API keys and credentials stored in environments where these packages were installed, as the RAT is designed for theft.
*   **1 Week:**
    *   Implement strict package allow-listing (npm allowlists) for the internal developer environment.
    *   Review `package-lock.` files in code repositories to ensure no typosquatted dependencies were committed.

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

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