THEGENTLEMEN Ransomware Gang: Global Campaign Intensifies — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules | Security Arsenal

THEGENTLEMEN is a relatively new ransomware operation that emerged in early 2026, operating under a RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service) model with multiple affiliates. Unlike traditional ransomware groups, THEGENTLEMEN have adopted a "professional" persona, using sophisticated social engineering techniques that mirror legitimate business operations.

Known Aliases: TG-Team, GentlemenClub (occasionally referenced in dark web forums)

RaaS vs Closed-Group: Operating as a RaaS platform, THEGENTLEMEN has recruited skilled affiliates with backgrounds in penetration testing and network administration. The core development team maintains the encryption payload while affiliates handle initial access and lateral movement.

Typical Ransom Demands: Ranging from $500,000 to $5 million USD, with demands scaling based on victim revenue and data sensitivity. Recent communications indicate a 25% increase in average demand compared to Q1 2026.

Initial Access Methods: The group primarily exploits VPN vulnerabilities (Check Point, Cisco), followed by RDP brute-forcing and phishing campaigns with weaponized documents. Recent intelligence suggests supply chain attacks via compromised managed service providers.

Double Extortion Approach: THEGENTLEMEN strictly follows a double extortion playbook, exfiltrating sensitive data before encryption. Victims who refuse to pay have their data published on their leak site within 72-96 hours.

Average Dwell Time: 7-14 days from initial compromise to encryption, with affiliates spending significant time enumerating networks and harvesting credentials.

Current Campaign Analysis

Sectors Being Targeted

THEGENTLEMEN has demonstrated notable sector diversity in recent campaigns, with the following targeted sectors:

Consumer Services (2 victims)
Transportation/Logistics (1 victim)
Construction (1 victim)
Business Services (3 victims)
Public Sector (1 victim)
Energy (1 victim)
Technology (1 victim)
Agriculture and Food Production (1 victim)
Healthcare (1 victim)
Not Found/Other (4 victims)

Geographic Concentration

The campaign shows significant geographic clustering:

France: 5 victims (33% of total)
United States: 2 victims
Taiwan: 1 victim
Canada: 1 victim
Nigeria: 1 victim
Switzerland: 1 victim
Czech Republic: 1 victim
Poland: 1 victim
Italy: 2 victims
Thailand: 1 victim

Victim Profile

Analysis of recent victims suggests a focus on mid-market organizations:

Revenue range: $10M - $500M USD
Employee count: 50-2,000
Technology maturity: Medium (hybrid cloud environments with legacy on-premise systems)

Observed Posting Frequency/Escalation Patterns

Spike in activity: 15 victims posted on a single day (2026-06-30)
Average posting frequency: 3-4 victims per week in Q2 2026
Time-to-publication: 8-10 days from initial encryption

Connection to CVEs as Initial Access Vectors

Based on recent victimology and associated CVEs, THEGENTLEMEN affiliates are actively exploiting:

CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point Security Gateway) - likely initial access vector for multiple European victims
CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center) - leveraged against North American targets
CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect) - used for persistence and lateral movement
CVE-2023-21529 (Microsoft Exchange Server) - credential harvesting and backdoor installation

The diversity of exploits suggests THEGENTLEMEN affiliates are opportunistic, exploiting whatever vulnerable entry points are available rather than specializing in specific vectors.

