---
title: Potential ScreenConnect Path Traversal Exploit CVE-2024-1708
id: a1b2c3d4-5678-90ab-cdef-1234567890ab
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious process execution patterns associated with ConnectWise ScreenConnect authentication bypass and path traversal vulnerability.
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/05/24
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2024.1708
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\Web.exe' # ScreenConnect web server process
        Image|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative use via ScreenConnect
level: critical
---
title: SmarterMail Suspicious File Upload - CVE-2025-52691
id: b2c3d4e5-6789-01ab-cdef-2345678901bc
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of ASPX files in web directories characteristic of SmarterMail exploitation.
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/05/24
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2025.52691
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_create
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Mail App\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.aspx'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate software updates
level: high
---
title: Large Volume Data Staging Prior to Encryption
id: c3d4e5f6-7890-12bc-def0-3456789012cd
status: experimental
description: Detects rapid archiving of multiple files typical of ransomware data staging/exfiltration preparation.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/
author: Security Arsenal Research
date: 2026/05/24
tags:
    - attack.collection
    - attack.exfiltration
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_create
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\winrar.exe'
            - '\7z.exe'
            - '\winzip.exe'
        FileName|contains:
            - '.zip'
            - '.rar'
            - '.7z'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection | count() > 10
falsepositives:
    - System backups
    - Legitimate user archiving
level: high

// Hunt for suspicious process spawns from Web Servers (IIS/SmarterMail/ScreenConnect)
Process
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in ("w3wp.exe", "Web.exe", "MailService.exe")
| where ProcessFileName in ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine
| extend TimestampFormat = format_datetime(Timestamp, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss')
| order by TimestampFormat desc

# Check for Scheduled Tasks created in the last 7 days
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {$_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} | Select-Object TaskName, Date, Author, Actions

# Check for suspicious ScreenConnect log patterns (if accessible)
$screenConnectPath = "C:\Program Files (x86)\ConnectWise\ScreenConnect"
if (Test-Path $screenConnectPath) {
    Write-Host "[!] ScreenConnect Detected. Reviewing recent error logs..."
    Get-ChildItem -Path "$screenConnectPath\Web Server\Logs" -Recurse -Filter "*.txt" | 
    Where-Object {$_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddHours(24)} | 
    Select-String -Pattern "assembly loading|path traversal" | Select-Object -First 10
}

# Check for SmarterMail ASPX shells in App_Data
$mailPath = "C:\Program Files (x86)\SmarterTools\SmarterMail"
if (Test-Path $mailPath) {
    Write-Host "[!] SmarterMail Detected. Scanning for recent ASPX modifications..."
    Get-ChildItem -Path $mailPath -Recurse -Filter "*.aspx" | 
    Where-Object {$_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(1)} | 
    Select-Object FullName, LastWriteTime
}


# Incident Response Priorities

**T-Minus Detection Checklist (Pre-Encryption):**
1.  **Audit Internet-Facing Assets:** Immediately scan for Cisco FMC, ConnectWise ScreenConnect, and SmarterMail instances. Check logs for the specific exploit signatures for CVE-2024-1708, CVE-2026-20131, and CVE-2025-52691.
2.  **Process Monitoring:** Look for `w3wp.exe` or `Web.exe` spawning `cmd.exe` or `powershell.exe`.
3.  **Network Traffic:** Identify large outbound data transfers (SSL/TLS) to non-corporate IP addresses occurring outside business hours.

**Critical Assets Prioritized for Exfiltration:**
*   Intellectual Property (CAD drawings, Source code)
*   Employee PII & HR Records (SSNs, Contracts)
*   Financial Data (Tax info, Audit reports)
*   Client Databases (CRM, ERP exports)

**Containment Actions:**
1.  **Isolate:** Disconnect compromised management interfaces (Cisco FMC, ScreenConnect) from the network immediately.
2.  **Suspend:** Suspend service accounts associated with the vulnerable applications.
3.  **Preserve:** Snapshot memory of affected web servers to capture webshell artifacts.

# Hardening Recommendations

**Immediate (24 Hours):**
*   **Patch:** Apply patches for CVE-2024-1708 (ScreenConnect), CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco FMC), and CVE-2025-52691/23760 (SmarterMail) globally.
*   **Disable:** If patching is not possible, disable external access to ScreenConnect and SmarterMail web interfaces via firewall ACLs. Enforce VPN access for management.
*   **MFA:** Enforce MFA on all remote access solutions, including ScreenConnect and VPN gateways.

**Short-term (2 Weeks):**
*   **Network Segmentation:** Isolate management interfaces (OoB management) from the internal production network.
*   **WAF:** Deploy Web Application Firewall rules to block known path traversal attempts on web servers.
*   **Storage Audit:** Implement strict auditing on Volume Shadow Copy (VSS) creation/deletion to prevent ransomware from wiping backups.