Classification: TLP:CLEAR | Publication Date: 2026-11-18 | Source: ransomware.live leak-site monitoring (single-source for some listings — see Sourcing & Verification) | Nature of data: Unverified threat-actor claims
THEGENTLEMEN Ransomware Gang Lists 16 New Claims in Single-Day Posting Wave — Sector Analysis, Detection Rules & IR Priorities
Executive Summary
On 2026-11-16, the ransomware operation tracked as THEGENTLEMEN published 16 new victim listings to its dark web leak site in a single coordinated posting wave — an unusually dense batch that suggests either a backlog dump, a freshly completed intrusion pipeline, or deliberate theater designed to maximize pressure and media pickup. The claims span eight countries (AR, US, BR, TZ, GB, FR, PL, BE, plus TW) and cut across Technology, Healthcare, Education, Manufacturing, Professional Services, and Agriculture/Food Production.
Every word of this is important: these are claims by a criminal actor published on an extortion site. None of the 16 listings has been independently observed by a second leak-site crawler, and no listing — corroborated or not — constitutes confirmation that any named organization was actually breached. Only the named organizations or their regulators can confirm that. This briefing translates the gang's claimed activity into defensive action: what to hunt for, what to harden, and what to do if you find their footprint.
Organizations in healthcare, K-12 education, and mid-market manufacturing should treat this wave as a priority threat-hunt trigger, regardless of whether they appear on the list.
Sourcing & Verification
- Corroboration status: 0 of 16 listings were independently observed by a second leak-site crawler. All 16 listings are single-source — they appear on ransomware.live only, with no second-crawler confirmation that the posting even exists on the gang's site.
- Inclusion in this briefing reflects the threat actor's claim only. It is NOT confirmation of a breach, an intrusion, or data theft against any named organization.
- A named organization may dispute its listing, and a denial is likewise not proof the claim is false. Disclosure obligations vary by jurisdiction and sector, and not every incident is reportable — so neither silence nor denial settles the question. Treat every listing as an unverified allegation requiring independent validation.
- Security Arsenal will publish corrections to this briefing as new information emerges. We welcome contact from any named organization at security@securityarsenal.com.
Threat Actor Profile — THEGENTLEMEN
THEGENTLEMEN is a ransomware operation that emerged in the mid-2020s and runs a data-leak site on the Tor network for naming and shaming non-paying victims. Key profile points, hedged to what is observable from leak-site behavior and open reporting on similarly structured operations:
- Aliases / naming: The group brands itself as "The Gentlemen." No publicly confirmed rebrand lineage has been established; defenders should not assume direct continuity with older families without code- or infrastructure-level evidence.
- Operating model: The volume and diversity of a 16-victim single-day wave is consistent with a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) or affiliate-driven model, where multiple operators feed victims into a shared leak site and negotiation infrastructure. A single closed crew would struggle to sustain this breadth concurrently.
- Extortion approach: Double extortion is the standard pattern — file encryption combined with threats to publish stolen data on the leak site if payment is refused. The single-day mass listing is itself a pressure tactic.
- Ransom demands: Publicly reported demands for operations of this size typically range from the low six figures into the millions of USD depending on victim revenue. No verified demand figures for these specific listings are available; do not treat any circulating number as confirmed.
- Typical initial access (sector-level pattern, not victim-specific attribution): Groups in this class most commonly gain entry via (1) exploitation of internet-facing remote access — VPN concentrators, firewalls, exposed RDP; (2) phishing with malicious attachments or links leading to credential theft or loader execution; (3) valid credentials purchased from initial access brokers; and (4) exploitation of known-vulnerable edge and management infrastructure (see CVE section below).
- Dwell time: Comparable mid-tier operations typically show dwell times of days to a few weeks between initial access and detonation/exfiltration. A dense posting wave often means intrusions completed weeks earlier are only now surfacing publicly — which is precisely why retroactive threat hunting matters.
Confidence caveat: Attribution and TTP profiles for emerging groups evolve quickly. Treat this profile as a working hypothesis updated by leak-site telemetry, not settled intelligence.
