Recent OTX Pulse data highlights a convergence of high-threat activity spanning financially motivated ransomware, state-sponsored espionage, and developer-focused supply chain attacks. The Gentlemen RaaS operation has accelerated, claiming over 400 victims through aggressive defense evasion tactics. Simultaneously, the China-aligned Webworm APT has shifted focus to European government and education sectors, utilizing novel "living-off-the-land" cloud services like Discord and Microsoft Graph API for C2. Separately, a massive SEO poisoning campaign is targeting developers in the US and UK by impersonating legitimate AI tools (Gemini, Claude) to deliver infostealers. These disparate campaigns share a reliance on PowerShell, scheduled tasks, and trusted cloud infrastructure to bypass traditional perimeter defenses.
Threat Actor / Malware Profile
The Gentlemen (RaaS)
- Type: Ransomware-as-a-Service (Qilin/BabyMeteoric variant).
- Distribution: Phishing, initial access brokers.
- Payload Behavior: Encrypts files, utilizes tools like
MpTamperBulkExclto bypass AV. - Persistence: Creates Scheduled Tasks to maintain access.
- Defense Evasion: Explicitly clears Security, System, and Application Event Logs (
wevtutil cl) to hinder forensics. Disables Microsoft Defender.
Webworm (China-aligned APT)
- Type: State-sponsored Espionage.
- Malware: EchoCreep, GraphWorm.
- C2 Communication: EchoCreep uses Discord for command and control; GraphWorm leverages Microsoft Graph API.
- Targeting: Government and Education sectors in Europe (Belgium, Czechia, Hungary, Italy, etc.).
- Techniques: GitHub staging, proxy tools (WormFrp), WormSockets.
SEO Poisoning Actors (Unknown)
- Type: eCrime / Credential Theft.
- Targeting: Software Developers / Technology sector.
- Method: Typosquatting and SEO poisoning to fake domains for "Gemini CLI", "Claude Code", "Node.js".
- Payload: Fileless PowerShell scripts delivering infostealers.
IOC Analysis
The provided indicators cover multiple vectors of compromise:
- IPv4 (193.233.202.17, 77.110.122.137): Hard C2 infrastructure associated with The Gentlemen ransomware. These should be blocked immediately at the firewall and proxy level.
- Domains (gemini-setup.com, claude-setup.com): Typosquatted domains used in the developer-targeted campaign. While
chocolatey.netis listed as a sample, it is likely a legitimate domain referenced in context or spoofed; SOC teams should verify DNS traffic for these specific fraudulent lookalikes. - File Hashes (SHA1/SHA256): Samples of EchoCreep, GraphWorm, and the AI-themed infostealers. These can be loaded into EDR solutions for memory scanning and disk hunts.
- CVEs (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2017-7692): Vulnerabilities exploited for initial access or privilege escalation.
Operational Guidance: SOC teams should import these IOCs into their SIEM for correlation. Focus heavily on network egress logs connecting to Discord IP ranges from non-workstation devices (servers) and DNS queries for the fake AI domains.
Detection Engineering
Sigma Rules
---
title: Potential The Gentlemen Ransomware Defense Evasion - Log Clearing
id: 4c8b6d12-1c5a-4a5f-9b8c-1d2e3f4a5b6c
description: Detects attempts to clear Security, System, or Application event logs, a tactic observed in The Gentlemen RaaS incidents.
status: experimental
date: 2026/05/22
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/66522a13f2b9e7d6e3a8b9c7
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1070.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4688
NewProcessName|endswith: '\wevtutil.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'cl Security'
- 'cl System'
- 'cl Application'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator maintenance
level: high
---
title: Webworm APT - Discord C2 Traffic via PowerShell
date: 2026/05/22
id: 5d9c7e23-2d6b-5b6g-0c9d-2e3f4a5b6c7d
description: Detects PowerShell processes initiating network connections to Discord endpoints, indicative of EchoCreep malware C2.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/66522b24f3c0e8d7f4b9c0d8
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1102.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: network_connection
detection:
selection_img:
Initiated: 'true'
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
selection_dest:
DestinationHostname|contains: 'discord.com'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate developer use of Discord APIs
level: medium
---
title: AI Impersonation - PowerShell Download from Typosquatted Domains
id: 6e0d8f34-3e7c-6c7h-1d0e-3f4a5b6c7d8e
date: 2026/05/22
description: Detects PowerShell downloading payloads from domains mimicking legitimate AI tools (Gemini, Claude).
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/66522c35g4d1f9e8g5c0d1e9
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection_pwsh:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
selection_flags:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Invoke-WebRequest'
- 'IEX'
- 'DownloadString'
selection_domains:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'gemini-setup.com'
- 'claude-setup.com'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
KQL Hunt Query (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunt for Webworm Discord C2 and SEO Poisoning domains
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("discord.com", "gemini-setup.com", "claude-setup.com")
or RemoteIP in ("193.233.202.17", "77.110.122.137")
| extend FullProcess = InitiatingProcessFileName, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, FullProcess, CommandLine
| where not(FullProcess in ~("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe")) and RemoteUrl has "discord"
| summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl, FullProcess
PowerShell Hunt Script
<#
.SYNOPSIS
Hunt for The Gentlemen persistence and Webworm artifacts.
.DESCRIPTION
Checks for Scheduled Tasks created by attackers and suspicious network connections.
#>
# Check for Scheduled Tasks created recently (last 7 days) that run PowerShell or Cmd
$schtasks =schtasks /query /fo LIST /v
Write-Host "Checking for recently created suspicious Scheduled Tasks..."
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} |
ForEach-Object {
$task = $_
$action = $task.Actions.Execute
if ($action -match "powershell" -or $action -match "cmd") {
Write-Host "[!] Suspicious Task Found: $($task.TaskName)" -ForegroundColor Yellow
Write-Host " Action: $action"
Write-Host " Args: $($task.Actions.Arguments)"
}
}
# Check for the specific file hashes (The Gentlemen)
$targetHashes = @(
"f918535f974591ef031bd0f30a8171e3da27a6754e6426a8ba095f83195661c8",
"9c87e8162b39fbb773c416006b16f8e34aca53372d1b2d4a584df0ffc69ad333"
)
Write-Host "\nScanning for malware hashes..."
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
ForEach-Object {
$hash = (Get-FileHash -Path $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Hash
if ($targetHashes -contains $hash) {
Write-Host "[!] MALWARE DETECTED: $($_.FullName)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
}
Response Priorities
- Immediate: Block the IP addresses
193.233.202.17and77.110.122.137at the perimeter. Block DNS resolution forgemini-setup.comandclaude-setup.com. Search endpoints for the SHA256 hashes provided in the IOC list. - 24h: Initiate credential reset for developer accounts who may have been targeted by the SEO poisoning campaign. Review authentication logs for anomalous access linked to the Webworm targeting set (Gov/Edu).
- 1 week: Harden the environment against PowerShell-based attacks by enforcing constrained language mode or strict script signing policies. Review allow-lists for AI developer tools to prevent typosquatting success. Audit logs for evidence of event log clearing (
wevtutil) to identify potential dormant RaaS activity.
Related Resources
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