Date: 2026-06-04
Source: Dark Web Leak Site / Ransomware.live
Analyst: Security Arsenal Intel Unit
Threat Actor Profile — THEGENTLEMEN
Overview: THEGENTLEMEN is a financially motivated threat actor group operating with a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) or highly structured affiliate model. While they maintain a "professional" veneer on their leak site, their operational tactics are aggressive, utilizing double extortion (encryption + data theft) to pressure victims.
- Known Aliases: None confirmed; operates exclusively as THEGENTLEMEN.
- Model: RaaS / Affiliate Network.
- Ransom Demands: Varies significantly by victim revenue, typically ranging from $500k to $5M USD.
- Initial Access: Historically relies on exposed Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), valid credentials via phishing, and exploitation of public-facing vulnerabilities (specifically VPNs and remote management tools).
- Dwell Time: Average estimated dwell time is 3–7 days, allowing for thorough data staging before detonation.
Current Campaign Analysis
Based on the last 100 postings analyzed from their .onion site, THEGENTLEMEN has posted 21 new victims in this specific data set, indicating a highly active operational tempo.
Sector Targeting
The current campaign shows a distinct pivot towards critical infrastructure and essential services:
- Healthcare: 4 victims (Michigan Surgical Center, Edgewood Surgical Hospital, Downriver Medical Associates, Soniva Dental). This sector is being aggressively targeted likely due to high willingness to pay to restore patient care operations.
- Transportation/Logistics: 1 victim (Thoresen Thai Agencies), significant for supply chain disruption potential.
- Manufacturing & Energy: Liztex Guatemala (Manufacturing), Suburban Water (Energy).
Geographic Concentration
- United States: 6 victims (highest concentration), heavily skewed towards the Healthcare sector.
- Asia-Pacific (APAC): 4 victims across Thailand, India, Singapore, Pakistan, and Hong Kong.
- Europe & Latin America: Germany, Portugal, and Guatemala.
Victim Profile & Patterns
- Posting Frequency: High frequency of publication on 2026-06-03 (6 victims) and 2026-06-01 (6 victims), suggesting automated batch processing of sites or coordinated affiliate activity.
- CVE Correlation: There is a strong probability that the recent surge in victims correlates with the exploitation of CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect) and CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console). These vulnerabilities provide immediate remote code execution (RCE) capabilities, aligning with the short dwell time observed.
Detection Engineering
Sigma Rules
---
title: Potential THEGENTLEMEN Initial Access via ScreenConnect Exploit
id: 48a2e111-6d3f-4c8f-b9f1-3d0f1c8e3d1a
description: Detects exploitation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect (CVE-2024-1708) often used by THEGENTLEMEN for initial access. Looks for suspicious path traversal patterns in URI.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
date: 2026/06/04
modified: 2026/06/04
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1190
- cve.2024.1708
logsource:
category: web
detection:
selection:
cs-uri-query|contains:
- '..\\'
- '..%5c'
- '%2e%2e%5c'
cs-uri-stem|contains: '/Setup/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
---
title: THEGENTLEMEN Lateral Movement via PsExec
id: 99b8c4d2-1a3e-4f5b-9e6d-7c8f9a0b1c2d
description: Detects lateral movement patterns indicative of THEGENTLEMEN affiliates using PsExec to spread across the network pre-encryption.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/04
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: '\\PsExec.exe'
OriginalFileName: 'psexec.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\\192.168.'
- '\\10.'
- '/accepteula'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative IT tasks
level: high
---
title: THEGENTLEMEN Data Staging Large File Copy
id: a1b2c3d4-5e6f-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
description: Detects rapid mass file copying consistent with ransomware data staging prior to exfiltration. High volume of file creation on a single drive.
status: experimental
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/04
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1074.001
logsource:
category: file_create
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains:
- ':\\Staging\'
- ':\\Temp\Ransom'
filter_legit:
Image|contains:
- '\\Program Files\'
- '\\Windows\\System32\'
timeframe: 1h
condition: selection and not filter_legit | count(TargetFilename) > 50
falsepositives:
- Backup software operations
level: medium
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunt for THEGENTLEMEN lateral movement indicators
// Looks for SMB access to multiple hosts and remote service installation
let TimeFrame = 1h;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
| where RemotePort == 445 // SMB
| summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteIP
| where count_ > 10 // Threshold for lateral movement scanning
| join kind=inner (DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "sc.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "create" // Service creation often used for persistence
) on $left.DeviceName == $right.DeviceName
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
PowerShell Response Script
# THEGENTLEMEN Rapid Response Check
# Checks for suspicious scheduled tasks (persistence) and modified VSS (ransomware prep)
Write-Host "[+] Checking for Scheduled Tasks created in the last 7 days..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
$DateCutoff = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
$SuspiciousTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -gt $DateCutoff }
if ($SuspiciousTasks) {
Write-Host "[!] ALERT: Found recently created scheduled tasks:" -ForegroundColor Red
$SuspiciousTasks | Format-List TaskName, TaskPath, Date, Author
} else {
Write-Host "[-] No suspicious tasks found." -ForegroundColor Green
}
Write-Host "\n[+] Checking Volume Shadow Copy Service (VSS) state..." -ForegroundColor Cyan
try {
$VSS = vssadmin list shadows
if ($VSS -match "No shadow copies") {
Write-Host "[!] WARNING: No shadow copies found. Possible deletion." -ForegroundColor Yellow
} else {
Write-Host "[-] Shadow copies exist." -ForegroundColor Green
# Check recent modifications to VSS writers
$WriterStatus = vssadmin list writers
if ($WriterStatus -match "State: \[5\]" -or $WriterStatus -match "State: \[6\]") {
Write-Host "[!] WARNING: VSS Writers in failed state." -ForegroundColor Yellow
}
}
} catch {
Write-Host "[!] Error checking VSS: $_" -ForegroundColor Red
}
Write-Host "\n[+] Check complete." -ForegroundColor Cyan
---
Incident Response Priorities
T-Minus Detection Checklist (Pre-Encryption):
- Network: Hunt for successful logins to VPN gateways from geographically impossible locations (e.g., US employee logging in from Thailand).
- Endpoint: Scan immediately for
PsExec.exeorCobaltStrike.beaconartifacts in memory. - Identity: Audit Active Directory for accounts with "Password Never Expires" set that have been active in the last 24 hours.
Critical Assets Prioritized for Exfiltration:
- Healthcare: PHI/PII databases, EMR backups, surgery schedules.
- Logistics: Cargo manifests, client lists, routing databases.
Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency):
- Isolate the identified patient zero or compromised segment immediately.
- Revoke all privileged access credentials (Domain Admin) and force a password reset for the entire organization if lateral movement is confirmed.
- Power down non-critical virtual machines to stop the spread of encryption scripts if detonation has started.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours):
- Patch: Apply patches for CVE-2024-1708 (ScreenConnect), CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console), and CVE-2023-21529 (Exchange) immediately.
- Access Control: Enforce MFA on all VPN and remote desktop access points. Block RDP (TCP 3389) from the internet.
- Email: Implement strict DMARC, SPF, and DKIM policies to reduce the success of phishing campaigns delivering initial access payloads.
Short-term (2 Weeks):
- Network Segmentation: Enforce strict isolation between critical systems (EMR, SCADA) and the general corporate network.
- EDR/XDR: Deploy or ensure coverage on all endpoints, specifically focusing on memory integrity protection and script block logging.
- Backup Verification: Conduct an offline restore test of critical backups to ensure they are not encrypted or deleted.
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Incident Response
Managed SOC & MDR Services
AlertMonitor Threat Detection
From The Dark Side Intel Hub
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