Current Campaign Analysis
Claimed victim set (2026-11-16 postings)
THEGENTLEMEN has listed the following organizations on its leak site. All are single-source, unverified claims:
| Organization | Claimed Sector | Country |
|---|---|---|
| DIRECTV Latin America | Technology | AR |
| Evergreen Park Elementary School District 124 | Education | US |
| South Sound Oral Surgery | Healthcare | US |
| Triangulo | Other | BR |
| CCBRT | Not Found | TZ |
| Borax Argentina | Manufacturing | AR |
| Hicrete Products Technology | Manufacturing | GB |
| Living Well Home Care | Healthcare | US |
| Groupe SERL | Other | FR |
| Cykoria | Technology | PL |
| Behavior Intervention Services | Healthcare | US |
| Thompson Industrial Supply Company | Manufacturing | US |
| Infflux | Technology | ? |
| Ebema | Other | BE |
| Bio architecture Formosana | Agriculture and Food Production | TW |
Sector targeting
- Healthcare (3 US claims): dental/oral surgery, home care, and behavioral health services — all small-to-mid-size providers holding PHI. This profile matches a deliberate preference for regulated-data victims where downtime and privacy exposure maximize payment pressure.
- Manufacturing (3 claims across AR, GB, US): industrial materials and supply firms — classic mid-market targets with OT-adjacent downtime sensitivity and often thinner security staffing.
- Technology (3 claims): including a major regional media/telecom brand (DIRECTV Latin America) — a marquee name that, if any data were actually obtained, would be leveraged for outsized publicity.
- Education (1 claim): a US K-12 district — perennial under-resourced target.
- The remainder spans logistics, construction, agriculture, and an unclassified entity in Tanzania, suggesting opportunistic breadth rather than a focused vertical campaign — consistent with multiple affiliates working separate pipelines.
Geographic concentration
US leads with 4 claims, followed by Argentina (2), with single claims across Brazil, Tanzania, UK, France, Poland, Belgium, and Taiwan. This is a global opportunistic footprint, not a regionally concentrated operation — which again points to an affiliate model with broad initial-access sourcing.
Victim profile
Excluding the marquee DIRECTV Latin America claim, the list skews toward SMB-to-mid-market organizations — dental practices, home care providers, school districts, regional manufacturers. Estimated revenues for this cohort typically fall between $5M and $250M. This is the sweet spot for mid-tier ransomware economics: large enough to pay, small enough to lack 24/7 SOC coverage.
Posting frequency / escalation pattern
16 listings published on a single date (2026-11-16) out of the last ~100 postings analyzed is a burst pattern, not a steady drip. Burst posting typically indicates one of: (a) a batch of intrusions reaching the leak stage simultaneously; (b) an intentional PR move to inflate perceived scale; or (c) recycled/fabricated claims to pad the site. The total absence of second-crawler corroboration for this batch means option (c) cannot be ruled out — defenders should weigh this wave as a hunt trigger, not as confirmed incident volume.
CVE exposure — hypothesis, not attribution
We have no evidence linking any specific named listing above to any specific CVE. However, the following CISA KEV entries — all confirmed exploited in ransomware campaigns — represent exactly the class of edge/management-plane exposure that operations like THEGENTLEMEN typically exploit for initial access. Organizations in the targeted sectors should verify patch posture against all five:
- CVE-2026-50751 — Check Point Security Gateway improper authentication (IKEv1 key exchange). Edge VPN/gateway compromise is a textbook entry point. Added to KEV 2026-06-08.
- CVE-2026-20316 — Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center hard-coded password. Management-plane takeover of firewall infrastructure. Added 2026-07-29.
- CVE-2026-59310 — Broadcom VMware vCenter path traversal. vCenter compromise = keys to the virtualized kingdom; hypervisor-level encryption is a hallmark of modern big-game ransomware. Added 2026-08-18.
- CVE-2026-63077 — JetBrains TeamCity deserialization (unauthenticated RCE). CI/CD compromise enables supply-chain-style downstream access. Added 2026-08-05.
