THEGENTLEMEN Ransomware Gang: 14 Victims Posted in 72 Hours — Transportation, Healthcare & Retail Under Fire

Classification: TLP:AMBER — Threat Intelligence Briefing Date: 2026-09-11 Source: Live monitoring of THEGENTLEMEN .onion leak site via ransomware.live Analyst: Security Arsenal — From The Dark Side

Executive Summary

Security Arsenal's dark web monitoring has observed a significant escalation in THEGENTLEMEN ransomware gang activity. Between 2026-09-07 and 2026-09-09, the group posted 14 victims to its dedicated leak site — a compressed burst that suggests either a coordinated encryption wave following a shared initial access window, or backlog publication intended to pressure stalled negotiations. Victims span transportation (Air Canada), healthcare (PharmaEssentia), retail (Metro, Superstore, Biotipo Jeans, Domis), manufacturing, agriculture, hospitality, and energy, across at least 11 countries.

Organizations in these sectors — particularly those with unpatched Cisco Secure FMC, Check Point Security Gateways, or ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances — should treat this as an active-threat window and immediately review the detection content below.

Threat Actor Profile — THEGENTLEMEN

The group's operational tempo and simultaneous cross-sector posting pattern is characteristic of a RaaS program with multiple active affiliates working a shared tooling and playbook standard.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sector Targeting (last 100 postings window — 14 recent victims)

Geographic Concentration

Victims are distributed across CA, TW, GE, CO, IT, PE, US, BR, DE, DK, IN, TR, CL — no single-country focus. The heavy Latin American and European retail presence, combined with a marquee North American transportation victim, indicates opportunistic affiliate-driven targeting rather than strategic nation-state-style selection. The common denominator is not geography — it is exposed perimeter infrastructure.

Victim Profile

The mix ranges from SMB regional retailers (Biotipo Jeans, El Carriel) to large enterprises (Air Canada, Metro). Estimated revenue spread: $5M–$5B+ USD. This breadth is typical of RaaS ecosystems: affiliates monetize whatever access they can obtain or purchase, and the operator handles extortion at scale.

Posting Frequency / Escalation Pattern

• 2026-09-07: 11 victims published in a single day — strongly suggests a coordinated detonation weekend (the classic Friday/Saturday encryption window) followed by Monday leak-site publication after 48–72h of failed negotiation.
• 2026-09-09: 2 additional high-value victims (Air Canada, PharmaEssentia) — likely longer negotiation runway given victim size.
• Assessment: Expect a follow-on wave within 7–14 days as the current affiliate cohort completes additional intrusions already in the dwell phase.

CVE Correlation — Probable Initial Access Vectors

The following CISA KEV entries (all confirmed ransomware-associated) align with THEGENTLEMEN's known perimeter-first tradecraft and should be treated as priority patch/verify items:

• CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure FMC hard-coded password. Direct management-plane compromise of the firewall stack. If exploited, attackers gain visibility into and control of the entire edge policy — an ideal pivot for disabling logging before lateral movement.
• CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication (IKEv1). Unauthenticated access to VPN gateway — matches the group's VPN-first access pattern. Verify IKEv1 is disabled if unused.
• CVE-2024-1708 — ConnectWise ScreenConnect path traversal / RCE. RMM tooling remains a top ransomware delivery channel; a compromised ScreenConnect instance hands affiliates legitimate remote execution on every managed endpoint.
• CVE-2025-60710 — Windows link following privilege escalation. Likely used post-compromise to escalate from user to SYSTEM prior to disabling defenses and staging exfil.
• CVE-2026-50751 / CVE-2026-20316 together suggest a deliberate campaign focus on network edge management planes — the exact blind spot in most enterprise monitoring stacks.
• CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console supply chain) is relevant to organizations with developer workstations; malicious IDE tooling provides an alternative phishing-free entry path.

Actionable correlation: If your organization runs Cisco FMC, Check Point gateways, or ScreenConnect, assume targeting and begin hunting now — do not wait for IOCs specific to this group.