Detection Engineering

SIGMA Rules

YAML

---
title: Potential Check Point Security Gateway Exploitation
id: 7f8a9c1d-2e3b-4a5f-8b7c-9d0e1f2a3b4c
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-50751 in Check Point Security Gateways
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/02
author: Security Arsenal Research Team
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1190
    - cve.2026.50751
    - detection.emerging_threats
logsource:
    product: checkpoint
    service: vpn
detection:
    selection:
        event_id:
            - 'vpntunnel'
            - 'ike_failure'
        failure_reason:
            - 'authentication_failed'
            - 'key_exchange_failed'
    filter:
        src_ip:
            - '10.0.0.0/8'
            - '172.16.0.0/12'
            - '192.168.0.0/16'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection and not filter | count() > 10
falsepositives:
    - Misconfigured VPN clients
    - Network instability issues
level: high
---
title: Suspicious ConnectWise ScreenConnect Activity
id: 3b2c1d0e-9f8a-7b6c-5d4e-3f2a1b0c9d8e
description: Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2024-1708 in ConnectWise ScreenConnect
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/02
author: Security Arsenal Research Team
references:
    - https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
tags:
    - attack.initial_access
    - attack.t1190
    - attack.lateral_movement
    - attack.t1021
    - cve.2024.1708
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5145
        RelativeTargetName|contains: 
            - 'App_Upload'
            - 'Host'
        ShareName|contains:
            - 'ScreenConnect'
            - 'ConnectWiseControl'
    filter:
        SubjectUserName|contains:
            - 'Admin'
            - 'Service'
    timeframe: 5m
    condition: selection and not filter | count() > 3
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activities
    - Automated management tools
level: high
---
title: Ransomware Pre-Encryption Activity Indicators
id: 9e8f7a6b-5d4c-3e2d-1c0b-9a8f7e6d5c4b
description: Detects pre-encryption staging activities typical of ransomware operations
status: experimental
date: 2026/07/02
author: Security Arsenal Research Team
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_shadowcopy:
        EventID: 1
        ProcessName|endswith: 
            - '\vssadmin.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\cmd.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'delete shadows'
            - 'resize shadowstorage'
    selection_psexec:
        EventID: 1
        ProcessName|contains: '\PsExec'
        CommandLine|contains: 
            - '\\*\ADMIN$'
            - '-accepteula'
    selection_share:
        EventID: 5140
        ShareName|contains:
            - 'ADMIN$'
            - 'C$'
    timeframe: 15m
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate system administration
    - Backup operations
level: critical

KQL Query for Microsoft Sentinel

KQL — Microsoft Sentinel / Defender

// Hunt for lateral movement indicators consistent with THEGENTLEMEN TTPs
let TimeFrame = ago(7d);
let suspiciousProcesses = dynamic(['powershell.exe', 'cmd.exe', 'wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe', 'rundll32.exe', 'regsvr32.exe', 'mshta.exe']);
let lateralMovementTools = dynamic(['psexec.exe', 'wmic.exe', 'wmiexec.vbs', 'smbexec.py', 'atexec.py', 'crackmapexec.exe']);
// Remote service creation via SC.EXE or PowerShell
let RemoteServiceCreation = 
SecurityEvent  
| where TimeGenerated > TimeFrame
| where EventID in (5145, 4624, 5140)
| where RelativeTargetName has 'services.exe' or ShareName in ('IPC$', 'ADMIN$')
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, IpAddress, EventID, _ResourceId;
// Unusual process execution patterns
let UnusualProcessExecution = 
DeviceProcessEvents  
| where TimeGenerated > TimeFrame
| where ProcessName in (suspiciousProcesses) or ProcessName has_any (lateralMovementTools)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ('explorer.exe', 'services.exe', 'svchost.exe', 'winlogon.exe', 'lsass.exe')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, _ResourceId;
// Multiple volume shadow copy deletions
let ShadowCopyDeletion = 
SecurityEvent  
| where TimeGenerated > TimeFrame
| where EventID == 4663
| where ObjectType == 'File' and ObjectName has 'Shadow Copy' and AccessMask == '0x10080'
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, ObjectName, _ResourceId;
// Large data transfers (potential exfiltration)
let DataExfiltration = 
CommonSecurityLog  
| where TimeGenerated > TimeFrame
| where DeviceProduct in ('Cisco ASA', 'Palo Alto Networks', 'Fortinet')
| where Activity == 'Accepted' and DeviceAction == 'Flow' and SentBytes > 104857600  // > 100MB
| summarize TotalBytes=sum(SentBytes) by bin(TimeGenerated, 1h), SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceProduct
| where TotalBytes > 1048576000  // > 1GB in 1 hour
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, TotalBytes, _ResourceId;
// Combine all indicators
union RemoteServiceCreation, UnusualProcessExecution, ShadowCopyDeletion, DataExfiltration
| summarize count() by bin(TimeGenerated, 1h), _ResourceId
| render timechart

Rapid-Response Hardening Script

PowerShell

# THEGENTLEMEN Ransomware Rapid Response and Hardening Script
# This script checks for common indicators of compromise and implements immediate hardening
# Run with administrative privileges

param(
    [switch]$Verbose,
    [switch]$Remediate
)

function Write-Log {
    param ([string]$Message, [string]$Level = "INFO")
    $timestamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"
    $logEntry = "[$timestamp] [$Level] $Message"
    Write-Host $logEntry
    if ($Verbose) { Add-Content -Path "$env:TEMP\ThreatHunt_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMdd').log" -Value $logEntry }
}