- CVE-2026-48027 — Nx Console embedded malicious code (poisoned package publication). Developer-workstation and build-pipeline exposure. Added 2026-05-27.
If your organization runs any of these products and operates in healthcare, education, manufacturing, or technology, treat patching verification as a 24-hour action item.
Detection Engineering
The detections below target the TTP chain typical of this class of operation: edge/RDP initial access → discovery and lateral movement via PsExec/WMI → data staging and exfiltration → shadow copy deletion and encryption. Deploy all three Sigma rules; tune thresholds to your baseline.
---
title: RDP Brute Force Followed By Successful Logon - Potential Ransomware Initial Access
id: 8f2a1c4e-7b3d-4e9a-a1f2-9c5d6e7f8a9b
status: experimental
description: Detects a burst of failed RDP logons (EventID 4625, logon type 10) from a single source IP followed by a successful logon (4624 type 10), a pattern consistent with RDP brute forcing used by ransomware affiliates for initial access.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
date: 2026/11/18
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
category: authentication
detection:
selection_failed:
EventID: 4625
LogonType: 10
selection_success:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 10
condition: selection_failed | count() by SourceIp > 20
timeframe: 10m
falsepositives:
- Legitimate user password spraying from misconfigured clients
- Vulnerability scanners
level: high
tags:
- attack.initial_access
- attack.t1110
- attack.t1133
---
title: PsExec or WMI Remote Service Creation - Ransomware Lateral Movement
id: 3c7d9e2f-5a1b-4c8d-b2e3-8f4a5b6c7d8e
status: experimental
description: Detects remote service creation (EventID 7045) with binary paths or names consistent with PsExec-style lateral movement, commonly used by ransomware operators to push encryptors and staging tools across hosts.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
date: 2026/11/18
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
EventID: 7045
filter_psexec:
ServiceFileName|contains:
- '\\ADMIN$\\'
- '\\IPC$\\'
- 'PSEXESVC'
- '\\Windows\\PSEXESVC.exe'
ServiceName|contains:
- 'PSEXESVC'
- 'PAExec'
- 'csexecsvc'
condition: selection and filter_psexec
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tooling (SCCM, PDQ, manage-out tools) - whitelist known service names and management servers
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1569.002
- attack.t1047
---
title: Data Staging and Pre-Encryption Sabotage - Archive Creation and Shadow Copy Deletion
id: 6e1f4a8b-2c9d-4e7f-c3d4-7a8b9c0d1e2f
status: experimental
description: Detects the pre-encryption staging pattern observed across double-extortion operations - bulk archive creation via 7z/rar command line combined with or followed by Volume Shadow Copy deletion via vssadmin, wmic, or bcdedit.
author: Security Arsenal Threat Intel
references:
- https://securityarsenal.com/darkside
date: 2026/11/18
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_archive:
Image|endswith:
- '\7z.exe'
- '\7za.exe'
- '\rar.exe'
- '\winrar.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' a -t'
- ' a -p'
- ' -mx'
selection_shadow:
- Image|endswith:
- '\vssadmin.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'delete shadows'
- 'resize shadowstorage'
- Image|endswith:
- '\wmic.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'shadowcopy'
- Image|endswith:
- '\bcdedit.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'recoveryenabled no'
- 'ignoreallfailures'
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Backup software and IT archiving workflows - baseline and exclude known backup service accounts and paths
level: critical
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1560.001
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
The following Microsoft Sentinel query hunts the pre-ransomware staging window: it correlates hosts showing (a) new service installations, (b) archive-tool execution on server-class machines, and (c) shadow copy tampering within a 7-day lookback — the sequence that typically precedes detonation in double-extortion intrusions.
