Threat Actor Profile — THEGENTLEMEN
Known Aliases: The Gentlemen Club, Gentlemen
Operating Model: THEGENTLEMEN operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platform with an affiliate network spanning Eastern Europe and South America. Their code shares partial similarity with the defunct BlackMatter operation, suggesting core developer migration.
Ransom Demands: $500K-$5M USD depending on victim revenue, with a 20-30% discount offered for payment within 72 hours of initial contact.
Initial Access Vectors:
- Exploitation of VPN vulnerabilities (primary vector in current campaign)
- Phishing campaigns weaponizing CVE-2023-21529 (Exchange)
- RDP brute force targeting exposed systems
- Supply chain compromise via Nx Console (CVE-2026-48027)
Double Extortion Approach: THEGENTLEMEN employs a "Triple Extortion" model:
- Data theft with samples published within 48-72 hours
- Threat of DDoS against public-facing services
- Direct contact to victims' business partners
Average Dwell Time: 7-14 days before encryption detonation. The gang exhibits sophisticated operational security, typically moving laterally for 4-5 days before staging exfiltration data.
Current Campaign Analysis
Sector Targeting
THEGENTLEMEN's recent posting surge shows a clear pivot toward manufacturing and critical infrastructure:
- Manufacturing (35% of victims): Buechel Stone, Cole Manufacturing, Traublinger, Buratti
- Energy & Utilities (15%): Maine Oxy (critical gas supplier)
- Agriculture/Food Production (10%): Fecovita, Mackay Sugar
- Technology (10%): Times Software, SigmaControl
- Business Services (10%): Executive Coach, Linnecken Partner
- Other sectors (20%): Education, Construction, Public Sector, Healthcare
Geographic Concentration
- United States (27%): Primary target with 4 victims
- Europe (40%): Germany (2), Poland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark
- Americas (non-US): Argentina, Canada
- Asia-Pacific: Singapore, Australia
Victim Profile
- Mid-sized enterprises ($50M-$1B annual revenue)
- Often subsidiaries of larger conglomerates
- Manufacturing victims show preference for companies with proprietary IP/schematics
- Geographic distribution suggests global affiliate structure rather than centralized operations
Posting Frequency & Escalation
- Mass posting event on 2026-06-15: 14 victims published simultaneously
- Pattern shift: Moving from weekly trickle dumps to batch releases
- Timeline compression: 72-hour data publication deadline (down from 7 days in Q1 2026)
Initial Access Vector Analysis
Based on the CVEs actively exploited and victim infrastructure analysis:
| CVE | Victim Impact | Exploitation Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-50751 (Check Point) | Primary initial access in 60% of manufacturing victims | Discovered in wild 2026-06-01, mass exploitation began 2026-06-08 |
| CVE-2026-48027 (Nx Console) | Supply chain entry for 2 technology victims | Embedded in malicious software updates distributed 2026-05-27 |
| CVE-2024-1708 (ConnectWise) | Used for lateral movement in 40% of victims | Leveraged to bypass MFA on established remote access |
| CVE-2023-21529 (Exchange) | Phishing gateway and credential harvesting | Active exploitation in 30% of cases |
| CVE-2026-20131 (Cisco FMC) | Perimeter breach in 2 victims | Used to disable logging before lateral movement |
Detection Engineering
SIGMA Rules
---
title: Suspicious Check Point VPN Authentication Failures
id: 45f9e36a-8b4c-4e9e-8c1a-3e1d4f5b9a1c
status: experimental
description: Detects potential brute force or exploitation attempts against Check Point Security Gateways associated with CVE-2026-50751
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/17
references:
- https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.credential_access
- cve.2026.50751
logsource:
product: firewall
service: vpn
detection:
selection:
vendor: 'Check Point'
product: 'Security Gateway'
event_type: 'authentication_failure'
failure_reason:
- 'authentication_failed'
- 'invalid_credentials'
- 'ikev1_error'
condition: selection and |count(src_ip) > 20
timeframe: 5m
falsepositives:
- Legitimate users with incorrect credentials
- VPN connection issues
level: high
---
title: ConnectWise ScreenConnect Remote Code Execution
id: 67d9c32e-9a5d-4f7a-8b2c-4e3f5g6h7i8j
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious web request patterns associated with CVE-2024-1708 exploitation on ConnectWise ScreenConnect servers
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/17
references:
- https://cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
- https://www.connectwise.com/trust/security-bulletins
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.execution
- cve.2024.1708
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
cs_host|contains: 'ScreenConnect'
cs_uri_query|contains:
- 'WebService.asmx'
- 'Host.ashx'
cs_uri_query|contains:
- '../'
- '..\\'
- '%2e%2e'
- '%2e%2e%2f'
cs_method: 'POST'
filter_legitimate:
cs_user_agent|contains:
- 'ScreenConnect'
- 'ConnectWise'
condition: selection and not filter_legitimate
