---
title: Potential Check Point Security Gateway IKEv1 Exploitation
date: 2026/07/02
description: Detects potential exploitation attempts of CVE-2026-50751 involving unusual IKEv1 packet sizes or anomalies in VPN gateway logs indicative of the auth bypass.
references:
  - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
status: experimental
logsource:
  category: firewall
detection:
  selection:
    dst_port: 500
    protocol: 'UDP'
    vpn_vendor|contains: 'Check Point'
  filter_legit:
    packets_per_second: '<= 50'
  condition: selection and not filter_legit
falsepositives:
  - Heavy VPN usage periods during business hours
level: high
---
title: Suspicious ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal
date: 2026/07/02
description: Detects path traversal attempts in ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708) often used for initial access by ransomware groups.
references:
  - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
status: experimental
logsource:
  category: web
detection:
  selection:
    cs-method: 'GET'
    c-uri|contains:
      - '/bin/'
      - '..%2f'
      - '..\\'
    sc-status: 200
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative testing (rare)
level: critical
---
title: PsExec Lateral Movement
id: 24b0f14c-736b-4e3f-bb49-432984f6fde1
date: 2026/07/02
description: Detects the usage of PsExec for lateral movement, a common TTP for THEGENTLEMEN affiliates.
status: experimental
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: '\psexec.exe'
    - Image|endswith: '\psexec64.exe'
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '-accepteula'
      - '\\*'
  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Administrative system maintenance
level: high


**KQL (Microsoft Sentinel) — Lateral Movement Hunt**
kql
// Hunt for lateral movement indicators commonly used post-exploitation
DeviceProcessEvents 
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("psexec", "wmic", "wmi", "powershell -enc", "iex") 
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "powershell_ise.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| summarize count(), make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName
| where count_ > 5


**PowerShell — Rapid Response Hardening**
powershell
<#
.SYNOPSIS
    Checks for recent scheduled task creation and exposed RDP sessions.
.DESCRIPTION
    Response script to identify indicators of persistence often used by THEGENTLEMEN.
#>

Write-Host "[+] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created in the last 7 days..."
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object {
    $_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
} | Select-Object TaskName, Date, Author, Action | Format-Table -AutoSize

Write-Host "[+] Checking for active RDP sessions (non-console)..."
$query = "SELECT * FROM Win32_LogonSession WHERE LogonType = 10"
Get-CimInstance -Query $query | ForEach-Object {
    $logonId = $_.LogonId
    $owner = Invoke-CimMethod -InputObject $_ -MethodName "GetOwner" 
    [PSCustomObject]@{
        User = "$($owner.Domain)\$($owner.User)"
        LogonId = $logonId
        StartTime = $_.StartTime
    }
} | Format-Table -AutoSize

Write-Host "[+] Verifying accessibility of Check Point / Cisco Services (Simulated)..."
Get-Service | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -match "Check Point|Cisco" -and $_.Status -eq "Running" } | Select-Object DisplayName, Status


---

# Incident Response Priorities

**T-Minus Detection Checklist (Pre-Encryption):**
1. **VPN/Firewall Logs:** Review Check Point and Cisco FMC logs for anomalies on port 500 (IKE) or unexpected administrative logins on port 443/8305.
2. **Remote Access Tools:** Audit ConnectWise ScreenConnect logs for the "Setup.aspx" or "Banner.ashx" path traversal activity.
3. **Exchange Logs:** Check IIS logs for `Ecp/` or `OAB/` requests returning 500/200 status codes followed by PowerShell execution (Exchange exploitation).

**Critical Assets for Exfiltration:**
Based on the victim profile, prioritize securing:
- HR databases (Employee PII is high leverage).
- Financial systems (Oracle/SAP).
- CAD/Blueprint repositories (Construction/Engineering victims).

**Containment Actions (Order of Urgency):**
1. **Isolate:** Immediately disconnect Check Point and Cisco Management interfaces from the internet if patching cannot be verified.
2. **Disable:** Temporarily disable Internet-facing VPN concentrators if the IKEv1 vulnerability (CVE-2026-50751) cannot be mitigated via configuration immediately.
3. **Suspend:** Suspend all ConnectWise ScreenConnect services until patched to the latest secure build.

---

# Hardening Recommendations

**Immediate (24 Hours):**
- **Patch CVE-2026-50751:** Apply the hotfix for Check Point Security Gateways immediately. Enforce IKEv2 only where possible.
- **Patch CVE-2026-20131:** Update Cisco Secure Firewall FMC to the fixed version.
- **Patch CVE-2024-1708:** Ensure ScreenConnect is updated to the latest version; enforce MFA on all remote access portals.

**Short-Term (2 Weeks):**
- **Network Segmentation:** Move VPN and Firewall Management interfaces to a dedicated OOB (Out-of-Band) management VLAN not accessible from the general corporate network.
- **Geo-Blocking:** Restrict management interface access to known source IP addresses only.
- **Audit Credentials:** Force a password reset for all administrative accounts on firewall and VPN appliances, assuming credential theft may have occurred.