Detection Engineering

The detections below target THEGENTLEMEN's observed playbook: edge/VPN exploitation → RMM or RDP pivot → WMI/PsExec lateral movement → data staging → mass encryption with shadow copy deletion.

---
title: THEGENTLEMEN - Pre-Ransomware Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 7f3a1c2e-9b41-4d58-a1e2-tg0000000001
status: experimental
description: Detects deletion or resizing of Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin, wmic, or diskshadow — a near-universal pre-encryption step in THEGENTLEMEN affiliate playbook. Alert on any execution outside approved backup maintenance windows.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/09/11
references:
  - https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
  level: high
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\vssadmin.exe'
      - '\wmic.exe'
      - '\diskshadow.exe'
      - '\bcdedit.exe'
  selection_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'delete shadows'
      - 'resize shadowstorage'
      - 'shadowcopy delete'
      - 'recoveryenabled no'
      - 'ignoreallfailures'
  condition: selection_img and selection_cmd
falsepositives:
  - Backup software maintenance
  - System administrators during storage remediation
level: high
tags:
  - attack.impact
  - attack.t1490
---
title: THEGENTLEMEN - Lateral Movement via PsExec or WMI Remote Execution
id: 7f3a1c2e-9b41-4d58-a1e2-tg0000000002
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service creation and WMI process spawn patterns consistent with THEGENTLEMEN affiliate lateral movement using PsExec-style tooling or wmic process call create across hosts.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/09/11
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_psexec:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\psexec.exe'
      - '\psexesvc.exe'
      - '\paexec.exe'
      - '\remcom.exe'
  selection_wmi:
    ParentImage|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
    Image|endswith:
      - '\cmd.exe'
      - '\powershell.exe'
      - '\rundll32.exe'
      - '\mshta.exe'
  selection_wmic_remote:
    Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
    CommandLine|contains:
      - '/node:'
      - 'process call create'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative tooling (SCCM, PDQ) — whitelist known admin hosts
level: high
tags:
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1021.002
  - attack.t1569.002
  - attack.t1047
---
title: THEGENTLEMEN - RMM Tool Execution for Staging and Exfiltration
id: 7f3a1c2e-9b41-4d58-a1e2-tg0000000003
status: experimental
description: Detects execution of remote access / data transfer tools frequently abused by ransomware affiliates for hands-on staging and exfiltration prior to encryption (ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, rclone, MEGAsync). Tune against your approved RMM baseline.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
date: 2026/09/11
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - '\rclone.exe'
      - '\megasync.exe'
      - '\anydesk.exe'
      - '\screenconnect.clientservice.exe'
      - '\filezilla.exe'
      - '\winscp.exe'
      - '\pcloud.exe'
  filter_approved:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'approved-backup-job'
  condition: selection_img and not filter_approved
falsepositives:
  - Approved IT RMM tooling — maintain an allowlist of sanctioned tool hashes and paths
level: medium
tags:
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1567.002
  - attack.t1219

// Security Arsenal — THEGENTLEMEN Pre-Ransomware Staging Hunt (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunts for the 72-hour pre-detonation pattern: new admin tool execution + shadow copy tampering + outbound bulk transfer
// Run over the last 14 days; investigate any host hitting 2+ signal clusters.

let Lookback = 14d;
let ShadowCopyTamper =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where FileName in~ ("vssadmin.exe", "wmic.exe", "bcdedit.exe", "diskshadow.exe")
    | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows", "resize shadowstorage", "shadowcopy delete", "recoveryenabled no")
    | summarize ShadowEvents = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated) by DeviceName, AccountName;
let SuspiciousTooling =
    DeviceProcessEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where FileName in~ ("rclone.exe", "psexec.exe", "anydesk.exe", "winscp.exe", "megasync.exe", "screenconnect.clientservice.exe")
       or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "process call create")
    | summarize ToolEvents = count(), Tools = make_set(FileName) by DeviceName, AccountName;
let BulkOutbound =
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(Lookback)
    | where RemoteIPType == "Public"
    | summarize TotalBytesOut = sum(BytesSent), UniqueDestinations = dcount(RemoteIP) by DeviceName
    | where TotalBytesOut > 500000000; // >500MB outbound — tune to baseline
ShadowCopyTamper
| join kind=inner SuspiciousTooling on DeviceName
| join kind=leftouter BulkOutbound on DeviceName
| project DeviceName, AccountName, FirstSeen, ShadowEvents, ToolEvents, Tools, TotalBytesOut, UniqueDestinations
| extend RiskScore = (ShadowEvents * 3) + (ToolEvents * 2) + iif(TotalBytesOut > 0, 5, 0)
| order by RiskScore desc;