function Check-ExposedRDP {
    Write-Log "Checking for exposed RDP connections..."
    $rdpConnections = Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -LocalPort 3389 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    if ($rdpConnections) {
        Write-Log "Found $($rdpConnections.Count) active RDP connections:" "WARNING"
        $rdpConnections | ForEach-Object {
            $process = Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
            Write-Log "  Remote IP: $($_.RemoteAddress), Process: $($process.ProcessName) ($($_.OwningProcess))" "WARNING"
        }
        if ($Remediate) {
            Write-Log "Attempting to disable RDP..." "INFO"
            Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" -Name "fDenyTSConnections" -Value 1 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
            Disable-NetFirewallRule -DisplayGroup "Remote Desktop" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
            Write-Log "RDP has been disabled." "INFO"
        }
    } else {
        Write-Log "No active RDP connections found." "INFO"
    }
}

function Check-RecentScheduledTasks {
    Write-Log "Checking for recently created or modified scheduled tasks..."
    $recentTasks = Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { 
        $_.Date -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) -or 
        $_.LastRunTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
    }
    if ($recentTasks) {
        Write-Log "Found $($recentTasks.Count) recently created or modified scheduled tasks:" "WARNING"
        $recentTasks | ForEach-Object {
            Write-Log "  Task: $($_.TaskName), Created: $($_.Date), Last Run: $($_.LastRunTime)" "WARNING"
        }
    } else {
        Write-Log "No suspicious recent scheduled tasks found." "INFO"
    }
}

function Check-ShadowCopies {
    Write-Log "Checking Volume Shadow Copy status..."
    $shadowCopies = Get-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy | Sort-Object InstallDate -Descending | Select-Object -First 5
    if ($shadowCopies) {
        Write-Log "Found $($shadowCopies.Count) recent shadow copies:" "INFO"
        $shadowCopies | ForEach-Object {
            $date = [Management.ManagementDateTimeConverter]::ToDateTime($_.InstallDate)
            Write-Log "  Volume: $($_.VolumeName), Created: $date, Device: $($_.DeviceObject)" "INFO"
        }
    } else {
        Write-Log "No shadow copies found - potential indicator of compromise." "WARNING"
    }
}

function Check-VPNConnections {
    Write-Log "Checking for VPN-related processes and connections..."
    $vpnProcesses = Get-Process | Where-Object { 
        $_.ProcessName -like '*vpn*' -or 
        $_.ProcessName -like '*tunnel*' -or
        $_.MainWindowTitle -like '*VPN*'
    }
    if ($vpnProcesses) {
        Write-Log "Found VPN-related processes:" "INFO"
        $vpnProcesses | ForEach-Object {
            Write-Log "  Process: $($_.ProcessName), PID: $($_.Id)" "INFO"
        }
    }
    $vpnConnections = Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established | Where-Object { 
        $_.LocalPort -in (443, 1194, 500, 4500, 1723) -or 
        $_.RemotePort -in (443, 1194, 500, 4500, 1723)
    }
    if ($vpnConnections) {
        Write-Log "Found potential VPN connections on standard ports:" "INFO"
        $vpnConnections | ForEach-Object {
            Write-Log "  Local: $($_.LocalAddress):$($_.LocalPort), Remote: $($_.RemoteAddress):$($_.RemotePort)" "INFO"
        }
    }
}

function Check-SuspiciousFiles {
    Write-Log "Checking for suspicious files in common locations..."
    $suspiciousPaths = @(
        "$env:PUBLIC\Desktop\*.exe",
        "$env:TEMP\*.exe",
        "$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\*.exe",
        "C:\ProgramData\*.exe",
        "C:\Windows\Temp\*.exe"
    )
    $suspiciousFiles = @()
    foreach ($path in $suspiciousPaths) {
        $files = Get-ChildItem -Path $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | 
            Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) }
        if ($files) { $suspiciousFiles += $files }
    }
    if ($suspiciousFiles) {
        Write-Log "Found $($suspiciousFiles.Count) recently created executables in suspicious locations:" "WARNING"
        $suspiciousFiles | ForEach-Object {
            Write-Log "  File: $($_.FullName), Created: $($_.CreationTime), Modified: $($_.LastWriteTime)" "WARNING"
        }
    } else {
        Write-Log "No suspicious files found." "INFO"
    }
}

function Harden-System {
    if (-not $Remediate) {
        Write-Log "Skipping remediation as -Remediate switch not specified." "INFO"
        return
    }
    
    Write-Log "Starting system hardening..." "INFO"
    