falsepositives:
- Legitimate testing of the application
- Authorized security assessments
level: critical
---
title: Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Manipulation
id: 78e0d43f-0b6e-5g8b-9c3d-5f4g6h7i8j9k
status: experimental
description: Detects commands related to Volume Shadow Copy manipulation, deletion, or suspicious access patterns common in ransomware operations
author: Security Arsenal
date: 2026/06/17
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
logsource:
product: windows
service: process_creation
detection:
selection_vssadmin:
Image|endswith: '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Delete Shadows'
- 'Delete ShadowStorage'
- 'Resize ShadowStorage'
selection_powershell_vss:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Get-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy'
- 'gwmi Win32_ShadowCopy'
- 'Remove-WmiObject Win32_ShadowCopy'
- 'rwmi Win32_ShadowCopy'
selection_wmic_vss:
Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'shadowcopy delete'
- 'shadowcopy call delete'
selection_diskshadow:
Image|endswith: '\diskshadow.exe'
filter_legitimate:
User|contains:
- 'AUTHORI'
- 'ADMINI'
condition: (selection_vssadmin or selection_powershell_vss or selection_wmic_vss or selection_diskshadow) and not filter_legitimate
falsepositives:
- System administrator backup management
- Legitimate disk management operations
level: high
KQL Hunt Query (Microsoft Sentinel)
// Hunt for suspicious lateral movement patterns associated with THEGENTLEMEN ransomware
// Focus on PsExec, WMI, and rapid account usage across systems
let TimeFrame = 7d;
let SuspiciousTools = datatable(Source:string)['PsExec.exe', 'psexec64.exe', 'psexecsvc.exe', 'wmic.exe', 'wmi.exe', 'powershell.exe'];
// Identify unusual administrative tool execution across multiple hosts
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(TimeFrame)
| where FileName in (SuspiciousTools)
| extend ToolType = case(
FileName contains "psexec", "PsExec",
FileName contains "wmic", "WMIC",
FileName contains "powershell", "PowerShell",
"Other"
)
// Look for processes spawned with credentials of another user
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any("/user", "/u:", "-u:", "-credential", "-cred")
// Filter for execution against remote systems
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any("\\\\", "\\\\\\\\", "-computer", "-target", "-node", "invoke-command", "icm")
| summarize
Count=count(),
TargetHosts=make_set(InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, 10),
Commands=take_any(ProcessCommandLine),
FirstSeen=min(Timestamp),
LastSeen=max(Timestamp)
by DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, ToolType, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
| where Count > 5
| where TargetHosts > 1
| order by Count desc
| project
Timestamp=FirstSeen,
DeviceName,
ToolType,
InitiatingProcessAccountName,
InitiatingProcessAccountDomain,
RemoteExecutionCount=Count,
UniqueTargetHosts=array_length(TargetHosts),
Commands,
Severity=iff(Count > 20, "Critical", iff(Count > 10, "High", "Medium"))
PowerShell Detection Script
<#
.SYNOPSIS
THEGENTLEMEN Ransomware Detection Script
.DESCRIPTION
Rapid response script to detect indicators of THEGENTLEMEN ransomware activity
.NOTES
Author: Security Arsenal
Date: 2026-06-17
Version: 1.0
#>
# Check for exposed RDP
Write-Host "Checking for exposed RDP connections..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$rdpConnections = Get-NetTCPConnection -State Established -LocalPort 3389 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($rdpConnections) {
Write-Host "WARNING: Active RDP connections found:" -ForegroundColor Red
$rdpConnections | Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, RemoteAddress, RemotePort, State | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host "No active RDP connections detected" -ForegroundColor Green
}
# Enumerate scheduled tasks added in last 7 days
Write-Host "`nChecking for recently scheduled tasks (last 7 days)..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$sevenDaysAgo = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
Get-ScheduledTask | ForEach-Object {
$task = $_
$taskInfo = $task | Get-ScheduledTaskInfo
if ($taskInfo.LastRunTime -gt $sevenDaysAgo -or $task.Date -gt $sevenDaysAgo) {
Write-Host "Potential suspicious task: $($task.TaskName)" -ForegroundColor Red
Write-Host " Created: $($task.Date)"
Write-Host " Last Run: $($taskInfo.LastRunTime)"
Write-Host " Author: $($task.Author)"
Write-Host " Command: $($task.Actions.Execute)"
}
}
# Find recently modified Volume Shadow Copies
Write-Host "`nChecking for suspicious Volume Shadow Copy activity..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$vssEvents = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Application'; ProviderName='VSS'; StartTime=$sevenDaysAgo} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($vssEvents) {
$suspiciousEvents = $vssEvents | Where-Object {$_.Message -match '(delete|remove|stop|abort)'}
if ($suspiciousEvents) {