<#
.SYNOPSIS
  Security Arsenal — THEGENTLEMEN Rapid Triage Script
.DESCRIPTION
  Run on suspected-intrusion hosts (or fleet-wide via your RMM/Intune) to surface
  pre-ransomware staging indicators: recent scheduled tasks, shadow copy state,
  suspicious RMM tooling, and RDP exposure. Outputs a consolidated report.
  Requires: Run as Administrator. Read-only — makes no changes.
#>

$ReportPath = "C:\Temp\TG-Triage_$(hostname)_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd-HHmm').txt"
New-Item -Path "C:\Temp" -ItemType Directory -Force | Out-Null
"=== THEGENTLEMEN Rapid Triage — $(hostname) — $(Get-Date) ===" | Out-File $ReportPath

# 1. Scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days (persistence / detonation timers)
"`n[+] Scheduled Tasks Created/Modified in Last 7 Days:" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -and ((New-TimeSpan -Start $_.Date -End (Get-Date)).Days -le 7) } |
    Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{N='RunAs';E={$_.Principal.UserId}} |
    Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String | Out-File $ReportPath -Append

# 2. Volume Shadow Copy status — encryption crews delete these minutes before detonation
"`n[+] Volume Shadow Copies Present:" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($shadows) {
    $shadows | Select-Object DeviceObject, InstallDate, VolumeName | Format-Table -AutoSize |
        Out-String | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
} else {
    "  *** WARNING: NO SHADOW COPIES FOUND — possible anti-recovery action ***" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
}

# 3. Hunt for commonly abused RMM/exfil tooling
"`n[+] Suspicious Tooling Processes/Installs:" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
$susTools = @("rclone", "anydesk", "psexec", "psexesvc", "megasync", "winscp", "filezilla", "screenconnect")
foreach ($tool in $susTools) {
    $proc = Get-Process -Name $tool -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    if ($proc) { "  RUNNING: $($proc.Name) (PID $($proc.Id)) — $($proc.Path)" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append }
    $bin = Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Program Files","C:\Program Files (x86)","C:\Users" -Filter "$tool*.exe" -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue -Depth 3 | Select-Object -First 3
    foreach ($b in $bin) { "  ON DISK: $($b.FullName) — LastWrite $($b.LastWriteTime)" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append }
}

# 4. RDP exposure + recent logon failures (brute-force signal)
"`n[+] RDP Configuration:" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
$rdp = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" -Name fDenyTSConnections -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$rdpState = if ($rdp.fDenyTSConnections -eq 0) { "ENABLED" } else { "Disabled" }
"  RDP State: $rdpState" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
$nla = Get-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" -Name UserAuthentication -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
"  NLA Required: $($nla.UserAuthentication) (1 = yes, 0 = NO — flag if 0)" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append

"`n[+] Failed Logons (Event 4625) Last 24h — Top Source Accounts:" | Out-File $ReportPath -Append
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-1)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
    ForEach-Object { ([xml]$_.ToXml()).Event.EventData.Data | Where-Object {$_.Name -eq 'TargetUserName'} | Select-Object -ExpandProperty '#text' } |
    Group-Object | Sort-Object Count -Descending | Select-Object -First 10 Count, Name |
    Format-Table -AutoSize | Out-String | Out-File $ReportPath -Append