    # Disable SMBv1
    Write-Log "Disabling SMBv1..." "INFO"
    Set-SmbServerConfiguration -EnableSMB1Protocol $false -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    
    # Block WinRM from public networks
    Write-Log "Restricting WinRM..." "INFO"
    Set-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'Windows Remote Management (HTTP-In)' -Enabled False -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    
    # Enable PowerShell logging
    Write-Log "Enabling PowerShell logging..." "INFO"
    $registryPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging"
    if (-not (Test-Path $registryPath)) {
        New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force | Out-Null
    }
    Set-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name "EnableScriptBlockLogging" -Value 1 -Force
    
    # Enable Command Process logging
    Write-Log "Enabling Command Process logging..." "INFO"
    $registryPath = "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit"
    if (-not (Test-Path $registryPath)) {
        New-Item -Path $registryPath -Force | Out-Null
    }
    Set-ItemProperty -Path $registryPath -Name "ProcessCreationIncludeCmdLine_Enabled" -Value 1 -Force
    
    Write-Log "System hardening complete." "INFO"
}

# Main execution
Write-Log "Starting THEGENTLEMEN ransomware rapid response and hardening..." "INFO"
Check-ExposedRDP
Check-RecentScheduledTasks
Check-ShadowCopies
Check-VPNConnections
Check-SuspiciousFiles
Harden-System
Write-Log "Script execution complete." "INFO"

Incident Response Priorities

T-Minus Detection Checklist

Look for these indicators BEFORE encryption begins:

Unusual VPN connection patterns, especially to Check Point Security Gateways
Failed authentication attempts followed by successful ones on VPN endpoints
New scheduled tasks created with SYSTEM privileges
PowerShell or WMI execution from unexpected locations
Large file transfers to unusual external destinations
Rapid succession of failed logins across multiple accounts (credential stuffing)
Use of legitimate admin tools (PsExec, WMI) from unexpected workstations
Sudden increase in SMB connections to multiple file shares
Volume shadow copy deletions or modifications
Registry modifications to persistence keys in unexpected patterns

Critical Assets THEGENTLEMEN Prioritizes for Exfiltration

Based on analysis of their leak site postings:

Customer databases and personally identifiable information (PII)
Financial documents and transaction records
Intellectual property and proprietary technology
Executive communications and sensitive email archives
Employee records including payroll and benefits data
Confidential business plans and merger/acquisition documents
Authentication credentials and access tokens

Containment Actions by Urgency

CRITICAL (Immediate)

Isolate affected systems from the network - disconnect physically if necessary
Disable all VPN and remote access capabilities temporarily
Force password resets for all privileged accounts
Disconnect backup systems from the network
Implement network segmentation to limit lateral movement

HIGH (Within 4 hours)

Collect volatile memory from affected systems
Preserve forensic images of systems before rebooting
Change service account passwords across the environment
Revoke and reissue all VPN tokens
Implement temporary deny-all rules on perimeter firewalls except for essential services

MEDIUM (Within 24 hours)

Conduct thorough malware analysis on affected systems
Review all privileged account usage during the compromise window
Identify and remediate the initial access vector
Validate that no backdoors or persistence mechanisms remain
Begin restoration from verified, uncompromised backups

Hardening Recommendations

Immediate (24 Hours)

Patch Critical Vulnerabilities: Immediately apply patches for CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point), CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco Firewalls), and CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise ScreenConnect)
Disable Unnecessary VPN Protocols: Disable IKEv1 on Check Point gateways and restrict VPN access to necessary users only
Implement MFA Everywhere: Enforce multi-factor authentication for all remote access and administrative interfaces
Review Firewall Rules: Audit and restrict outbound connectivity from administrative workstations
Segment Administrative Access: Create a dedicated management VLAN for administrative activities
Enable PowerShell Logging: Activate script block logging and transcription for all systems

Short-term (2 Weeks)

Implement Zero Trust Architecture: Begin transition to a zero-trust network model with strict identity verification
Deploy EDR Across Environment: Ensure comprehensive endpoint detection and response coverage
Enhance Monitoring of VPN Infrastructure: Deploy specific detection rules for authentication anomalies
Create Access Playbooks: Develop and document emergency access procedures for critical systems
Conduct Red Team Exercises: Test detection capabilities against known THEGENTLEMEN TTPs
Review Third-Party Access: Audit and restrict vendor and supplier access to internal systems
Implement Just-In-Time Access: Replace standing administrative privileges with time-limited access grants

Related Resources

Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub

THEGENTLEMEN Ransomware Gang: Global Campaign Intensifies — Sector Targeting Analysis & Detection Rules