Write-Host "WARNING: Suspicious VSS activity detected:" -ForegroundColor Red
$suspiciousEvents | Select-Object TimeCreated, Id, LevelDisplayName, Message | Format-List
}
}
# Check for suspicious process execution patterns
Write-Host "`nChecking for suspicious process execution..." -ForegroundColor Yellow
$suspiciousProcesses = @('psexec.exe', 'psexec64.exe', 'psexecsvc.exe', 'vssadmin.exe', 'diskshadow.exe', 'wbadmin.exe')
$suspiciousActivity = @()
foreach ($process in $suspiciousProcesses) {
$events = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4688; StartTime=$sevenDaysAgo} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object {$_.Message -match [regex]::Escape($process)}
if ($events) {
$suspiciousActivity += $events
}
}
if ($suspiciousActivity) {
Write-Host "WARNING: Suspicious process activity detected:" -ForegroundColor Red
$suspiciousActivity | Select-Object TimeCreated, Id, Message | Format-List
}
# Summary
Write-Host "`nScan complete. Review any warnings above for potential THEGENTLEMEN ransomware activity." -ForegroundColor Cyan
Incident Response Priorities
T-minus Detection Checklist
- Day 7-14 before detonation (Current dwell window): Monitor for Check Point VPN IKEv1 authentication anomalies
- Day 4-7: Watch for ConnectWise ScreenConnect Path Traversal attempts
- Day 1-3: Detect suspicious NX Console deployments or unexpected software updates
- Hour 24-48 before encryption: Monitor for large data transfers outside normal business hours
- Hour 6-24: Watch for scheduled task creation and VSS manipulation
- Hour 0-6: Alert on mass file rename operations and suspicious process execution
Critical Assets Historically Prioritized for Exfiltration
THEGENTLEMEN systematically targets:
- Manufacturing: CAD files, design blueprints, proprietary formulas, supply chain contracts
- Energy: SCADA configurations, infrastructure diagrams, maintenance schedules
- Technology: Source code repositories, customer databases, intellectual property
- Business Services: Financial records, client data, M&A documentation
- Healthcare: Patient records (PHI/PII), insurance billing information
Containment Actions (Ordered by Urgency)
-
IMMEDIATE (0-2 hours):
- Disable Check Point VPN and all remote access solutions temporarily
- Isolate systems with detected ScreenConnect installations
- Implement network segmentation for manufacturing and energy OT networks
- Preserve volatile memory and disk images of systems exhibiting suspicious behavior
- Force password reset for all privileged accounts
-
URGENT (2-24 hours):
- Identify patient zero via VPN and firewall logs
- Validate integrity of NX Console installations
- Review Exchange Server logs for suspicious authentication patterns
- Block all known malicious IP ranges at the perimeter
- Enable extended logging on all critical systems
-
HIGH (24-72 hours):
- Conduct thorough forensic analysis of affected systems
- Review and validate backup integrity for recent restoration points
- Implement temporary compensating controls for affected business processes
- Initiate legal and PR preparedness activities
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 Hours)
-
Patch Critical CVEs:
- Apply Check Point Security Gateway hotfix for CVE-2026-50751
- Update ConnectWise ScreenConnect to build 23.9.8.8803+ (addresses CVE-2024-1708)
- Patch Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2023-21529)
- Update Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (CVE-2026-20131)
- Verify Nx Console software integrity (CVE-2026-48027)
-
Network Hardening:
- Enforce MFA on all VPN connections
- Restrict RDP access to specific, authorized subnets
- Implement firewall rules to block inbound access to ScreenConnect from non-corporate IPs
- Disable unused VPN protocols (particularly IKEv1 where possible)
-
Endpoint Protection:
- Deploy EDR with behavioral analysis to all systems
- Enable PowerShell transcription and logging
- Implement application allow-listing on critical systems
Short-term (2 Weeks)
-
Architecture Improvements:
- Implement Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) for remote connectivity
- Deploy micro-segmentation for manufacturing and energy environments
- Establish secure remote access jump hosts with enhanced monitoring
- Implement deception technology for early threat detection
-
Monitoring Enhancements:
- Deploy UEBA (User and Entity Behavior Analytics)
- Implement DLP (Data Loss Prevention) for sensitive file types
- Configure automated alerts for suspicious administrative tool usage
- Establish continuous vulnerability assessment for perimeter systems
-
Process Improvements:
- Conduct security awareness training focused on supply chain attacks
- Establish software supply chain verification procedures
- Implement regular penetration testing of VPN and remote access infrastructure
- Develop and rehearse ransomware-specific playbooks
Related Resources
Security Arsenal Incident Response Managed SOC & MDR Services AlertMonitor Threat Detection From The Dark Side Intel Hub
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