"`n=== Triage complete. Report: $ReportPath ==="
Get-Content $ReportPath

Incident Response Priorities — THEGENTLEMEN Playbook

T-Minus Detection Checklist (Before Encryption Fires)

You typically have a 5–14 day window between initial access and detonation. Hunt for:

• Unusual VPN/firewall admin-plane logins — especially Cisco FMC or Check Point management access from unfamiliar source IPs, or IKEv1 negotiation anomalies
• New local/domain admin accounts created outside change control
• RMM tooling appearing that isn't your sanctioned stack (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect on non-IT hosts)
• vssadmin/wmic/bcdedit execution anywhere in the fleet — treat as P1
• Large outbound transfers (>500MB) to consumer cloud storage, Mega, or unfamiliar IPs — especially overnight/weekends
• PsExec service installation (Event 7045) or WMI-spawned shells on servers
• EDR/AV tampering events — services stopped, exclusions added, agents uninstalled
• ScreenConnect/RMM version drift — confirm you are patched against CVE-2024-1708

Critical Assets This Gang Prioritizes for Exfiltration

Based on double-extortion leak-site content patterns:

1. Finance & legal data — contracts, payroll, banking records (maximum negotiation leverage)
2. PII/PHI databases — healthcare and transportation victims face regulatory exposure; expect PHI (PharmaEssentia) and passenger data (Air Canada) to be leveraged publicly
3. IP and R&D — manufacturing and pharma victims: designs, formulations, process docs
4. Email archives of executive leadership — used for credibility in negotiation and follow-on BEC

Containment Actions — Ordered by Urgency

1. Isolate, don't power off suspected-staging hosts — preserve memory for forensics; kill network paths (switch ACL / EDR network isolation)
2. Disable compromised identities immediately — force enterprise-wide credential reset if domain admin integrity is in question; revoke VPN sessions and tokens
3. Block exfil egress — emergency egress filtering to deny unsanctioned cloud storage and known-abused file-sharing destinations
4. Freeze lateral movement paths — disable PsExec/WMI remote execution via GPO on non-admin endpoints; segment backup infrastructure NOW
5. Protect backups — take backup consoles offline from production network; verify immutable/offline copies are intact and restorable
6. Engage IR retainer before negotiation begins — leak-site countdown timers create pressure to make rushed decisions

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

• Patch or mitigate the edge: Cisco Secure FMC (CVE-2026-20316), Check Point gateways (CVE-2026-50751 — disable IKEv1 if unused), ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708). If you can't patch, take the management interface off any routable path.
• Block PsExec/WMI remote execution fleet-wide except from a dedicated admin tier (PAW/jump hosts).
• Enable tamper protection on all EDR agents; alert on any exclusion or service-stop attempt.
• Deploy the Sigma rules above to your SIEM; run the KQL hunt over the last 14 days retroactively.
• Enforce MFA on all remote access — VPN, RDP gateways, RMM consoles. No exceptions for service accounts (use certificate auth instead).
• Verify shadow copies exist on critical servers and alert on deletion (the triage script above checks this).

Short-Term (2 Weeks)

• Segment the network — isolate backup infrastructure, crown-jewel data stores, and OT/manufacturing segments from general user VLANs. THEGENTLEMEN's retail and manufacturing victims almost certainly suffered flat-network spread.
• Egress filtering with TLS inspection or destination categorization — ransomware exfil dies when unsanctioned cloud storage is unreachable.
• Application allowlisting on servers — stops rclone/psexec/ad-hoc tooling cold.
• Implement an RMM governance policy — one sanctioned tool, everything else blocked by hash and alerted on execution.
• Tabletop a double-extortion scenario — legal, comms, and leadership need a pre-agreed decision framework for leak-site publication before a countdown timer is running.
• Deploy canary files and decoy credentials on file servers and endpoints — high-fidelity, near-zero-false-positive early warning of staging activity.

Security Arsenal continues to monitor THEGENTLEMEN's leak site and affiliate infrastructure. This briefing will be updated as new victims or tooling are observed. If your organization appears in this dataset or you suspect compromise, contact our incident response team immediately.

Related Resources

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