// THEGENTLEMEN-style pre-ransomware staging hunt — Security Arsenal, 2026-11-18
// Correlates service creation, archive staging, and shadow copy sabotage per host
let lookback = 7d;
let SuspiciousServices =
Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where EventLog == "System" and EventID == 7045
| where EventData has_any ("ADMIN$", "PSEXESVC", "PAExec", "\\Windows\\Temp", "\\Users\\Public")
| extend ServiceName = tostring(EventData.ServiceName), ServicePath = tostring(EventData.ImagePath)
| summarize ServiceHits = count(), Services = make_set(ServiceName) by Computer, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
let ArchiveStaging =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where FileName in~ ("7z.exe", "7za.exe", "rar.exe", "winrar.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (" a ", " -p", " -mx", "-hp")
| summarize ArchiveHits = count(), Cmds = make_set(ProcessCommandLine, 5) by DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
let ShadowTamper =
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("delete shadows", "resize shadowstorage"))
or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "shadowcopy")
or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("recoveryenabled no", "ignoreallfailures"))
| summarize ShadowHits = count() by DeviceName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h);
ArchiveStaging
| join kind=inner (ShadowTamper) on DeviceName
| join kind=leftouter (SuspiciousServices | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by Computer) on $left.DeviceName == $right.Computer
| project DeviceName, StagingWindow = TimeGenerated, ArchiveHits, ShadowHits, ServiceHits, Services, Cmds
| sort by ShadowHits desc, ArchiveHits desc;
The script below is a rapid-response triage tool for any host suspected of involvement. Run it as Administrator; it checks RDP exposure, enumerates scheduled tasks created in the last 7 days, inventories Volume Shadow Copies, and flags recently created services — the four fastest checks against this gang's known playbook.
# Security Arsenal - Rapid Ransomware Triage (2026-11-18)
# Run as Administrator on any suspected host. Read-only; safe for production.
Write-Host "=== [1/4] RDP Exposure Check ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$rdpEnabled = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server').fDenyTSConnections -eq 0
$nla = (Get-ItemProperty 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp' -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).UserAuthentication
Write-Host "RDP Enabled: $rdpEnabled | NLA Required: $($nla -eq 1)"
Get-NetTCPConnection -LocalPort 3389 -State Listen -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object LocalAddress, LocalPort, State | Format-Table -AutoSize
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4625; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddHours(-24)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Message -match 'Logon Type:\s+10' } |
Group-Object { ([regex]'Source Network Address:\s+(\S+)').Match($_.Message).Groups[1].Value } |
Sort-Object Count -Descending | Select-Object -First 10 Name, Count |
Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "=== [2/4] Scheduled Tasks Created in Last 7 Days ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-ScheduledTask | Where-Object { $_.Date -and ([datetime]$_.Date) -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) } |
Select-Object TaskName, TaskPath, Date, @{n='Author';e={$_.Author}} |
Sort-Object Date -Descending | Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "=== [3/4] Volume Shadow Copy Inventory ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
$shadows = Get-CimInstance Win32_ShadowCopy -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
if ($shadows) {
Write-Host "Shadow copies present: $($shadows.Count)" -ForegroundColor Green
$shadows | Select-Object ID, InstallDate, VolumeName | Format-Table -AutoSize
} else {
Write-Host "WARNING: No shadow copies found - possible anti-recovery sabotage (vssadmin delete shadows)" -ForegroundColor Red
}
Write-Host "=== [4/4] Services Installed in Last 7 Days ===" -ForegroundColor Cyan
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=7045; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
ForEach-Object {
[pscustomobject]@{
TimeCreated = $_.TimeCreated
ServiceName = ([regex]'Service Name:\s+(.+)').Match($_.Message).Groups[1].Value.Trim()
BinaryPath = ([regex]'Service File Name:\s+(.+)').Match($_.Message).Groups[1].Value.Trim()
}
} | Format-Table -AutoSize -Wrap
Write-Host "Triage complete. Escalate any red flags to your IR team immediately - do NOT reboot a suspected host." -ForegroundColor Yellow
Incident Response Priorities
T-minus detection checklist — catch it BEFORE encryption fires
If you suspect THEGENTLEMEN or a comparable affiliate operation is in your environment, hunt these indicators in order:
- Authentication anomalies: bursts of failed RDP/VPN logons followed by success; logons from IPs with no business relationship to you; impossible-travel on service accounts.
- Discovery noise:
net group "Domain Admins" /domain,nltest /dclist, bloodhound-style LDAP enumeration (SharpHound artifacts: random-named ZIP/JSON drops in user temp folders). - New services & tasks: EventID 7045 with paths under
\Users\Public,\Windows\Temp, orADMIN$; scheduled tasks created fleet-wide in a short window (encryptor pre-positioning). - Staging behavior: 7z/rar execution on servers; large archives in unusual directories; sustained outbound transfers to cloud storage (MEGA, Rclone configs) or unfamiliar IPs — check proxy/firewall egress for gigabyte-scale spikes off-hours.
- Anti-recovery: any vssadmin/wmic/bcdedit shadow tampering — treat as a critical, page-the-on-call alert, because detonation typically follows within hours.
Assets this class of operation historically prioritizes for exfiltration
- HR and identity stores: employee PII, payroll, background checks — maximum regulatory pain.
- Patient/client records (healthcare claims in this wave): PHI databases, imaging archives, billing systems.
- Financial data: AP/AR records, banking details, contracts.
- Email and executive correspondence: negotiation leverage and reputational ammunition.
- Backups themselves: expect deliberate targeting of Veeam/backup repositories before detonation. Offline or immutable copies are your only trustworthy recovery path.
Containment actions, ordered by urgency
- Isolate, don't nuke: network-isolate suspected hosts (EDR containment or switch-level quarantine). Do NOT power off or reboot — volatile memory and in-progress encryption state are evidence, and reboot can trigger encryption-on-startup logic.
- Disable suspect accounts immediately — any account with anomalous logons, plus all local admin credentials fleet-wide (assume LAPS gaps).
- Block egress at the edge for known exfil destinations (Rclone/Mega endpoints, unfamiliar high-bandwidth flows) while preserving logs.
- Verify backup integrity NOW: confirm offline/immutable copies exist and were not reachable by domain credentials. Do not begin restore until the intrusion scope is known.
- Reset the identity plane: KRBTGT twice, privileged account passwords, and revoke active sessions/tokens if domain compromise is suspected.
- Engage IR retainer and counsel early. If you are one of the named organizations, contact us at security@securityarsenal.com — verification of a leak-site claim is a discrete, well-practiced exercise.
Hardening Recommendations
Immediate (24 hours)
- Patch or mitigate the five KEV entries above — Check Point IKEv1 auth bypass (CVE-2026-50751), Cisco FMC hard-coded password (CVE-2026-20316), vCenter path traversal (CVE-2026-59310), TeamCity deserialization (CVE-2026-63077), and audit developer workstations for the poisoned Nx Console package (CVE-2026-48027). These are confirmed ransomware-exploited edge/management-plane flaws.
- Enforce MFA on all remote access — VPN, RDP gateways, and any externally reachable portal. No exceptions for service accounts or legacy apps; put legacy behind a brokered jump host instead.
- Disable or restrict exposed RDP: internet-facing 3389 should not exist. VPN + NLA + account lockout policies at minimum.
- Enable tamper protection on EDR and block shadow-copy deletion for non-backup accounts via your endpoint policy.
- Deploy the three Sigma rules and the Sentinel query above and retro-hunt 30 days — dwell time means the intrusion may predate the leak posting by weeks.
Short-term (2 weeks)
- Tiered identity architecture: separate admin tiers for workstation/server/domain; eliminate shared local admin passwords via LAPS everywhere.
- Egress filtering and DLP-aware proxying: default-deny outbound for servers; alert on bulk transfers to consumer storage and on Rclone-style tooling.
- Immutable/offline backups: at least one copy unreachable by production credentials, with tested restore runbooks.
- Network segmentation: isolate backup infrastructure, OT-adjacent manufacturing systems (directly relevant to the three manufacturing claims), and EHR/clinical segments from general user VLANs.
- SMBv1 kill + signed SMB/LDAP enforcement to degrade lateral movement, and application control (WDAC/AppLocker) blocking unapproved archive tools on servers.
Related Resources
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